Reply Obj. 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no
virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive
part of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act
of the appetitive faculty (Q. 13, A. 1). Wherefore a habit of
choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is
that habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although the
acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice.
Reply Obj. 3: "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text.
3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the
appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by
consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the
appetitive faculty.
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