Whether Prudence Is a Distinct Virtue from Art?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue
from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But
diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since
there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore
prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too
should be reckoned a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, prudence has more in common with art than the
speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters
that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4, 5). Now some
speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should
prudence be called an art.
Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel"
(Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, as
stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of
seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from
art.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art
(Ethic. vi, 5).
_I answer that,_ Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a
different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above (A. 1; Q. 56,
A. 3) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely
conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits are virtues,
not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through
conferring the use. But art confers the mere aptness for good work;
since it does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not
only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the
appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof.
The reason for this difference is that art is the "right reason of
things to be made"; whereas prudence is the "right reason of things
to be done." Now "making" and "doing" differ, as stated in _Metaph._
ix, text. 16, in that "making" is an action passing into outward
matter, e.g. "to build," "to saw," and so forth; whereas "doing" is
an action abiding in the agent, e.g. "to see," "to will," and the
like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like
human actions, consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art
does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the
things with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of
reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which
reason argues; just as we have said above (A. 2, ad 2) that science
depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the habit of
principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in
speculative matters, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 8. Consequently, it
is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be
done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this
depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence
there is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite. On the
other hand the good of things made by art is not the good of man's
appetite, but the good of those things themselves: wherefore art does
not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that
more praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than
to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to
sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is
essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is evident that
prudence is a virtue distinct from art.
Reply Obj. 1: The various kinds of things made by art are all
external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue.
But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is
a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative
habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are both
in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be
otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art
has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what
has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding
man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there
is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts.
Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of
warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots,
but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good
counsel about all the concerns of life.
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