Whether the Intellectual Habit, Art, Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue.
For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19) that "no one makes bad
use of virtue." But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can
work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is
not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But "there is a
virtue of art," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5).
Therefore art is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just
as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are
speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would
have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3, 4) says that art is
a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative
virtues, which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of
the soul.
_I answer that,_ Art is nothing else but "the right reason about
certain works to be made." And yet the good of these things depends,
not on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way,
but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as such, is
commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the
quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an
operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the
speculative habits: since the quality of the object considered by the
latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human
appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the
geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his
appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry:
even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed.
And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the
speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither art nor speculative
habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the
property of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards
the aptness to work well.
Reply Obj. 1: When anyone endowed with an art produces bad
workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary
to the art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his
words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto.
Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated
above (A. 2, ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this reason that
it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect
virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for
which purpose something further is requisite: although there cannot
be a good use without the art.
Reply Obj. 2: In order that man may make good use of the art he has,
he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for
this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art;
namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a
moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by
justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.
Reply Obj. 3: Even in speculative matters there is something by way
of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or
the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained
to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of
comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to
distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by
the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body
is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul,
is free (_liber_). On the other hand, those sciences which are not
ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not
arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that
the notion of art is more applicable to them.
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