Whether Prudence Is a Virtue Necessary to Man?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to
lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it
is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in
respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence is the right
reason about these things, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 5. Now art is
not necessary in things that are made, save in order that they be
made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is
prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has
become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become
virtuous.
Obj. 2: Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as
stated in _Ethic._ vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, but
also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need
prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough that he
follow the counsels of prudent men.
Obj. 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always
tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem to be
the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking
counsel about what is to be done; since human actions are about
things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wis.
9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels
uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned
an intellectual virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for
human life, when it is written (Wis. 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: "She
teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which
are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life."
_I answer that,_ Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life.
For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good
deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it;
to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse
or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the
end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due end,
and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably
directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the
appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to
that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be
rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and
choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the
reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason,
to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things
ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently
prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.
Reply Obj. 1: The good of an art is to be found, not in the
craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason
about things to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into
external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the
thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art
is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good
of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its
perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as
stated above (A. 4). Consequently art does not require of the
craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good.
Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g.
that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it
were proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on,
because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the
craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may
produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas
prudence is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not
merely that he may be a good man.
Reply Obj. 2: When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel,
but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as
regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him.
Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet
this is required in order that he may lead a good life.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2, truth is not the same for
the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of
the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect
and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in
conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary
matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an
intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things. On
the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on
conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in
necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only
in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be
matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence
it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is
assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to
be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.
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