Whether There Are Only Three Habits of the Speculative Intellect, Viz.
Wisdom, Science and Understanding?
Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of
the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.
Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7.
Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the
intellectual virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in
respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of
these objects, as we have already explained (I, Q. 77, A. 3).
Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material
objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now the
principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the
conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of principles should
not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of
conclusions.
Obj. 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the
essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason employs
the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs
the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the
result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual
virtue, so also should opinion be.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three
alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and
understanding.
_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 1), the virtues of the
speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative
intellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work.
Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration--as known in
itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as
a _principle,_ and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore
the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such
truth is called _understanding,_ which is the habit of principles.
On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is
understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the
reason's inquiry, and is as a _term._ This may happen in two ways:
first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so
that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since
"things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable
first and chiefly in their nature" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that
which is last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is
knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is
_wisdom,_ which considers the highest causes, as stated in _Metaph._
i, 1, 2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in
order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is
not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which is last in
this or that genus of knowable matter, it is _science_ which perfects
the intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable
matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas
there is but one wisdom.
Reply Obj. 1: Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that
which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions
from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above
the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to
their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore
it is a more perfect virtue than science.
Reply Obj. 2: When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a
power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or
power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object:
thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, and
light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is
seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles
of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion
being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with
the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them.
Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs
to science, which considers the conclusions also: while to consider
the principles in themselves belongs to understanding.
Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues
are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a
certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes,
wherein one part is more perfect than another; for instance, the
rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the
sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that science depends on
understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these
depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing
beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the
conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4), a virtuous habit has
a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the
good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore
those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell
the truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can
be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in _Ethic._ vi,
3, they are not intellectual virtues.
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