FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 48, Art. 1]

Whether Anger Causes Pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure.

Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow,

since, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger,

acts with pain." Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "vengeance

makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain":

whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from

vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the

advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an

effect united with pleasure.

Obj. 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed

to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in _Rhet._ ii, 3.

Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying

that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad,

xviii, 109, trl. Pope).

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures,

chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow:

and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible

are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of

thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from

what has been said (Q. 47, AA. 1, 3), that the movement of anger

arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow

vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is

present, pleasure ensues, and so much the greater according as the

sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect

pleasure ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement of

anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes

present to the angry man in two ways: in one way, by hope; because

none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above (Q. 46,

A. 1); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone

that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what

he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant.

Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about

vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish

sorrow and consequently anger.

Reply Obj. 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same

thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the

thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its

beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the

real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.

Reply Obj. 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and

consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking

vengeance follows from anger.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 322 / 746 题