Whether Sorrow Is Caused by the Loss of Good or by the Presence of
Evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a
good rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De
viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal
goods. Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss
of some good.
Obj. 2: Further, it was said above (Q. 35, A. 4) that the sorrow
which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that
pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above (Q. 23,
A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 3). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly
by the loss of good.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), love
is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. But the
object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss
of good rather than for an evil that is present.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the
dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of
sorrow."
_I answer that,_ If privations, as considered by the mind, were what
they are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance.
For, as stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 10; Q. 48, A. 3), evil is
the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than
the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow
for the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence
of evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of
an apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect
of a being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason." And in this
way evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary."
Accordingly, so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it
makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present
evil or the good which is lost.
Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place
in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in natural things;
the truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural
movements. For if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach
and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable
to nature; while withdrawal is of itself directed to something
contrary to nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a
higher place, and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we
consider the cause of both these movements, viz. gravity, then
gravity itself inclines towards the lower place more than it
withdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is
the reason for its downward tendency.
Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a
kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or
approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its
proper object, so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the
other hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards
good rather than evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the
cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of
sorrow or pain, than the good which is lost.
Reply Obj. 1: The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just
as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense
Augustine says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods.
Reply Obj. 2: Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object,
but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular
thing be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is
the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation of the
other, as stated in _Metaph._ x, 4: and consequently sorrow in
respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same thing
under a contrary aspect.
Reply Obj. 3: When many movements arise from one cause, it does not
follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards
chiefly, but only the first of them. And each of the others regards
chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature.
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