Whether Desire Is a Cause of Sorrow?
Objection 1: It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or
sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above (A.
1): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now
movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement towards the
other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Obj. 2: Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12),
is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire is
something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of
pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says
(Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance
of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found
their way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But
ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of
sorrow.
_I answer that,_ Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now,
as stated above (A. 1), the appetitive movement is likened to the
natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold
cause; one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the
principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a
heavy body's downward movement is the lower place; while the
principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting from
gravity.
Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is
the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above (A. 1)
that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other
hand, the cause, by way of principle, of that movement, is the inward
inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all,
the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil. Hence
the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is the
first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good:
while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination
of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since
concupiscence or desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise
to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 6); hence it is
that Augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense
of love, as was also stated (Q. 30, A. 2, ad 2): and in this sense he
says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes,
however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow.
Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary
to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the movement of the
appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause
of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or
for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow:
since we sorrow more for the loss of present good, in which we have
already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which
we desire to have.
Reply Obj. 1: The inclination of the appetite to the possession of
good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as
stated above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that
regard good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that
regard evil.
Reply Obj. 2: That which is desired, though really future, is,
nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we
may say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the
hindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.
Reply Obj. 3: Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of
obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through
the presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow.
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