Whether Movement Is a Cause of Pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Because, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1), the good which is obtained
and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with
generation, but with the operation of a thing already in existence.
Now that which is being moved towards something has it not as yet;
but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, forasmuch as
generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in
_Phys._ viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Obj. 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in
our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are
not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of
pleasure.
Obj. 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the
opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, are
pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement
is not a cause of pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means
this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and
some things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this,
that this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and
reconciled?" From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes
pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore movement seems to
cause pleasure.
_I answer that,_ Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e.
the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him;
and a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect
of these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are
concerned, change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable:
for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not
suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to
man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing
good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued
action of an agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person
remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the
natural mode of being consists in a certain measure; and therefore
when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure
of one's natural mode of being, the removal of that object becomes
pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes
pleasant), because man desires to know something whole and perfect:
when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole,
change in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and
another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine
says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay,
but fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the whole. And so
whenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not exist
together, all would please collectively more than they do severally,
if all could be perceived collectively."
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the
natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of
any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its
delight at once--to such a one change will afford no delight. And the
more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of
being continual.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly
that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have
something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something
of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure;
because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are
unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so
far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes
suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our
natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by
removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude.
Reply Obj. 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it
becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the
movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom,
but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of
being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the
same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become
pleasant.
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