Whether Operation Is the Proper Cause of Pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first
cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11),
"pleasure consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is
requisite for pleasure, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1). But the
objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves.
Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.
Obj. 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained: since
it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always an
operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore
operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure.
Obj. 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and
they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation is
not the proper cause of pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12, 13; x, 4)
that "pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 31, A. 1), two things are
requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good,
and knowledge of this attainment. Now each of these consists in a
kind of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the
attainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation.
Moreover, the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore
every pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.
Reply Obj. 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable save
inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when
we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in
some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes pleasure
in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the like;
which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as
possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take
great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the
natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such like things is
nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is
through some operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure
is traced to some operation as its cause.
Reply Obj. 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an
operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as
possessed or effected: and this implies use or operation.
Reply Obj. 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are
proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is
finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain
measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer
proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome.
And in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to
repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results
from labor.
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