Whether the Pleasures of Touch Are Greater Than the Pleasures
Afforded by the Other Senses?
Objection 1: It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not
greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the
greatest pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an
end. But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the
words of Tob. 5:12: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in
darkness, and see not the light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure
afforded by the sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures.
Obj. 2: Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the
Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight is
loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to
be afforded by sight.
Obj. 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of
the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such
friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by
sight.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the
greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 25, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 27, A. 4, ad
1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as
stated in _Metaph._ i, 1, the senses are loved for two reasons: for
the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness.
Wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these ways. But because
it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good,
it follows that the former pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which
arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the
senses, as loved for their usefulness, are common to all animals.
If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of
knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than
any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible
pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure
is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is
gauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal's nature.
Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this
usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are
vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like.
Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as
being more closely related to the end. For this reason, too, other
animals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of
usefulness, derive no pleasure from the other senses except as
subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not
take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor
does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring
it" (Ethic. iii, 10).
Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect
of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in
respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will
find that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than
the pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits
of sensible pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that
which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of
the touch that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food,
sexual union, and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider
the pleasures of sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind,
then the pleasures of sight are greater, forasmuch as intellectual
pleasures are greater than sensible.
Reply Obj. 1: Joy, as stated above (A. 3), denotes pleasure of the
soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure
belongs principally to the touch.
Reply Obj. 2: The sight is loved most, "on account of knowledge,
because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is stated in the
same passage (Metaph. i, 1).
Reply Obj. 3: Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in
another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the
touch, is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of
the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a
movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the
lovable object receives an impression of its image, which entices him
to love it and to seek its delight.
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