FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 5]

Whether Bodily and Sensible Pleasures Are Greater Than Spiritual and

Intellectual Pleasures?

Objection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are

greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek

some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2, 4). But

more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures.

Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.

Obj. 2: Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But

bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the state of

the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore

bodily pleasures are greater.

Obj. 3: Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by

reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check

spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 118:103): "How sweet are Thy

words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher

says (Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest pleasure is derived from the

operation of wisdom."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), pleasure arises from union

with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of

the soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must

be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are

acts or perfections of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to

will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter,

are actions and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for

"movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys.

iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and

intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and

are known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does

pleasure arise, and not only from their objects.

If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible

pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for instance

in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt

intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For

man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding

it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense.

Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is

better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than

sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for

there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than

his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as

Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).

If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with

sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely

speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the

consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good

which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and

the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more

beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from

even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor

which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is

much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the

conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More

intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a

thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the

object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, because

the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement, which

is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived

all at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other

part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in

pleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible

things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are

realized all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily

pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods

are incorruptible.

On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more

vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more

known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible

pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are

accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not

occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of

the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures

are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various

griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their

succeeding griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently

are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary

griefs, as we shall state farther on (Q. 35, A. 5).

Reply Obj. 1: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is

because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and,

again, because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow

and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures,

which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to

seek those of the body.

Reply Obj. 2: Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily

pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.

Reply Obj. 3: Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive

faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be

tempered and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the

mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both

sober and moderate.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 220 / 746 题