FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 4]

Whether Delight Is in the Intellectual Appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual

appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight is

a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual

power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.

Obj. 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the

sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive

appetite.

Obj. 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational

animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we

have in common with irrational animals.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 36:4): "Delight in the Lord."

But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual

appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), a certain delight arises

from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending

something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its

application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual

appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the

intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called

joy, but not bodily delight.

However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that

delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily

transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is

nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De

Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition

of consent to the things we wish."

Reply Obj. 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word

"sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For he

says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it

is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation." Or we may

say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.

Reply Obj. 2: Delight has the character of passion, properly

speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in

the intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus

it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.

vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at

the end of _De Coel. Hier.,_ that "the angels are not susceptible to

our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness

of incorruption."

Reply Obj. 3: In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb

animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De

Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights."

Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive appetite,

which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the

intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 219 / 746 题