Whether Knowledge Is a Cause of Love?
Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For
it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought
without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have
them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu.
35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them.
Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
Obj. 2: Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something
more than we know it. But some things are loved more than they are
known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be
known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
Obj. 3: Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be
no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is
love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not
knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1, 2) that "none can
love what he does not know."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), good is the cause of love,
as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite,
except as apprehended. And therefore love demands some apprehension
of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic.
ix, 5, 12) says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love:
and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness
is the beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the
cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only
if known.
Reply Obj. 1: He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge
thereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either
in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard
it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1, 2). But to have it is
not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.
Reply Obj. 2: Something is required for the perfection of knowledge,
that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge
belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things
which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion,
things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently
the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know distinctly
all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and properties. On
the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a
thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection
of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself.
Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is known;
since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known.
This is most evident in regard to the sciences, which some love
through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance,
they know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade
others; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to
the love of God.
Reply Obj. 3: Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused
by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things
themselves, but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above
(Q. 26, A. 1; cf. I, Q. 6, A. 1, ad 2).
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