Whether Good Is the Only Cause of Love?
Objection 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of love.
For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it
happens that evil also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6: "He that
loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be
good. Therefore good is not the only cause of love.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love
those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil is
the cause of love.
Obj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good"
only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all."
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the
good alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 26, A. 1), Love belongs to the
appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object
stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act.
Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the
proper object of love is the good; because, as stated above (Q. 26,
AA. 1, 2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of
the lover for the thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a
good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore,
that good is the proper cause of love.
Reply Obj. 1: Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good,
that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is
considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in
so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is in
this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of
iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or
such like.
Reply Obj. 2: Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not
for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good
thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes
insincerity or hypocrisy.
Reply Obj. 3: The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ
in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good
is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is
that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently
those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most
cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we
speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to
the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression
"beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful
odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation
to the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means that which simply
pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant
to apprehend.
________________________