Whether Likeness Is a Cause of Love?
Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For
the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the
cause of hatred; for it is written (Prov. 13:10) that "among the
proud there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic.
viii, 1) that "potters quarrel with one another." Therefore likeness
is not a cause of love.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves
in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves an
actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if
likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would
love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to
possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.
Obj. 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have
it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches.
But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them.
Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.
Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love
those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain
their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore
likeness is not a cause of love.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): "Every beast loveth
its like."
_I answer that,_ Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But
it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind
of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually:
for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said
to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having
potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has
actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its
proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper
place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its
act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.
Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or
well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it
were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus
two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men
are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the
other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to
himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of
concupiscence, or friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure:
because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its
act; and it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient
and cognitive being.
Now it has been stated above (Q. 26, A. 4), that in the love of
concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in
willing the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than
another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with
another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently,
if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a
form, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes
hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from
gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel among themselves,"
because they hinder one another's gain: and why "there are
contentions among the proud," because they hinder one another in
attaining the position they covet.
Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.
Reply Obj. 2: Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in
himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the
latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that
which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good
writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has
that which is becoming to him in respect of his art.
Reply Obj. 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what
he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated
above.
Reply Obj. 4: According to the same likeness of potentiality to its
act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he
expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the
man who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is
inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on
usefulness. We might also say that although not all men have these
virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to
certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which
principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as
being in conformity with his own natural reason.
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