Whether Love Is the First of the Concupiscible Passions?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the
concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called
from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things
are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4).
Therefore desire takes precedence of love.
Obj. 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting
and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But
concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing
coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
Obj. 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is
sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure
(Ethic. viii, 3, 4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and
consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9) that all
the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved
object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore
love is the first of the concupiscible passions.
_I answer that,_ Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible
faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of
good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are
naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say,
each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is
the reason for shunning the opposite evil.
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the
order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently
the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in
the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of
execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in
the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever
tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion
to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly,
it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having
attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to
good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards
good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.
Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes
pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because
the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the
enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as
the good itself is, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 3, ad 3).
Reply Obj. 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are
signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now
in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love,
when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not
possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De
Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which
we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions,
concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named
after it.
Reply Obj. 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is
real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This
union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also
an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so
far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for
and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such
a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.
Reply Obj. 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in
the order of intention.
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