THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 3]

Whether Hope Is the First of the Irascible Passions?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the

irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from

anger. Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief

characteristic" (cf. A. 2, Obj. 1), it seems that anger precedes and

surpasses hope.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something

arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary

evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or

an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive

simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to

overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to

be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And

consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.

Obj. 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement

of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and despair

imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach

towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and daring.

_On the contrary,_ The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it

precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of

the passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the

irascible faculty.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) all irascible passions imply

movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible

faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere

aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or

hatred; [the other is the presence of good or evil itself,] and this

belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good

produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (Q. 23, AA. 3,

4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.

Since then in the order of generation or execution, proportion or

aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows

that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order

of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty,

which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil,

those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally

precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that

hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such,

which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly;

whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is

consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else,

wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like

manner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And

that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident

from this--that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding

evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because

daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the

despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one

is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself,

as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his _Physics._ Accordingly,

it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.

And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of

generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second;

hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth

and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as

stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire

precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and

joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated

above.

Reply Obj. 1: Because anger arises from the other passions, as an

effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being

more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that is the

reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good

more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even

anger regards something more arduous.

Reply Obj. 3: The movement of the appetite is essentially and

directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement

from evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part

is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of

nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a

contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining

the end.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 184 / 746 题