Whether the Irascible Passions Precede the Concupiscible Passions, or
Vice Versa?
Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of
their objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the
difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the
irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions.
Obj. 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the
irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that
which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purpose of
removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from
enjoying its object, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1; I, Q. 81,
A. 2). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover"
(Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the
concupiscible passions.
Obj. 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy
and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "retaliation causes anger to cease, because
it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore the
concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.
_On the contrary,_ The concupiscible passions regard the absolute
good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the
difficult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the
restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede
the irascible.
_I answer that,_ In the concupiscible passions there is more
diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the
former we find something relating to movement--e.g. desire; and
something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the
irascible passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only
that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we
find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something
difficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible
faculty.
Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of
intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we
compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those
concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that
in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of
such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes
joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12):
"Rejoicing in hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest
in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: because
it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the
evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement of anger; since
the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the
movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a good thing to
pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this
he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every passion of the irascible
faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz.
either in joy or in sadness.
But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible
passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take
precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add
something to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object
of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the
object of the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a
certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the
realization of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion
or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty
in shunning the evil.
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those
concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and
those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it
is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and
terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object of the
concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just as
the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous.
But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good
absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the
common precedes the proper.
Reply Obj. 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an
accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly
related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the
obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.
Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those
concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third objection leads
to the same conclusion.
________________________