Whether Every Circumstance That Makes an Action Better or Worse,
Places a Moral Action in a Species of Good or Evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that every circumstance relating to
good or evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific
differences of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a
difference in the goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a
specific difference, which is the same as to make it differ in
species. Now that which makes an action better or worse, makes it
differ in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in
species. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better
or worse, constitutes a species.
Obj. 2: Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself the
character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot
make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot
make a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater
evil. But if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this
very reason it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every
circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a new
species of good or evil.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is
caused by each single defect." Now every circumstance that increases
malice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds
a new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance
that increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just
as every unity added to a number makes a new species of number; since
the good consists in "number, weight, and measure" (I, Q. 5, A. 5).
_On the contrary,_ More and less do not change a species. But more
and less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice.
Therefore not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or
worse, places it in a species of good or evil.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 10), a circumstance gives the
species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a
special order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance
does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil,
except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from
which the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to
take something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the
order of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other
condition be presupposed, from which the action takes its malice or
goodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which
makes the action to be discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what
belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the
species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the
sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions. Consequently not
every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes
its species.
Reply Obj. 1: In things which can be more or less intense, the
difference of more or less does not change the species: thus by
differing in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is
not changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that
which makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make
the action differ in species.
Reply Obj. 2: A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to the
goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself,
but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated above.
Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds to the goodness
or malice derived from this other condition of the action.
Reply Obj. 3: A circumstance does not always involve a distinct
defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to
something else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add
further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for
as much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice,
it does not always change the species of good or evil.
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