Whether a Circumstance Places a Moral Action in the Species of Good
or Evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral
action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action
is taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object.
Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species.
Obj. 2: Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the
moral action, as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1). But an accident does not
constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute
a species of good or evil.
Obj. 3: Further, one thing is not in several species. But one action
has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not place a
moral action in a species of good or evil.
_On the contrary,_ Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral
action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from
a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral
action to be specifically good or bad.
_I answer that,_ Just as the species of natural things are
constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions
are constituted by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident
from what was said above (A. 5). But since nature is determinate to
one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must
needs be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after
which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in
natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken
as a difference constituting the species. But the process of reason
is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still
proceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken
as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can
again be taken by the directing reason, as the principal condition of
the object that determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate
another's property is specified by reason of the property being
"another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species of
theft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or
time, then this will be an additional circumstance. But since the
reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that
the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered
as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids
damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy
place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus
place, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is
considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as
itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance
has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must
needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
Reply Obj. 1: A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is
considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as
being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.
Reply Obj. 2: A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance,
does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but
when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does
specify the action.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not every circumstance that places the moral
action in the species of good or evil; since not every circumstance
implies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one
action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in
many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should
not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as said above (A.
7, ad 1; Q. 1, A. 3, ad 3).
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