Whether an Individual Action Can Be Indifferent?
Objection 1: It would seem that an individual action can be
indifferent. For there is no species that does not, or cannot,
contain an individual. But an action can be indifferent in its
species, as stated above (A. 8). Therefore an individual action can
be indifferent.
Obj. 2: Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated in
_Ethic._ ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal
disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not
good, since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in
respect of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are indifferent.
Obj. 3: Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil
belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain
a specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end.
Therefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An idle
word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the
motive of just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an
evil, because "men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of
judgment" (Matt. 12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just
necessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word is
either good or bad. For the same reason every other action is either
good or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent.
_I answer that,_ It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent
in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil.
And the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above (A.
3), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes
its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its
accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason
of his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason
of his species. And every individual action must needs have some
circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the
intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct;
if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to
the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has
the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in
accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it
must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end.
Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason,
if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.
If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from
some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or
moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not
moral or human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be
indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
Reply Obj. 1: For an action to be indifferent in its species can be
understood in several ways. First in such a way that its species
demands that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along
this line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus: since
no object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good
or evil, either through its end or through a circumstance. Secondly,
specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact that as far
as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it
can be made good or bad by something else. Thus man, as far as his
species is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a
condition of his species that he should not be black or white; but
blackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than
those of his species.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher states that a man is evil, properly
speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, he says that
the prodigal is not evil, because he hurts none save himself. And the
same applies to all others who are not hurtful to other men. But we
say here that evil, in general, is all that is repugnant to right
reason. And in this sense every individual action is either good or
bad, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it
belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some
vice. Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose
of his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he
direct his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly
applies to other actions.
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