Whether the Process of Counsel Is One of Analysis?
Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of
analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of
our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz.
from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always
proceed by way of analysis.
Obj. 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason
proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according to
the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present,
and the present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel
one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is
not an analytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is not one
of analysis.
Obj. 3: Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to
us, according to _Ethic._ iii, 3. But the question as to whether a
certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or
unable to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore the
inquiry of counsel should begin from things present.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who
takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze."
_I answer that,_ In every inquiry one must begin from some principle.
And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the
process is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause
to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple
than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the
order of being, the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment
deals with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple
causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which
precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution.
Hence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning
that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and
continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.
Reply Obj. 1: Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their
reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning about
actions is contrary to the order of actions.
Reply Obj. 2: Reason begins with that which is first according to
reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.
Reply Obj. 3: We should not want to know whether something to be done
for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining that end.
Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end,
before considering whether it be possible.
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