Whether Counsel Is About All Things That We Do?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we
have to do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as
stated above (A. 1). But choice is about all things that we do.
Therefore counsel is too.
Obj. 2: Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But, whenever
we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue of the
reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we
do.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "if it
appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take
counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but
if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this."
But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore
counsel takes place in all things that we do.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.]
says that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to
science or art."
_I answer that,_ Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above
(A. 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt;
hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, "is a
reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero,
_Topic._ ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation to human acts
admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because
certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means: as
happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of
action; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters,
for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little
matters whether it is done this or that way; this occurs in minute
matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed
at; and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently
there are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they
conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely,
minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as in
works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of
conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory of
Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].
Reply Obj. 1: Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or
decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident
without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.
Reply Obj. 2: In matters that are evident, the reason makes no
inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel
in all that is done by reason.
Reply Obj. 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in
different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished
by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only the
means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then there is
no need of counsel.
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