Whether the Process of Counsel Is Indefinite?
Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite.
For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which
action is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the
process of counsel is indefinite.
Obj. 2: Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what
is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human action can
be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason.
Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely.
Obj. 3: Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on
indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are
self-evident, which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty
is not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and
uncertain. Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.
_On the contrary,_ "No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly
reach" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the
infinite. If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one
would begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.
_I answer that,_ The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both
sides, on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a
twofold principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is
proper to it, and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining to
operation: this is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is
taken for granted as its principle, as stated above (A. 2). The other
principle is taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in
demonstrative sciences one science postulates certain things from
another, without inquiring into them. Now these principles which are
taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel are any facts received
through the senses--for instance, that this is bread or iron: and
also any general statements known either through speculative or
through practical science; for instance, that adultery is forbidden
by God, or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of such
things counsel makes no inquiry. But the term of inquiry is that
which we are able to do at once. For just as the end is considered in
the light of a principle, so the means are considered in the light of
a conclusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done
first, holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the
inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel from being
infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may
present themselves to be inquired into by means of counsel.
Reply Obj. 1: Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only
potentially.
Reply Obj. 2: Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is
not always at hand. Consequently it is not always necessary to take
counsel about removing the obstacle.
Reply Obj. 3: In contingent singulars, something may be taken for
certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it
concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a
necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues
to sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.
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