Whether Counsel Is Only of Things That We Do?
Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we
do. For counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible
for many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and
are not the result of our actions, such as the nature of various
things. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
Obj. 2: Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are
laid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those who
seek counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore
counsel is not only of things that we do.
Obj. 3: Further, some are said to take consultation about future
events; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel is
not only of things that we do.
Obj. 4: Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no one
would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly
untrue. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.]
says: "We take counsel of things that are within our competency and
that we are able to do."
_I answer that,_ Counsel properly implies a conference held between
several; the very word (_consilium_) denotes this, for it means a
sitting together (_considium_), from the fact that many sit together in
order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that in
contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for
certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances
into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are
considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes
note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and
universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more
absolute and simple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to
consider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned,
properly speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of
the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of
itself, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it
is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on
things singular and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking,
counsel is about things done by us.
Reply Obj. 1: Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about
what is to be done, for the reason given above.
Reply Obj. 2: Although that which is laid down by the law is not due
to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him
in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing
something.
Reply Obj. 3: Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about
whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak
of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do
or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.
Reply Obj. 4: We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far
as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of
affection--thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend,
as though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument,
for the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause,
since one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about
what he would do through his servant.
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