THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 3]

Whether Choice Is Only of the Means, or Sometimes Also of the End?

Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only of the means. For

the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "virtue makes us choose

aright; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power to

direct aright those things which are to be done for its sake." But

that for the sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore

choice is of the end.

Obj. 2: Further, choice implies preference of one thing to another.

But just as there can be preference of means, so can there be

preference of ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can

be of means.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that

"volition is of the end, but choice of the means."

_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 1, ad 2), choice results from

the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a

practical syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a

practical syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things

the end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion,

as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end, as such, is

not a matter of choice.

But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of

one demonstration or of one science, from being the conclusion of

another demonstration or science; while the first indemonstrable

principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration or science;

so too that which is the end in one operation, may be ordained to

something as an end. And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus

in the work of a physician health is the end: wherefore it is not a

matter of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. Now the

health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently

with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may

be a matter of choice; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:10): "For when

I am weak, then am I powerful." But the last end is nowise a matter

of choice.

Reply Obj. 1: The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as

to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 5), there is but one last

end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the

subject of choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) From the Complete American Edition · 第 99 / 746 题