Whether Choice Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals are able to
choose. For choice "is the desire of certain things on account of an
end," as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 2, 3. But irrational animals desire
something on account of an end: since they act for an end, and from
desire. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.
Obj. 2: Further, the very word _electio_ (choice) seems to signify
the taking of something in preference to others. But irrational
animals take something in preference to others: thus we can easily
see for ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse another.
Therefore choice is in irrational animals.
Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vi, 12, "it is from prudence
that a man makes a good choice of means." But prudence is found in
irrational animals: hence it is said in the beginning of _Metaph._ i,
1 that "those animals which, like bees, cannot hear sounds, are
prudent by instinct." We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of
sagacity manifested in the works of various animals, such as bees,
spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a
crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or
the second road: and if he find that the stag has not passed there,
being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent;
as though he were reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the
stag must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the
others, and there is no other road. Therefore it seems that
irrational animals are able to choose.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.]
says that "children and irrational animals act willingly but not from
choice." Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.
_I answer that,_ Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference
to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that
can be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether
determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the difference
between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above
(Q. 1, A. 2, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one
particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will,
although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according
to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of
particular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will,
and not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals
have. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.
Reply Obj. 1: Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is
called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one thing
from another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be
moved to several things.
Reply Obj. 2: An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to
another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing.
Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its
imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is naturally
inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just
as fire is moved upwards and not downwards, without its making any
choice.
Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Phys._ iii, 3 "movement is the act of the
movable, caused by a mover." Wherefore the power of the mover appears
in the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things
moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is evident,
although the things themselves are without reason: for an arrow
through the motion of the archer goes straight towards the target, as
though it were endowed with reason to direct its course. The same may
be seen in the movements of clocks and all engines put together by
the art of man. Now as artificial things are in comparison to human
art, so are all natural things in comparison to the Divine art. And
accordingly order is to be seen in things moved by nature, just as in
things moved by reason, as is stated in _Phys._ ii. And thus it is
that in the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks of
sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about
their actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the
Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called
prudent or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any
choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share
in one nature, invariably act in the same way.
________________________