Whether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by Its Object?
Objection 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its
object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover
to movable, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 10. But a mover, if it be
sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be
moved of necessity by its object.
Obj. 2: Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the
intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as
stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity,
by its object: therefore the will also, by its object.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or something
ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end necessarily:
because it is like the principle in speculative matters, to which
principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason for
willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also
necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.
_On the contrary,_ The rational powers, according to the Philosopher
(Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational
power, since it is in the reason, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 9.
Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not
moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites.
_I answer that,_ The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the
exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act,
derived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the
will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's
power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually.
But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one
object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by
its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the
power. For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color
actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it
moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes away; which
belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted
with something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in
some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of
necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the
object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it.
Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so is good
the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object
which is good universally and from every point of view, the will
tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it
cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered
an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend
to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a
non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking
in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this
is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they
are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this
point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which
can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.
Reply Obj. 1: The sufficient mover of a power is none but that object
that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that power.
If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move
of necessity, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object
which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by that
which may be either true or false--viz. by that which is contingent:
as we have said of the good.
Reply Obj. 3: The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is
the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end,
and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to
live," and the like. But other things without which the end can be
gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as
he who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the
conclusions, without which the principles can still be true.
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