Whether the Will Is Moved to Anything Naturally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything
naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary
agent, as stated at the beginning of _Phys._ ii, 1. Therefore the will
is not moved to anything naturally.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as
"being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will.
Therefore no movement is natural to the will.
Obj. 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will
is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing naturally.
_On the contrary,_ The movement of the will follows the movement of
the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally.
Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.
_I answer that,_ As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the
Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a
manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle
in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the
material form, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 1. In another sense nature
stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense,
that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of
its substance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now
all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which
they are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that
thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense,
it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be
a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect: for
the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like
manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something
naturally willed.
Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as
does each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which
stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first
principles of demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking
generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer
according to his nature. For it is not only things pertaining to the
will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each
power, and to the entire man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only
the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to
the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the
intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard
the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of
the will, as so many particular goods.
Reply Obj. 1: The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of
cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are
done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that
is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the
manner proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since
the will is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement
proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as what
belongs to a previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because
in every thing, being itself, which is from nature, precedes
volition, which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills
something naturally.
Reply Obj. 2: In the case of natural things, that which is natural,
as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is
in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not
always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality: because
form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is "the act
of that which is in potentiality" (Aristotle, _Phys._ iii, 1).
Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard
to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always
move upwards, but only when it is outside its own place. [*The
Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven,
i.e. the Empyrean.] And in like manner it is not necessary that the
will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills
something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it
is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is
pure act, is always in the act of volition.
Reply Obj. 3: To every nature there is one thing corresponding,
proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a
genus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as
species there corresponds something one specifically; and to the
individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since,
therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some
one general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good;
just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing,
which is the true, or being, or "what a thing is." And under good in
general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the
will determined.
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