Whether Happiness Is an Operation?
Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For
the Apostle says (Rom. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto
sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an
operation, but the very being of living things. Therefore the last
end, which is happiness, is not an operation.
Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a
state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But state
does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Obj. 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy
one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of operation
does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather
something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an
operation.
Obj. 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation
does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Obj. 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations
are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.
Obj. 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But
human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some
other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an
operation.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that
"happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."
_I answer that,_ In so far as man's happiness is something created,
existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For
happiness is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in
so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect.
Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is
evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the
Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that
which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows
is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things,
too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3).
Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.
Reply Obj. 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being
of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been
shown (Q. 2, A. 5) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may
consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true
that His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation
of the living, by which operation the principle of life is made
actual: thus we speak of active and contemplative life, or of a life
of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last
end, as is clear from John 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may
know Thee, the only true God."
Reply Obj. 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness
in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and he
signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by
the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that the state of a
happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle
expressed the very essence of happiness, showing by what man is
established in this state, and that it is by some kind of operation.
And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good"
(Ethic. i, 7).
Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Metaph._ ix, 7 action is twofold. One
proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and
"to cut." And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an
operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather
of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an
action that remains in the agent, such as to feel, to understand, and
to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent.
And such an operation can be happiness.
Reply Obj. 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection;
according as various things capable of happiness can attain to
various degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings
applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially;
since His very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other
than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect
of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good:
and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men,
according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in
respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this
operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one
only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for
this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be
attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's
happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and
after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as
men." But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as
the angels . . . in heaven" (Matt. 22:30).
Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails:
because in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God
by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in
as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation
so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a
participation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation
can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life,
which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the
contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the
contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged
in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and
since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself
otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were,
continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are
evident.
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