_Nineteenth Volunteer Battalion. Statement of occurrences which
does not correspond with the official report of Colonel Peacocke,
and historical narrative of Major Denison._
The nineteenth battalion of volunteers comprises the St. Catharines
and Thorold companies. It is commanded by Lieut.-Col. the Hon. J. C.
Currie, member of the legislative council. St. Catharines is situated
about twelve miles from Clifton Suspension Bridge, both on G. W.
Railway. Chippewa is five miles higher on Niagara shore with railway
connection, the Erie and Ontario line. Col. Peacocke says, (official
reports)
“On arriving at St. Catharines (about 4 p. m.) I received telegrams
to the effect that the Fenians about 800 strong, were marching on
Suspension Bridge and were two or three miles from Chippewa.”
I am informed, for the object of this full and true account of
the Fenian Invasion, and enabled on authority the most reliable,
to remark on Major Denison’s history, that he says nothing about
the fact that until about 8 p. m., Friday, June 1, the village of
Chippewa and important bridges were entirely unprotected. At 10 a.
m. on Friday, ten hours sooner, the St. Catharines 19th volunteers,
under Lieut.-Col. Currie, could have easily been there 450 strong.
It is now asked, why were they not sent there instead of the men
kicking their heels on the street until half past 9 p. m.? The 19th
at that hour, a day wasted, left St. Catharines with the detachment
of 47th and 10th Royals, for Clifton (Suspension Bridge) and could
have reached Chippewa that night at half past 11 o’clock. But instead
of that being done they remained at Clifton in the cars until 4 a.
m. next day. “Had they been allowed to go up the night before, the
whole force under Colonel Peacocke could have left Chippewa at 3 or 4
a. m. on Saturday, and by going the direct road, would have reached
Stevensville by 7 a. m. with ease.” [Letter from the 19th.]
As to the delay at Chippewa to enable the volunteers to breakfast
[see Col. P.’s Rep. and extracts just given from Major Denison], it
is stated on behalf of the 19th, that they did not take breakfast
until they reached New Germany. There they partook of their own
supplies, and shared them with both the royals and regulars.
At noon they reached New Germany and there _remained until after 6 p.
m._ Col. Peacocke says he left this place at 4 p. m. Major Denison
says Col. Peacocke at about 4 p. m. had positive intelligence, of the
Fenians falling back on Fort Erie. “He immediately made arrangements
to move in pursuit. _It was about half past 5_, when he started from
New Germany.” And then says Major D. “Had this delay not occurred the
Fenians in all probability could not have escaped.” Which delay? does
he mean the time that elapsed between noon and 4 p. m.? or the time
lost after 4 p. m.? He says: “it was particularly unfortunate that
Col. Peacocke had not decided to move on Fort Erie three hours or so
sooner.” On behalf of the Volunteer 19th it is said, the whole force
remained at New Germany until after 6 p. m. “I cannot understand why
we delayed unless Col. P. waited for reinforcements (see Lowry’s
report.)” Looking to Col. Lowry’s report it does appear that Col.
P. had telegraphed for assistance, and additional force arrived at
New Germany after he had left. The superintendent of G. W. Railway
told Col. L. at Hamilton, that Col. P. had twice telegraphed for
reinforcements.
It may be reasonably suggested on behalf of Col. Peacocke, that at
New Germany he neither knew the force of the Fenians, nor where they
were, nor whether they had been augmented in strength by artillery.
As it was, they had on that morning, though unknown to any British
commander, from forty to fifty horses. They had cavalry men also, but
no cavalry accoutrements. The critics of Col. Peacocke are writing
after the time and the occurrences when all is known. It is easy in
that case to say what should have been done. But this suggestion
only covers the time from 12 noon to 4 p. m. Why the loss of ninety
minutes (Denison) or over two hours (authority of 19th) before
starting when the locality of the Fenians became known at 4 p. m.
But the other question raised by the letter from the 19th battalion
is more serious. Why were the forces, (they were all night in the
cars at Clifton only five miles off,) not at Chippewa to advance to
Stevensville at 3 or 4 a. m.? The delay for breakfast was meant well,
but no breakfast rewarded the delay, at least for the 19th. None of
these authorities tell why. Let me. The delay was for breakfast;
the marching to New Germany without breakfast was from want of camp
kettles to cook it. These were not up in time. The government was at
fault. The St. Catharines authority says:
At pp. 52, 53, Major Denison gives the cause of our halt when
within two and a half miles of Fort Erie. I have undeniable
authority for saying that there were really no Fenians in the woods
there referred to, nor had there been any for twenty-four hours
before.
These woods were on Lots 8 and 9, R. and W. Bowens, fifth concession
of Bertie. The Fenians had been on Newbigging’s farm less than two
miles distant until the midnight preceding and entrenched there as
related in this work. Col. Peacocke not knowing their number and
resources was right in being cautious now that night had come. Yet,
again, Why so late in getting there? The writer continues: “I do not
deny that he and his troop (Denison) saw some men. But they were
people of our own, who accompanied us to see the expected fight. This
halt was most unfortunate. Then, as to the positions of the troops at
page 54, he commits other errors.
“The 19th were the only men in line on the left of the road; but were
covered by a company of the 16th, regulars, and by No. 7 of the 19th,
as advanced skirmishers.” The statement of Major Denison is: “The
19th battalion, Lieut.-Col. Currie took up a similar position [in
line] on the left of the road; in the rear of the 16th.”
There was a small creek close in front, and at a mile farther,
Frenchman’s creek; both crossing Col. P’s line of march. “At this
time,” says Major Denison, p. 54. “While I was close beside Col.
Peacocke, a voice in the dark, said, ‘you can’t go down that way,
sir.’ On looking closely we saw that it was a farmer living about
a quarter of a mile back, who had given us some information as we
passed. Col. Peacocke asked him; ‘Why not?’ He answered, ‘The bridge
is broken.’ The Colonel questioned him closely and he adhered to it
positively that we could not get through. This information, together
with the inability for the skirmishers to make their way through
the woods (these were tangled bush and logs, the ground marshy and
wet, p. 53). This decided Colonel Peacocke. With that report of a
broken bridge; with darkness of night set in; with uncertainty of his
enemy’s place and strength; with the possibility of an ambush in the
woods, or at the broken bridge, he was fully justified in remaining
as he did until daylight.”
The reader will keep in mind that the blame laid on this commander
for that halt implies that he thereby permitted the Fenians to
escape. This is no light charge. But the graver charge of his not
advancing from Chippewa at 3 or 4 a. m. so as to reach Stevensville
at 7 remains as the gentleman of the 19th has put it.
In Major Denison’s account of the line of march taken, and as Col.
Peacocke related to me personally when in conversation at Fort Erie,
there arose several circumstances of hinderance. There was the bad
and devious road taken by the river side instead of the better and
shorter direct way, through his relying on advisers and informants
who seem to have led him up the river side to Black Creek, around
windings and out of the way in order to drive the Fenians from
their properties, or prevent their coming upon them. Mr. Tupper, a
government constable resident at Fort Erie, has since told me that
he was sent to inform Col. Peacocke and conduct him from Chippewa,
but that his service was not accepted. Tupper says that Mr. Street M.
P. P. told the Col. that he was an official person and reliable. But
after seeing him at Fort Erie that officer had no recollection of him
at Chippewa. Major Denison remarking on the unreliability of persons
offering to be guides, relates that one bustling person, talking on
Friday night at Chippewa told what he could accomplish in taking a
message to Port Colborne if he had a horse. He was furnished with
a horse, and the message committed to his care; what did he do? He
rode to the Fenians, gave them the message and the horse too; himself
also, perhaps, for he never again turned up.
We are now sufficiently informed on the aspect which the campaign
presented on the morning of 2nd June; at Chippewa, where delay was
caused because volunteer militia had come without haversacks without
food; at Ridgeway, where Col, Booker had arrived an hour before the
time he should have been leaving Colborne; at Henry Angur’s farm,
where the Fenian commander O’Neil had halted his force, while he sent
scouts forward to see if British and Canadian troops were approaching
in his direction.—With this sufficiency of information let us catch
up to the gallant eight hundred sons of Toronto and Hamilton, cities;
Caledonia and York villages, and march in their footsteps to the
field of conflict.