_Colonel Peacocke’s advance to Chippewa on June 1st. His march next
day. And the day after. Lieut.-Colonels Booker and Dennis. Night of
June 1st, and morning of the 2nd._
We are now arrived at the morning of June 2nd. In the Niagara
District the first act of the Fenian Invasion being in progress
Colonel Peacocke is looked to as the leading actor in the operations.
Around him the main forces for defence and repulsion of the enemy
have gathered. On him expectation rests. A senior officer Colonel
Lowry of the 47th will presently appear, but not yet. Colonel
Peacocke’s official report as written in his own terms is demanded by
the pretentions of this narrative to fulness, and fidelity to truth.
A chapter describing his advance and halts from Suspension Bridge to
Fort Erie to be followed by that report, and the report by comments
on his movements and strategy would occupy too many of these pages.
It is convenient therefore to introduce his official statement first.
This is it:
COLONEL PEACOCKE’S REPORT; _To Major-General G. Napier, C. B.
Commanding 1st Military District, Toronto, C. W._
FORT ERIE, 4th June, 1866.
SIR.—I have the honor to make the following Report of my operations
in the field since the 1st inst. In compliance with a telegram
received from you, I joined at 2 o’clock, at Hamilton, with 200
men of my own battalion, the force proceeding from Toronto to St.
Catherines, consisting of one battery of Royal Artillery, under
the Command of Lieut.-Col. Hoste, C. B., and 200 men of the 47th
Regt, under the command of Major Lodder. You had also placed under
my command, for the defence of the frontier, 7 companies of the
volunteer force stationed at St. Catherines, under the command
of Lieut.-Col. Currie, the Queen’s Own regiment of volunteers at
Port Colborne, and the 13th Battalion volunteer militia, commanded
by Lieut.-Col. Booker, at Dunnville; and you had informed me
that I should be reinforced at St. Catherines by 800 men. Your
instructions were that I was to make St. Catherines my base, to
act according to my own discretion, to advance on Clifton or
elsewhere, and to attack the enemy as soon as I could do so with a
force sufficient to ensure success. On arriving at St. Catherines,
I received telegrams to the effect that the Fenians, about 800
strong, were marching on the Suspension Bridge and were actually
two or three miles from Chippewa. I pushed on immediately to the
Bridge, leaving orders for all troops arriving at St. Catherines
to follow me as soon as possible. On reaching the Bridge, I heard
that the enemy had not yet reached Chippewa, and being anxious
to save the bridge over the creek, I pressed on with the 400
infantry, preceded by a pilot engine—the battery marching by road
in consequence of the reported want of platform accommodation at
the Chippewa station. (1.) It was dark when we arrived at Chippewa.
We bivouacked there that night. I there received numerous reports
from scouts sent out by Mr. Kirkpatrick, the reeve. They agreed
generally in the statement that the Fenians had entrenched
themselves roughly a little below Fort Erie, at Frenchman’s Creek,
and had sent on a party towards Chippewa. Their strength was
variously estimated from 800 to 1,500. I resolved on effecting a
junction with the force at Port Colborne, to which place I had
already ordered the battalion from Dunnville. With this object in
view, I selected Stevensville as the point of junction, and having
explained to Captain Akers, of the Royal Engineers, who accompanied
the force from Toronto, what my object was, and that this point
was chosen, because judging from information received we could
not be anticipated at it by the evening. (2.) I despatched that
officer at 12 o’clock, to communicate with the officer commanding
at Port Colborne, to make him conversant with my views and to meet
me at Stevensville between ten and eleven o’clock next morning,
informing him that I should start at six o’clock. I continued to
send out scouts during the night, and to receive reports which made
me believe that my information was correct, and that the enemy had
not left their camp. At about two o’clock, I received a telegram
from Colonel Booker, despatched before he was joined by Captain
Akers, informing me that he had given orders to attack the enemy
at Fort Erie. (3.) At about half past three I received another one
from Captain Akers, despatched after he had reached Port Colborne,
saying the enemy was at French Creek, and proposing that Lt.-Col.
Booker’s force should advance on Fort Erie and join us at
Frenchman’s Creek.
At about 4.30 o’clock, I was joined by the eleven companies of
volunteers from St. Catharines, formed into a battalion 350 strong,
under Lt.-Col. Currie, and by the expected reinforcement under
Lt.-Col. Villiers, of the 47th Regiment, which consisted of 150
men of the 47th, and of the 10th Royals, 415 strong, under Major
Boxall. The volunteers, being unprovided with the means of carrying
provisions and of cooking them had not been able to comply with
an order I had sent the previous evening, that they were to bring
provisions in their haversacks. I saw that the absolute necessity
of furnishing them with some would cause delay, and I telegraphed
to Port Colborne that I should be one hour later in starting. (5).
We marched at 7 o’clock, leaving the Garrison Volunteer Battery,
from St. Catharines, under Capt Stoker, to hold Chippewa. The day
was oppressively hot, and our guide took us by a road much longer
than necessary. (6). When about three miles from Stevensville, at
about 11 o’clock, I received a few words from Lieut.-Col. Booker,
written at 7.30 o’clock, to the effect that he had just received
my telegram, but that he was attacked in force by the enemy at a
place three miles south of Stevensville, (7). At the same time, I
received information that he had retired from Ridgway. I encamped
a mile further on, at a small place called New Germany, across a
road leading due south to Stevensville. At about 4 o’clock, having
gathered information that the enemy was falling back on Fort
Erie, I left everything behind which would encumber the men and
started to follow them. At the moment of starting, we received an
important accession to strength by the arrival of the Cavalry Body
Guard of His Excellency the Governor-General, 55 strong, under
Major Denison. (8.) We marched until dark, and halted two and a
half miles from Fort Erie, the men sleeping on their arms, due
precautions being observed. During the night, I sent out scouts to
collect information. It appeared that the Fenians, on retiring,
had posted themselves at once near the old Fort. Some said they
had been reinforced, some that they were attempting to re-cross
into the United States. I also heard that three companies of the
60th Rifles had arrived at our vacated camp at New Germany and
that a force had reached Black Creek; also that 10 more companies
of volunteer militia had arrived at Port Colborne. The Volunteer
Garrison Battery, which I had left at Chippewa, joined me during
the night.
Anxious to prevent the escape of the Fenians, I sent word to the
officers commanding at those places that I was going to attack
Fort Erie, and asked when they would be able to co-operate.
Subsequently, fresh reports of attempts of the Fenians to escape
having reached me, I determined to advance at once. We were about
to move when Lt.-Col. the Hon. John Hillyard Cameron came into camp
and informed me that the Fenians had escaped. The intelligence
caused great mortification in my little force. I desired Major
Denison to scour the country and enter the town. He sent me a
message that he was informed that there was still a body of
Fenians about the old Fort. We at once marched in that direction,
skirmishing through the woods. Major Denison soon informed us that
they really had escaped. As many scouts and farm people assured
us they had not escaped, we took a long sweep through the woods.
On our right on Lake Erie, a few stragglers were seen, and four
were reported shot. On entering the old fort, traces were found
of its having been recently occupied. During the short operation
which extended only over forty hours, the troops under my command
underwent very great fatigue, and bore it with great cheerfulness.
I received all possible support and co-operation from officers of
all ranks. The conduct of the men was excellent. A great number
of private individuals rendered me service in many ways, and the
inhabitants generally exhibited a good and loyal feeling. Mr.
Swinyard, Manager of the Great Western Railroad, gave me the
benefit of his services in person. He placed at my disposal the
resources of the railway; and the officials on the line exerted
themselves to render these available. I have the honor to enclose a
report of Lieut.-Col. Booker, of his operations on the 2nd inst.
GEO. PEACOCKE,
Col. and Lt.-Col. 16th Regt.
NOTES TO COLONEL PEACOCKE’S REPORT. 1. “The reported want of platform
accommodation.” Since the time and the events, persons have spoken
largely as to how quickly they would have provided platforms had
they been consulted. The Colonel could not consult persons of
whose existence he was uninformed. He acted according to the best
information.
2. and 3. I had written a criticism on the extraordinary, the
unmilitary procedure of Captain Akers, Lieut.-Colonels Dennis and
Booker, in taking upon themselves to alter the plans of their
superior, Colonel Peacocke, who alone was responsible in the
campaign, and from whom they were bound to take instructions; but a
statement of Major Denison having been published as these sheets are
passing to the press, some portions of it are here cited.
Major Denison’s account of the campaign is lucid, and soldier-like.
But he has committed errors in his description of the combat at
Limestone Ridge. They are serious errors. He is not known to have
consulted any officer of the 13th, at Hamilton, as to matters of
fact affecting that battalion, but has followed stories floating
about Toronto, among certain of the “Queen’s Own,” that are not
true. He expresses acknowledgments for information to Lieut.-Col.
Booker, which is about enough to declare against the fidelity of his
narrative. That person was not at any time in a position to know much
of what was done in the front. In matters within his own knowledge
he has not told the whole truth. Major Denison having had close
intercourse on the advance to Fort Erie with Colonel Peacocke, his
remarks may be accepted as interpreting the mind of that officer.
They also accord with what the Colonel related to me at Fort Erie
village soon after the incidents occurred. Says Major Denison,
referring to June 1, at Chippewa:
HISTORY OF THE FENIAN RAID, p. 30. “Colonel Peacocke then made
arrangements for the junction of his forces with Lieut.-Colonel
Booker’s. At the time he decided upon the hour of meeting, the
greater portion of his force was yet to arrive, and not knowing
what hour in the morning or in the night they might come, he was
unable to name an earlier hour to start than 6 a. m. which would
make the hour of his arrival at Stevensville between 10 and 11
a. m. Not having a map showing the roads about Port Colborne and
between there and Stevensville, and being unable in Chippewa to
obtain accurate information as to the roads, or the condition
of them, and having received at the same time very conflicting
information as to the movements of the enemy, he found it was
impossible for him to lay down the route Lieut.-Col. Booker should
take, or the hour at which he should start, in order to meet him
at Stevensville between 10 and 11 a. m. Under these circumstances
he thought it desirable to send an officer across to Lieut.-Col.
Booker who should be thoroughly acquainted with his plan, and would
be able in case of doubt or difficulty, to consult with Lieut.-Col.
Booker and see that the spirit of the plan was carried out even if
the details were varied.
“Acting upon this idea, Colonel Peacocke chose Capt. Akers R. E.
for this service and explained his plan and the reasons which
induced him to adopt it; but with reference to the roads he left
it entirely optional with Lieut.-Col. Booker and Capt. Akers to
choose a road after making thorough inquiries as to the most
available route, _and the route most remote from the position of
the enemy_—going even so far as to tell Capt. Akers that they
might go along the Welland railway, northerly to a point opposite
Stevensville and then march due east to that place; or take the
Grand Trunk railway for some miles, and then cut across the country
in a diagonal direction to the point of junction. _Ridgeway was
never mentioned as a point to leave the railway_; and there is
little doubt that with a correct map, Colonel Peacocke would have
positively forbidden it—Ridgeway being nearer Fort Erie than
Stevensville, and the further march being consequently brought
nearer to the enemy’s position than the occasion called for. From
information received since, there is no doubt that the shortest
and safest route lay from Sherk’s crossing across the country to
Stevensville.”
Yes, that was the route. But Lieut.-Col. Booker had no map; not even
the poor pretence of one which the officer in chief had. Lieut.-Col.
Dennis may have known the roads but his head seems to have been
deluded with the idea of independent command. Booker in his official
report contradicts the chief direct. He says: “In accordance with
instructions received from Colonel Peacocke, through Captain Akers
I proceeded by a train at 5 a. m. to Ridgeway station.” “Ridgeway
station,” says Major Denison “was never mentioned as a point to leave
the railway.”
In his statement to the Court of Inquiry Lieut.-Col. Booker again
names Ridgeway as the place to which he went, but went with
hesitation. His hesitation, however, did not grow out of a doubt
whether his superior intended him to go there, but whether he and
Dennis and Akers should not go off on an expedition of their own to
French Creek, leaving Colonel Peacocke to his own fortunes. Says
Lieut.-Col. Booker [Court of Inquiry]. “On arrival of Captain Akers,
it appeared that Lieut.-Col. Dennis and myself were in possession
of later and more reliable information of the position of the enemy
than Colonel Peacocke seemed to have had when Capt. Akers left him at
midnight. It then seemed necessary to enquire whether the original
plan for a junction at Stevensville to attack the enemy supposed to
be encamped near Black Creek should be adhered to, when it appeared
they were encamped much higher up the river and nearer to Fort Erie.”
Had they followed their “later and more reliable information,” they
would have reached Frenchman’s creek eight hours after the Fenians
left it. Colonel Peacocke did not know precisely which route his
enemy might pursue inland towards the Welland canal, but strategical
prescience led him to provide against the Fenian advance in that
direction, and he planned accordingly. The event proved that he had
judged correctly.
A strange predicament was that of Colonel Peacocke. At Chippewa his
advisers and scouts gave contradictory information. His subordinates
dividing the command of a distant detachment, set themselves up as
superior to him. Major Denison tells the story, thus:
“We must go back a little and give an account of what happened
at Port Colborne until the arrival of Capt. Akers. It will be
remembered that Lieut.-Col. Dennis was sent there on the morning of
Friday with 400 men of the Queen’s Own, and directed to occupy and,
if necessary, entrench a position there and wait for further orders
before an attack was made. He arrived at Port Colborne about noon
and hearing that the enemy were not very near the village, billeted
the men to enable them to get their dinners, and sent out scouts
during the afternoon to discover the position of the Fenians. The
day and evening was occupied in this way. In the evening about 11
p. m. Lieut.-Col. Booker arrived with his battalion, the 13th from
Hamilton, and being the senior officer took command of the whole
force.
“At 10 p. m. Mr. Graham, the collector of customs at Fort Erie,
arrived with information of the exact position of the Fenian camp.
This was at Frenchman’s creek a mile below the Lower Ferry, on
Mr. Newbigging’s farm. He had been in their camp at 6 o’clock
that evening, and was of opinion there was not more than 700
men, and that as they had been drinking hard during the day they
would certainly fall an easy prey to any force that might attack
them. Lieut.-Col. Dennis’s _orders were positive not to attack
until further orders; the same orders were binding on Lieut.-Col.
Booker_, and consequently they could not move to the attack which
Mr. Graham urged them on to make, and which he stated would
certainly be successful. In order to induce them to move at once
to the attack, he suggested that, probably, Colonel Peacocke _was
endeavoring to keep the volunteers back in order that the regulars
should have all the credit of capturing the Fenians_.”
Mr. Graham spoke only as nine civilians out of ten would have
done, in the same position of time and circumstances. Since then
the complaint of the nine out of ten has been that this force of
volunteers was precipitated by General Napier and Colonel Peacocke
into a position of peril, where they had to prematurely encounter
the enemy in mortal combat, unsupported by artillery, unaided by
cavalry. Yet they would have been in a worse predicament, by far, had
they, equally without artillery and cavalry, been precipitated upon
the Fenian field breast-works at Frenchman’s creek. It was Colonel
Peacocke’s negative to that mad project which avoided that peril,
and its probable disaster. Adherence to his orders to find the best
and safest roads, where the Fenians were least likely to be met, in
moving from Colborne to Stevensville to join him, would have avoided
the premature conflict at Limestone Ridge.
But in this remark I write as they may do whose beloved sons,
brothers, friends fell there, slain and wounded. In the larger aspect
of a military event the conflict at Limestone Ridge is not to be
mourned. On the contrary it has exalted the character of the Province.
“Whether any of the three” says Major Denison, that is, Akers,
Dennis, or Booker, “had reflected on the propriety of moving a
large force by rail through a wooded country at night, and through
a section not properly reconnoitred, and in close proximity to an
active enemy, does not appear in the official reports.”
Whether the three had an overflow of courage at Colborne before the
hour of trial, or were only in their normal condition of heroes, held
back and impatient of restraint, may never be known. But though each
became separated from the other two in the operations of next day,
each earned the distinction of avoiding, in a conspicuous hurry, the
risk of captivity with the Fenians. Colonel Dennis when attacked at
the village, ran down Niagara side, reached the house of Mr. Thomas,
shaved off his beard, and changed his clothes and so escaped capture.
Capt. Akers, by his own account, made tracks through the woods
towards Port Colborne in a buggy, at the same time as Colonel Dennis
shaved himself, that is about 2 p. m. Lieut.-Col. Booker had then
reached Colborne from the battle of Limestone Ridge thirteen miles,
much flurried.
The other marked passages in Colonel Peacocke’s report refer to the
delay caused by want of haversacks with the volunteers, and the time
at which he got a message from Lieut.-Col. Booker through Detective
Armstrong. This last falls to be noticed in next chapter but one.
Major Denison says, referring to Chippewa, morning of June 2:
“Colonel Peacocke’s reinforcements were to join him sometime in
the morning, and being anxious that there should be no delay in
starting, he telegraphed back to Hamilton and St. Catharines
directing that the reinforcements should bring with them a supply
of cooked provisions, so that no delay should be occasioned by
waiting to get breakfast for the men after they arrived. At about
4.30 a. m. the expected reinforcements came up and after being
unloaded, Colonel Peacocke mentioned to the officers commanding
that he should march at six o’clock, it being then nearly five.
_They at once objected on account of their men not having had any
breakfast, and very little to eat the whole of the previous day_,
and they were unable to bring anything with them, _as they were
unprovided with haversacks in which to carry it_.”
Severe animadversions have been directed against this commander for
his having delayed on that morning to give his own regiment and
other regulars breakfast, while the Hamilton, and Toronto Volunteers
had marched to battle while fasting. It was the volunteers, newly
arrived at Chippewa, not the regulars, for whom breakfast and
delay were requisite. Whatever the degree of misfortune may have
been, arising from that circumstance, it was directly traceable to
the misjudged economy of the Provincial executive in not having
provided equipments for volunteers suitable for the field and to the
negligence of commanding officers, who preferred scrupulous attention
to the inferior trifles of parade show, well enough in their way,
but not vital to the soldier’s efficiency in fight, existence under
privation. Two more passages are here materially important.
“Being unwilling to set out upon a very severe march, to finish
probably with a severe battle, and through a country where it would
be difficult to get food, Col. Peacocke decided it would be better
to wait an hour to enable the men to get breakfast, and immediately
telegraphed to Lieut.-Col. Booker to delay his march an hour. This
message, did not reach him until he was engaged with the enemy.
_Had he started at the proper time he would have received the
message before he left_, for even to have reached Stevensville at
9.30 it was not necessary for him to leave Port Colborne until six.
He was at the battle ground, three miles from Stevensville at 7.30;
and if not interrupted would have reached Stevensville at 8.30,
about an hour earlier than Capt. Akers mentioned, and two hours
before Colonel Peacocke’s time of junction. This mistake of one
hour led to his not receiving the message to delay, and therefore
caused him to be really three hours too soon.
“It must not be forgotten that at the time Colonel Peacocke decided
to wait that there was no reason for him to fear any ill result
from the delay. At that time he expected that a heavy battle would
take place, before the Fenians would be driven out, and that
instead of the object being to prevent them getting out of the
country, the opinion of every one was, that the great difficulty
would be to drive them out, and that he was right in proceeding
cautiously with that object in view. At any rate he anticipated
that the steamer (for which he had given orders to be employed)
would have prevented their escape.”
In another passage the writer speaks thus, of the plans of Dennis,
Booker and Akers, at Colborne in contravention of their chief at
Chippewa;
“There was the commanding officer’s plan changed by his
subordinates almost at the moment of execution. The three
officers whom he had charged with the execution of his orders,
even including the staff officer who carried them, coolly forming
themselves into a mimic council of war, aided by a customs officer,
and unitedly deciding upon a plan which has been previously shown
to be absurd, a plan for cutting off the Fenian retreat to the
east, but leaving the whole country open to them to the west, as
well as uncovering the canal they were sent to protect.
“Again Lieut.-Col. Dennis’s instructions were to wait further
orders before any attack was made; and yet Capt Akers says, he
was anxious to move with the volunteers at once without arranging
a junction with Colonel Peacocke. Capt. Akers was sent to go
with Lieut.-Col. Booker, and consult and advise with him on Col.
Peacocke’s plan, and assist him in carrying it out. Col. Dennis was
sent to command the ‘Queen’s Own,’ and yet before receiving any
answer from Col. Peacocke, both these officers, in disobedience to
orders, went off in the tug to carry out their own plan.
“The only way in which their conduct can be accounted for is,
that they were so confident that Col. Peacocke would at once fall
in with their plan of operation in lieu of his own, that they
never, for one moment, calculated that his answer would be in the
negative. Being imbued with this idea it can readily be imagined
that Capt. Akers would not be very particular in going into details
and explaining minutely to Lieut.-Col. Booker the plan which
they had both looked upon as virtually abandoned. It can also be
conceived, even if Capt. Akers did enter minutely into the details
of the plan laid down by Col. Peacocke, that Lieut.-Col. Booker
believing that it was a useless precaution, would not give so
close attention to it, or be able so clearly to remember it, as
if he felt when he heard it he was about setting out to put it in
execution.
“It also so happened, unfortunately, that Captain Akers, fearing
the delays which often occur in the movements of a large number
of men, as a matter of precaution directed them to start an
hour earlier than they should, and to be an hour earlier at
Stevensville, thinking that in all probability at least an hour
would be lost in setting off, or on the march, and that if they
were before the time they might be kept back a little on the way.
If he had staid with them to have kept them back, it would have
been all right, but unfortunately he was away when he was wanted.
“Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Capt. Akers as stated in the report,
without receiving any answer from Col. Peacocke, left Port Colborne
about 4 a. m. in the tug ‘Robb’ which had at that time arrived
taking with them the Welland garrison battery (but without cannon,
these having been removed to Hamilton, and not then returned) under
command of Capt. Richard F. King, and a few men of the Dunnville
naval company under command of Capt. McCallum.
“After they had left Colborne Lieut.-Col. Booker received a
telegram from Col. Peacocke directing him to adhere strictly to the
first plan, the particulars of which had been carried to him by
Capt. Akers.”
This telegram was in these words, “Chippewa 3.45 a. m. Have received
your message of 3 a. m. I do not approve of it. Follow original
plan. Acknowledge receipt of this. GEORGE PEACOCKE.” Major Denison
continues:
“Lieut.-Col. Booker, therefore had set out upon his march without
the assistance he should have received from Capt. Akers, and
without the opportunity of referring to him for enlightenment on
those parts of his instructions which he did not clearly understand.
“Having his men all ready in the cars to start, and having heard
that the railway was clear as far as Fort Erie, he decided to go
by train as far as Ridgeway, and to keep his men in the cars, or
at least under arms for the short time he would have to delay
before starting. Having his men thus all ready there occurred none
of that delay which Capt. Akers had anticipated, and to provide
against which he had named an earlier hour for starting. Being in
the cars ready, and only waiting for a particular hour to arrive,
it can readily be believed that he would be likely to start a
little before the time rather than after it. However this may be,
there is no doubt Lieut.-Col. Booker started at least as early
as 5 a. m., an hour or more earlier than necessary. Immediately
after the force had left a telegraph arrived from Col. Peacocke
directing Lieut.-Col. Booker to delay his march for one hour, which
would make his time of arrival at Stevensville between 11 and 12,
cautiously feeling his way in the direction of the rendezvous, Mr.
Stovin of the Welland railway seeing the importance of the message
took a hand car and followed Lieut.-Col. Booker as fast as he
could.”
The more exact fact is that Capt. McGrath, general manager of the
Welland line, seeing the importance of the message took the hand
car, Mr. Stovin with him, and proceeded about half way, five miles,
when they saw the train returning from Ridgeway after debarking the
troops. Capt. McGrath stopped it by signal, and having a pressure
of business on his own line returned with the train to Colborne.
He directed Mr. Stovin to be exact in noting the time at which the
telegram was delivered to Col. Booker, as he already foresaw through
the various nature of the orders with an apparent desire to disobey
them, that trouble would arise. The message was delivered at 7.30,
when the action was just begun at the Ridge and not at 9.30 as stated
by Lieut.-Col. Booker, “when the troops had been under a hot fire
an hour and a half.” This telegram was addressed “to the officer
commanding,” and said; “Be careful in feeling your way for fear
obstacles should prevent a junction; if possible open communications
with me. I will do the same. G. Peacocke.”