_Combat on Limestone Ridge._
Lieut.-Col. Booker produced the following as having been written
by him at Colborne after the arrival of Capt. Akers: “_Mem._
leave not later than 5.30, at 5 if bread be ready. Move to depot
at Erie and wait till 7. If not communicated with by 7, move to
Frenchman’s Creek. If NO by telegraph, disembark at Ridgeway, and
move to Stevensville at 9.30. Send pilot engine to communicate with
Lieut.-Col. Denison at Erie and with telegrams.”
About that bread. The reeve of Colborne offered to provide rations
for the 13th if presented with a requisition. Booker said; “No;
I think the least the municipality can do is to provide us with
rations.” He did not then give a requisition. But bread and cheese
for supper were procured. About three in the morning an officer went
to him at the house of Mr. Pring, customs collector, and spoke of
breakfast being requisite for the men before starting on the march.
Lieut.-Col. Booker was then seated with a dish of hot beef-steak
before him. He replied to the officer: “I am very tired. Go see what
you can get from the reeve or any one in the village.” The officer,
accompanied by the Quarter-master of the Toronto Rifles, went to the
reeve’s house; knocked at the door; saw a window raised, and heard
an angry reply to their request, “You got all the bread I had hours
ago.” Then the reeve shut down his window, and they went elsewhere.
That was the bread, the supply of which, Capt. Akers had made a
condition in the time of marching. What bread? None. The Lieut.-Col.
who had his hot beef-steak as a foundation for the fatigues of the
day, had presented no requisition, else the baker, being also reeve,
would have readily complied with it. Booker says (Statement to Court
of Inquiry)
“During the night at my request Major Skinner endeavoured to secure
a bread ration for the men. Some biscuits and bread were obtained,
and that officer reported to me that the baker would prepare a
batch of bread to be ready at 3 a. m. of the 2nd.”
This is not true. It is of minor importance to other mis-statements
of this gentleman, and is only noticed here, as showing that his
story laid before the Court of Inquiry was unreliable, even where he
had no motive for erratic obliquity. He did not concern himself about
the men’s rations further than to murmur over his own substantial
breakfast that he was very tired, and request some one else to do
informally, what he should have done officially. The irregularities
of the day had commenced. Applications were made to several owners
of stores and crackers and red herrings were obtained, but in small
quantity. Some men got half a herring; others a whole one; some
had crackers; some had none. They who ate no herring were the most
fortunate; for that June day became hot, and they had no canteens in
which to carry water.
“Move not later than 5.30, at five if bread be ready.” He knew he had
made no requisition on the baker. Officers of the “Queen’s Own” were
running hither and thither in search of food. Meeting Mr. McGrath of
the Welland railway they implored him for something to eat. He gave
them crackers for which they were thankful. As there was no bread to
wait for, Booker left Colborne at 5-8 a. m. Twenty minutes afterwards
the telegram arrived from Col. Peacocke ordering him not to move
until 7.
The train arrived at Ridgeway about 6, having proceeded over the
intervening ten miles slowly and with due caution, so far as the
engine driver had command. The Fenians instead of being at French
creek were halted on the Ridge road, three miles distant and had sent
forward scouts to watch military arrivals at this station. No sooner
did the small volunteer army alight than emissaries of the enemy
numbered them and went off with information.
The combined force of Q. O. Rifles from Toronto, 480; of York and
Caledonia companies, together 95, and 13th from Hamilton 265;
numbered, 840 of all ranks. Only one company of Q. O. had ammunition.
Why they had come from Toronto without it, and been scattered
through Colborne village without pickets, or guards, or sentries,
can only be accounted for on the supposition that Col. Dennis, who
came in command of them and leaving them to Major Gilmore, started
off on an enterprise of his own devising at 4 a. m., had an imperfect
conception of the military art, though holding the office of Brigade
Major of the 5th military district. Why the Q. O. were sent from
Toronto without ammunition, Major-General Napier knowing that fact,
and telling them they were likely to be engaged with the enemy within
twenty-four hours, (his first speech), or within twelve hours his
second version of first speech, the powers of common sense fails to
comprehend.
Quartermaster-sergeant Stoneman of the 13th supplied ammunition to
the Toronto, York, and Caledonia Rifles at Ridgeway. The percussion
caps ran short. Some of the York and Caledonia getting only 40 caps
to 60 cartridges. There was a large surplus of cartridges left, but
no caps. With difficulty and delay, Q. M. S. Stoneman pressed a
farmer’s waggon into service and followed after the column which by
that time had marched out of sight. No guard was placed by Lt.-Col.
Booker over the ammunition. Dr. Ryal junr. of the 13th had been
supplied at his father’s expense with some surgical necessaries. But
there were no hospital ambulance.
Arrived at this point, with mind depressed by fault-finding, by
recital of official negligences, by wants not supplied among the rank
and file, the follower of this little army enters within a fresher,
higher, moral atmosphere. The mind is now carried to a height from
whence it beholds heroes. They may not be all developed. He is not
the best soldier who distinguishes himself even in some very notable
performance of gallantry. The true and good soldier is he who keeps
his place in the ranks, goes where he is ordered to go, does what
he is ordered to do. The men of the column now before us may have
no demand made on them this day, to display the qualities commonly
called heroic. The nervous and unsteady will sometimes rush upon an
enemy with a vehemence which the world applauds. That is not heroism.
The popular idea of high courage displayed in battle, is the charge,
the shout, the rush with bayonet on the enemy’s line. That charge
of bayonets has on occasions been effective, but it neither evinces
high courage, nor is it often a safe movement. There is no man
breathing who approaches the verge where the enemy’s fire may open,
or who being within it hears the whiz of mortal missiles of death,
but fears to be a victim. Courage is not a condition of mind which
has no fear; courage is the conquest of fear. Without fear there
is no courage. Of all the forms of danger from an enemy in battle
the most trying to the manhood of the soldier, is bullet firing from
forest thickets, from orchards, from behind curtains of concealment,
out of houses, over garden walls, under covert of field fences; from
behind trees. In such places the enemy is not seen or is but dimly
discernable. In the greater fields of carnage where columns are
undergoing rapid evolutions, and moving through massive formations
exposed to quickly repeated vollies of artillery, men do not feel
so acutely apprehensive, and sensitive. The reasons why not are
various. The sight of blood maddens some. The magnitude of sanguinary
havoc deadens the more delicate senses. Combativeness is inflamed.
The desire to destroy obtains ascendancy. In the more intellectual
natures the thought of death and the hereafter have been committed to
the mercy of Almighty God. It has been done silently, and military
duty, proceeds as if there had been no praying. The individual
reckons on being killed. Unless he be fool as well as sinner he has
not deferred repentance and prayer to that supreme hour. If he finds
himself alive, and unhurt where many have fallen, he accepts the
renewed term of life calmly, but inwardly gives Heaven his gratitude,
feeling that he has yet some good service to perform for himself,
kindred, country.
If these columns of subdivisions now marching from Ridgeway station
up the Ridge road, have some quality that the hypercritical must find
fault with, it is a disposition towards too much levity. These young
volunteers are rather too sure that a fight with the Fenians will do
them no harm. But this condition of gaiety has another meaning. It
is young life in the morning of promise. That lightness of laugh,
aptness of jest, gaiety of remark, that general vivacity is the
sparkling of a native born, self-reliant spirit. Underneath lies
manly fortitude.
“With ball cartridge, load!” These words of command at Ridgeway
Station fell upon youthful ears with more meaning than any other
words of command, at any time previously. Yet their full import may
not have been comprehended. The Toronto men, clothed in dark green,
ten small companies, had the lead, right in front. To Trinity College
company of that battalion, only about twenty strong, the York Rifles
were added, also in green. Next was the 13th, six companies, in
scarlet. The Caledonia men wearing green, formed a rear guard. The
Toronto field officers left their horses at Colborne, because said
they, with some prudent ideas of difficulties to come, horses would
be of no use in forest thickets; because said they afterwards,
horses could not have been safely landed from the cars at Ridgeway.
Major Skinner of the 13th took his horse, and lent it to Lt.-Col.
Booker.
The road from Ridgeway station is skirted on each side with the
ancient forest, but occasionally with cleared patches on which are
dwellings and gardens, until you reach up about as far as the houses
near to the letters B B on the map. There the cleared land widens on
either hand. Towards the left the woods are seen forming a waving
line, five, six, and seven hundred yards back to north-west, several
farm fields with zigzag rail fences intervening. On the right hand is
a space of pasturage unenclosed, broken on the front near the Ridge
road with shallow quarries of limestone, lime-kilns now disused; much
debris of broken stone; occasional trees dotted on the surface; the
extent upward over a gentle elevation, three or four hundred yards.
This is a section of Limestone Ridge. Its first boundary is that
marked garrison road, and school house. The bugler sounds. The column
halts. What is the matter? One on horseback comes to Lt.-Col. Booker
and informs him that the Fenians occupy the road, and positions on
the ridge within the fields and orchards, about three quarters of a
mile further along to north-east. This is Squire Learn a justice of
peace. He has been considerably beyond Hoffman’s tavern, and says
he had come within sight of Fenian outposts on the road near to the
place of letter C on the map where subsequently the square to receive
Cavalry was formed. The Squire was fired upon. He had, he says, been
commissioned by government to assist the commanding officer with
information, and is now fulfilling this service. Little more of him
was seen. The Colonel might reasonably doubt every man’s fidelity.
Possibly he doubted this gentleman. Possibly he doubted none. But
there were somewhere around him, persons professing to be friends who
were not trustworthy.
Something in motion by the edge of the wood down on the left, drew
the Colonel’s attention. He consulted with Adjutant Henery of the
13th and other officers. They and he differed in opinion. By aid of
his field glass, he saw, so he affirmed, at least 200 Fenians in the
wood, some mounted. They said there were only some cows and a man on
horseback driving them. This matter did not involve any important
issue. It was only a farmer, one of the Angurs, “running his cows
off.” Yet the Colonel acted prudently, with the concurrence of Major
Gilmore, in sending skirmishers across the fields to discover if the
enemy occupied the woods on the left. No opposition was met in that
direction.
Let us look at the ground before taking up the story of the fight.
We have arrived at the crossing of Ridge road, and Garrison road;
the latter leading to Fort Erie, distant seven miles, eastward to
the right hand. At our left is a tavern, a white house and red barn,
called the Smuggler’s Home, but which on the map bears the occupier’s
name, Hoffman. This was afterwards used as a temporary hospital; so
also the next two houses near the bend of the road, now in rear of us
towards Ridgeway. On the Garrison road which, with a gentle ascent,
crosses over the stoney ridge, and penetrates the forest thickets, is
a school house.
Crossing a rail fence from the Garrison road, a person tracing the
movements of the combatants, enters a field, which in June bore a
crop of young wheat. Let this fence be named 1. The wheat field is
about 200 yards wide. At fence 2 many bullet marks are seen. Cross
it; the field lying before you, 350 yards wide, bears a crop; half
spring wheat, half grass. Near fence 3 is a large maple, at 20
yards from the junction with the cross fence—that which runs nearly
parallel with the front of the wood on your right hand. Here is a
small enclosure of a quarter acre. Within this lay a Fenian picket
at the commencement of the conflict. Behind this small enclosure,
on ground stoney and slightly rising, are thirteen scoriated trees,
leafless and of dismal aspect. The field beyond fence 3, has a crop
of rye. The rye field merges with an orchard. The Fenian right flank,
advance, occupied this orchard at the first. At the head of this
orchard towards the right is a copse of thick brushwood, and on its
higher edge a low stone wall running parallel with the upper woods,
and about 150 yards from their front. Getting through the orchard
and this copse and across another patch of open land about 100 yards
wide, you reach a concession road. Its distance from the Garrison
road is about 800 yards. This concession way crosses the Ridge road.
You see in the corner a brick house—that is J. N. Angur’s house. The
fences on each side of this road are, in the present reckoning, 5
and 6. The Fenian main body occupied that road, where the map shows
black. They took the rails of fence 6, and laid them slanting on
fence 5, with a face for a screen against bullets towards the south,
from which direction the Canada volunteers were to advance. At bottom
of that orchard on the Ridge road are two barns and a dwelling-house,
a few hundred yards south of J. N. Angur’s brick house, which you see
in the corner.
Crossing that concession road at about 300 yards east of J. N.
Angur’s brick house, you are well up on the crown of the ridge. To
your left is Stoneman’s orchard; and at the bottom of that orchard
on the Ridge road is Stoneman’s house, and Reinhard’s house. Beyond
Stoneman’s orchard, on the Ridge road, at the letter A. is Henry F.
Angur’s house, where O’Neil made his head-quarters. Keeping near
the crown of the ridge, where the concession road was crossed, you
follow the track on which the Fenians fell back. You cross fence 7,
and fence 8, and observe that they join at an angle. Also it is to be
noticed that a portion of each is thrown down. From much treading,
the grass shows here that a crowd had left a beaten track. This track
was made by the Fenians hastening to another position in their rear.
They having got through fences 7 and 8, had a thick pine wood on
their left front; the fence 9, beyond a narrow wheat field crossing
before them, and a maple grove of grand old trees, standing on their
right, within which they buried some of their dead. You can see the
grave of four. It was when they were driven back over fences 7 and
8, and out of Stoneman’s orchard by a concentrated fire from fences
5 and 6, concession road, that Booker’s bugles three times sounded
_retire_. The Fenians then encouraged to a fresh attack counter
marched round by the higher woods, and did execution on the retiring
volunteers; the deadliest of it on those nearest the upper woods, the
University Rifle company as we shall presently see.
Observe that all the open ground lying to the left of the Ridge road
and down to a marshy rivulet on the edge of the forest, is farm land.
It is intersected by many rail fences, all of zigzag form. The York
Rifle, and Trinity College companies got along the lower edges of
those fields, and on the concession road, formed the left of the
advanced skirmishers.
The Toronto Rifles had the lead assigned them, Major Denison says
because they were the senior corps. Coming up from Ridgway No. 5
company, under Captain Edwards, were sent forward as an advanced
guard. They were armed with Spencer rifles. On arriving near, perhaps
a little beyond, that part of the road marked B. B. intimation of the
enemy having then been given by Mr. Peter Learn J. P. No. 5 extended
from its centre. The troops were marching in a column at quarter
distance. No. 1 moved forward and extended on the left, and No. 2 on
the right of No. 5. As supports No. 3 formed the centre; No’s 4 and 6
the left and right.
In this formation one does not recognize an adherence to any ordinary
battalion movement. Indeed throughout, the Q. O. seem to have acted
as independent companies. After moving on in this way for some
distance, according to Major D’s report, but precisely how far I
have failed to ascertain, No. 7 was sent out as a flanking party to
the left towards the woods on that side, supported by No. 8, Trinity
College company. This last was but a section, about twenty in number.
Subsequently, the University, and Highland Companies No. 9 and 10
went on the right; but for the present they formed a reserve. The
York company went with the Trinity college youths as an additional
support on the left.
The advance was steady. They with the Spencer rifles had only thirty
rounds of cartridges per man, and these they fired rapidly away. They
fell back, some reports say in seven, others in ten minutes from the
time they began to fire. Rapid firing, with repeating rifles had in
that instance the disadvantage of too quickly expending an imperfect
supply of ammunition; but it produced noise, and had a formidable
appearance. It assisted materially to drive back the foremost Fenian
pickets. In crossing into the first field from the garrison road an
officer of No. 5 was killed.
At this time, seven to ten minutes after the first firing of the
Fenian pickets on the advance of the Queen’s Own, the Hamilton 13th
moved over the stoney ground on right of Ridge road, distant from
Garrison road, about a hundred yards. Companies No’s 1, 2, and 3,
then advanced and extended as skirmishers; their supports being No’s
4, 5, and 6, Major Skinner and Adjutant Henery accompanied the front
line. “They advanced,” says Adjutant Henery, who is an experienced
Sergeant from Her Majesty’s Coldstream Guards, “as steadily, evenly,
as ever did soldiers on a field day.” Said Sergeant-Major Rosconnell,
an old British soldier, “their advance over the fences and across
those fields was as regular and steady as could be desired.” This
was strictly a battalion movement. The Queen’s Own also advanced as
companies, regularly, steadily, but not as a battalion. Let us here
observe them from the high ground beyond concession road, as the
Fenian chief O’Neil saw them. This is how they looked to their enemy:
The _Nashville Press_ of July 9, 1866, reported a statement made
the day before by O’Neil, on the occasion of a public reception.
“Tell us,” cried a voice in the crowd, “about the ‘Queen’s Own.’”
He responded: “I desire to rectify a mistake about those troops. It
has been said that they acted in a cowardly manner. Not so. _When
they advanced in line of battle in their red uniforms they presented
a beautiful appearance. It was one of the prettiest sights I ever
witnessed. The line was well formed and their advance was brave._”
Words similar to these had been used by General O’Neil at Buffalo.
The present writer did not at first attach importance to this matter,
until he observed that the Nashville statement was so well accepted
at Toronto by some who have with an unsoldier-like spirit underrated
the 13th, to exalt the Queen’s Own, that they reprinted the paragraph
omitting the distinctive mark of the 13th, “their red uniforms.” It
was known that not only on the American side, but generally about
Ridgeway and Fort Erie, Canadian residents spoke of the volunteers
collectively, who had been engaged, on June 2nd, as the “Queen’s
Own.” For the accuracy of history, in face of this perversion in
Toronto newspapers, a writer whose constant aim is historical
accuracy and fair play to all persons irrespective of frowns or
favours, addressed, General O’Neil, as to which of the reports was
the true one. He replied thus: (The letters in full will be seen on
another page);—Nashville, Tennessee, July 31st 1866.
“In answer to your inquiries I beg leave to state that on account
of the prominence given to the ‘Queen’s Own’ by the American and
Canadian newspapers, I had been led to believe that they were the
principal troops opposed to me on the 2nd of June last. And as the
red uniform appeared to me the most conspicuous on the field, I had
taken up the idea, without making any inquiry on the subject, that
the ‘Queen’s Own’ were dressed in red. In my speech at this place
I did not intend to distinguish the troops dressed in ‘red’ from
those dressed in ‘green’. I intended to speak of the whole when I
stated that they fought well.”
Thus, from the enemy’s point of view on those heights above
concession road, it is seen that while nothing was observed
detracting from the steady, soldier-like gallantry of the Toronto
and York and Caledonia Rifles, who wore green uniforms, the equally
soldier-like gallantry of the Hamilton 13th is vindicated. The enemy,
against whom a force advances in mortal conflict is the best judge
of the effect which it produces. Prisoners taken, and other Fenian
informants, concur in stating that while the men in dark green (Q.
O.) had driven in the advanced Fenian pickets, it was the additional
line, the line of red which decided them to abandon the concession
road. About the same time, the University Rifle Company supported
by Capt. Gardener’s Highlanders (Denison’s Hist.) advanced on the
extreme right. “There,” says a writer in Toronto _Leader_ “they bore
the brunt of the battle.” The University youths like all else on the
field were brave, and bravely did their duty, but it was not while
advancing on the enemy’s position that their casualties occurred, nor
while keeping that post on the right under cover of the wood on the
upper ridge. They suffered severely, but not yet, and not there.
From the accounts so plentifully written by members of the Q. O. in
various newspapers the writers seem to have exhausted their soldierly
qualities on the field of fight. It is not soldierly, when the fight
is over to take pens in hand for the detraction of another portion
of the force equally engaged with themselves. The 13th continued to
advance and co-operate, all its companies as a battalion; its three
companies of skirmishers, and its three companies of supports. It
had not been ordered, it was not its duty to take the place of Q. O.
companies that they might fall to the rear. Its duty was to do what
it did, advance as closely as practicable upon the enemy, and make
the best use of its arms and the position. The ultimate position was
in the orchards north and east of the concession road.
The Q. O. companies interchanged and relieved each other, or without
being in each case, relieved, fell back, making a column of reserve.
The order in which this was done cannot be distinctly traced, as few
of the Q. O., officers or men, agree in giving the same statement.
Captain Gardener, (Court of Inquiry,) speaks of having been twice
with his Highlanders sent to the front. Major Gilmore says (Court
of Inquiry,) Gardener did not retire from the front until the last.
Capt. Adam is represented as saying that he and No. 6, Q. O. drove
the Fenians out of J. N. Angur’s brick house, which is situated in
the corner at the crossing of Ridge road with concession road; while
again Lieut. McLean (Court of Inquiry) relates that his company on
the concession road, should have been relieved by one of the 13th,
which did not advance so far, and that on its default to relieve him
he said to his men “peg away”, and they pegged away accordingly. Mr.
McLean’s story in other respects is equally marvelous. The 13th were
in the front. They had nobody to relieve. The duty of all was to
fight, not to fall back.
Three companies of the 13th had advanced upon the brick house and
to right and left of it. No. 1, Capt. Grant, Lieut. Gibson, Ensign
McKenzie, took a position extending up the concession road, where
Fenian breast-work of rails had been. No. 2, Capt. Watson, and Lieut.
Sewell, [Ensign Baker of that company being with the regimental
colours at the reserve], occupied a space of the road on each side
of the brick house, within and in front of it. No. 3 company, Lieut.
Ferguson, [his Capt. absent, and Mr. Armstrong, his Ensign, with
the 13th’s colours at the reserve], advanced upon concession road
to the left of J. N. Angur’s brick house. Finding here that his men
could not fire at anything but a thicket of orchard trees, where
no enemy was visible, Mr. Ferguson advanced his company across the
road towards the letter B of the map, half wheeled to the right and
obtained a range of fire towards a Fenian position beyond Stoneman’s
orchard. No other company was so far advanced towards the enemy. Mr.
McLean says he and a subdivision of No. 6, Q. O. were there; others
say no. Major Skinner and Adjutant Henery with portions of the 13th
took possession of the brick house and the garden in front. The
front garden gate and house doors were all fast until they forced
an entrance, and took up a fighting position. Fenians were not
driven out by the Q. O.; they had not been in. But that house was
then in the range of Fenian bullets. Nor did the 13th find the Q.
O. in possession of the premises, nor see them in front, except a
very few, some half dozen men, on the road, their companies having
scattered and gone back as part of the reserve, so these men said. At
the corner of Angur’s barn an officer of the Q. O. was industriously
firing the rifles which two or more men behind the barn loaded for
him. This was probably Capt. Adam; because, Major Denison says p. 43,
“For some reason the company of the 13th which was to have relieved
No. 6 Q. O. Capt. Adam, marched up to the brick house, where No. 6,
after driving out the enemy with great gallantry had established
itself; and both companies remained in that position fighting
together.”
The meaning of this is obscure. A tone of doubt is not here assumed
as to the gallantry of the Q. O. but as to the exactness of their
recollections, or of the description of their motions. I heard
this brick house incident freely spoken of at Toronto before Major
Denison’s book came out, and have therefore been more particular in
examining the recollections of the 13th. The skirmishers of that
battalion, extended on both sides and in front of Angur’s brick
house, have a vivid recollection of Major Skinner and Adjutant Henery
going along their line, speaking words of cheerful encouragement,
patting some of the youngsters on the shoulder, accompanied with
remarks, such as, “good boys; take steady aim; do not throw away your
fire; do not expose yourselves needlessly”.
There is a large single tree on the Ridge road side, fifty yards or
so, to north of Angur’s brick house, and near to that tree a land
roller. In the hinder part of the frame of the roller is a bullet
hole made by a shot which came from the direction of the barn 200
yards behind Angur’s house. Adjutant Henery and some men were firing
from behind the roller using it and the tree as cover, when that
bullet struck close to his head, he kneeling and taking aim. This was
a circumstance to make him look around and notice who was shooting
in that direction. Nobody was then visible except men in scarlet,
none of whom could have fired that shot, and eight or nine Q. O.
men, who said their company had retired to the reserves, but that
they had remained. This incident is only named as a marking place of
memory. Major Skinner who commanded the three companies in front is
equally clear that men in scarlet uniforms were the sole occupants
of those premises and of the concession road adjoining, as of the
orchard across concession road, when he advanced and held possession
of it. From the nature of the ground which undulated, and from
frequency of wooded thickets, and orchards interrupting the view,
the Q. O. companies which went earliest to the front, especially
those on the extreme right, became concealed to those behind. And
the 13th when they soon after advanced still further to the front,
were in like manner indistinctly seen by the Q. O. who fell back.
When the right wing of the 13th had advanced in even skirmish line
about 400 yards, from garrison road, the left wing under Major
Cattley advancing compactly, as supports, at an interval of 150 or
200 yards, the coolness, caution, precision of eye and soldier-like
watchfulness of the officers were happily exemplified. Major Skinner
having passed along the skirmish line to confer with the adjutant
and observe what was in the front, and on the right flank noticed
objects which some of the 13th were about to fire at. These objects
from their apparently stealthy motions in the bush were supposed by
some to be Fenians. The Major perceived they were not. And Captain
Grant also reported to him that men in dark clothing were creeping
about under cover and occasionally visible in the higher wood, on the
ridge, easterly; that he had difficulty in restraining his company
from firing on them as Fenians; but that he did not think they were
Fenians. Major Skinner said they were not the enemy, and went along
the extended files of No. 1, as also did the officers of the company
giving the men caution that the heads indistinctly seen in that bush,
up to their right, were not heads of the enemy. It is probable they
were the University Rifle Company, perhaps also Captain Gardener’s
Highlanders.
Soon after this the supporting companies of the 13th occupied the
orchard, which is about 200 yards south and in rear of the skirmish
line on concession road. These were No. 4, Lieut. Routh (Capt. John
Brown absent with leave) and Ensign J. B. Young. No. 5, Capt. Askin
and Lieut. Ritchie. Captain Askin is assistant engineer on the Great
Western Railway. I, and the battalion, and the public, are indebted
to him for the map of Limestone Ridge, published herewith. He had
been absent at Windsor when the alarm to assemble, fall in, march,
was given at Hamilton. A telegram told he was wanted. Taking the
earliest train east, he heard at Paris that the 13th had gone by B.
and L. H. Line to Dunnville. He overtook them at Port Colborne, just
as they were marching for Ridgeway. The other company in support,
occupying that orchard, was No. 6, Ensign Roy. Captain Irving of this
Company was absent from Hamilton when they left, and thinking to
reach the battalion by a shorter route followed Colonel Peacocke’s
force, by which he was prevented from reaching the field of fight in
time, much to his mortification.
At a point of the Ridge road about 400 yards north of Angur’s brick
house, a reserve of the Q. O. was halted. The two colours of the
13th, carried by Ensigns Armstrong and Baker were here, in their
proper place. Also the men guarding the colours, and some orderlies.
Major Gilmore (Court. of In.) mentioned this reserve as comprising
green and scarlet uniforms. Those just indicated were the only
officers and men of the 13th there at that time. The only companies
of men in green not in the reserve on the road, when the hottest fire
was being delivered in front by the skirmishers, were the University
and Highlander companies then engaged on the extreme right; Trinity
College and York companies on the left, not then exposed to Fenian
fire. The Caledonias forming a rear guard; and desultory portions of
several Q. O. companies on the concession road, or under the trees
or about the barns. It being said by Major Denison that No. 6, Capt.
Adam, was there, that must also be admitted, but if so, that company
was considerably scattered towards the rear.
All these in the front delivered a steady, well sustained fire,
forward, and into copse woods, and places of covert where the Fenian
smoke and rattle indicated the enemy to be. At no place, in front
of concession road, could more than 200 yards of clear range be
seen. Very few casualties had then occurred, the Fenian bullets
going high. Both Q. O. and 13th men were struck in rear of the
line of skirmishers by bullets flying over the heads of the front
line. Besides the enemy were retiring before the steady, brave,
soldier-like advances of the Q. O. front companies and 13th The
Fenian chief says the men in red were the more conspicuous; but both
his testimony, and that of others competent to judge give the Q. O.
and York Rifles credit in largest measure, highest degree, as well
as the gallant 13th in red. Had there been any generalship then, the
fight was won. Major Denison says p. 44:
“Our troops had been in this position for some time when it seems
that the Fenian leaders decided to charge again, to drive our men
back from the line they had carried.”
Charge again, means that they had charged before. Nobody saw them
charge either before or then. Their tactics were exclusively
movements under cover. They crept from bush to bush. They were
retiring to get round to concession road to retreat to Fort Erie.
They could not have come round the right flank, on crown of the ridge
without being seen by the U. R. and Gardener’s companies posted
there, and by Grant’s of the 13th. Major Cattley of 13th who was
attached to the three companies of supports was at the upper end of
the orchard, at a copse where the low stone wall, before mentioned,
ran parallel with the ridge, 100 yards from the wood on the ridge,
and he saw persons, supposed at the time to have been Fenians the
same as were seen from the Q. O. reserve and Capt. Grant’s company of
13th. If these had been the enemy no better place than that low stone
wall could have been found to shelter troops to keep the position and
drive the Fenians back. Major Cattley made his apprehensions known.
But the brigadier, Lt.-Col. Booker, made no disposition of force in
that direction, nor in any other. These men in the upper wood, and
near to it, were the U. R. and Highlander companies of Q. O.
Two Fenian officers had been at different times seen on horseback.
One was unhorsed, the animal galloping away to eastward with empty
saddle, itself wounded. It was found dead at the top of H. F. Angur’s
field, near the wood of the Fenian graves.
If cavalry had been seen in that direction which it was not, it could
not have charged either upon skirmish lines, or supports, or reserve.
There were several high zigzag fences, impassable by cavalry, had
there been any, on the right, on the left, and in front, except only
in front of the reserve when it stood on the Ridge road. And there
also it was flanked with fences, proof against cavalry. Major Denison
says p. 44.
“The skirmishers seeing the mounted men coming towards them,
thought a body of cavalry was going to charge; and raising a cry
that cavalry were coming began to run back, calling out to the
reserve ‘look out for cavalry’. The reserves were on the road and
there mounted men were also seen upon it. Lieut.-Col. Booker, from
the position in front of the reserves, could not possibly see
for himself whether the report was true or false; but hearing it
reiterated, he called to Major Gilmore to ‘look out for cavalry.’
Major Gilmore therefore ordered his battalion to form square. This
was done. The bugles sounded to ‘prepare for cavalry!’ and the
companies on the flanks ran in—some forming in rear of the square,
others forming rallying squares in the fields, and afterwards
falling back on the main body.”
How or why Major Denison could have written this story can only
be accounted for, by his saying in his book that for information
received, he tenders his thanks to Lt.-Col. Booker.
To the facts as they were; not as the story was afterwards concocted
and imagined. The facts were these. Between the place of the reserve
on ridge road, letter C on the map, and J. N. Angur’s brick house,
there are two houses on the left of the road, and a barn on the
right of it. From undulations of the ground, bending of the road,
and orchard trees, Booker and those near him, behind that house next
to the reserve, could not see along the road. He had been screening
himself from imaginary bullets. He knew nothing of what was going on
at the front, or to the right of the skirmish line. He was not in a
place to see. He was not in a condition of mind to understand. But of
that presently. The Q. O. men and officers who were scattered behind
the other houses and barn—[not improperly, shelter was legitimate to
all who could obtain it where duty required them to be]—they could
not see farther to the front along ridge road than 100, 200, to 300
yards. But Major Skinner and part of the 13th were in possession of
the brick house and orchard opposite. They could see farther along to
north-east, and saw no horsemen in that direction, nor heard any cry
of cavalry. Adjutant Henery of the 13th, and some men were advanced
still farther, out on the open of Ridge road, they heard no alarm of
cavalry. Capt. Ferguson and his company of 13th, were still farther
advanced, by the side of the orchard on left of the Ridge road, near
Stoneman’s house, at letter B of the map, they heard no alarm of
cavalry. All these ultimately retreated; but when they reached the
place where the reserve had been, where the square had been, where
the cry of cavalry had been,—all had vanished. The cry of cavalry
did not come from the front. Those who were fighting in front,
and came in, when they discovered that their supports were gone,
saw no reserves, no square. They were afterwards told that such
formations had been. Nor did these men, with their company officers,
and the battalion officers, Major Skinner and Adjutant Henery, see
Lieut.-Col. Booker. None of the 13th had seen him after commencement
of the action, except the few with the colours and the orderlies, and
they had been in action one hour. Several persons had noted the time.
The retreat, the confusion, did not originate in the cry of cavalry.
The fight was a soldier’s battle, not that of a general. No coherent
words of command had been given by Lt.-Col. Booker. The fight was won.
The Fenians were retreating. With waggons and stores they were
getting away to Niagara river Ferry from Henry F. Angur’s house,
O’Neil’s head-quarters. They were throwing food out of the waggons
to make room for the wounded and hurrying around to be off. Captain
Mahony came into Henry F. Augur’s house, hurriedly put off his
uniform and assumed the clothes of a labouring man to disguise
himself. They were destroying arms and ammunition, which they could
not carry with them. Unused rifles and bayonets in quantities they
were plunging into a marsh to be hidden. On the upper woods they
were retreating on the run to reach round to the concession road and
so on to Fort Erie village. They had lost the battle. What stopped
them? O’Neil and his officers heard Booker’s bugle sounding _retire_,
that stopped them. A second time it sounded _retire_. A third time
_retire_, and the call to _double_.
At first the Fenians thought this was a trick of tactics to draw
them on in pursuit, and into ambush. They were cautious, but at last
discovered that the force which had advanced upon them so gallantly,
steadily, beautifully, was actually retreating, and in confusion.
They then raised a shout. They followed up. The U. R. Company had
been nighest to them, nearly concealed in the upper wood. It did not
hear the _retire_ and lingered. When the increase of Fenian firing,
with shouting, and the decrease of firing on their own skirmish line,
led them to examine their position, the U. R. retired. And then came
their casualties. They were now at short range and shot down; so also
the Highland Company, but in less degree.
Let us examine that bugle call, _retire_. Sergeant Gibbons of the
13th, (an experienced soldier of H. M. 71st), says: “It was that
bugle call, _retire_, that began the confusion. The first call was
for the skirmishers to come in, and also the second, and they were
retiring, in proper order; but the third was given with the _double_;
and then men came running, and leaping, over fences, and stumbling.”
Capt. Grant, who was with Lieut. Gibson, beside No. 1 Company of the
13th, highest up concession road, except U. R. and Highlanders, heard
the bugle call _retire_. He knowing the enemy had been retreating,
and Fenian fire declining, remarked; “what is meant by that _retire_?
Why is it sounding?” On its second call they retired upon their
supports at head of the orchard. Others fell back in obedience to
that call, and formed on the supports. Major Skinner, Adjutant Henery
and the force nearest their position at the brick house, and in
the orchard beyond the house, over concession road, remained, the
bugle sound not having reached them through the noise of firing, and
impediments of trees.
O’Neil does not admit that he was beaten. Perhaps he did not feel
that he was. But in his Nashville speech he admits that he felt the
necessity of retreating, having a formidable force in his front, and
knowing that, “two or three other small armies were pressing forward
to overwhelm his small and inadequate force.” He was retreating,
pressed by the gallant 13th, and Q. O. with York and Caledonia
Rifles, and would have yielded the field to their advance, had not
the unaccountable retreat of his assailants recalled him to action.
They of the skirmish line who heard the first and second calls
retired. The supports retained their places in the orchard until the
third call and double were sounded. Then they also retired across the
orchard, fields, and fences towards the Q. O. reserve. Then arose the
panic; the cry of, _look out for cavalry_. Perhaps O’Neil and his
mounted officers may have been seen at this crisis riding to their
front to ascertain what was the matter. Perhaps some of the portions
of companies and officers of the Q. O. who were near Lt.-Col. Booker,
beside the barn where he had taken his station, with its walls in
front of him, the orchard on his right hand, nothing visible to him
but the reserve in his rear and the persons around,—it may have been
some of these who cried “look out for cavalry” if he did not himself
imagine its presence. Booker did not know where his front skirmish
line was, did not know that some were beyond hearing the recall of
the bugle from his place of retirement, did not know the enemy had
retreated. The bugler bears testimony that Booker gave the commands
to sound. He seemed to have decided, so far as, in a condition of
imbecility and nervous prostration, he could decide anything, to
retreat from the field of action.
It had been his custom on field days, and Hamilton holidays, to
follow the call of _skirmishers retire_, with _form square_; _prepare
to receive cavalry_. My old note-books written when looking on,
bear that record, so do the memories of his men. Perhaps, in this
hour of his mental prostration he reverted to the old rotation of
movements learned from a book, and gave the order to the bugler _form
square_. Charity would rather believe that he made that mistake in
forgetfulness, than that his vision of cavalry, crossing a variety
of fences, five and six feet high, in pursuit of the retiring
skirmishers, whom he had called in, led to the formation of a square.
An hour and a half earlier, the action about to begin, but no shots
fired, he mistook a farmer “running off his cows” for a Fenian force
of two hundred men, some of them mounted. In his narrative to the
court of inquiry, concocted after the events, and in contradiction to
animadversions on his conduct published two or three days after the
2nd of June, he said: “I observed loose horses moving about in the
woods to our left, but saw no men.”
Officers of the 13th who were then beside him, would make affidavit
were it required, that he said to them his field glass enabled him to
see, distinctly two hundred men, some of them mounted. But these are
gentlemen of honor. They have passed their word to this statement,
their word is sufficient. Thus we have it that Lt.-Col. Booker,
entered on the field seeing cavalry where none were.
It was shortly after this, at 7.30 a. m. that Mr. Stovin of the
Welland railway delivered the telegram from Col. Peacocke, to
Lt.-Col. Booker who expressed, in words of vehemence, anxiety for a
messenger to go to Col. Peacocke. Detective Armstrong was at hand and
offered to go. “Tell him,” said Col. Booker, “how I am situated,”
“you must write it,” rejoined Mr. Armstrong. “I have no paper!”
Booker fumbled about his person and finding no paper said: “tell him
that”—Armstrong repeated that he must have a written message. “Well
then, don’t go at all,” Mr. Lawson of Port Colborne who was present
offered paper. Mr. Armstrong gave paper and pencil. Lt.-Col. Booker
enquired the time and was told by Lawson, by Stovin, by Armstrong and
others 7.30. He wrote 7.30 the only portion of his despatch which was
legible. Mr. Armstrong says it was written on paper given by him.
Booker says to the court of inquiry that now 9.30; “I turned to
Detective Armstrong and wrote on the telegram which I had received
that the enemy had attacked us at 7.30.” Mr. Stovin says: “It seemed
a strange thing to me that he sent away the telegram he had received;
and still more so that after Armstrong was gone, he inquired of me
where that telegram came from. He had not read Chippewa.” Squire
Learn said of Booker, then: “If they have not got a fool for a
commander, he is something worse.”
The time of 7.30, put in the past tense, was an after-thought for
the Court of Inquiry. Mr. Armstrong, rode out two horses in seeking
Col. Peacock, and delivered that paper, he will swear if required,
near Black Creek by 8.30. He is positive it was delivered within the
hour from the time of his getting it. From whom Booker got paper is
in itself immaterial. He went to the field in command of a brigade,
without a map, without a pencil, without a scrap of paper. Says Major
Denison, apologetically, p. 39:
“Lt.-Col. Booker was on this eventful morning, for the first time
in his life in command of a brigade.... During his whole military
career he had never commanded a brigade of infantry, even at a
review, and was sent to the front merely as a commanding officer of
his regiment, the 13th and not in any other capacity. Chance threw
him into the position of a brigadier-general on the morning of a
battle, without any mounted staff, without any mounted orderlies,
without any artillery, or cavalry, and without a mounted officer
in the field but himself. Such was the position in which he found
himself when forming up his command at the village of Ridgeway
after taking them off the cars.”
Chance may have made that the morning of battle, but chance did not
find him in command of the brigade. On the cars all the way from
Hamilton he had boasted of his seniority to every other Lt.-Col. of
Volunteers likely to come in rivalry with him, and told in grand
tones that within a few days he expected to command a force of at
least 3,000 men. “And,” say the companions of his journey, “he talked
as if he were competent to command fifty thousand men.”
“Without a mounted officer in the field but himself!” By what chance,
since chance ruled the day, was he himself mounted? At Hamilton
before starting, an officer inquired “Are you not to be mounted
colonel? Why don’t you take your horse?” His reply was to poke the
officer in the side with his fingers, and say: “Skinner! there is
Skinner with his horse; I’ll dismount him.” So, that had Lt.-Col.
Booker supplied himself with a charger for the field, he would
have had at least one mounted officer besides himself. He says to
the Court of Inquiry, and Major Denison says; that finding himself
in command of the brigade, he handed over the command of the 13th
battalion to Major Skinner. Not true. He arranged that Major Gilmore
should handle the Q. O. and York Rifles, and that he would take the
rest. The only words approaching to an order given to Major Skinner
on that day were, to proceed to the front with the right wing of the
battalion, Major Cattley having charge of the left wing as supports.
Had Major Skinner been placed in command of the battalion, Major
Cattley would have gone with the right wing.
“In command of a brigade for the first time in his life.” The force
on Limestone Ridge was not at any time formed or moved as a brigade,
except on the line of march from Ridgeway to the place of first
deployance. He neither commanded his own battalion as such nor the
whole brigade as such. Yet the 13th did operate as a battalion The
Q. O. operated as a series of independent companies, some advancing,
some falling back, pretty much at their own will and option;
or dividing, some portions of a company remaining in position,
another portion falling back upon the reserve; no one in particular
controlling their motions.
Questions by Lt.-Col. Booker to Major Gilmore, Court of Inquiry:
“What did they,(the Highland Company) report on their return?” ANS.
“I do not recollect their return. I believe them to be the last to
leave the field.” Ques. “Did you see that we were outflanked on the
right?” ANS. “No.” By the Court. “On what do you ground your belief
that they were not outflanked on the right?” ANS. “Principally on
the statements of the officers and men who were out skirmishing on
the right.”
Following this Major Gilmore was asked by the Court, whose members
seem from first and to the end, to have had a very imperfect
knowledge of what occurred on the field, and small wonder, as they
shut themselves up against information, refusing to permit any one
who could have directed their inquiries to hear what was said by
others, except Lt.-Col. Booker, and peremptorily stopping explanatory
observations of witnesses, when they attempted to lead the Court into
a clear channel of information; Major Gilmore was asked: “When three
companies of the 13th were sent out to relieve the Queen’s Own, had
the movement been executed before the retreat was sounded?” ANS. “No;
so far as my knowledge extends. Both lines of skirmishers, Rifles
and 13th came in together.” The 13th had been out and their movement
executed nearly, if not quite one hour. Their movement was to drive
back the enemy. With the skirmishers of the Q. O. who remained in
front they did it.
Major Gilmore could not see from his position at letter C on the map,
where the right wing of the 13th were. He may have seen the rear of
the left wing, in the orchard before him.
“Did you notice,” asked Lt.-Col. Booker, “men coming down the hill to
our front at a double in front of the reserves crying, ‘cavalry’?”
ANS. “No.”
Previous to this Court of Inquiry, the story had been that the cry
of cavalry came along the Ridge road from direction of the brick
house.—That story being given up it was tried, on Booker’s behalf, to
fix the cry as coming down the hill from what he calls “our front,”
but which was his right flank, for he had never changed front, at
least his troops had not. That company was No. 1 of the 13th, coming
in at a run in obedience to the _retire_ and _double_. They had heard
no cry of cavalry.
No. 6 Company of the 13th being of the supports, the one nearest the
Q. O. reserve, got over the rails, not in time for the square, but to
form in rear of it. No other men in scarlet had reached that square
then, except they with the colours and the orderlies of the 13th. But
just as the Q. O. were being re-formed into column from the square,
which had been imperfectly formed and but momentary, (for, says Major
Gilmore, a sharp fire was then directed on it from the enemy’s front
and left,) No. 1 Company reached the ground. They hurrying over the
railings into the road, were about to form in rear of that reserve,
now half square half column, when it broke. It broke through No. 6 of
the 13th, and through No. 1. Capt. Grant was violently thrust against
the fence rails on a heap of stones. He saw some of his men trodden
down. Ensign Roy of No. 6 and some of his men were trodden down. And
in that moment of emergency Lt.-Col. Booker called the orderly who
held the horse, Major Skinner’s horse, and quickly vaulting into
the saddle rode off rapidly to the rear. All this has been denied
on behalf of Lt.-Col. Booker. Capt. Grant is a gentleman whose word
is not to be doubted. He saw the act of riding away. Others saw
the same. The companies of the 13th, which had been coming into the
road at the call of _form square_, on seeing the reserve broken and
hurriedly retreating continued their line of retreat across the
fields towards garrison road. The companies at the front which had
not heard the bugle call to retire, observed their supports gone, and
retreated along the ridge road. When arrived where the reserve had
been there was no reserve, no square, no column, no Queen’s Own.
Bugler Clarke says Booker ordered and he obeyed to sound the halt.—It
was sounded, but most say who heard it, rather faintly, bugler
and colonel being both in a hurry. The Court of Inquiry makes one
witness, Mr. Urquart assistant editor of the Hamilton _Spectator_,
and who was in the ranks of the 13th to say:
“Several attempts by officers of the 13th and the Rifles were made
to rally or re-form the men. I noticed Colonel Booker and Adjutant
Henery do this, and Ensign Armstrong who carried the colours.”
Mr. Urquart did not say this. The Court made several answers into
one; thereby placing Booker where he was not. Adjutant Henery was
not where Booker was. Mr. Armstrong was with the colours, but Booker
was not there. Mr. Urquart was in No. 4 Company, which under Lieut.
Routh was one of the supports at the head of the orchard to the right
front of the square C. “What made your Company retreat?” asked the
Court. “We retreated because the bugle sounded retreat; and we were
also ordered to retreat by Lieut. Routh the officer in command of our
Company, who afterwards said it must have been a mistake as it should
have been the advance, and ordered us to halt and front—and we halted
and fronted accordingly.” Then, as the skirmishers came in rapidly in
obedience to the call of _double_, they all retreated. There was no
reserve to go to, it had melted away. No. 4 Company and No. 5 under
Captain Askin again halted and formed at the corner of garrison and
Ridge roads. By that time also Major Skinner, Adjutant Henery and
they who had been in the most advanced front got up; all tried their
utmost to re-organize a force to withstand the enemy now steadily
though cautiously coming in pursuit. Lieut. Gibson of No. 4 saw
Adjutant Henery near the log house (see map) at a tree, assembling
men around him; also Major Skinner near the same spot endeavoring to
arrest and re-form the retreating current, which was then a mixture
of green and red uniforms. He saw Captain Davis of the York rifles
making efforts to organize a force near Mrs. Ryerson’s house. Major
Skinner had partially succeeded in forming a red line across the
road with fixed bayonets directed against the retreat. But his men
were overborne by a rush from behind. Lieut. Routh was there shot
through the body and carried into one of the houses. The University
and Highland companies were then streaming along, having left several
dead and wounded on the track of their retreat. Brave spirits all.
Youths of fair promise cut down in the morning of life, who an hour
before had, with the rest, driven the invading strangers before them,
now destroyed on a retreat which should never have occurred, for
which there was no cause, the culpable author of which was away on
horseback to the front, among the leaders of the panic.
He denies, and loud denials have been made on his behalf that he went
away on horseback. Captain Grant saw him ride off, when the square
and the column dissolved. The Revd. Mr. Inglis who, as a minister
of religion accompanied the 13th from Hamilton, and witnessed as
much of the action as lay between Garrison road and concession road,
and was now on the ammunition waggon with Q. S. Stoneman, says; “I
saw Colonel Booker on the horse (Major Skinner’s) coming towards
Ridgeway.” “Oh no,” said Colonel Booker to the Revd. gentleman when
before the Court of Inquiry, “I was on foot, not on horseback.” But
Mr. Inglis was not mistaken, and he is a witness not to be overborne
by such questionable obliquity of an inculpated party. Lieut.
McKinnon, Caledonia company, said “Col. Booker was on horseback when
he came to Ridgeway.”
But, “Colonel Booker may have hastened to the front of the retreat
to intercept it.” Did he? What in this supposition comes of the want
of evidence of his trying to stem the panic which he had made? What
comes of facts to the contrary, showing that he not only hurried
away himself but prevented others from arresting the retreat? Here
are facts which would have been given in evidence to the Court of
Inquiry, which sat at Hamilton in July, had its members summoned
witnesses whose names were furnished to them, but whom they did not
call. A volunteer officer who commanded a company in the action wrote
to Hamilton for the information of the officers of the 13th. He said;
“Have Lieut. Davis of York Rifles, and Capt. Jackson of Caledonia
Rifles summoned, witnesses as to the language and action of Col.
Booker upon the 2nd ult. I will give you a resume of what they will
swear. Mr. Davis stopped the Colonel (Booker) and begged him to
halt, and rally the men as they knew him. The reply he got was: ‘We
must go to the lake shore.’ Some distance farther on he came up to
Captain Jackson’s company which was the rear guard. He asked, ‘what
company, and who commands?’ and received the reply as above (that
it was rear guard, Caledonia company, commanded by Capt. Jackson).
Then Colonel Booker said: ‘Save yourselves men, the Fenians are after
you!’ The company broke at once, until stopped by their Captain.”
The writer continued: “I have not the slightest ill-feeling, or
wish, for Col. Booker. On the contrary I feel heartily sorry for the
man; but I do not think it fair that the good name and fame of the
officers and men of a good regiment should be impugned, much less
sacrificed, to shield the incompetence of any man. I think I am only
doing my duty as a man who loves his country, and as a volunteer who
knows the stuff there is in the force, if I can throw any light upon
the cause of the disaster of the 2nd of June.”
The gentlemen indicated by this officer were not called, though their
names, on behalf of the slandered 13th, were furnished to the Court
of Inquiry. As was also the name of Captain McGrath, Manager of the
Welland Railway, whose important statement will be read presently. At
the end of August while these pages are preparing for the press, I am
in receipt of a letter; from which the following extract is made in
reference to the passages just quoted: “Had Lieut. Davis been called
before the court he would have given his evidence without any malice,
fear, or favour.”
“Must go to the lake shore.” Could not halt then. The lake shore,
from the point where this fugitive speech was made, Mrs. Ryerson’s
house or thereabout, was eight, or ten, or more miles away according
to the road he might take. By the road he took it was twelve miles
away.
Major Gilmore says (C. of In.) he could have at any time halted and
gathered around him a few hundreds of men, but deemed the effort of
no use. He saw officers at different points of the road “exciting
themselves frantically” to arrest the retreat. Such were his words,
but he was more cool and allowed things to happen as fate and
confusion without a commander would have it. Lieut. Arthur of the
Q. O. has been reported as grandly stemming the tide of retreat,
in its very front, at Ridgeway. He may have been one of those who
“frantically excited themselves.” A more practical question, is;
how did Lieut. Arthur get there so soon? Mr. Arthur a civilian gave
evidence to the Court of Inquiry somewhat exculpatory of Booker. But
it is not forgotten at Hamilton that this same Mr. Arthur returned
from the field of action, where he had been a non-combatant, on the
evening of 2nd of June, and at the railway depot was the first to
give intimation that Booker had broken down as commander and made a
fool of himself.
Men of the 13th called to mind on the line of retreat, that when
Booker was largely pompous at the Hamilton drill-shed on the previous
morning he said, “I know you will follow me.” They followed, but only
a few could get sight of him.
Captains Grant, Askin, Ferguson, Lieut. Gibson, and other officers of
the 13th got sight of him half a mile past Ridgeway. A considerable
force was then halted on the road. They expected that a stand would
be made, the ground being advantageous for resistance, and fighting.
Booker was heard calling for somebody to show the road to Port
Colborne. To a farmer looking on, he trotted up, then returning to
the imperfect column cried “Fours right, quick march!” And so the
return to Colborne was continued in that disorder which incompetency
had initiated, and aggravated. Sometimes he was seen riding, again
walking, and trotting on foot in the semblance of a man crazed in the
head. At Sherkston, five miles west of Ridgeway, they got a railway
train to Colborne. It took them at two trips.
At some point on the road Booker turned to observe the dislocated
column and accosted Sergeant Gibbons whom I have named as affirming
with others that the bugle calls of _retire_ and _double_ gave origin
to the retreat. This general of brigade, who had been so grand
yesterday, that “he looked and talked as if able to command fifty
thousand men,” and who at Port Colborne had asserted his seniority
and displaced the officer who came in command from Toronto, now
murmured in whining tone, and broken speech; “Sergeant, I suppose
this is not your first engagement with an enemy? It is mine.” He gave
the horse to carry a sick man, and on this his apologists form a
claim for magnanimity. It would have been the attitude of a General
to remain mounted, especially on the retreat, that his person might
be observed, his place known, his command heard. A true soldier,
while modest, mild, keenly perceptive that necessary equipments were
present with his force, while days were pleasant and peaceful, would
have now risen with the crisis, firm in his saddle, firm in mind,
lofty with the great emergency, to retrieve order out of confusion.
But Brigadier-General Booker straddled on foot a little while, then
got on the horse a little while, got down again, and again ambled on
foot, seeking sociality with the bugler, the groom, the sergeant,
abjectly mumbling that he had never previously been in battle; then
getting hold of a Lieutenant’s arm said; “I am a failure; I have
failed; I acknowledge my failure.” And to a Captain uttering words
to the same effect. And at Port Colborne continuing his abject
confession to others.
Generous minds might have forgiven him after his miserable
confessions however much they deplored the unhappy consequences of
his incompetency, triumph to the enemy, derision of the Province by
Americans; wild invention of calumnies against the 13th battalion,
because he, its Lt.-Col., had involved the Q. O. Rifles in discredit.
In face of all this his subordinate officers and battalion might
have pitied the man while they deplored his military failure. But
with a feeling of safety to his own person, he began to retract
his confessions of incapacity, and to give currency to accusations
of blame on his troops, and proclaim himself a martyr. At Colborne
a report of the morning’s work was written for the authorities,
imperfect, and untrue. He did not seek the assistance of any officer
of the 13th all of whom could have informed him of as much of the
action as they engaged in the front could know. He did not employ
his own orderly room clerk to write for him. He got a person of the
Q. O. to write, in order to satisfy Major Gilmore; and even then the
Major gave only a general assent to the report. “Yes, its general
tenor was correct, and I assented to it.” But Major Gilmore was not
quite exact about it himself according to his own statement. The
report said the telegram arrived at 9.30 after an hour and a half
of hot fighting. That was not true. It spoke of driving the enemy
from their rifle pits. There were no rifle pits. It said we were in
a cul de sac. There was no cul de sac. All was open to the front
except intervening woods. The enemy had retreated through the woods.
The report said nothing of the 13th having as a battalion advanced
from garrison road across fields and fences half a mile, the enemy
retiring before their beautiful red line, and then across concession
road; they engaged in fight one hour, except the supports lying
within 150 yards of the skirmish line, which however were actually
advancing to the relief of their right wing when the retire stopped
them; while most of that _one hour_ the Q. O. were in reserve, two
companies on the right front, and one on the extreme left front
only excepted. On the contrary Lt.-Col. Booker caused a telegram
to be sent to his superiors reporting the 13th as demoralized, and
unfit for duty. It has been denied by himself and friends that he
did so. But it is known on the highest railway authority that such
messages with his name appended, went over the wires. A Hamilton
newspaper gave currency to that phrase, demoralization. Two days
after, Lieut.-Colonel Booker visited the reporter, and besought him
to retract the imputation, saying “You know it was not I who said
demoralized; it was that —— rascal Gilmore.”
THE SQUARE. _Ques._, by Lieut.-Col. Booker to Major Gilmore. “Were
you satisfied with my conduct on the field?” _Ans._ “Col. Booker
asked me the same question in Port Colborne, and I now give him the
same answer that I did then, which was that I could see nothing in
his conduct to disapprove of except with regard to the formation of
the square, which I thought at that time was a mistake and I think so
still.”
_Ques._ By Court. “Who gave the order to form square?” _Ans._
“Lieut.-Col. Booker gave the caution to look out for Cavalry, and I
gave the command to form square.”
AMMUNITION OF Q. O. The paragraph beginning on page 77, and ending
on page 78, in this chapter is inaccurate as respects the alleged
non-supply of ammunition; but not as regards the omission to post
sentries on the arrival of the Q. O. at Colborne. The misstatement
made on authority which I trusted was unfortunate, yet the ammunition
served at Toronto was inadequate to go into a locality near the
presence of an enemy. The following evidence touches this highly
important question:
_Ques._ To Alex Muir, Q. O. “How many rounds of ammunition had
been issued to you?” _Ans._ “I received 5 rounds at Toronto before
leaving; and 30 rounds at Port Colborne. I had 35 rounds.”
To _Ques._ of the Court to Major Gilmore; _Ans._ “No. 5 company were
armed, about forty of them, with Spencer rifles, and for those rifles
they had under thirty rounds each man; the remainder of the company
were armed with long Enfields. The whole regiment had on average
forty rounds of ammunition per man.” _Q._ by the court: “How long
were they under fire when the right wing of the 13th were advanced
to their relief?” _Ans._ “I could not form any idea as to the time.”
Major Skinner, Adj. Henery, Capts. Askin, Grant, Watson, Ferguson,
Lieut. Gibson, Private Urquart, Editor of Spectator, all say that the
13th were engaged about one hour.
DRILL OF THE Q. O. In reply to questions from the Court, Major
Gilmore said;
“They were as a rule partially drilled, some men undrilled.
Recruits are joining every week. All the available men, drilled
and undrilled, were in the field. With the exception of one or two
days in May when the whole battalion was out skirmishing, I am
satisfied that half of the battalion had never fired a shot,” (with
blank cartridge). _Ques._ “What proportion had not fired with ball
cartridge?” _Ans._ “The proportion was about the same; one half.”
_Ques._ “What proportion of the regiment was composed of lads
under 20 years of age?” _Ans._ “I should say more than half the
regiment.” _Ques._ “Did you observe any difference in the demeanour
of the lads and the older soldiers going into action?” _Ans._
“No. Each were equally cool. I may state here that this was the
first occasion in which the whole regiment had the opportunity to
skirmish as a battalion. I also wish to state that I saw the right
wing of the 13th extend and advance in skirmishing order, and that
nothing could exceed the steadiness and regularity with which they
advanced.”
LIST OF KILLED AND WOUNDED AT LIMESTONE RIDGE.
TORONTO Q. O. RIFLES.
KILLED.—Ensign Malcolm McEachern, No. 5 Company, Sergeant H.
Matheson, No. 1, Private Christopher Alderson, No. 7, Private M.
Defries, No. 3, Private W. F. Tempest, No. 9, Private William
Smith, No. 2, Private J. H. Mewburn, No. 9, Private M. McKenzie,
No. 9, Corporal F. Lackie, No. 2.
WOUNDED.—Captain J. B. Boustead, No. 3 Company, Lieut. J. H.
Beaven, No. 3, Lieut. W. C. Campbell, No. 6, Ensign Fahey, No. 1,
Color Sergeant Forbes McHardy, No. 10, Private C. F. Bell, No. 5,
Private W. Vandersmissen, No. 9, Private Kingsford, No. 9, Private
John White, No. 10, Private Paul Robbins, No. 6, Private Thomas
Oulster, No. 1, Private William Thompson, No. 2, Private Charles
Winter, No. 3, Private Colin Forsyth, No. 10, Private Edward Copp,
No. 5, Private J. H. Rutherford, No. 6, Private E. J. Patterson,
No. 9, Private Joseph Lugsden, No. 4, Private Alexander Muir, No.
10, Private E. T. Paul, No. 9, Sergeant William Foster, No. 7,
Color-Sergeant John Tuck, York Rifles. Private Robert Cranston,
ditto.
HAMILTON 13TH—WOUNDED.
Private Edwin Hilders, No. 1 Company, Private S. Dallas, No.
3, Private J. G. Powell, No. 3, Private James Stewart, No. 3,
Lieut. Routh, No. 4, Private John Donnely, No. 5, Private Richard
Pentecost, No. 3, Private McKenzie, No. 4.
Private Morrison died of fatigue. Several suffered from sun stroke.
Welland Field Battery, at Fort Erie Village. Wounded: Capt. King,
leg amputated. Sergeant Bradley, and several others very severely.
FENIANS KILLED.—Nine bodies found on Limestone Ridge, one at French
Creek. Several said to have been found dead near Fort Erie, and some
bodies carried to Buffalo. Most of the wounded were carried away; two
were brought prisoners to Colborne Hospital.
LIEUT.-COL. BOOKER’S REPORT OF THE COMBAT AT LIMESTONE RIDGE.
PORT COLBORNE, June 2, 1866.
SIR,—I have the honour to report that, in accordance with
instructions received from Colonel Peacocke, through Capt. Akers,
I proceeded by train at 5 a. m. to-day to Ridgway station on the
Buffalo and Lake Huron R. R., with the Queen’s Own, of Toronto,
Major Gilmore, say 480 men of all ranks; the York Rifles, Capt.
Davis; the Caledonia Rifles, Capt. Jackson; and the 13th Battalion
of Hamilton—together about 360 men—total of all ranks, say 840 men,
in order to form a junction with Col. Peacocke, at Stevensville, at
9 to 9.30 a. m. On arriving at Ridgway, I sent the Great Western
Railway train away; and as I could not obtain a horse or waggon
in the place for the conveyance of the force, I was compelled to
leave without the stores, and sent them back to Port Colborne at a
little before 8 a. m. We were feeling our way on the Stevensville
road, and were about three miles from that village, when our
advanced guard felt the enemy—Major Gilmore extended the Queen’s
Own in skirmishing order, in admirable style—the men advancing in
good spirits. They were supported and relieved, as required, by
the 13th Battalion of Hamilton and the Rifle companies from York
and Caledonia. After Major Gilmore had expended much ammunition,
he reported to me that his ammunition was failing. At 9.30, after
being engaged under a hot fire for an hour and a half, I observed
the enemy throwing back his right and reinforcing his left flank.
I immediately ordered up two companies in support, to counteract
the movement. At this moment I received a telegram by the hands
of Mr. Stovin, Welland Railway, on the field, informing me that
Col. Peacocke could not leave Chippewa before 7 o’clock, instead
of 5 a. m., the hour named by Capt. Akers on his behalf. The enemy
was strongly posted in the woods on the west of the garrison
road, the road forming the entrance as it were to a _cul de sac_.
We outflanked him, when he brought up his centre reserves and
outflanked us. We drove them, in the first place, over a mile, and
held possession of the rifle pits. A cry of cavalry from the front,
and the retreat of a number of men in our centre on the reserves,
caused me to form a square and prepare for cavalry. This mistake
originated from relieved skirmishers doubling back. I immediately
re-formed column, and endeavoured to deploy to the right. A panic
here seized our men, and I could not bring them again to the front.
I regret to say we have lost several valuable officers and men. I
estimate the strength of the enemy as greater than ours; and, from
the rapid firing, they were evidently armed with repeating rifles.
I have, &c.,
(Signed) A. BOOKER,
Lieut.-Col. Com. Vol. Militia.