accepting the old view that Germany was organized into a province,
or that any attempt was made to that end. On the other hand Riese’s
presentation of facts has definitely proved, beyond the chance for
further argument, that no such province was organized. But so strong is
the force of the preconceived and traditional view that Riese, despite
his successful attack on a part of it, expresses the belief that a
conquest of Germany was intended. However, we are by no means restricted
to Riese’s contention that Rome’s relations with the Germans, as a part
of the Gallic province, looked to their subjugation. If so, they would
have been treated as other peoples, including the Gauls, whom we know
Rome wished to make subjects, and would not have been left in a state
of uncertainty, neither a province nor yet wholly independent, as they
were left for fifteen years after Tiberius’ departure for Rhodes. This
very matter of indecision with reference to Germany has been suggested
as directly responsible for the catastrophe which befell Varus. So
Ferrero says[128]: “In Germany ... the people, apparently subdued, were
not bound to pay any tribute, and were left to govern themselves solely
and entirely by their own laws,—a strange anomaly in the history of Roman
conquests.” Nor in theirs alone, one may well add. It seems strange that
such an anomalous “conquest” should not long since have been recognized
as no conquest at all, and as nothing more or less than a desultory
series of punitive expeditions or of demonstrations.
Once more we press the question why, if Germany was not subdued by Rome
and never organized into a province, did Rome give up the attempt to do
so? Many, as shown above[129], argue that Rome was unable to accomplish
her purpose, and that the defeat of Varus was the great turning point
in her policy, and the direct cause for abandoning the attempt.[130]
Gardthausen in addition to the direct cause (the defeat) finds also a
more remote one.[131] He thinks that the unfortunate family estrangement
which in 6 B. C. drove Tiberius into voluntary retirement forced Augustus
to suspend or give up a plan that was well considered and already
successfully begun; that this advantage nevertheless was forever lost,
since Augustus could find no competent successor to Tiberius[132], and
was unwilling to entrust to one person the large forces which were
necessary to bring about the subjugation of the land. Although the war
with Germany was costly and fraught with danger, Delbrück is of the
opinion that Rome could reasonably count upon final success, since the
war party which is not strong enough to risk an engagement must sooner
or later succumb. Energetic prosecution of the war with Rome’s available
forces would without doubt have brought ultimate victory.[133]. But
the explanation why Rome did not continue the war which Germanicus was
apparently bringing to successful issue Delbrück discovers not in the war
itself, but in the inner conditions of the Roman principate. Tiberius had
become emperor only by adoption; Germanicus, however, stood in the same
relationship to the deceased Augustus in which the latter once stood to
Julius Caesar. Tiberius was by nature jealous, and concluded that for
his own safety he could not allow the same condition to establish itself
between Germanicus and the legions in Germany as had once existed between
Caesar and the legions in Gaul. To bring the war to a close required not
only a commander of the highest ability, and with great means at his
disposal, but one who had a free hand in the prosecution of the war.
Tiberius did not have a general who could meet the requirements, and even
if he had had such a one, would not have dared to send him. Hence after
watching the course of affairs for a year or two he recalled Germanicus,
and the Germans remained free.[134] Koepp[135] sees the reason for
Germanicus’ recall not, as Tacitus hints, in the jealousy of Tiberius,
but in the fact that Germanicus’ campaigns and losses were proving too
expensive.[136] Riese is closely in agreement with Delbrück’s view given
above. There was, he says, no change of policy on the part of Augustus,
but the change was due to Tiberius. Notwithstanding Germanicus’ loyalty
in putting down a rebellion in the legions, Tiberius was suspicious and
recalled him. The Roman troops were brought to the right bank of the
Rhine, and Germanicus, as commander of Gaul, never had a successor. Never
again was Tiberius willing to expose his power to the danger of great
leaders in command of the Rhine army. As a result of this decision the
frontier forces were divided into the armies of lower and upper Germany,
and, after the year 17 A. D., these were under the command of consular
legates, because Tiberius was too suspicious to allow the command of
these armies to be united with that of Gaul.[137]
The great diversity of views cited above shows that as yet no
satisfactory conclusion has been reached which will explain Rome’s
alleged change of policy toward German territory. As we have seen, many
have sought other reasons for this change beside the defeat of Varus,
a clear indication that it in itself is insufficient. If one must
assume such a series of personal and accidental causes, adding supposed
conditions of jealousy, weakness of the empire, inadequate finances,
etc., it is evident that the defeat of Varus ceases, even under the
most favorable interpretation, to be a great climacteric cause. It was
only one of a series of contributing causes, i. e., of relatively small
concern, and significant only because of chance association with other
reasons. The whole position of the theorists as to Varus’ defeat is full
of inconsistencies, assumptions, and inferences, at variance with the
evidence, and ending in the admission that after all several other causes
were equally operative. With this we may take leave of the traditional
view as to the significance of the defeat of Varus, in the conviction
that no one has reasonable ground to continue to espouse it, when once a
simple and satisfactory solution is offered that not only recognizes but
explains all the ascertainable facts. And at this point we may summarize
the objections which have been adduced against the belief that Augustus
had in mind the conquest of Germany:
(1) Varus was defeated with a small army in a battle which was
absolutely no test of the military strength of the two peoples.
(2) The defeat was completely avenged by Tiberius and
Germanicus, and Germany was overrun by them only a few years
later. Only twice in these campaigns did the Germans venture to
meet the invaders in the open field, and each time they were
severely defeated.
(3) The Roman power was vastly greater than that of even a
united Germany, and could unquestionably have completed a
thorough conquest had that been the desire.
(4) It was contrary in the first place to the well-known
character of Augustus to attempt this war of conquest, and
in the second place, after having begun it, to abandon the
undertaking.
(5) It was also contrary to the well-recognized peace policy of
Rome at this period.
(6) It was highly unlike Rome to give up this conquest on
account of a single setback.
(7) Whatever may have been the ultimate intentions of Augustus,
certainly the methods followed were utterly unlike those of any
conquest ever undertaken, and a rational criticism will try
to explain the facts rather than to twist them so as to fit a
preconceived theory.
(8) There was certainly no “_provincia_” to abandon, under any
circumstances.
(9) If there was any change of policy it was under Tiberius,
and to be explained by circumstances peculiar to that time.
Augustus, after the defeat of Varus, went on quite as he had
after the defeat of Lollius.
The cumulative effect of these objections is overwhelming, and causes the
student of history not only to feel sceptical about the significance of
Varus’ defeat, but strongly convinced that it played no such part in the
determination of Augustus’ Germanic policy as is generally supposed. And
since the current theory as to this defeat can be maintained only after
disregarding these several and serious objections, some interpretation of
Augustus’ purpose must be offered which will obviate these difficulties,
and still be consistent with his known policies and acknowledged acts. In
the following chapter it will be made clear that Augustus had no other
purpose in his operations in Germany than to make repeated demonstrations
of Rome’s power, in order to impress the barbarians[138], and to make
the frontier defense effective by pacifying and bringing into friendly
relations with Rome large parts of the bordering territory; that it was
not at any time his intention to conquer Germany, and organize it as a
subject province.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 41; 51; Idem, _Die Oertlichkeit der
Varusschlacht_, p. 207; Gardthausen, I, p. 1199. Ch. Gailly de Taurines
(_Les Légions de Varus_, Paris, 1911, p. 73) places the number as
probably 22,000.
[2] Vell., II, 119.
[3] Velleius’ words (II, 119) suggest a series of changing incidents
and conditions: “ordinem atrocissimae calamitatis; exercitus iniquitate
fortunae circumventus ... inclusus silvis, paludibus, insidiis”; cf. also
Tac., _Ann._, I, 65: “Quintilium Varum sanguine oblitum et paludibus
emersum”.
[4] Vell., II, 117; II, 120: “ex quo apparet Varum magis
imperatoris defectum consilio quam virtute destitutum militum se
magnificentissimumque perdidisse exercitum”; Suet., _Tib._, 18:
“Varianam cladem temeritate et neglegentia ducis accidisse.” Cf. also
Tac., _Ann._, II, 46: “quoniam tres vagas legiones et ducem fraudis
ignarum perfidia deceperit” [Arminius], where “vagas” suggests an army
marching in loose order, ignorant of the territory and without proper
leadership. So Mommsen (_Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 40) calls Varus: “Ein Mann
... von trägem Körper und stumpfem Geist und ohne jede militärische
Begabung und Erfahrung”; Deppe (_Rh. Jahrbr._, 87, p. 59) accepting
Zangemeister’s date for the defeat of Varus as August 2, 9 A. D. (see
_Westd. Zeitschr._, 1887, pp. 239-242) says that the battle followed a
feast day, which explains the enigma of how a Roman army of 18,000 men
could be annihilated by an unorganized German host: “Die Soldaten waren
an diesem Tage noch festkrank, nicht geordnet, überhaupt unvorbereitet,
entsprechend der Angabe des Tacitus, der sie in den _Ann._, II, 46, nennt
‘tres vacuas [vagas] legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum’”.
[5] Dio, 56, 20 f. says that the Romans were fewer at every point
than their assailants; moreover, the latter increased as the battle
continued, since many of those who at first wavered later joined them,
particularly for the sake of plunder. Mommsen (_Die Oertlichkeit_, etc.,
p. 209) thinks that from the communities which joined the Cherusci in
the uprising the Romans were confronted by numbers probably two or three
times their equal.
[6] Cf. Tac., _Ann._, II, 46: “At se [Maroboduum] duodecim legionibus
petitum duce Tiberio inlibatam Germanorum gloriam servavisse.” Mommsen
(_Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 34) estimates the combined strength (regular and
auxiliary) of the two armies in the campaign against Maroboduus at almost
double that of their opponents, whose fighting force was 70,000 infantry
and 4,000 horsemen.
[7] See Eduard Meyer, “Kaiser Augustus” (in _Kleine Schriften_, Halle a.
S., 1900, p. 486); Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 37; Shuckburgh, Suet.,
_Aug._, 24; Vell., II, 114. Ritterling (“Zur Geschichte des römischen
Heeres in Gallien,” _Rh. Jahrbr._, 114-115, p. 162) argues, on the basis
of three legions each to the nine provinces, that Augustus retained 27
legions after the battle of Actium. This is out of harmony with the
well-known view of Mommsen that Augustus had only 18 legions until the
year 6 A. D., at which time he raised eight new legions in view of the
uprising in Illyricum.
[8] _Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit_, I, p. 232 f.: “Der Verlust—er mag
16.000 betragen haben—erscheint trotz alledem nicht bedeutend genug, um
eine Wendung in der germanischen Politik zu rechtfertigen.” Koepp (_Die
Römer in Deutschland_, p. 34) agrees that it is absurd to think that
the loss of three legions could produce such a change in policy: “so
ist es doch schwer zu glauben, dass er [Augustus] in besonnenen Stunden
aus dem Verlust dreier Legionen die Konsequenz gezogen haben sollte,
dass es mit der Provinz Germanien aus und vorbei sein müsse.” Much the
same view is expressed by him in _Westfalen_, I, p. 40: “nicht als ob
der Untergang dreier Legionen ein Verlust gewesen wäre, der das Reich
in seinen Grundfesten hätte erschüttern können; wenn man in Pannonien
fünfzehn Legionen aufgeboten hatte, so hätte man auch am Rhein eine
ähnliche Waffenmacht zusammenbringen können, wenn wirklich der Sieg des
Arminius zu einer Gefahr des Reiches geworden wäre. Und später noch ist
Brittannien erobert worden, ist Dacien Provinz geworden, ist der Kampf
gegen die Parther aufgenommen worden.”
[9] _Hist. of Rome_, V, p. 61; cf. also p. 54: “The Romano-German
conflict was not a conflict between two powers equal in the political
balance, in which the defeat of the one might justify the conclusion of
an unfavorable peace; it was a conflict in which ... an isolated failure
in the plan as sketched might as little produce any change as the ship
gives up its voyage because a gust of wind drives it out of its course.”
[10] _Kaiser Augustus_, p. 116.
[11] _Kaiser Augustus_, p. 486; cf. Dio, 57, 5. However, Meyer attaches
undue significance to this fact. While the old rule confined service in
the army to citizens, in times of peril freedmen, or slaves manumitted
especially for the occasion, had been enrolled many times previous
to the occasion referred to—indeed as early as the Punic wars. See
examples cited by Shuckburgh, Suet., _Aug._, 25. According to Suetonius
_libertini_ were employed twice by Augustus: “Libertino milite,
praeterquam Romae incendiorum causa et si tumultus in graviore annona
metueretur, bis usus est: semel ad praesidium coloniarum Illyricum
contingentium, iterum ad tutelam ripae Rheni.” These two occasions, at
the uprising in Pannonia, and after the defeat of Varus, are mentioned
also by Dio, 55, 31 and 56, 23.
[12] This is the figure given by Ed. Meyer (“Bevölkerung des Altertums,”
_Conrad’s Handw. d. Staatsw._, 3rd ed., II (1909), p. 911), who
accepts with slight modifications, Beloch’s calculations. The latter
(_Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt_ (1886), p. 507) gave
54,000,000 at the time of the death of Augustus. In a later essay (_Rh.
Mus._, IV (1889), p. 414 ff.) Beloch raises materially his estimate of
the population of Gaul, which, if accepted, and it seems very plausible,
would affect somewhat the total for the empire. Thus H. Delbrück (_Gesch.
d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 175) after Beloch’s revision,
calculates the population of the empire at sixty to sixty-five millions,
and O. Seeck (_Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie und Statistik_, III, 13
(1897), p. 161 ff.), would prefer in many instances much more generous
calculations than those of Beloch. Compare, however, Beloch’s vigorous
reply in the same volume. We have preferred to accept, however, the more
conservative figure.
[13] That this was the custom followed for the _socii_ and _auxilia_
during the period of the republic is suggested by Pliny, _N. H._, 25, 33,
6, and the same general proportion seems to have been observed later, as
Tacitus, _Ann._, IV, 5, in speaking of the “sociae triremes alasque et
auxilia cohortium,” adds, “neque multo secus in numero virium.” Detailed
information regarding the size of these auxiliary contingents is nowhere
given. See Liebenam, art. “Exercitus,” _Pauly-Wiss._, VI, 1601, 1607. G.
L. Cheesman (_The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army_, Oxford, 1914 p. 53
ff.) finds that the _auxilia_ under Augustus were at least as numerous as
the legionaries, and later became more so. He calculates 180,000 for the
year 69 A. D., and 220,000 for the middle of the second century A. D. Cf.
also Delbrück, _op. cit._, II, p. 203 (2nd ed.).
[14] Cf. Ed. Meyer, _ibid._, p. 909. The evidence for the enrollment of
foreigners in the legions at this time is conveniently summarized by
Liebenam, art. “Dilectus,” _Pauly-Wiss._, V, 611 ff.
[15] Mommsen, _Eph. Epigr._, V (1884), p. 159 ff.; _Hermes_, XIX (1884),
p. 1 ff., esp. p. 11.
[16] We must remember that this restriction in the recruiting sources of
the legionaries was wholly an act of free choice on the part of Augustus,
whatever the motive may have been. That suggested by Seeck, _l. c._, p.
611, does not seem very probable; it involved a change in the usage to
which men had already become accustomed in the civil wars, and it was
gradually but completely abandoned by his successors. There was nothing
in the general conditions which required it.
[17] _Rh. Mus._, XLVIII (1893), p. 602 ff. His conclusions in part
rest on none too certain foundations, and introduce an insufficiently
motivated complexity in the system of levying troops, for Augustus at
the beginning of his career used non-citizen soldiers freely, and after
the defeat of Varus, of the two new legions which were raised one was a
Galatian contingent, the _Deiotariana_, which was given citizenship and
a place in the army (Mommsen, _Res Gestae Divi Augusti_, 2nd ed. (1885),
p. 70; O. Seeck, _Gesch. d. Untergangs d. ant. Welt_, 3rd ed., I, p.
260), and the other was recruited from the non-citizen population of Rome
(Tac., _Ann._, I, 31, “vernacula multitudo”; cf. Mommsen, _Hermes_, XIX
(1884), p. 15, n. 1). Seeck’s statement of the system which he believes
Augustus followed is: “Prätorianer und Stadtsoldaten rekrutirten sich aus
Latium, Etrurien, Umbrien, und den frühesten Bürgercolonien; den übrigen
Italikern sind die Legionen zugewiesen, den Bürgern der Provinz die
Freiwilligencohorten; aus den Libertinen setzen sich die Mannschaften der
Flotte und der Feuerwehr zusammen; die Nichtbürger bilden Cohorten und
Alen und einen Theil der Flotte.”
[18] In B. C. 8 it was 4,233,000; in A. D. 14, 4,957,000. See the _Mon.
Anc._, 8. Of course if we accept the view still defended by Gardthausen
and Kornemann that this number represented only the male population
(_Augustus_, II, 532; and _Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u. Statistik_,
III, 14 (1897), p. 291 ff.), a citizen army of more than a million men
might have been raised, but the view of Beloch and Ed. Meyer that the
numbers in the _Mon. Anc._ include women and children seems the only
one possible. See Meyer’s complete refutation of Kornemann, _Jahrb. für
Nationalökonomie_, III, 15 (1898), p. 59 ff.
[19] This figure, 800,000, is modest, amounting to roughly 1½% of the
total population, about the same proportion which Germany and France
have for some time past kept under arms in time of peace, while their
war strength is several times as great as this. Rome did actually at
one time, the crisis of the Second Punic War, have at least 7½% of her
total population in the field, even according to the most conservative
estimates. Cf. H. Delbrück, _Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, I, 2nd ed. (1908),
pp. 349, 355 ff.
[20] Mommsen, _Hermes_, XIX (1884), p. 3, n. 3, gives the number of Roman
citizens who were engaged in the war between Octavian and Antony as
300,000, which makes a total of 600,000 troops or more.
[21] The details in Marquardt, _Röm. Staatsver._, V, 2 (2nd ed., 1884),
p. 444 f.
[22] Or possibly 28; see von Domaszewski, “Zur Geschichte des
Rheinheeres,” _Röm.-Germ. Korrespondenzblatt_, 1910, on the date of
the establishment of the twenty-first and twenty-second legions. There
is some question about the exact date at which the increase in the
size of the legions was made (see the literature cited by Gardthausen,
_Augustus_, II, p. 775), but that does not affect our argument. See above
note 7.
[23] Mommsen, _op. cit._, p. 75; Liebenam in _Pauly-Wiss._, VI, 1605.
We must remember that this number was somewhat low; and was gradually
raised by succeeding emperors. Claudius added two legions, Nero one, and
Galba two, so that Vespasian had thirty, and that number seems to have
been maintained until the time of Septimius Severus, who added three
more. It is significant that Trajan found 30 legions quite sufficient for
extensive and difficult conquests, so that 25 would doubtless have been
regarded even by him as adequate for the conquest of Germany. For the
evidence of the gradual increase in the army see Marquardt, _op. cit._,
p. 448 ff.
[24] The evidence for the size of the legion at this time is conveniently
summarized by R. Cagnat, “Legio,” _Daremberg et Saglio_, III, p. 1050
f. The most elaborate discussion of the size of the legion (especially
that of Caesar) is in Fr. Stolle, _Lager und Heer der Römer_, 1912, pp.
1-23. He finds what he regards as evidence for legions of varying size,
from 3600 up to 5000 men. The standard legion of the empire, however, can
hardly have been less than 6000. Cf. also Fröhlich’s review of Stolle’s
work, _Berl. Philol. Wochenschr._, 1913, 530 ff.
[25] A list of these is given by Liebenam, _op. cit._, p. 1607 ff.
[26] Calculations as to the effective strength of the standing army of
Augustus vary somewhat. H. Furneaux (_The Annals of Tacitus_, I (1884),
p. 109), gives 350,000; Mommsen (_Hermes_, XIX (1884), p. 4—apparently
excluding the naval forces), 300,000 as a maximum figure; Seeck (_Rh.
Mus._, XLVIII (1893), p. 618) reckons on the basis of 20 legions (which
would be applicable only down to the year 6 A. D.) 132,000 citizen
soldiery out of Italy: in his _Gesch. des Untergangs d. ant. Welt_, 3rd
ed., I (1910), p. 255, on a basis of 25 to 30 legions, from Augustus
to Diocletian, he calculates the total forces of the empire at 300,000
to 350,000; H. Delbrück (_Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1904),
p. 174) counting only the 25 legions, estimates 225,000 men; if other
contingents be included the total would certainly exceed 250,000 even
on the basis of his extremely low estimates; Gardthausen (_Augustus_,
I, p. 635) estimates 250,000-300,000. The figure 200,000 which he gives
on p. 637 seems to refer to the conditions before 6 A. D., when only 18
legions were maintained. G. Boissier’s number, 500,000 (_L’opposition
sous les Césars_, 3rd ed. 1892, p. 4), seems to count the auxilia three
times, once in making up the number 250,000 for the legions, and again in
doubling that!
[27] For historical parallels to this condition compare Miss Ellen
Semple, _Influences of Geographic Environment_, New York, 1911, p. 215 ff.
[28] E. M. Arndt, _Zeitschr. f. Geschichtswissenschaft_, III (1845),
p. 244, calculated a population of 800-1000 per (German) square mile,
but only then on the assumption, which no man would now accept, that
the Roman reports about the primitive conditions of agriculture were
incorrect. On this estimate the population of Germany between the Rhine,
Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, which is the part generally considered in
the question of conquest, would have been roughly 1,840,000 to 2,300,000.
H. Von Sybel (_Entstehung d. deutschen Königtums_, 1881, p. 80) estimates
the Germans at 12,000,000, basing his calculation on a highly problematic
series of inferences regarding the extent of territory which the Sugambri
once occupied, 40,000 of whom were said to have been transferred to the
west bank of the Rhine by Tiberius. Karl Lamprecht, _Deutsche Geschichte_
(1894), I, p. 236 accepts the traditional statement that the Goths alone
amounted to five-sixths of a million, a reckoning which would make the
total population of Germany many times that number. Even G. Waitz,
_Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte_ (1880), I, p. 19, takes at their face
value such Roman exaggerations as 300,000 warriors for the Cimbri and
Teutones, 60,000 for the Bructeri, and the like, figures which presuppose
an incredibly dense population.
[29] _Histoire des Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France_, I
(1875), “L’Invasion Germanique,” p. 310 ff. For Delbrück’s results see
the chapter entitled “Zahlen,” _Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed.
(1909), p. 294 ff. On the actual number of the Vandals and their allies,
a cardinal point in the discussion, compare H. Delbrück, _Preuss.
Jahrb._, 81 (1895), 475 f. O. Seeck (_Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u.
Statistik_, III, 13 (1897), p. 173 ff.) argued unsuccessfully for the
older view, but Delbrück (_Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p.
308 f.) has completely settled this specific question.
[30] “Observations sur l’état et le nombre des populations germaniques
dans la seconde moitié du IVe siècle, d’après Ammien Marcellin,”
_Mélanges Cagnat_, Paris, 1912, pp. 247-267.
[31] “Der urgermanische Gau und Staat,” _Preussische Jahrbücher_,
81, (1895), p. 471 ff. The main arguments here presented (except the
detailed criticism and comparison of a number of ancient estimates, p.
474 ff.) are repeated with some slight modifications in his _Gesch. d.
Kriegskunst_, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 12 ff. L. Schmidt, _Gesch. der
deutschen Stämme_, I (1904), p. 48, accepts Delbrück’s calculations
indeed, though with some reserve; p. 46 f. he criticizes effectively the
absurd exaggerations with which the pages of many ancient authors abound.
[32] _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 482.
[33] _Grundriss der allgemeinen Volkswirtschaftslehre_, I, Leipzig, 1901,
p. 158 ff., especially 159 f. and 183.
[34] Velleius, II, 109.
[35] _Op. cit._, I, p. 48; II, p. 209.
[36] See Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I. p. 1169 on this campaign.
[37] This is the calculation Caesar uses for the Helvetians (_Bell.
Gall._, I, 29), and Velleius (II, 116) for the Pannonian rebels. Cf.
Beloch, _Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), p. 431, 1. L. Schmidt uses the ratio of
one to five. It seems more reasonable, however, to use the Roman system
of reckoning. Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, 81, p. 480, uses the one to
five ratio for the proportion of warriors who might be expected to attend
the war council, but that is a slightly different thing from the utmost
that a tribe could do in a desperate situation.
[38] That the Cheruscan confederacy was originally not more powerful than
the Marcomannic seems clear from the fact that, even after the defection
of the Semnones, Longobardi and certain Suebian tribes (Tacitus, _Ann._,
II, 45) Arminius and Maroboduus fought a drawn battle. Tacitus’ statement
that the counter defection of Inguiomerus was a complete offset is most
improbable; see L. Schmidt, _op. cit._, II, 2, 181.
[39] _La population française. Histoire de la population avant 1789_,
I, Paris, 1889, p. 99 ff. Otto Hirschfeld (_Sitzungsber. d. Berl.
Akad._, 1897, p. 1101) also uses this bit of evidence as a basis for
calculations. Beloch, however, (_Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), p. 414 f.)
utterly rejects it, because he insists on taking the word ἄνδρες here as
equivalent to fighting men. That is doubtless correct, but as it makes
arrant nonsense of the calculation, it should not be ascribed to so
well-informed a scientist as Posidonius, but only to the stupid Diodorus,
who has thus changed what must have been an estimate only of the total
population, into one of the number capable of bearing arms. Beloch’s
remark that the ancient Gauls had no idea of the total population, but
only of the fighting men, seems to go too far. If one number be known
it is an easy matter to calculate the other. Certainly Posidonius was
capable of multiplying any figures the Gauls may have given him for
their fighting men by 4 or 5, in order to secure an estimate of the
whole population. Besides, the Gauls must have had a certain accepted
proportion between the total population of a district and the number of
fighting men it could produce. They had a great many more occasions to
make use of such calculations than any one in modern times would ever
have; for questions of life and death depended only too frequently on
just such estimates.
[40] Strabo, IV, 3, 2.
[41] _Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), pp. 438, 443.
[42] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 47 f. Any exact calculation of the
total number of tribes in Germany is impossible because our knowledge
of the different tribal names comes from diverse periods, and the
designations of clans and confederacies varied greatly from time to time.
[43] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 428, note, and _Geschichte der
Kriegskunst_, I, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 14.
[44] _Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im Mittelalter_, Leipzig, 1886, I, p.
148 ff., esp. 161 ff.
[45] Assuming that the region occupied by the Germans in the time
of Augustus was approximately as large as the modern German empire.
Agrippa’s imperfect calculation, even including Raetia and Noricum, was
to be sure much smaller, i. e., 686 × 248 m.; Pliny, _Nat. Hist._, IV, 98.
[46] See Beloch, _Rh. Mus._, LIV (1899), pp. 418, 423, 428. In his
_Bevölkerung_, p. 457, he had estimated one in ten, which was too large a
fraction.
[47] Tac., _Ann._, I, 56.
[48] Tac., _Ann._, II, 16. This was the force later kept at the Rhine.
Tacitus, _Ann._, IV, 5; Josephus, II, 16, 4.
[49] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 481 f., has well refuted the Roman
claims of great numerical superiority on the part of the Germans, and
concludes that the forces on both sides were about equal. Judging from
the campaign against Maroboduus, which it may be noted, is the only one
in which we have apparently reliable information regarding the strength
of both sides, one might safely infer that, at least under Tiberius, the
Romans enjoyed actual numerical superiority.
[50] Delbrück, _Preuss. Jahrb._, p. 481, exaggerates somewhat the
advantage in cavalry which the Germans enjoyed.
[51] Velleius, II, 106.
[52] The overwhelmingly superior force of Rome is specifically admitted
by some historians, but hardly seems as yet to be generally accepted. See
especially Fustel de Coulanges, _Histoire des institutions politiques
de l’ancienne France_, vol. II, 2nd ed. (by C. Jullian), Paris, 1891,
p. 328; Ed. Meyer, _Kl. Schr._, p. 486; von Domaszewski, _Geschichte
der_ _römischen Kaiser_, Leipzig, 1909, p. 245. The same thing is meant
also by J. Beloch where he observes that the Romans recognized “dass die
Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde als das Objekt wert war”
(_Griechische Geschichte_, 2nd ed., vol. I, 1 (1912), p. 14).
[53] See p. 37.
[54] Cf. Koepp, _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 35: “Kurz, als Tiberius
am Rhein erschien, waren die Befürchtungen der ersten Aufregung schon
zerstreut, die Folgen des Unglücksfalls eingedämmt. Rasch war das Heer
ergänzt, ja vermehrt”; Hübner, _op. cit._, p. 111: “Nach des Varus
Niederlage musste zeitweilig das rechtsrheinische Gebiet verlassen
werden; Tiberius und Germanicus gewannen es wieder”; Mommsen, _Hist. of
Rome_, V, 53: “The defeat was soon compensated, in so far as the Rhine
army was immediately not simply made up to its strength, but considerably
reinforced”; Gardthausen, I, p. 1223: “damals ... wurde die Rheinarmee
auf acht Legionen verstärkt.” So Niese, _Röm. Gesch._, p. 298.
[55] Vell., II, 120: “mittitur [Tiberius] ad Germaniam ... ultro Rhenum
cum exercitu transgreditur.”
[56] Suet., _Tib._, 18 and 19; Gardthausen, I, p. 1224.
[57] Gardthausen, I, p. 1225.
[58] Suet., _Tib._, 19.
[59] Cf. Tac., _Ann._, II, 26, 4: “Precante Germanico annum efficiendis
coeptis.” This is the basis of Mommsen’s statement (_Hist. of Rome_,
V, p. 59): [Germanicus] “reported to Rome that in the next campaign he
should have the subjugation of Germany complete.” And just preceding
this the same author says: “The second tropaeum of Germanicus [in the
Teutoburg forest] spoke of the overthrow of all the Germanic tribes
between the Rhine and the Elbe.” See also p. 54 f. for further discussion
of the campaigns of Tiberius and Germanicus. Mommsen speaks of the
campaigns of the summers 12, 13, and 14 as years of inaction, a mere
continuance of the war, of which nothing at all is reported. This gap in
the record Riese explains, _Forschungen_, etc., p. 13 by the meagerness
of our sources (Velleius, Suetonius, and Dio) covering the last years of
Augustus, as compared with the fuller account in Tacitus of the early
years of the regency of Tiberius. So Koepp, _op. cit._, p. 34.
[60] _Hist. of Rome_, V, p. 62.
[61] I, p. 1201.
[62] Cf. p. 36.
[63] Cf. Gardthausen, I, p. 492: “Mit einem Worte Augustus ist derselbe
geblieben: kalt, klar und klug sein ganzes Leben lang, keineswegs
so genial wie Julius Caesar, aber entschieden verständiger.” These
characteristics are uncontradicted save, of course, by the rhetorically
embellished gossip about Augustus’ discomposure after the defeat of
Varus; see Suet., _Aug._, 23; Dio, 56, 23. There is not the slightest
evidence of a panic at Rome or of alarm on the part of any one except
Augustus. Yet at the Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt, only a short time
before (6-9 A. D.), the people were greatly wrought up because of wars
and famines (Dio, 55, 31), and Augustus announced in the senate that
in a few days the enemy might reach Rome, while Tiberius was provided
with 15 legions (Velleius, II, 111, 1). So there was profound alarm
at Rome at the time of the Marcomannic war (167-180 A. D. See Julius
Capitolinus, _Marcus Antoninus_, 13, 1 and Ammianus, XXXI, 5, 13),
while at the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones all Italy was palsied
with fear (Sall., _Jug._, 114; Orosius, 5, 15, 7; 6, 14, 2). But at the
defeat of Varus we hear nothing of the kind. Besides, Augustus was now
well advanced in years, his health was precarious, his daughter and
granddaughter had humiliated and cruelly disappointed him, while the
successive deaths in his family had forced him to adopt as his heir and
successor Tiberius, whom he greatly disliked. It is small wonder that
in his old age and bereavements he should give way to some momentary
weakness. The Varus calamity, coming so soon after the Pannonian revolt,
and just at the time when the strain from the latter had momentarily
lifted, must have been too much for Augustus to bear.
[64] Gardthausen, I, p. 508. This view of Augustus is not invalidated
by Gardthausen’s further statement: “Der Kaiser scheute sich nicht
zurückzutreten, wenn der Widerstand grösser war als die Mittel, die er
darauf verwenden wollte oder konnte.” These words are nothing more than
an attempt to explain what all who hold to the traditional view are
forced to explain, viz., Augustus’ reversal of policy in “die schwere
Wahl zwischen der Politik des dauernden Friedens und der Politik der
fortgesetzten Eroberung.”
[65] _Kleine Schriften_, p. 462.
[66] Meyer, _l. c._: “Der Vorwurf, dass er feige gewesen sei, ist gewiss
unbegründet.”
[67] The reduction of the army after the battle of Actium shows that
Augustus wished no larger standing forces than would be sufficient for
the internal and external peace of the empire. See Gardthausen, I,
p. 637; Furneaux, _Tacitus_, Introd., p. 121; Mommsen, _Germanische
Politik_, etc., p. 8: “ja man darf sagen, dass Augustus das Militärwesen
in einem Grade auf die Defensive beschränkte.”
[68] _Monumentum Ancyranum_, V, 14. Cf. Dio, 56, 33; Suet., _Aug._,
101; Tac., _Ann._, I, 11: “quae cuncta sua manu perscripserat Augustus
addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii, incertum metu
an per invidiam.” The sneer, “metu an per invidiam”, found in the words
of Tacitus, who wrote in the time of the great expansive conquests of
Trajan, and who had only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of
Augustus (see Furneaux on this passage), has undoubtedly caused many to
restrict Augustus’ peace policy to the period _after_ Varus’ defeat. But
no such restriction should be made. We now know that the _Monum. Ancyr._
was not written at one time, nor at the end of Augustus’ life, but was
finished in 6 A. D. See Chapter III, notes 84 and 88. This shows that his
counsel of peace and his advice not to extend the limits of the empire
was made prior to, and hence not as a result of, the defeat of Varus (9
A. D.), as has so frequently been asserted.
[69] _Aug._, 21: “nec ulli genti sine iustis et necessariis causis bellum
intulit.”
[70] _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_, ed. 1910, I, p. 1 f.
[71] Gardthausen, I, p. 317: “Freude am Kriege und an Eroberungen ist
bekanntlich das Letzte, was man dem jugendlichen und doch staatsklugen
Caesar billiger Weise vorwerfen konnte.” Tacitus’ statement (_Ann._, I,
3), that Augustus’ later wars against the Germans were “abolendae magis
infamiae ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum quam cupidine proferendi
imperii”, does not necessarily mean, as is often inferred, that the
earlier wars aimed to enlarge the empire.
[72] Vell., II, 89: “Finita vicesimo anno bella civilia, sepulta externa,
revocata pax, sopitus ubique armorum furor, restituta vis legibus,
iudiciis auctoritas.” This is well expressed by Botsford, _Hist. of
Rome_, p. 205: “The chief aim of Augustus was to protect the frontiers,
to maintain quiet by diplomacy and to wage war solely for the sake of
peace.”
[73] _Kleine Schriften_, p. 455.
[74] Gardthausen, I, p. 477: “Der Friede war der Preis, um den Rom sich
die Herrschaft des Augustus gefallen liess; und auch seine Nachfolger
haben im Wesentlichen eine Politik des Friedens befolgt.” Cf. Lang,
_op. cit._, p. 56: “Sein [Tiberius] Ziel war es daher, als er zur
Herrschaft gekommen war, im Sinne und in Fortsetzung der Politik seines
Adoptivvaters und Vorgängers Augustus, ihnen [den Provinzen] diese Ruhe
und Ordnung zu verschaffen.”
[75] Suet., _Aug._, 22: “Ianum Quirinum, semel atque iterum a condita
urbe ante memoriam suam clausum, in multo breviore temporis spatio terra
marique pace parta ter clusit.”
[76] Davis, _Outline Hist. of the Rom. Empire_, New York, 1907, p. 59.
[77] Dio, 54, 20; Suet., _Aug._, 23.
[78] See Eduard Meyer, _Kleine Schriften_, p. 230: “He [Augustus] might
have followed the precedent of Caesar and have aspired to world-conquest
and absolute monarchy; by shrinking from it, by giving the state a new
constitution and retaining for himself only limited powers, he made
world-conquest impossible”; _Ibid._, p. 470 f.; Gardthausen, I, p.
1069; Drumann, _Röm. Gesch._, IV (1910), p. 300; Gibbon (see above p.
57). It is refuted also by the emperor Julian, who shows himself to be
singularly well-informed regarding the history of the early empire (Cf.
J. Geffcken, _Kaiser Julianus_, Leipzig, 1914, p. 150: “Julian zeigt ...
wie gründlich er sich mit der Geschichte jener Zeit beschäftigt hat”). In
_The Caesars_, 326 C, he represents Augustus as saying: “For I did not
give way to boundless ambition and aim at enlarging her [Rome’s] empire
at all costs, but assigned for it two boundaries defined as it were by
nature herself, the Danube and the Euphrates. Then after conquering
the Scythians and Thracians I did not employ the long reign that you
gods vouchsafed me in making projects for war after war, but devoted my
leisure to legislation and to reforming the evils that war had caused.”
(Trans. by Wilmer Cave Wright).
[79] _Op. cit._, p. 12. There is at least consistency in von Ranke’s
position. The only conceivable reason for the conquest of Germany
would be precisely such a fantastic dream of universal empire. But the
weakness of the whole argument of those who claim that Germany’s conquest
was intended is that its logical consequences lead to absurd results,
contradicting all that we know of the character of the emperor and of his
times.
[80] II, 39.
[81] Cf. Drumann, _Gesch. Roms_,² 1910, IV, p. 300: “Octavian ergriff
als Imperator das Schwert nur zu seiner Verteidigung; er führte nur
gerechte Kriege; die Lorbeeren reizten ihn nicht, und darin, nicht
in der Ueberzeugung, dass ein endloss vergrösserter Koloss in sich
zusammenstürzt, lag die erste und vorzügliche Ursache seiner Mässigung.
Gern hätte er den Tempel des Janus für immer geschlossen.”
[82] “Zum Monum. Ancyr.” _Beiträge zur alten Gesch._, II (1902), pp.
141-162.
[83] This view, together with the statement that the last addition was
made by Augustus in 14 A. D., was subsequently modified by Kornemann
in placing the number of revisions at seven (_Klio_, IV (1904), pp.
88-97), and the final revision at the end or middle of the year 6 A. D.
(_Beiträge zur alten Gesch._, III (1903), p. 74 f.).
[84] “Zur Entstehung des Monum. Ancyr.,” _Hermes_, 38 (1903), pp. 618-628.
[85] Vulić, “Quando fu scritto il monumento Ancyrano,” _Riv. di Storia
Ant._, XIII (1909), pp. 41-46, objects to the theory of interpolation
in chapter 26. In it Augustus says: “Gallias et Hispanias provincias et
Germaniam ... pacavi”, i. e. the Gauls and the Spains are considered
real provinces, while Germany is a neighboring territory, over which
for the time Rome’s beneficent influence was extended. The necessity of
bringing out this distinction made imperative the repetition of the word
“provinciae” (read two lines above), and this repetition justifies the
abandonment of the geographical order.
[86] “Nochmals das Monum. Ancyr.,” _Klio_, IV (1904), pp. 88-97.
[87] “Récents Travaux sur les Res Gestae Divi Augusti,” _Mélanges
Cagnat_, Paris, 1912, p. 144.
[88] Cf. Bésnier, _op. cit._, p. 145: “nous savons en tout cas, qu’
Auguste n’a pas improvisé son apologie à la veille de sa mort, qu’il a
commencé de bonne heure à la rédiger, au moins dès l’an 12 av. J.-C.
et peut-être plus tot encore, qu’en l’an 6 de notre ére il a cessé d’y
travailler, et que dans l’intervalle il l’a enrichie graduellement
d’additions nombreuses et significatives.... Le souple génie politique
d’Auguste s’y manifeste tout entier et l’on y retrouve, présentées sous
le meilleur jour, les grandes pensées dont il s’est inspire tour à tour
pendant son règne si long et si bien rempli.”
[89] Cf. Ritterling, _op. cit._, p. 176: “Aber eine durchgreifende
Aenderung ist sicher erst infolge der lollianischen Niederlage und des
durch diese hervorgerufenen Umschwunges der römischen Politik gegenüber
den Germanen vorgenommen worden. Bisher war die Kriegführung gegen die
Germanen eine in der Hauptsache rein defensive gewesen ... Eine Eroberung
des rechtsrheinischen Gebietes lag der bisherigen römischen Politik
durchaus fern. Jetzt fasste Augustus die völlige Einverleibung Germaniens
bis an die Elbe ins Auge und traf während seiner mehrjährigen Anwesenheit
in Gallien von 16 bis 13 die in grossem Stile angelegten Vorbereitungen
zur Ausführung dieses Planes.”
[90] _Op. cit._, p. 25.
[91] _Monumentum Ancyranum_, VI, 3.
[92] Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 23; Gardthausen, I, p. 1066; Jullian,
_Histoire de la Gaule_, Paris, 1914, IV, p. 108.
[93] Dio, 54, 20; Vell., II, 97; Suet., _Aug._, 23.
[94] Paul Meyer, _Der Triumphzug des Germanicus_, p. 85.
[95] I, p. 1067. According to Niese, _op. cit._, p. 295, the decision
came later, and by reason of a new attack from the Sugambri: “Dann
erfolgte 12 v. Chr. ein neuer Angriff des Sugambrers Melo, und nun ward
beschlossen, um Gallien zu sichern und zu beruhigen, über den Rhein
hinüberzugreifen und die Germanen zu unterwerfen.”
[96] _Kleine Schriften_, p. 471.
[97] _Op. cit._, p. 214: “Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt von seinem
Grundsatz, das Reich nicht durch Eroberung zu mehren, abzugehen und ...
auf diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen welche leichter zu vertheidigen
und kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende.”
[98] _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 9.
[99] _Op. cit._, 29.
[100] The same statement is made by other historians, e. g., Merivale,
_General Hist. of Rome_, New York, 1876, p. 431; Bury (_Hist. of the
Roman Empire_, New York, 1893, p. 125), who speaks of “The project of
extending the empire to the Albis, into which perhaps the cautious
emperor was persuaded by the ardor of his favorite stepson, Drusus.” Cf.
Mommsen, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 10: “Ob Augustus ganz von freien
Stücken sich dazu entschloss, die Friedenspolitik zu verlassen, oder ob
er dem Drängen der Seinigen [Agrippa, Tiberius, and Drusus] nachgab, die
Niederlage des Lollius gab den Ausschlag.”
[101] I, p. 1049 f.
[102] _Op. cit._, V, p. 142.
[103] Eduard Meyer, _Kleine Schriften_, p. 230, citing Augustus’ decision
against imperial expansion, as a remarkable instance of the power and
consequence of the individual action in history, says: “If we put the
question, how it came to pass that the ... Germans were not bent under
the yoke of Rome ... the only reason history can give is that it was
the result of the decision which Augustus made concerning the internal
organization of the empire, when he had become its absolute master by the
battle of Actium. This decision sprang from his character and his own
free will.” On the other hand Beloch, _Griech. Gesch.²_, I, 1 (1912), p.
15, takes the traditional view: “nicht der Wille zur Eroberung hat den
Römern gefehlt, sondern die Macht; wenn man lieber will, sie erkannten
dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde, als das Objekt
wert war.”
[104] _Kaiser Augustus_, p. 111.
[105] I, p. 1048 f.
[106] _Op. cit._, V, p. 153 f.
[107] Mommsen, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 13: “wie Gallien durch
Caesar, so war vierzig Jahre später Germanien zum römischen Reiche
gebracht, die neue Monarchie mit Waffenruhm und Siegesglanz geschmückt
worden.” In explanation of the fact that still later, in Tiberius’ time,
Germany is spoken of as “almost a province” (Vell., II, 97, 4), Mommsen
says: “so ist es begreiflich genug, dass man das nachherige Aufgeben
desselben mit dem Willen des Augustus zu beschönigen bemüht war.” Niese,
_Grundriss der röm. Gesch._, 1910, p. 297; Gardthausen, II, p. 1197; Fr.
Kauffman, “Deutsche Altertumskunde” (in _Matthias’ Handbuch d. deutschen
Unterrichts_, München, 1913, p. 317): “In den Jahren 12 v. Ch. Geb.
bestand offiziell eine römische Provinz Germanien, die das Land vom Rhein
bis zur Elbe unfasste.”
[108] But see the evidence to prove that as late as 6 A. D. Augustus did
not consider Germany a province. (See Chapter III, note 85). Augustus’
own opinion as to whether it was or was not a province at this date is
of the highest value for our question. For if he did not so consider
it, then a great deal of first class documentary evidence is necessary
to establish the fact that it really was a province. Similarly some
convincing reason must be given to account for his failure to call it a
province. Such evidence is not forthcoming. On the other hand there is
no evidence to show that Augustus did regard it as a province but was
hindered by the defeat of Varus from formally organizing it as such. For
since no part of the _Monum. Ancyr._ was written after 6 A. D., it cannot
be cited as evidence of any change in Augustus’ views after 9 A. D., as
is often done on the assumption that the final revision of that document
took place in 14 A. D.
[109] II, p. 1089.
[110] I, p. 1198: “Wenn auch die von Schuchhardt gefundenen Reste
zweifelhaft sind, so bleibt doch immer die Thatsache bestehen, dass die
Römer im Innern von Deutschland Castelle angelegt haben.”
[111] _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 34. Eduard Meyer, in _Kleine
Schriften_, p. 230, expresses the same view in different words: “Now
the very existence of Teutonic languages is a consequence of the fact
that Germany was not subdued by the Romans.... Caesar would have subdued
Germany as well as he did Gaul when he had once begun; but for the
military and financial organization which Augustus gave to the Roman
world, the task was too great indeed. So the emperor left Germany to
herself.”
[112] _Westfalen_, p. 40: “das rechtsrheinische Germanien ist niemals
eigentlich Provinz gewesen, auch nicht vor der Varusschlacht.”
[113] _Studia Romana_, 1859, P. 130.
[114] _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 23 f.
[115] In _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 13, Mommsen suggests that these
terms, Upper and Lower Germany, later and improperly applied to the
small territory on the left bank of the Rhine, were probably original
designations for Germany between the Rhine and the Elbe. For the correct
status, see Riese’s view as given below, p. 73 ff.
[116] “Die Verwaltung der Rheingrenze,” etc., _Commentationes philologae
in honorem Th. Mommseni_, p. 434.
[117] _Röm. Staatsverwaltung_, I (1881), p. 271.
[118] _Op. cit._, p. 212.
[119] p. 219.
[120] p. 229.
[121] p. 233. Pelham, “The Roman Frontier in Southern Germany” (in
_Essays on Roman History_, 1910, p. 179 f.), while speaking repeatedly of
Upper and Lower Germany, limits his discussion for the most part to the
period after Augustus’ time and specifically to the territory lying along
the left bank of the Rhine. He says, referring to Tacitus’ statement
(_Germ._, 29) to the effect that a stretch of territory beyond the Upper
Rhine had been annexed by Rome and made a part of the province, that
Upper Germany must be the province meant; that the land annexed to it
was in reality “debatable land” (_dubiae possessionis_ of Tacitus), and
had been so for more than 150 years. The last sentence clearly indicates
that, in the writer’s view, Rome had never had the land organized as her
own territory.
[122] _Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit_, p. 5
f. See also Riese in _Westdeutsche Zeitschrift f. Gesch. u. Kunst,
Korrespondenz-Blatt_, xiv (1895), p. 156 f. He shows here that the two
provinces, Upper and Lower Germany, were not established until the
time of Domitian, some time between 82-90 A. D.: “Vor dem Jahre 90 gab
es also ... nur eine Germania, in der ein exercitus Germanicus als
superior und inferior unter zwei zu gegenseitiger Hülfe verbundenen
Heereslegaten standen; dagegen gab es keine Germania superior und keine
Germania inferior.... Auch ist jene Germania keine Provinz, sondern der
Heeresbezirk der gallischen Provinzen.”
[123] Plin., _N. H._, iv, 105; Dio, 53, 12; Oros., I, 2.
[124] Ritterling (_op. cit._, p. 162) believes, however, that there
were only two Gauls, and that the division took place at the beginning
of Augustus’ reign: “Bei der Neuordnung des Reiches nach Beendigung der
Bürgerkriege, i. J. 727-27, war ganz Gallien in zwei Kommandobezirke
geteilt worden: der eine umfasste Aquitania und Narbonensis, der andere
Gallia comata, also die Gebiete der späteren Provinzen Lugdunensis und
Belgica.” See also Gardthausen, I, 662; II, 355.
[125] See p. 27 and note.
[126] Marquardt, _Röm. Staatsverwaltung_, I², 504.
[127] There seems to be no doubt that the military forces of all the
Gauls were at this time under the direction of one commander; further
that this position was in the nature of a commandership-in-chief of
all the forces, on the lower, middle, and upper Rhine. Cf. Ritterling,
_op. cit._, p. 187: “die Neuordnung der politischen und militärischen
Verhältnisse Galliens durch Augustus seit dem Jahre 739-15 musste
notwendig auch eine Aenderung in der Organisation des Heereskommandos
zur Folge haben. Dem Statthalter der neugebildeten Provinz Belgica, in
deren Gebiet jetzt beide gallischen Heere ihre Standlager hatten, konnte
unmöglich diese bedeutendste Streitmacht des Reiches und die Führung
des Krieges gegen die Germanen anvertraut werden. Anderseits machte die
Grösse der militärischen Aufgaben und das Ineinandergreifen der geplanten
Operationen am Mittel- und Niederrhein ein einheitliches Oberkommando
notwendig.”
[128] _Characters and Events of Roman History_, p. 165.
[129] See also Sadée, _Römer und Germanen_, II. Theil, p. 99 (the chapter
“Die Befreiung Deutschlands durch Arminius”); Wolf, _Die That des
Arminius_, p. 41 f. (“Der Befreiungskampf”). Eduard Meyer’s statement
that it was not possible for Rome to raise sufficient citizen troops to
win back the advantage lost in 9 A. D. has already been answered (see p.
38).
[130] Reitzenstein, “Das deutsche Heldenlied bei Tacitus,” _Hermes_, 48
(1913), p. 268, quite correctly observes that the defeat of Varus had
no such significance; that there was no change in Rome’s policy until
Germanicus’ time, and that Rome’s contest with Germany through three
decades did nothing to unite the strength of her antagonist, for hatred
toward Arminius and the desire for his downfall characterize a political
situation which is found at a much later time.
[131] Cf. also Mommsen, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 14 f.: “Die
Unterwerfung Germaniens ... stockt mit dem Jahre 747 [7 B. C.] plötzlich.
Wenn die sachlichen Verhältnisse dafür schlechterdings keinen Grund an
die Hand geben, so liegt derselbe in den persönlichen klar genug vor.” As
reasons of a private character he mentions: (1) the deaths of Agrippa and
Drusus; (2) the estrangement of Tiberius. Then, after Tiberius’ return
and the beginning of the war anew (4 A. D.), the following events: (1)
the Dalmatian-Pannonian uprising; (2) the defeat of Varus; (3) the recall
of Germanicus and the conditions surrounding the absolute monarchy of
Tiberius.
[132] II, p. 1214; this is also the view of Ferrero, _Characters and
Events_, p. 165.
[133] _Op. cit._, p. 117: “Freilich gehörte dazu eine sehr grosse
Anstrengung; nur Heere von mehreren Legionen durften sich in das
germanische Gebiet tiefer hineinwagen. Aber Cäsar hatte zuletzt in
Gallien zum wenigsten 11 oder 12 Legionen gehabt. Germanicus hatte nur
8. Man sieht nicht weshalb das römische Reich nicht diese oder eine noch
grössere Zahl Legionen viele Jahre hintereinander hätte über den Rhein
schicken, oder wie die germanischen Grenzvölker sich dagegen hätten
wehren können.”
[134] Practically the same point is made by Paul Meyer, _op. cit._, p.
86. That is, Germanicus was making notable progress in his campaigns,
but was forced by the suspicions and jealousy of Tiberius to sheathe
his sword. For the purpose of closing his career an elaborate and well
deserved triumph was given him May 26, 17 A. D. Von Ranke, _op. cit._,
p. 28, on the other hand, does not believe that hostilities were renewed
against the Germans under Tiberius for purposes of conquest “sondern nur
darauf, die Ehre der römischen Waffen herzustellen.” Hence the Roman
troops were withdrawn because “die Germanen wurden, wie Tiberius mit
Recht bemerkt, für die römische Welt durch ihre inneren Entzweiungen
unschädlich.”
[135] _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 45.
[136] This is not convincing to Riese (p. 12, n. 1): “Allerdings bildeten
diese Schädigungen ... nur einen und zwar nicht den wichtigsten Grund der
Abberufung des Germanicus.” As for the matter of the great costs of such
a campaign, one should bear in mind that the difference in cost between
maintaining an ancient army on a war footing and on a peace footing was
relatively slight. There was no great expense involved in the wastage of
artillery and of equipment, when most of the fighting was done hand to
hand, and when the soldiers required less rather than more supplies while
living in part from the enemy’s country. As a professional standing army
was always ready, and no new levies of troops required, not even in the
greater wars, regular campaigns in Germany would have been a very slight
drain on the treasury.
[137] See _op. cit._, p. 20.
[138] Cf. Merivale: _History of the Romans under the Empire_, IV, p.
240: “These repeated advances ... though far from having the character
of conquests, could not altogether fail in extending the influence of
Rome throughout a great portion of central Europe. They inspired a
strong sense of her invincibility, and of her conquering destiny; at the
same time they exalted the respect of the barbarians for the southern
civilization, which could marshal such irresistible forces at so vast a
distance from the sources of its power.”