CRITICISM OF THE ACCEPTED VIEW
Examination has already been given to the sources on which historians
base their accounts of the Varus disaster. The influences under which
these sources were written—ancient accounts repeated for the most part
without question by later writers—and their availability for sound
historical conclusions have also been discussed. We now advance to a
general consideration of facts which are in contradiction to the accepted
view as to the effect of Varus’ defeat.
The great importance usually attributed to this defeat is surprising
to the student of history, in the light of several significant facts
revealed by a study of the battle. Varus at that time had three legions,
which, if complete, comprised not more, or scarcely more, than 20,000
troops.[1] The battle was not a regular contest, but one in which the
Romans were hemmed in, we are told[2], by woods, lakes, and bodies of
the enemy in ambush. Our authorities are agreed that swamps, forests,
a running contest, and the elements were factors that contributed to
the Roman defeat.[3] Further, in the encounter the Romans were directed
by a leader very generally represented[4] as indolent, rash, and
self-confident, and they were pitted against far superior numbers.[5]
This contest, therefore, waged under such circumstances, could not have
been in any sense a real test of the military strength of the contending
forces. Remembering too that it was a fundamental policy of Rome to
take no backward step in the face of defeat, and considering also the
known strength of Rome at this period, it is inconceivable that the
loss of three legions could in itself have reversed the policy of that
great world-power, particularly when it is remembered that only a few
years before (6 A. D.) Tiberius had assembled twelve legions against
Maroboduus[6], while in that same year, against the Dalmatian-Pannonian
insurrection, the Roman legions were increased to twenty-six, a body of
troops such as had never since the close of the civil wars been united
under the same command.[7] This difficulty has not escaped notice.
Schiller recognizes it[8], and while denying that the explanation is to
be found in the exhaustion of the empire, he urges the advanced age of
Augustus and the financial situation, which, without the creation of new
revenues, could not have provided sufficient means. Similarly Mommsen
observes[9]: “We have difficulty in conceiving that the destruction
of an army of 20,000 men without further direct military consequences
should have given a decisive turn to the policy at large of a judiciously
governed universal empire.” Immediately following this Mommsen offers
as explanation: “there is no other reason to be found for it than that
they [Augustus and Tiberius] recognized the plans pursued by them for
twenty years for the changing of the boundary to the north as incapable
of execution, and the subjugation and mastery of the region between the
Rhine and the Elbe appeared to them to transcend the resources of the
empire.” Seeck, commenting on the difference in Rome’s policy in the
time of the Punic wars and after the disaster to Varus[10], believes
that Augustus turned back to his “weaker wisdom” of an earlier day
(the year 20 B. C., when he said the empire was large enough), because
the Germans threatened only the provinces, not Rome itself, as did the
Pannonians, whom Rome was at all hazard and at any cost compelled to
subdue. Eduard Meyer thinks that although Arminius’ revolt and the battle
as a military event had no greater significance than the revolts and
victories of the Celts and the Pannonians, the battle nevertheless was
decisive because it was not possible for Rome to raise troops sufficient
to win back the advantage lost, the two legions that were levied being
raised by proscription, and from the non-citizen class. Further, whereas
the insurrection in Pannonia left no choice but to increase the army,
the war with Germany would have imposed not only too great a financial
burden, but would have revoked in the most drastic way the old rule which
permitted service in the army only to citizens.[11] To have subdued
Germany at such a cost as this, argues Meyer (p. 487) would have been as
inexpedient as to subdue the Parthians.
These suggestions by Mommsen and Meyer as to Rome’s lack of resources
necessitate, before any conclusion is reached as to the permanent effect
of this one defeat, a consideration of the relative resources of Rome and
Germany at this period.
When we compare the general resources of the Roman empire with those of
Germany the balance is found to be overwhelmingly in favor of the former,
had its whole strength, or even any considerable fraction thereof,
been employed. The population of the empire under Augustus was not
far from 55,000,000[12], and, as service was voluntary and men of any
nationality were admitted, at least into the _auxilia_, practically the
whole free male population of the empire was available for service. There
was, of course, the traditional custom according to which the legions
were restricted to Roman citizens, and the _auxilia_, consisting of
foreigners, were kept at about the same number as the legionaries[13],
but Pompey and then Caesar had enrolled legions of provincials (the
so-called _legiones vernaculae_), and in the armies of Brutus and Cassius
and the triumvirs this was done on so extensive a scale that Vergil,
_Ecl._ I, 70 f. calls the veterans who were settled in Italy out and
out “miles ... barbarus.”[14] Now Augustus appears to have made some
consistent efforts to restore the old conditions, but even then the
eastern legions seem to have been recruited, in large part at least,
from the Orient, while those of the west were drawn from Italy and the
Latin Occident[15], and under the succeeding emperors the provinces were
more and more heavily drawn upon, until Roman citizens almost wholly
disappeared from the ranks of the imperial army.[16] Seeck indeed, after
a renewed examination of the material collected by Mommsen, comes to the
conclusion that Augustus did exercise much greater caution in drawing
the bulk at least of his forces from the citizens of Italy and the Roman
citizens of the provinces.[17] But granting this position for the sake of
argument, and admitting that Augustus would recruit his legionaries only
from Roman citizens (for we prefer to give minimal estimates in order
to avoid any charge of overstating our case), the citizen population of
the empire (about 4,700,000 in 9 A. D.)[18] was sufficient to raise an
army of 400,000 men under the inspiration of some great national cause,
which, with an equal number of _auxilia_, would yield a total potential
military force of 800,000, not counting the fleet which was frequently
employed in the operations in Germany, and must have been heavily drawn
upon if any permanent conquest of the land was to be undertaken.[19]
That such a figure as this is not beyond reason is clear from the fact
that after Actium Augustus found himself in possession of 50 legions, a
total army of between five and six hundred thousand men[20], while after
Mutina, 66 legions, at least 660,000 men, were in the field at once, and
after the defeat of Sextus Pompey in 36, Octavian and Antony had together
no fewer than 74 or 75 legions under arms, which, counting everything,
and including naval contingents, must have amounted to at least 800,000
men.[21]
However, even if the numerical superiority of the Roman empire may not
appear so overwhelming in the number of troops which might be raised, we
must remember that the resources of the whole population were available
to the full for maintaining in the field, at the highest efficiency,
and for an indefinite period, an army of several hundred thousand men;
for all the inhabitants of the empire without exception contributed
abundantly in money and materials, so that in this respect the great
numbers and vast economic resources of the empire gave it a position of
immeasurable superiority over the barbarians. Furthermore for a war such
as the organized conquest of Germany would have entailed, a huge levy
of men suddenly rushed to the spot, would have proved useless—or rather
positively injurious; without adequate means of communication in that
rough country it would have been almost impossible to make effective
use of them at one spot, or even along one line, while the difficulty
of provisioning them would have been quite insuperable. What was needed
was a force of moderate size, capable of meeting any concerted effort on
the part of the enemy, which could press steadily forward, constructing
roads, establishing depots of supplies, firmly seizing and organizing the
territory that was reached and passed, and leave no possibility of revolt
in their rear. For this an army of ten to twelve legions operating from
two established bases, the Rhine and the Danube, would have sufficed.
Before such methods Germany must inevitably have succumbed after two or
three campaigns.
For the actual size of the standing army under Augustus was ample to
have carried on precisely such operations. The number of his legions
varied somewhat from time to time. After Actium Augustus had about 50
legions; this number was reduced to 18, then raised again to 26 at the
outbreak of the Pannonian revolt.[22] Three were lost in 9 A. D., and
in their place but two were added, so that the number left at his death
was 25.[23] Taking this latter as that of the average number about the
time of the defeat of Varus, calculating the theoretical strength of the
legion at 6000 men[24], and adding in an equal number of _auxilia_, the
city troops, the praetorian cohorts, the fleet, and various detached
contingents[25], we get about 325,000. The effective force would be
somewhat less than this, of course, but would not probably fall much if
any under 300,000 men.[26] Now the majority of these could have been
launched upon Germany with little or no difficulty. Fifteen legions,
or nearly three-fifths of the total force of the empire had been
concentrated in Pannonia for three years (Suetonius, _Tiberius_, 16),
and there is no conceivable reason why these same legions might not at
once have turned upon the Germanic tribes, their task in Pannonia now
accomplished, especially as twelve legions, that is to say, two-thirds
of the whole army as it stood at that time, were actually operating in
Germany at the time of the outbreak of the Pannonian revolt. Fifteen
legions and the whole of the otherwise unoccupied fleet would constitute
an effective strength of at least 175,000 men, a force several times as
large as that with which Caesar had accomplished the conquest of Gaul.
On the other hand the population of Germany between the Rhine, the Elbe,
and the Danube was extremely small. The Germans had no regular cities
(Tacitus, _Germania_, 16), some tribes had as yet scarcely passed the
nomadic state, there were immense forests, and undrained swamps, while
there were here and there wide stretches of waste and uninhabited land
on the marches between hostile tribes.[27] Agriculture was primitive,
and industries did not exist at all. Under such conditions the density
of population must have been low indeed. And yet the traditional view
represents the Germans as being very numerous, several millions in
fact (Gutsche und Schultze, _Deutsche Geschichte_, I (1894), p. 236,
for example, estimate the total number of Germans at no fewer than
15,000,000, more in fact, rather than less!), and the persistence of such
utterly uncritical opinions explains in part the strange tenacity with
which even those who know better are obsessed with the idea that the
conquest of Germany, because of its teeming millions, would have been a
very difficult undertaking.[28] Fustel de Coulanges long since and H.
Delbrück more recently had insisted upon the numerical weakness of the
tribes which actually overthrew the empire in the fifth century[29], and
Ch. Dubois, in an elaborate study of Ammianus, has shown that the actual
numbers of the Franks, Alamanni, etc., who wrought such devastation in
Gaul in the fourth century, were astonishingly small.[30]
H. Delbrück was the first to use severely critical methods for the
calculation of the population of Germany.[31] On the basis of Beloch’s
calculations for Gaul he estimated an average density of population of
4-5 per square kilometer, which makes for the region between the Rhine,
Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, with which alone he is concerned, a
population of roughly 515,000 to 645,000, or as he prefers to count it
at 250 per (German) square mile, about 575,000 (calculating the area of
this district at ca. 2300 (German) square miles). For the whole region
between the Rhine and the Elbe he estimates not more than about 1,000,000
inhabitants. That makes for all Germany about 2,000,000, taking the
first group of tribes as constituting not quite one third of the whole
nation.[32] This calculation he supports on the basis of a totally
different one, which is derived from the number of warriors who could
take part in an assembly and be addressed by a single speaker. Setting
this at a maximum of six to eight thousand, and taking the average as
five thousand, at the ratio of 5 to 1 he gets 25,000 as the size of
the average German tribe, and as there were about twenty-three of these
between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line, he reaches exactly the same
figure of 575,000 for the population of this district.
A different line of attack was pursued by G. Schmoller shortly after
Delbrück’s critique.[33] Taking the results of extensive studies in the
population of nations at different stages of economic development, he
estimates the average density of population per square kilometer for
“the north Indogermanic farming and cattle-raising communities about
the beginning of the Christian era” to have varied between the limits
5 and 12, setting that of Germany as 5 to 6. This would give for the
area between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line a population of
roughly about 640,000 to 770,000, or for the whole of Germany, taking
this portion as not quite one-third, a total population only slightly
in excess of two millions. The substantial agreement in the results
reached by these three different methods employed independently, the
historical-statistical, the institutional, and the economic, makes an
exceedingly strong case. It can be further strengthened, perhaps, by one
or two other considerations which have as yet not been employed. They are
the following.
Maroboduus at the head of the Marcomannic confederation, which included
a large number of tribes (even the distant Semnones and the Longobardi)
seems, at the height of his power, to have commanded a total force of
74,000 men.[34] This number, as Ludwig Schmidt has pointed out[35],
bears every evidence of being reliable, because of the immense force,
twelve legions, one hundred thousand men at the lowest estimate, which
Tiberius felt he must employ in order to crush him.[36] Now this is
probably the total number of males who in the last extremity might bear
arms, i. e., following the customary Roman calculations[37], one-fourth
of the whole population. The Marcomannic confederation at its greatest
development would have had, therefore, a population of 296,000, or let
us say, in round numbers, 300,000. Now some years later the Cheruscan
confederacy under Arminius waged war with Maroboduus on fairly even
terms; hence it is not unreasonable to suppose that the strength of the
two confederations was about equal.[38] Of course a large number of the
tribes which lay even between the Rhine and the Elbe must have held
aloof from the struggle, certainly those along the sea coast like the
Cannanefates, the Frisii and the like, who were under Roman control,
but doubtless many others also in the remoter parts of the district
concerned. The neutrals may very well have been as numerous as either
confederacy, but hardly more numerous than both combined, for the
struggle is represented as a great national movement. In one case we
would get a total population of 900,000, in the other 1,200,000, figures
which agree very closely with those already reached by Delbrück and
Schmoller.
Again Posidonius in his description of Gaul (in Diod., V, 25) has
calculated that the smaller tribes of Gaul counted 50,000 members,
the largest a scant 200,000. The average would be 125,000, but, as
E. Levasseur, who has used this _datum_ for his calculations of the
population of Gaul, observes[39], the number of large tribes was
probably very small, so that a lower average (he accepts 100,000)
must be taken. On what seems to be a fair assumption, therefore, i.
e., that the 60 tribes of Gaul which were represented on the great
altar at Lyons[40], existed in Posidonius’ day, one would get a total
population of about 6,000,000, which is astonishingly close to Beloch’s
own revised calculations, who concedes the possibility of 6,750,000, but
prefers 5,700,000.[41] Now the Germans being without cities, developed
agriculture or elaborate commerce, must have had a very much scantier
population, certainly not more than an average of 50,000 per tribe, and
probably much less. Hence taking 50,000 as a maximum figure, we should
get for the whole of Germany with about 60 tribes[42], a maximum of
3,000,000, and for the Rhine, Elbe, Main-Saale district with 20 to 23
tribes[43], a maximum of 1,000,000 to 1,150,000, and a probable size of
about three quarters of a million—or even less. These numbers, while
somewhat larger than those already reached by other methods, are yet
reasonably close to them to serve as a sort of confirmation, and in
any event come very far below the figures customarily given for the
population of Germany.
Finally, one might note Lamprecht’s ingenious estimate of the population
in a district of the Moselle country by a comparison of the relative
number of place names recorded for different epochs.[44] He finds that
a district which in 1800 A. D. had a population of about 450,000, had
in 800 A. D. only about 20,000. This would give the German settlements
of the year 800 A. D. as a whole, about 4.5% of the population one
thousand years later. As the population of Germany in 1800 was about
23,000,000 (Levasseur), that of a correspondingly large area would have
been slightly in excess of one million. In attempting to apply this
result to conditions in Germany at the beginning of our era[45], we must
bear in mind that the method employed is one which is likely to secure
minimal figures, and that in the Moselle land we do not have the ancient
seat of the Germanic tribes, but only a colonised territory, which for
some accident or other may not have been as thickly settled as other
localities. On the other hand, we must note that the land in question
had been German probably for four centuries, and the conditions were
favorable to its bearing as heavy a population as that of any interior
district of Germany in the first century of our era. While, therefore, we
should regard this estimate as being certainly too low, yet it supports
in a way the calculations of Delbrück and Schmoller, and is utterly
inconsistent with figures like twelve or fifteen millions.
We shall regard then the population of Germany between the Rhine, Elbe,
and Danube, as about 1,000,000, or taking the Main-Saale line instead
of the Danube, for all the campaigning was done in the region northwest
of these two streams, the population could not have been in excess of
three quarters of a million. Taking Caesar’s calculation of one man for
every twelve inhabitants as the largest army which a semibarbarous people
could collect from a considerable extent of territory[46], we should
get something over 60,000 men as the maximum force which the Germans
could put into the field for a single stroke. Without any adequate
organization, transport, or central authority, this number could not
be fed and maintained any length of time, and it is extremely doubtful
whether Arminius ever had a force as large as this. Besides, a number
of the tribes along the coast as far as the Weser, and along the lower
Rhine, remained friendly and loyal, so that their contingents would have
to be subtracted from the total. That something less than 60,000, say
roughly 50,000, is approximately correct may be inferred from the size of
the armies which campaigned in Germany. We have already seen that when
Tiberius set out to crush Maroboduus with his 74,000 men, he assembled
twelve legions, a force of 100,000 to 120,000 legionaries and _auxilia_.
Yet Germanicus invaded Germany in 14 A. D. with only four legions[47],
and fought the campaigns of the next two years with no more than
eight[48], and that too when he had reason to expect that practically all
of the tribes of northwestern Germany would be united against him. We
cannot imagine that the extremely cautious Tiberius would have entrusted
his nephew, his legions, and his own imperial position to eight legions
alone, if he had had reason to think that the enemy exceeded 50,000 in
number, when he had ventured against Maroboduus only with a numerical
superiority of 50%. In other words the same proportional strength used
against Maroboduus, 12 legions against 74,000 men, would allow us to
infer that Tiberius expected to find no more than 50,000 capable of
meeting his eight legions.[49]
We have already referred to the hopeless inferiority of the Germans in
tactics, strategy, and equipment, and their inability to cope with the
great resources of the empire, if systematically employed in steady
and long drawn out operations. The only branch of service in which the
Germans were on an equality with the Romans, if not actually surpassing
them, was the cavalry, but that was of comparatively little consequence,
partly because the Romans used the Batavians for cavalry service,
and they were easily the equals of the Germans, while the nature of
the country, consisting largely of swamps and forests, made cavalry
an unimportant arm of the service. Indeed the cavalry played no very
important rôle in the great battles, and in the one serious defeat
of the Romans, that of Varus, they are not so much as mentioned.[50]
Two other advantages the Germans had on their side, one a difficult
terrain, the other inadequate supplies for a large force of invaders. The
first was a real difficulty, but nothing insuperable; indeed it may be
questioned whether the terrain of Germany was much more difficult than
that of Gaul in Caesar’s time, and certainly not nearly so difficult as
that of the Alps and of Illyricum, the inhabitants of which were subdued
with no especial difficulty. As for provisions, it was a simple thing for
the Romans to collect immense stores along the frontier and to deposit
them at various stations inland as the armies advanced; besides, the
numerous navigable rivers would enable them to bring supplies in any
desired quantity far into the interior, and it is well known how often
the fleet was used in the campaigns, on one occasion actually sailing far
up the Elbe to meet Tiberius and the land army.[51]
This suggests the final point of advantage which the Romans had, that
of the superior military position. Germany could be attacked from three
sides, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Ocean. The Romans could select
their own time and place of attack, and support a forward thrust in any
direction by a powerful flank movement. Any position the Germans took
up might have been turned by forces coming from one side or the other,
or, if they held their ground, they would be in imminent danger of
being caught and crushed between two armies. The rivers of Germany are
numerous, and most of them, three at least in the west, navigable for
Roman fleets, which could not merely move considerable armies at slight
risk far inland, but also furnish inexhaustible supplies. That the Romans
know how to use this superior strategical position is clear from the plan
of campaign against Maroboduus, and the numerous occasions when the fleet
cooperated with the Rhine armies.
To sum up, the Romans had such overwhelming superiority[52] in total
population, size of army, general resources, equipment, tactics,
strategy and military location, that any serious and persistent effort
at conquest could not conceivably have failed. If the Romans, therefore,
did not complete a conquest it was unquestionably because they did not
desire to do so, not because they could not. As we shall see later on,
the course of their operations nowhere shows a consistent effort at
subjugation; the reason they did not incorporate Germany into the empire
is simply that they were engaged in doing something quite different.
We must not forget that what the Middle Ages could not bring about in
the Alps, or the Turks in the Balkans, i. e., the utter pacification of
these districts, the Romans accomplished with ease and celerity, while
Charlemagne, with forces and opportunities incomparably inferior to those
of Rome, achieved the most thorough subjugation of the Germanic tribes.
To deny that Rome could have done the same is an utterly untenable
position.
It is clear from the preceding discussion, and of the utmost significance
for our question, that this battle was not a fair test of the comparative
strength, actual or potential, of the Roman and Germanic forces. Not less
noteworthy is a consideration of the incidents following the defeat.
One would have expected that the events succeeding such a momentous
engagement would have been equally as important as the battle itself,
if not more so. Such, however, is not the case, and this fact is
recognized by Mommsen in the words quoted above[53], “without further
direct military consequences.” If there was an advantage on either side
it was with the Romans[54], for immediately the army was increased to
eight legions, and Tiberius, an experienced general, was placed at its
head.[55] It is to be noted too that not another victory was gained by
the Germans, while the Romans under Tiberius (who had no opportunity for
victories), and particularly under Germanicus, marched and countermarched
over practically all of Germany (certainly over the territory of the
tribes who had taken part in this war), with little or no opposition.
Tiberius’ activity following the overthrow of Varus is told by Velleius
(II, 120), and making due allowance for the latter’s partiality and
proneness to exaggeration, we cannot disregard entirely his general
statements, since he was an eye witness (II, 104). There is no doubt
that Tiberius proceeded cautiously[56] in the years 10 and 11, but in
the latter year he crossed the Rhine and starting from Vetera marched up
the Lippe river, utterly devastating the territory of the Bructeri[57],
resentment for which doubtless caused a member of this tribe to attempt
Tiberius’ assassination.[58] Later on (16 A. D.) Germanicus, just before
his recall, was so successful against the Germans that he requested
only one more year for the completion of his work.[59] This means that
Germany at this time was as near to being a province as in any of the
preceding years, but no nearer, since the land had never been reduced to
tranquillity. And with respect to possession, the Romans were in control
of as much territory as they formerly held, and had the advantage of
having an army larger than it had ever been before. Moreover, while it
doubtless was more difficult to raise troops at this time than in the
days of Julius Caesar, the presence in Germany of this larger armed
force shows beyond doubt that Rome’s resources were as yet by no means
exhausted. As already noted above, excellent authorities admit that had
Rome made any whole-hearted attempt she could have conquered Germany just
as she had other countries. Likewise Mommsen, after observing that it was
no easy task for Rome to overthrow the Germanic patriot-party, as well
as the Suebian king in Bohemia, says[60]: “Nevertheless they had already
once stood on the verge of succeeding and with a right conduct of the war
these results could not fail to be reached.” Gardthausen[61] too agrees
that Rome could easily have erased this blot upon her military honor had
she tried.
As has been suggested above, the Romans never at any time brought into
the field against the Germans their full quota of available troops.
If it had been necessary, Augustus could have sent into Germany the
larger part of the great army of Tiberius, after the revolt in Pannonia
had been put down.[62] It is evident, therefore, that Augustus had
sufficient troops at his disposal for Germany’s subjugation, if he had
wished to use them for that purpose. And, if we grant the contention put
forward by many, that he changed his mind after he had once resolved to
subdue that country, some purely psychological reason must be found for
this change. A brief review of his leading traits of character ought
to bring to light such a reason, if there be one. Does it accord with
what we know of Augustus to conclude that he gave up such an ambitious
undertaking because of the intervention of a single, incidental defeat?
Cold, calculating, shrewd, determined, is the character that Augustus
reveals preeminently in his public and private life.[63] Nor is
there any contradiction in recognizing in Augustus’ nature a desire
for supreme power united with great gentleness, and at the same time
with great positiveness. One can conceive that Julius Caesar might
attempt the impossible, Augustus never, since he began nothing without
careful preparation, and tests which brought a decision favorable
to the undertaking.[64] Meyer, after contrasting Augustus’ calm and
deliberate procedure with that of Julius Caesar, says[65]: “In all
seinem Tun dominiert der Verstand.... Alles sorgfältig wieder und wieder
zu erwägen, alle Chancen in Rechnung zu ersetzen, immer den sichersten
Weg zu gehen, das war Octavians Art.” No basis whatever exists for the
reproach sometimes brought, that Augustus was wanting in courage, even
if he did lack the bold warrior-spirit of Caesar.[66] Considering then
that Augustus began nothing without careful and thorough preparation,
that he was positive and resourceful, and not wanting in bravery,
there is no reason for the belief that he would suddenly have given
up a policy so important and so far-reaching. Further, it must be
remembered that it involves a contradiction of Rome’s entire previous
history to conclude that she would abandon, because of a trivial
reverse, a great national plan of conquest, once it had been begun. But
even should we admit such an abandonment, it is almost impossible to
believe that Augustus would have undertaken a war as extensive as that
necessitated by the subjugation of Germany, after his army had been
so greatly diminished.[67] That too in the face of the fact that he
was primarily a man of peace, as is shown by the following words from
one of the documents deposited by Augustus with his will: “nulli genti
bello per iniuriam lato.”[68] That he was a man of peace is shown also
by the statement of Suetonius;[69] and of Dio (56, 33) to the effect
that whereas Augustus might have made great acquisitions of barbarian
territory, he was unwilling to do so; also of Dio (54, 9), a striking bit
of evidence, which has not been accorded its due significance, to the
effect that in the year 20 B. C. Augustus laid down as his policy that
“he did not think it desirable that there should be any addition to the
former [subject territory] or that any new regions should be acquired,
but deemed it best for the people to be satisfied with what they already
possessed; and he communicated this opinion to the senate.” Similar
too, we note, is the view of Gibbon:[70] “It was reserved for Augustus
to relinquish the ambitious design of subduing the whole earth and to
introduce a spirit of moderation into the public councils. Inclined to
peace by his temper and situation, it was easy for him to discover that
Rome, in her present exalted station, had much less to hope than to fear
from the chance of arms.” Finally, Augustus found no joy in war for war’s
sake, as did Julius Caesar.[71]
Since Augustus was practically an absolute ruler, his wishes and
character would determine the policy of the empire. And, as seen above,
it was contrary to Augustus’ character and wishes to carry on extensive
wars of conquest. Further, that peace was Rome’s object at this period
is universally admitted.[72] The reason for this desire for peace Meyer
sums up as follows[73]: “weil die Kämpfe des letzten Jahrzehnts einen so
furchtbaren Charakter getragen hatten, weil ... aus dem entsetzlichen
Elend der Zeit nur ein Gefühl übermächtig sich erhoben hatte, die
Sehnsucht nach Frieden, nach Ordnung und Sicherheit um jeden Preis.”
While it is true that this feeling and condition refer more particularly
to the early part of Augustus’ reign, the same policy of peace manifested
itself all through his rule, and was continued by his successors.[74]
The fact that the doors of the temple of Janus, which had stood open for
more than two centuries, and had been previously closed but twice since
Rome’s beginning in recorded history, were closed three times in the
first few years of Augustus’ reign[75] proves that he was eager for a
cessation of war.
The previous discussion shows that the effect of Varus’ defeat has long
been exaggerated; that this reversal was a mere incident, “a wound to
the pride rather than to the prosperity of the empire.”[76] While it
was without doubt of greater consequence than the loss of Lollius’
legion[77], which occurred at the beginning of the Germanic incursions
across the northern border (16 B. C.), the overthrow of Lollius, coming
at an earlier date, should naturally have influenced Rome’s policy more
than Varus’ misfortune, which came long after her plans of conquest, as
many suppose, had been definitely formed. If a defeat did not cause Rome
to take a backward step, when she was merely on the defensive, it seems
highly improbable that “a wound to her pride” could have done so, when
she had once definitely assumed the offensive. If there is any truth
in the theory that Augustus intended to subdue and organize Germany
into a province, no satisfactory explanation has been offered as to why
he allowed a defeat, which was of such little military or political
consequence, to interfere with a national policy of so great moment.
We must now examine in more detail three questions which have a very
important bearing on the subject under discussion. First, why did
Augustus begin his wars against Germany? Second, was Germany ever subdued
by Rome and organized into a province? Third, if not, and if the attempt
was made, why was the effort not carried to completion? In the absence
of documentary evidence historians must have recourse to conjecture to
explain why Augustus, contrary to his well-known personal inclination,
contrary to his peace policy of years, attempted the conquest of
Germany. The view has been advanced that he had a burning ambition for
world-empire, and, through mere desire for military renown, he wished to
see himself at the head of such an empire; that as a part of his plans
to that end, the attempt at conquest was begun. This view merits little
consideration, as it has been rejected by practically every competent
historian who has investigated the subject[78], despite the fact that
it enlists the support of von Ranke, whose authority, to be sure, in
the field of ancient history is relatively slight. He sees in Augustus’
plans with respect to Germany “das ideale Ziel der Welteroberung[79],
welches aus einem ungeheuren geographischen Irrthum entsprang. Man
meinte, nach Osten weiter schiffend in das caspische Meer gelangen zu
können, das einen Busen des indischen Weltmeeres bilde, welches die Erde
umkreise.” Further, he speaks of Augustus’ ambition as directed toward
the unattainable. But there is no evidence to show that the sober-minded
Augustus ever indulged the vision of world-empire that haunted Alexander.
Moreover, it is too much to assume that he shared the colossal geographic
error of Strabo.[80] And even if he had, that is no reason for assuming
a desire to conquer the whole world. Besides, universal dominion must
have included the South as well as the North, and there was never any
attempt by the Romans to push their conquests far into Africa, either
directly from Egypt into the Sudan or along either eastern or western
coast. Furthermore, the conquest of Britain must have been an important
milestone in such an undertaking, yet there was no move in the long reign
of Augustus toward that end. Finally, Augustus must have had much clearer
conceptions of the immense stretch of Asia, as he was the first of
European monarchs to receive ambassadors from China, a region which these
same ambassadors must have made clear to him lay far beyond the utmost
confines of Parthia, or the remotest conquests of Alexander. On the other
hand, if he had wished to send his legions to the ends of the earth, it
is unthinkable that he would have waited until fifteen years after he had
become master of the Roman world as a result of the battle of Actium.
And for a beginning, to engage in slight and irregular campaigns with
small armies, no consistent plan of action, and with the requirement that
each fall the legions were to recross the Rhine and winter behind the
frontier! If this be the indication of a policy of universal dominion
its futility is nothing less than colossal. The madcap fancies of the
“Emperor of the Sahara” would look like the combined sagacity of Bismarck
and von Moltke in comparison. It is to be remembered too that plans for
universal empire would have brought Augustus into conflict with the
Parthians, with whom he was very careful to avoid war, preferring the
less hazardous weapons of diplomacy. Further, it is to be borne in mind
that by character and from principle Augustus was committed to a policy
of peace. The brilliant successes of his earlier rule, instead of firing
him with a desire for world-empire, brought to him the conviction that
his empire was large enough. Neither the wish nor the need of enhancing
his military renown can be used as a valid reason for his having altered
his belief in this respect.[81]
Kornemann[82] indeed maintains that Augustus suddenly became warlike
about the year 4 B. C. The events leading up to, and the evidence for,
such a singular reversal of policy he gives as follows. In 5 B. C. the
Roman senate agreed that Gaius Caesar, grandson of Augustus and heir
presumptive, should be consul, as soon as he had attained the age of
twenty. Augustus, with a successor thus assured, invited the people to
share his own joy and that of the prince’s family in the celebration of
public festivals, in the construction of buildings, in the distribution
of largesses, donations, etc. to the public. At this time Augustus added
to the _Monumentum Ancyranum_ (which Kornemann believes was a political
document written in five distinct parts and at as many different
periods[83]), the second part, chapters 15-24, in which he enumerates
with satisfaction all that he has done for the people, for the city
of Rome, and for the army. Then in 2 B. C. Lucius Caesar obtains the
same favor as his brother Gaius, and shortly thereafter aids in the
establishment of the Roman protectorate over Armenia. Thereupon Augustus,
forgetting that he had already represented himself as the champion of
peace, and yielding to the love of military glory and conquest, added,
about 1 B. C., a third part, chapters 25-33 with chapters 14 and 35,
in which he sets forth what he has done to strengthen the Roman power
in the provinces and to extend it beyond, dwelling all the while on
the part that his grandsons and future successors have played in this
achievement. However, Kornemann’s theory and the deduction therefrom as
to Augustus’ attitude toward imperial conquest find contradiction in
an article by Wilcken[84], who argues that while Augustus worked long
over the document nothing was added after the year 6 A. D. Further, the
three parts, _honores_, _impensae_, _res gestae_, form a whole, and were
written at one and the same time. Augustus filled in the original outline
with details which may be easily detected. For example in chapter 26 the
provinces of western Europe are thus enumerated: Gaul, Spain, Germany.
Now Germany, according to its geographical position, ought to stand at
the head of the list, but its position of third in order is proof that
it was inserted after the other two.[85] For Germany could not have been
called a province until after the campaign of Drusus to the Elbe in 9
B. C. Hence the first outline of the _res gestae_ antedates not only
the year 1 B. C. (proposed by Kornemann), but even 9 B. C. Therefore
Augustus’ warlike tendency developed, if at all, prior to 4 B. C., the
date claimed by Kornemann.
This conclusion Kornemann combats[86] with the assumption that while
the passage referring to the western provinces shows clear traces of
interpolation, the name of Germany was not inserted until the year 6 A.
D., at which time there was entered also the mention of Tiberius’ naval
expedition to the coasts of that country in 5 A. D. The insertion of each
item attests the desire which Augustus felt at that time to bring into
relief the services rendered to Rome by his adoptive son and sole heir.
But the chapter as a whole, he avers, is older than this, and the reasons
for attributing it to the earlier date remain unshaken. Bésnier[87], on
the other hand is undoubtedly right in saying that it is impossible to
follow Kornemann in assigning precise dates to each fragment of the
_Monumentum Ancyranum_ and in tracing point by point, from 23 B. C. to 14
A. D., the successive accretions to the text. The most that can be said
is that the three parts, _honores_, _impensae_, _res gestae_ were written
at three different times and that they correspond to the different and
successive preoccupations of Augustus. We may feel certain, however,
that Augustus did not revise his work just before his death, and that
he ceased to add to it in the year 6 A. D.[88] Kornemann’s theories
are super-subtle and break down under a cumulation of interdependent
suppositions, besides being psychologically almost inconceivable. Their
rejection by such scholars as Wilcken, Gardthausen, Koepp, Marcks, Vulić,
and Bésnier completely invalidates his view as to Augustus’ attitude
toward the expansion of the empire by conquests. Kornemann feels keenly,
as do others, the psychological difficulties in the way of explaining
Augustus’ Germanic campaigns as due to thirst for conquest. He therefore
attempts to suggest a plausible motive, i. e., to give the young princes
their “baptism of fire”, and a chance to win the military prestige, which
down to that time every great Roman had had. But his effort fails for
reasons which may now be summarized as follows: (1) If Augustus really
was engaged in the conquest of Germany he had been at the task ever
since 10 B. C., and not merely since 4 B. C. (2) The explanation offered
creates far greater difficulties than it avoids. (3) There is no need of
any explanation whatever, if one takes the simple straightforward view of
events.
More important, and very widely accepted, is the view that Augustus,
in order to protect Gaul and Italy from the barbarians, was under
the military and political necessity of conquering Germany. The year
16 B. C. is cited as the time which brought a significant change in
Rome’s foreign policy[89], and committed Augustus to the subjugation of
Germany. The reasons are stated broadly by Hertzberg[90] as follows:
“es waren die Verhältnisse an der gesammten europäischen Nordgrenze des
römischen Reichs, die schliesslich den grossen Staatsmann bestimmt haben,
abermals und in sehr umfassender Weise, eine Arena auswärtiger Kriege
zu eröffnen.” The events of this year were the barbarian invasions from
all the boundaries of the north. From the Danube wild robber bands made
their way into Macedonia. Germanic stocks, the Sugambri with the remnants
and descendents of the Usipites and Tencteri, under the leadership of
Melo[91], attacked and killed the Roman traders sojourning in their
midst, crossed the Rhine, plundered Gaul far and wide[92], cut off
and defeated the fifth legion under Marcus Lollius, and captured its
standard.[93] To meet this danger Augustus himself was called to the
Rhine, and although he found to his surprise that the enemy had retreated
and the land was enjoying peace, he decided upon “einen Gegenstoss nach
Germanien hinein und ... ein Vorschieben der Marken bis zur Elbe.”[94]
It is also Gardthausen’s belief that by reason of Lollius’ defeat
Augustus felt the necessity of protecting Gaul either by an offensive or
a defensive policy; that he had to choose between either strengthening
the army for holding the Rhine or the subjugation of Germany; and that
he finally decided on the latter.[95] Eduard Meyer finds not only
the protection of Gaul but the winning of a shorter and more distant
boundary from Italy as reasons for Augustus’ wars against Germany[96]:
“nur gegen die Germanen hat er sich nach der Vollendung der Organisation
Galliens zum Kriege entschlossen: der selbe schien notwendig um Gallien
zu sichern und womöglich in der Elblinie eine kürzere und zugleich weiter
von Italien abliegende Grenze zu gewinnen.” So Schiller urges the same
reasons.[97] Likewise it is Mommsen’s view[98] that Augustus’ change in
policy was necessary to Rome’s security; that it is easy to understand
how Roman statesmen, who, like the emperor himself, were opposed to a
policy of subjugation, could no longer assume that it was expedient for
the empire to halt at the Rhine and on the north slopes of the Alps;
that “Great Germany” (so called by the Romans), which forced itself in
like a wedge between the Rhine and Danube boundaries, and the Germans
on the right of the Rhine, with inevitable boundary strife, were far
more dangerous to Roman rule than the blazing torch in Gaul and the
zeal of Gallic patriots. Hertzberg[99] thinks that Augustus was greatly
influenced by the eager desire for war and adventure on the part of the
three military leaders of his household, his spirited stepsons, Tiberius
and Drusus, and his old friend and son-in-law Agrippa.[100] Gardthausen
also believes[101] that, while preliminary conditions urgently demanding
a strong offensive policy were at hand, the desire and vigorous support
of such a policy by Tiberius and Drusus was a matter of considerable
weight. As for Agrippa, he was either not an open advocate of imperial
conquest or did not wish to hazard his well-deserved military reputation
by new ventures; moreover advancing age and illness made him cautious.
As long as he lived his voice was potent in the emperor’s counsels, and
no attempt was made to break away from Augustus’ policy of peace. But
with his death the situation changed; youth took the place of age, and
while both Tiberius and Drusus were alike supporters of the now altered
policy, Drusus must be regarded as the really aggressive factor. Ferrero
at the very beginning of his chapter on the “Conquest of Germania”[102]
discusses the reasons therefor. He rejects “the theory of ancient and
modern historians” that Augustus’ unexpected decision for expansion by
conquest can be “traced to no other cause than an inexplicable change
of personal will.”[103] The urgency of the undertaking depended on
the fact that it was the only possible means of preserving Gaul, the
value of which had been revealed to Augustus by Licinus. Beside the
economic advantages of this rich province great political advantages
also were apparent. The western provinces were inferior to the eastern
in population, and though national feeling affected to despise the
orientals, eastern, particularly Egyptian influence, was spreading a
more refined and intellectual civilization throughout Italy and the
empire. “It is therefore not improbable” adds Ferrero, “that Augustus
under the advice of Licinus may have regarded the rich and populous
province of Gaul ... as a counterpoise to the excessive wealth and the
teeming populations of the eastern provinces.” Finally we may note
the view expressed by Seeck[104], viz., that Rome discovered from the
events of the year 16 B. C. that only continued conquest would permit
Roman territory bordering the empire’s boundaries to come to quiet and
fruitful development; that the peaceful provinces had imperative need
of the partially subdued ones at their side as a protection; that if
these half-subdued territories became peaceful, and developed under
Roman culture into a condition that attracted plundering bands, then
the partially subdued must in turn be wholly subdued until some natural
protecting border of sea or desert was reached. He concludes: “so wurde
denn die Eroberung der freien Barbarenländer in noch grösserem Umfang ins
Auge gefasst, als sie zwanzig Jahre früher beabsichtigt war.”
Gardthausen voices the belief[105] that political reasons also forced
Augustus into a policy of imperial conquest. He himself from principle
and character was a man of peace, but the man of peace had to reckon with
both citizens and soldiers. Not only had he to convince the former ever
anew of the absolute necessity of the form of government he had wrought
out, but he was obliged to gratify the soldier’s desire for his natural
element, by allowing him to break the eternal monotony of long service
in peace by the glory and spoils of war. Unimportant wars, which, even
when unsuccessful, were not sufficient to destroy the equilibrium of the
state, seemed to be the best means to meet the wishes of the citizen
and soldier classes. After the civil wars a time of rest was necessary
to recruit the strength of the Roman state. This transition period was
now past and the gaps which many battles had made in the ranks were now
filled. Peace was no longer praised as the greatest blessing. Freedom for
the Romans was forever gone, but as a recompense the empire could offer
its subjects fame in war, and by foreign victories could also strengthen
itself internally. Indeed even the opponents of Augustus’ government were
easily reconciled to imperial expansion when they saw Rome’s position
abroad bettered through the operations of the army, and the burdens of
the individual diminished by the empire’s enlargement. But of special
moment to the emperor was the temper of the army. The soldier loves war
as such; the avarice of the commanders, the hope of the soldiers for
booty, and the desire for adventure are all factors with which even a
peace-loving prince must reckon. So Ferrero, wholly apart from conditions
in Gaul, finds[106] a necessity for some military conquest by Augustus,
and says further, that this necessity was recognized by Augustus by
virtue of his acute appreciation of public opinion; that some important
enterprise at this time had to be found, which would occupy the attention
of the people as a whole, and would serve as a concession to the ideas of
a new generation, which could not sympathize with the peaceful ideals of
the early empire, and which was restive under Augustus’ social reforms.
Further, Augustus saw clearly the decadence in Roman society; that the
Roman aristocracy was now willing to die by a kind of slow suicide in
physical and intellectual indolence and voluptuousness, tendencies which
were personified by Ovid and which were beginning to act upon the new
generation, as peace dispelled the recollections of the civil wars, and
as Egyptian influence grew stronger.
* * * * *
By way of summary we may note at this point that of the long series of
opinions and explanations given above:
(1) One set assume a sudden change of Augustus’ peace policy
through mere desire of conquest for its own sake. These have
been shown to have no basis in fact.
(2) Another set assume that Augustus, in order to protect Gaul
and Italy, found it necessary to conquer Germany and make it
a province. But this process as a protective policy, as Seeck
admits, would have been a futile one, for it would have been
necessary to continue it indefinitely. That is, as soon as
each new province became civilized the bordering territory
must have been subdued until some great natural barrier for a
frontier was reached. Such a barrier did not exist. The great
plains of Northern Europe were known by all, statesmen as well
as geographers, and by none better than Augustus himself. Such
a policy would have been one of sheer stupidity, a quality
that we must not impute to one of the most astute political
geniuses of the ancient world.
(3) Another set assume that Augustus was influenced in changing
his policy by his stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, and by the
desire to give his grandsons, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, a chance
to win military prestige. But on the one hand there is no
evidence whatever for such an assumption, and on the other it
is at variance with what we do know of Augustus’ caution and
singular independence in dealing with matters of state.
(4) Still other views assume that Augustus was compelled to
yield to the demands for war by army and citizens. But where is
there a shred of evidence to show that the Roman army pined for
conquest? On the other hand in the long and melancholy list of
military revolts and imperial assassinations during the empire
no cause is more frequently given than the dislike of active
campaigning against a dangerous enemy, and the strictness
of discipline which it demanded. Troops constantly revolted
because they were compelled to leave comfortable quarters and
go to distant ends of the empire on campaigns. Under great and
successful generals like Trajan, there would not likely be
revolts against profitable conquests, but where is the evidence
to show that the army as such ever demanded conquests, and had
to be appeased? Least of all conquests in Germany, where there
was no spoil, nothing but privations, dense forests, untrodden
ways, storms, and in particular a savage foe. Armies mutinied
when ordered to undertake wars against the Germans: there is no
instance of their urging a campaign against them. As for the
demands of the citizens for wars it may be said that hatred of
wars and praise of peace is the key note of the literature of
the period. Nothing can be further removed from the demands for
war than the spirit in which the elegiac poets, for example,
pride themselves on their disinclination to encounter the
perils and hardships of war. The senate and nobility were
not eager for war, since an emperor’s conquest made him even
more powerful and necessary to the state, while working a
corresponding diminution in the prestige of the senate and the
nobility. As for the _plebs urbana_, they had by this time lost
practically all their political activity and influence. Neither
their condition nor their temper would prompt them to yearn
for a war, which would likely result in their being called away
to service from the distributions of corn in the city, from the
largesses of money, and from the games now more numerous and
splendid than ever.
(5) It will be observed further, that all the views cited
above assume: (a) that the conquest of Germany was the only
means at Augustus’ disposal for protecting Gaul; (b) that his
conflicts on German soil could have had no other purpose than
Germany’s subjugation. These views, however, prove nothing
further than that Gaul needed protection, and that to this end
battles were fought in Germany. Evidence will be presented
to show that at this period, in Germany as elsewhere, Rome
was endeavoring to protect her borders by a show of military
strength, and by rendering friendly considerable portions of
territory between these borders and the strongholds of the
enemy. A study of Rome’s several campaigns from this point of
view justifies such a conclusion. Only in this sense could Rome
have sought to establish at the Elbe a shorter and more distant
boundary from Italy. The “bufferstate” policy (see Chapter IV),
once we concede it as a possibility, makes unnecessary any
speculation as to who, if any, of Augustus’ military advisers
was responsible for his abandonment of peace plans, so long
maintained. The military movements involved in such a policy,
in lieu of imperial conquest, would satisfy very well the
longing for adventure, and even for the spoils of war, on the
part of the Roman soldiery. Foreign victories were scarcely
needed to strengthen the internal organization of the Roman
state. And it seems difficult to believe that Augustus could
have expected to find in them any effective antidote for the
decadence in Roman society, a decadence which had begun during,
and largely as a result of, a period of conquests, and had
grown apace down to the days of his own reign. It was from
the middle class, in whom the frugal and constant virtues of
earlier days still survived, not from the fashionable upper
classes, the young nobility, to whom Ovid’s writings appealed,
that the empire drew its solid and dependable support.
We must now consider the matter of a German province in the time of
Augustus. Many assert that the subjugation was complete or practically
complete;[107] that the provincial organization was just about to be
put into operation when disaster overtook Varus, and made such an
organization forever impossible.[108] Gardthausen thinks[109] that
Drusus’ death came opportunely for German freedom; that although his
three campaigns did not reduce Germany to the actual condition of
a province, Drusus had nevertheless laid sure foundations for the
subjugation of that country. And while he can point to no certain
evidence Gardthausen believes the Romans established garrisons in the
very heart of the land[110]: Koepp sees no reason to conclude that
Germany was ever a Roman province[111]; he is quite sure that the part
on the right of the Rhine was never such, either before or after the
battle with Varus.[112] Zumpt[113] was probably the first to deny the
existence of a province in Germany. Later, however, Mommsen’s view became
the accepted one.[114] He mentions for the year 16 B. C. a “governor
of Germany”, and gives for the years 9-6 B. C., during which the land
between the Rhine and the Elbe is described as “a province, though still
by no means reduced to tranquillity”, a discussion on the “Organization
of the province of Germany”, as evidence for which he adduces the
administration of Roman law, and the establishment of an altar to
Augustus among the Ubii. Next, for the years 6-9 A. D., he speaks of the
“province of Germany”, as an undoubted fact, and says that the battle
of the Teutoburg forest was the reason for “giving up the new German
province” (p. 52). Quite positively he says (p. 107): “The original
province of Germany, which embraced the country from the Rhine to the
Elbe, subsisted only twenty years”, i. e., 12 B. C. to 9 A. D. Further on
(p. 108) we are told that “the governorship and the command were not, in
a strict sense done away with by that catastrophe, although they were, so
to speak, placed in suspense”, and that out of the parts on the left of
the Rhine, and the remnants of the district upon the right, there were
formed the two Roman provinces of Upper and Lower Germany[115]; that
these were “in the territory which properly belonged to the Belgic”,
but that the latter, since “a separation of the military and civil
administration was, according to the Roman arrangements, excluded, was
placed for administrative purposes also under the commandants of the two
armies, so long as the troops were stationed there” [east of the Rhine].
The relation of this so-called province of Germany to the great
Gallic-Germanic command is discussed by Hirschfeld[116], who believes
that the separation of the command over the Rhine legions from the
Gallic governorship was complete in Augustus’ time. In like manner
Marquardt[117] thinks that as a consequence of subjugation on the east
side of the Rhine there arose the two provinces of Upper and Lower
Germany, whose organization was interrupted by reason of the unexpected
events of the year 9 A. D. Schiller also speaks of a division into two
provinces, but regards the establishment of the provinces as planned
rather than actually carried out. While he includes the Germans on the
left bank of the Rhine in the Belgic, one of the three Gallic provinces
set up by Augustus 16-13 B. C., he adds: “Wahrscheinlich nahmen später
auch die beiden Germanien an den gallischen Provinziallandtagen [in
Lugdunum] theil.”[118] On the other hand, he describes Mainz in the year
9 B. C. as lying in “der von ihm [Drusus] gewonnenen künftigen Provinz
Germaniae.”[119] Further on[120] we are told that after Quintilius Varus
succeeded Tiberius, and at the same time obtained command over both the
provinces of Germany, the disaster to Varus took place, and a change
in the German policy of the emperor ensued, “und die Benennung Ober-
und Untergermanien, einst als Benennung für das Land zur Elbe geplant,
bezeichnete jetzt etwas prahlerisch den schmalen Streifen längs dem
Rheine am linken Ufer.”[121] Riese, who has carefully examined all the
available sources, shows conclusively that no such separation was made,
and that Germany was considered by the Romans as merely a part of Gaul,
which they regarded as extending to the Elbe.[122] The east boundary of
Roman Gaul, to be sure, was originally the Rhine, and, as land divisions
in the geographical treatise of Agrippa (who died 12 B. C.), Gaul appears
on the one side, while Germany with Raetia and Noricum stands on the
other. The governor of Gaul (the so-called Gallia Comata) was Agrippa
in 21, M. Lollius in 17, and Tiberius in 16. Then, probably during the
presence of the emperor in Gaul (16-13 B. C.), the land was divided
into three separate provinces—Belgica, Lugdunensis, and Aquitania.[123]
The legate of Belgica naturally, as before, commanded the army of all
Gaul[124], which was on duty among the Germanic stocks on the left bank
of the Rhine, and intended to serve as a defense against the Germans
on the right bank of that river. Therefore such commanders could very
properly be called commanders in Germany, as by Velleius (II, 97, 1):
“accepta in Germania clades sub legato M. Lollio”, although, as is well
known, the actual defeat of the legion was west of the Rhine, in Roman
Germany, i. e., in Gaul proper. During Drusus’ command, in the year 12
B. C., the three Gauls were again united. Later Tiberius, and after
him Ahenobarbus, commanded, probably under like conditions, as more
certainly Tiberius did, when a second time (4-6 A. D.) he held both
the supreme civil and military commands in Gaul and the Danube lands.
The only difficulty in the acceptance of such a view is that Sentinus
is called by Velleius “legatus Augusti in Germania”, and by Dio “τῆς
Γερμανίας ἄρχων”. But this does not mean that at that time there was a
German province along with the Gallic one. The combined testimony of
Pliny, Ptolemy, Strabo, and of Augustus himself, tells us nothing of a
German province, but indicates that the Gallica extended to the Elbe.
Significant too are the words employed by Velleius. Although ever ready
to praise Tiberius, and to expatiate on his military achievements, in
his narrative of peoples subdued by Tiberius (“in formam provinciae
redacti”), he says nothing about his conquering the Germans, but
“sic perdomuit Germaniam, ut in formam paene stipendiariae redigeret
provinciae” (II, 97, 4). Florus is the only ancient author who supports
the view that Germany was conquered and organized as a province (II,
30). And he is not only unreliable, but uses the term _provincia_ in
different senses.[125] Once (II, 30, 23) it may mean nothing more than
“land”, since surely there was no province before Drusus, while in
another place (II, 30, 25) it may very well refer to the province of
Gaul. In answer to Mommsen’s view that the establishment of a separate
province in Germany is evident from the organization of courts there, and
in the erection of an altar to Augustus, Riese convincingly argues that
the administration of justice, which could be exercised also by a Gallic
governor, proves nothing; further that the establishment of an altar to
Augustus at Köln would be of significance for our question only in case
it had been customary in every province for the emperor’s worship to be
observed in a single place. But that this was by no means true is seen
from the instances of this cult in different places of one and the same
province[126], e. g., in Asia, Macedonia, and Lycia. Riese concludes
that Varus also, as his predecessors, was at the head of the entire
Gallic-Germanic province. This is nowhere expressly stated in the ancient
sources, but seems probable from all the facts. First of all Varus, as
the husband of Claudia Pulchra, was related by marriage to Augustus,
and so an available man for the position, since it was the emperor’s
policy from the beginning of the reorganization in Gaul to entrust this
position of plenary power only to those who were closely connected with
the emperor’s house.[127] And not only are we nowhere told the contrary,
but it is highly improbable that the emperor, just at the time when the
Gallico-Germanic provincial arrangement was succeeding so well, would
have instituted any change in it. Further, since we find that under
Varus’ successor, no less than under his predecessors, the entire power
of Gaul and Germany was combined, it would seem most probable that the
status was not different during Varus’ incumbency.