A NEW INTERPRETATION
Every empire of the ancient world was bordered on one or more sides, if
not actually surrounded by barbarian tribes which envied its prosperity
and were ever on the alert to organize a _razzia_ into its prosperous
domains. It was therefore a prime policy of every empire builder, not
merely to mark out distinctly the limits of national authority and
responsibility, and to round off the lines of dominion by the inclusion
of the whole of some tribe or nation, or the complete extent of a certain
well defined district possessed of a unified economic character, but
beyond all else to secure an easily defensible frontier line against
the aggression of his civilized rivals, and the chronic brigandage of
barbarian neighbors. Certainly no civilized country of ancient times
enjoyed such immunity from annoyance on the part of its neighbors as
did ancient Egypt, when once the upper and the lower kingdoms had been
united, for it is wholly surrounded by seas and deserts; yet even here
the barbarian was an intermittent danger, the Nubian and Ethiopian in the
south, against whom many a Pharaoh waged punitive campaigns; the Libyan
in the west; the Bedouins at the northeast; and even the sea could not
protect the Delta from the ravages of freebooters from the isles, the
far spread front of the latest wave of the Hellenic invaders of Greece.
And two of the barbarian nations actually invaded the country in such
numbers as to set up dynasties of more than an ephemeral character, the
Hyksos and the Ethiopians. Less favorably situated was the civilization
in the Mesopotamian valley; Elamites, Kassites, Mitanni, Khita,
Aramaeans, and the brigands of the mountains, the last and most powerful,
the Medo-Persians, were ready to devastate their peaceful preserves.
Persia had to contend with Massagetae and Scythians;[1] Philistia had
the Hebrews, and they in turn the Amalekites and other dwellers in the
wastes; Carthage, the Numidians, Libyans, and Moors; the Macedonians had
the Thracians and Paeonians; the Greeks in Asia Minor had the Lydians,
in Italy, the Sabellians, Bruttians, Lucanians, Iapygians,—in short the
Greek colonies had upon every coast of the three continents a fringe
of warlike and rapacious enemies with whom permanent peace was an
impossibility.
Rome was, of course, no exception to the rule, and once her power
had spread beyond the confines of Italy it was inevitable that her
extraordinary national vitality and genius for organization must keep
extending her confines until strong and satisfactory frontiers were
secured. By the beginning of our era the great permanent boundaries of
the empire had in the main been reached. To the west lay the Atlantic
ocean; the south and southeast was covered by the deserts of Sahara,
Arabia, and Syria; the north had the Black Sea[2] and the Danube; only
two quarters were inadequately provided for, the northeast, Armenia,
and the northwest, Germany. In the former case the uplands of the
Taurus constitute a welter of confused peaks and ranges, whose trend
is, however, in the main east and west, so that neither the crest of
a long line of mountains nor the course of some large river supplies
any satisfactory north and south line.[3] In the latter, a relatively
small river, that showed a marked tendency to flow in parallel channels,
with a rather sluggish current except in a few places, and with a
considerable number of islands, so that it could be crossed almost at
will even by barbarian tribes, furnished inadequate protection to the
rich provinces of Gaul.[4] Had the population on the right band of the
Rhine been extremely thin, or sluggish, as for a long period it seems
to have been on the north bank of the Danube, no great danger need have
been anticipated here, but the Germans were, for barbarians, relatively
numerous,[5] brave, and adventurous to a fault, and passionately addicted
to warfare and marauding. Under these circumstances it seems clear that
an ordinary frontier line would have been thoroughly insecure. No matter
how many forts and trenches might be established along the Rhine it would
have been impossible to hold a single line intact even with the full
standing army of the Empire. If the hostile territory extended right up
to the ramparts of the legionaries, the Germans, secure in the protection
of their hills, forests, and swamps, could gather an overwhelming force,
cross the river and break through the fortifications at any point they
pleased along a line of several hundred miles in length, before an
adequate force, with the slow methods of communication then available,
could be gathered to resist them. And once past the defenses, either the
invaders must be allowed to harry and plunder at will, while the breach
was repaired to stop the influx of others, or else, if they were pursued
and hunted down, the forts must be weakened to the imminent danger of a
repetition of the same event at some other point.
There were but two ways to remedy this situation. One was to give up
the Rhine as a frontier and to push on; but this would merely have
transferred the scene of difficulty, not removed it, for bad as the
Rhine may have been it was the best available frontier in this direction
until one came to the Arctic Ocean and the Ural Mountains;[6] or if only
the Germans were so dangerous as neighbors, the limits of the empire
must have been pushed to the almost equally impossible line of the
Vistula, or beyond, in order to include them all within its confines;
and finally, a very material increase must have been made in the size
of the standing army, because the legions on the Rhine served not only
the purpose of warding off the Germans but also of keeping in restraint
the restless Gauls, while, if the frontier were fixed at the Elbe or
the Oder, quite as many troops would be needed to defend it there, and
many additional legions for garrison service in Belgica, Gaul, and
Noricum.[7] The other way was to buttress the frontier by securing on
the right bank of the Rhine a series of friendly states or tribes, whose
leading men or factions were to be kept well disposed to the empire by
all the expedients of force and diplomacy. In this way the danger from
the barbarian would be minimized, no sudden attacks from the proximate
tribes need be apprehended, and even against a great tribal movement in
the remote hinterland, like that of the Basternae, the Galatians, the
Cimbri and Teutones, the Helvetians, and many another even before the
_Völkerwanderung_, the Romans would be amply prepared in advance. The
shock could be absorbed by the launching of friendly tribes, more or
less strongly supported by Roman troops, against the newcomers, and, if
worst came to worst, and the foe pushed his way relentlessly onward, the
issue could be decided on foreign territory beyond the frontiers, and
with the assistance of tribes which otherwise would have been forced
to join the invaders against Rome, or at the best, have remained
neutral.[8] Once established, such friendly relations might easily be
maintained by the countless devices of a resourceful diplomacy, the
honors and recognitions, the flattery and gifts which are so dear to the
barbaric heart, and for which incalculable values have ofttimes been
rashly bartered away; or, when a chief proved recalcitrant, it was easy
among so ambitious and independent a nobility as was that of Germany
to raise up a rival who could either compel obedience or else take his
place.[9] We can readily believe that the subtle and resourceful Tiberius
accomplished during his German campaigns more by diplomacy than with the
sword[10], and characteristic not merely of the man but of the general
situation which had been produced was his effort to console the impetuous
Germanicus with the observation that the Germans could well be left to
themselves now, i. e. to cutting one another’s throats at the artful
suggestion of Roman diplomacy.[11] But diplomacy alone could never have
initiated such a condition in Germany; nothing less was needed than the
vivid fear of the legionaries, and that too not as a static body of
troops however powerful, but dreaded through bitter experience of what it
meant to have the cohorts carry fire and sword to the innermost recesses
of the country. Barbarian peoples are easily impressed by a portentous
occurrence, but with them the effect wears rapidly away, unless by
frequent repetition it be seared into their consciousness. This process
of terrorization had to be kept up until the fear of Rome was so great
that the mere thought of invasion would be recognized as madness. The
readiness with which the tribes of Gaul and even of Germany[12] expressed
their submission to Caesar, after some heavy stroke, is familiar to
all readers of the _Gallic Wars_, but no less characteristic is the
readiness with which they would take up arms at the least rumor of a
reverse, or even without any change in the situation whatsoever, merely
after the first effects of the news of disaster had worn away.[13] For
years therefore after the Rhine had been definitely determined upon as
a frontier it was necessary for Roman generals to march at frequent
intervals into Germany, making powerful demonstrations in force not
simply among the proximate tribes, but penetrating far into the interior,
so that even the remotest might trust no more to their forests and their
swamps; bringing ships of war up the larger rivers not merely to support
the land troops, but also to demonstrate the mastery over water as well
as land, and to show how far beyond the actual frontier of the empire
its outstretched arm could strike; rewarding friends and establishing
them more firmly in places of authority, punishing foes individually and
in small groups, beating down any armed opposition that dared to raise
its head (and that was relatively seldom in the numerous campaigns that
were waged), and ruthlessly devasting the territory of the intransigent,
frequently in the more completely pacified districts adjusting disputes
between Roman merchants and the natives, or acting as arbitrators in
difficulties which had arisen between individuals and factions among
the Germans themselves. Such is the picture of these German campaigns
as we should draw it, filling in the meager outlines of events as given
by the ancient historians. Of a similar nature are the punitive or
monitory expeditions carried on by the French, the British, and the
Russians, in their dealing with similar barbarous or semicivilized
tribes upon the borders of their African or Asiatic empires. Real warfare
was rare, a pitched battle seldom took place[14], but the repetition of
the demonstrations gradually had its effect even upon the fierce and
rapacious Germans.
Let us examine from this point of view the actual conduct of the Germanic
campaigns, bearing in mind the utter dissimilarity with the methods
employed by Caesar for the conquest of Gaul under similar conditions.
In the first place no army posts, forts, or powerful garrisons were
established and maintained in Germany. Aliso was nothing more than a
station for munitions of war and no doubt traders’ stocks of goods[15],
and it was established so short a distance from the Rhine, only a
trifle more than 30 miles from Vetera, as to have little more effect in
overawing the tribes in its vicinity than did the powerful fortresses
along the Rhine itself.[16] The fort built by Drusus in Mt. Taunus can
hardly have been much out of sight of the Rhine, and doubtless served
merely to secure an easy entrance into the upland country for the
garrisons farther south along the river.[17] These two posts certainly
could have had no direct influence upon the maintenance of authority in
the remote interior. Flevum on the coast was a feeble trading post for
merchants, sufficient only to hold their supplies, give a safe anchorage
for their vessels, harbor an occasional Roman war vessel which would be
needed to guard against the danger of piracy, and protect a few ships
engaged in coast traffic towards the north and the northeast. On rare
occasions it might serve as a naval base for a large fleet sent out to
make a demonstration along the coast and rivers of Germany.[18] None
of these can properly be denominated a “Zwingburg”, yet how could the
Romans have expected to maintain and make permanent a conquest over
such fierce barbarians without overawing them in some wise with great
fortresses located at strategical points in their very midst?
It is noteworthy also that no Roman army ventured to spend the winter on
German soil except on one occasion, and that was in 4-5 A. D., when for
some unknown cause (doubtless one of considerable importance judging from
the way in which Velleius speaks of it), Tiberius was so long delayed
in the north that his active campaign was not over until December, and
winter must have been upon him before he could reach the Rhine.[19] In
this case he remained “ad caput Iuliae”, as near the permanent camps
doubtless as he could get.[20] The next summer an extensive campaign was
undertaken to the north and east, and with the cooperation of the fleet
even the Elbe was reached, but that this encampment in the confines of
Germany the preceding winter had meant nothing singular, and established
no new policy, is clear from the fact that after this summer’s campaign,
when, if ever, it would have been necessary to retain a powerful army in
the “conquered” territory whose limits are supposed to have been greatly
extended, Tiberius calmly led his troops back to the Rhine as usual (“in
hiberna legiones reduxit”, Velleius, II, 107, 3).[21]
Furthermore, there was no building of a network of great military roads
to facilitate the march of the legions far into the interior, yet if such
roads were anywhere needed it was surely in Germany, where the trifling
commercial trade routes could not possibly have sufficed for the sure and
speedy movements of the legions and their large baggage trains. There are
some vague statements regarding engineering works by Drusus[22], and
we hear likewise of certain structures of Domitius, the _pontes longi_
in the northwestern swamps[23], and certain _limites_ and _aggeres_
with which Germanicus connected Aliso and the Rhine[24], nothing at all
commensurate with the ambitious schemes which the Romans are supposed to
have entertained for the conquest of the country.[25]
Finally there was no civil administration established for any part of the
country, even that which might have some appearance of being under Roman
sway; no colonies were founded, either military or commercial; there was
no effort to push forward, to settle, and to absorb the newly acquired
“province”.[26] Nor can shortness of time be put forward as an excuse
for failure to perform these characteristic features of a regular Roman
conquest. Two generations had passed between Caesar’s first passage of
the Rhine and the defeat of Varus, forty-seven years since Agrippa had
crossed the same river, or, if we consent to take the date generally
set for the conquest of Germany, the last campaign of Drusus, 9 B. C.,
eighteen years of Roman domination had elapsed before the battle of
the Teutoburg forest, yet nothing of any real importance had been done
to organize the “new province”. For the earlier part of this period
since Caesar, one might indeed argue that Rome had been engaged in more
absorbing enterprises, to wit, the civil wars, but since the battle
of Actium, or at all events since the establishment of the dyarchy,
Augustus had a perfectly free hand to complete any project whatsoever
that he may have had in mind with regard to Germany. Drusus, Tiberius,
Domitius, Vinicius, and Tiberius again had campaigned often enough beyond
the Rhine, but nothing was actually done toward finishing any formal
conquest. Nor will it do to ascribe to Augustus, as is generally done,
the policy of turning over to Quintilius Varus the last formal act of
organizing the province. What less opportune moment could possibly have
been selected than just the period of the Pannonian revolt, when the
Rhine armies were reduced below their normal strength, and a man placed
in charge, who, whatever his other virtues may have been, was certainly
not an experienced general? For it would certainly be expected that the
formal establishment of complete imperial administration in Germany would
have aroused what little spirit of independence yet remained (according
to this theory) in German bosoms, and to have entrusted such a mission
to such a man, at such a time, with such small forces, and without any
of the necessary preliminary work of roadbuilding, fortress erection,
stationing of garrisons and the like, would have been an act of colossal
and criminal folly on the part of one of the shrewdest and most patient
and calculating statesmen of the ancient world.[27]
We must here examine the arguments of the authorities who are cited
for the statement that Varus was engaged in organizing a full civil
administration for the “province” when disaster overtook him. The
rhetorical nature of these documents and their general untrustworthiness
have already been emphasized; when we look for perfectly definite acts we
find either the vaguest language, or else utterly improbable statements.
Much has been said of the presence of “causarum patroni” in Varus’ army,
but just how much is properly to be inferred therefrom is doubtful. In
the first place the evidence for their presence is the worst possible,
Florus alone mentioning them (II, 30, 36 f.), and that with the most
patent rhetorical purpose, and the highly colored story of how, when the
tongue of one was cut out and the lips sewed together he was taunted
with the remark, “Viper, you have finally ceased to hiss”. But granted
that some “causarum patroni” attended Varus, how much does that signify?
When was the organization of a province entrusted to these men, or what
official rôle would they play in such a process? Their presence is easily
enough explained as an aid to the general in his semilegal activities.
We have already observed that he must often have been called upon to
settle disputes between the numerous rival nobles of Germany. Who indeed
was better suited to act as arbitrator than a powerful and disinterested
official of the great neighboring empire?[28] Doubtless many an appeal
regarding the business dealings of Roman traders with the Germans was
referred likewise to him. The only regular course of procedure would have
been to act in accordance with the recognized Roman legal traditions—one
surely would not expect a Roman general to dispense German law or to
act merely on his passing whims—, and it would be perfectly natural to
have on his general staff a few legal advisers. That Varus took their
advice frequently, and that some persons felt that they had been injured
when such advice was followed, and bore a special grudge against those
men, may very well be, but that the final steps of turning a barbarian
country into a province were being then and there taken surely cannot be
established by the presence of a few legal advisers on Varus’ staff.
More serious is the statement that tribute was being assessed and
collected.[29] That this was literally true on any comprehensive scale
is clearly impossible. We hear nowhere of _publicani_[30], or any of the
paraphernalia for collecting the tribute of a conquered province.[31]
That certain things were given Varus and his army by allied and friendly
chiefs and tribes there can be no doubt, and these may have been objects
of high specific value, as choice pieces of amber and the like, or mere
supplies of grain, meat, hides, and similar material. It was not to be
expected that Roman armies should march through Germany without being
amply assisted by their _socii_ and _amici_. An example of what such
assistance may have been is the well-known case of the Frisians, who
were expected to furnish a few oxhides annually for military uses,
and who started to fight when an exacting officer modified the terms
of the original understanding. That the Frisians however were really a
free, though allied people, at this time, there can be no question, for
there is not a hint of actual Roman administration of their affairs.[32]
Similar must have been the case with the Cheruscans and other tribes
farther inland. A certain amount of assistance was doubtless quite
properly expected, and in fact the genuineness of the friendship might
well have been doubted if there were no willingness manifested to be
helpful.[33] That Varus or some of his officers may occasionally have
regarded a voluntary service of friendship or policy in the light of
an obligation, and may have requested and even insisted upon more than
friendship or policy would lead the Germans to regard as a fair offering,
is quite possible, although with a weak force and while the Pannonian
revolt was still unsubdued, it would indeed have been preternatural
folly. But we are not justified in admitting any more, and this is all
that our sources, stripped of a little rhetorical embellishment, really
assert.[34]
Finally, Dio speaks of a division of Varus’ forces, whereby a large
portion of his army was serving on garrison duty at one point or
another in the country, and adds that after the defeat of the main
body of his troops all these separate detachments were hunted down and
destroyed.[35] This would be important if it could be used as evidence
for the establishment of Roman garrisons throughout the land, but it
cannot. There is no hint in any other author that a large number of
forts and strongholds were captured in consequence of this defeat, yet
as intensifying the importance of the reverse, that must surely have
been referred to by some one. Every other authority knows merely of the
annihilation of Varus and his army, not of the capture of a whole series
of strongholds all over the land.[36] Besides, one asks in vain what
these places were and when occupied. There is nothing in the accounts
of earlier or of later operations which furnishes any answer to such
questions, or a parallel to such a military policy on the part of Varus.
And finally, what could have been more foolish than to divide a force,
unusually small in itself, at a critical period, when the great revolt in
Pannonia was not yet put down? That Varus might not have had every man of
his three legions with him on the fatal occasion, is quite conceivable.
Some detachments might have been with convoys of provisions, others
out to look for supplies, yet others engaged in hunting down some band
of outlaws, or in putting into execution some decision favorable to a
conspicuous supporter of Rome, and that these small bands may have fallen
victims after the great disaster is perfectly possible. That is all that
we are justified in inferring from Dio after the veneer of rhetoric has
been removed.
For we must bear in mind the marked tendencies of our sources for the
administration of Varus. Florus was concocting a melodrama; Dio arranging
an explanation, which should save the credit of Rome and the Roman
soldier by putting all the blame on the dead who tell no tales; Velleius
distorting everything _in maiorem gloriam_ of Tiberius, for whom Varus
must serve as a foil at every turn. There is therefore nothing so stupid,
arrogant, or wilful that it is not cheerfully ascribed to him, while
perfectly proper and natural things, like the presence of lawyers on his
staff, the making of arrangements regarding the quantity and character of
the assistance to be rendered by the _socii_, the dispersion of little
detachments of troops upon one or another small but necessary service,
are exaggerated into acts of wanton folly and oppression, and interpreted
as the inauguration of a totally new policy. Yet every one of these
things must inevitably have taken place on all the numerous similar
demonstrations that had been made in Germany; the only reason that they
are not mentioned elsewhere is that we have no accounts regarding other
operations in Germany in which such details would have been in place.
They were the ordinary routine of campaigning and of no interest to the
average ancient historiographer, save as they served to point a lurid
description of a disaster, or to supply a basis, however flimsy, for a
misrepresentation.
Varus was, we may feel assured, doing no more, in all probability much
less, than his predecessors had done on numerous occasions. Two years
of heavy fighting had not broken the Pannonian revolt. The forces
along the Rhine, if not actually weakened in order to enlarge those in
Pannonia, would doubtless be so represented by hot-headed Germans of the
nationalist persuasion, particularly after two years of utter inaction.
It was doubtless in response to suggestions that Roman prestige needed
some refurbishing in the interior, and very likely at the express
command of Augustus, that Varus undertook his fatal demonstration. The
very fact that he left so large a force at the Rhine under Asprenas would
indicate that he felt it safer to keep two armies in readiness for action
at different points, rather than to concentrate his forces and so risk
the breaking out of trouble in some quarter from which pressure had been
removed. Without any open show of violence, rather with every expression
of courtesy, confidence, and good will, he was engaged in the ordinary
routine of a commanding officer upon such a demonstration in force, when
suddenly attacked and destroyed. Graciousness and friendliness had been
taken for weakness, as too often with the barbarian, and he and his men
had to pay for a conciliatory attitude with their lives. All this is but
the thing which we should reasonably expect under the circumstances;
it is all that the sources, critically examined, will justify us in
asserting. We do not possess, to be sure, the actual documents of
alliance between Rome and various tribes or chieftains of Germany; we
have in fact scarcely the name of any German preserved from Ariovistus to
Arminius, but we can be perfectly certain that negotiations of friendship
and alliance were frequently and solemnly entered upon. If Rome had made
an alliance with Ariovistus in 59 B. C. (see above n. 8), while as yet
he was a relatively unknown force, hundreds of miles from the frontier,
how much more must she have been busy in organizing friendly relations
with the German tribes that were immediately contiguous to the Rhine and
through whose territories her armies so often marched in peace?
Finally, we would emphasize the general defensive character of the
campaigns. In the great majority of cases some disturbance in Germany is
definitely given as the cause of the operations, and if our sources for
the Germanic wars were not so hopelessly fragmentary we should doubtless
find that in every instance the Germans were the aggressors.[37] Even
the proposed campaign against Maroboduus we have no right to regard as
an act of wanton aggression, for Maroboduus had retired sulkily into the
forests of Bohemia, and there developed a formidable army, and though
his overt acts were conciliatory, his very presence, considering the
inflammable character of the nation to which he belonged, and in which
he might incite greater disturbances than had ever yet broken out, was
a cause of justifiable apprehension.[38] Indeed any other German than
Maroboduus and the fact that he did not seems to have been regarded
by his fellow Germans as disloyalty to the national cause. Likewise
the campaigns of Germanicus in 14 A. D., while apparently at the very
moment unprovoked, were in reality a bit of deferred revenge for the
treacherous attack upon the legions of Varus. Is it in fact not truly
singular that among so many scattered references to the Germanic wars,
there is nowhere, save in Florus, who has been dealt with elsewhere, any
direct assertion that the purpose was conquest, reduction to a state of
subjection, or the like? (Cf. pp. 27 and note; 75). All writers represent
the Romans as being compelled to send troops from time to time into
Germany to preserve the peace, and to make powerful demonstrations;
there are none of the characteristic marks or processes of conquest.
Were it not for the all but universal preconception that conquest was
intended the sources speaking for themselves would tell a very different
tale. That is briefly the following: for a generation from the time of
Caesar to that of Drusus, Rome had been content with merely repelling
attacks and punishing the immediate offenders, together with a local
demonstration of her forces. That procedure finally appeared to be
ineffective, and so a vigorous policy of terrorizing the Germans from
further disturbances of the peace was tried. Some canals were dug to
facilitate the movements of the fleet which was greatly needed for
the purpose of transporting supplies upon the marches into the remote
interior; close to the Rhine some swamp road construction was undertaken,
subsidiary apparently to the naval operations; a few _castella_ near to
the Rhine and along the highways leading into the interior were erected
as munition depots, and nothing further.[39] Preparations were made to
facilitate incursions into Germany, and these were repeatedly undertaken,
but every year Drusus came back to his starting point upon the Rhine,
after the most approved manœuvers of the noble Duke of York, or of the
perplexed Persian poet who tried to become a philosopher,
“but evermore
Came out by the same door where in I went.”
The campaigns of Domitius and of Tiberius are of exactly the same
character, a rally, a raid, and a relapse. Regarded as attempts at
conquest these operations represented from the political point of view
sheer folly, from the military point of view a sequence of grandiose
fiascos; considered as a prolonged series of demonstrations intended to
establish a line of buffer states in the form of friendly, allied tribes
as a further protection of a naturally weak frontier against the barbaric
hordes of the remote swamps and forests, they were sagaciously conceived
and to the highest degree successful.
Our argument has thus far followed the process of exclusion. The Roman
operations in Germany were either those of permanent conquest or of
demonstration; there is no _tertium quid_. If not conquest, and we
have endeavored to refute that view at every point, it must have been
demonstration. The nature of our sources does not permit a positive and
detailed proof of our new interpretation; that, properly interpreted,
however, they are in harmony with it, we have been at pains to show.
By way of conclusion we shall undertake to strengthen our position by
pointing out analogies and parallels, not merely in the general course of
ancient history, but in the foreign policy of Augustus himself.
Punitive and monitory raids were frequently undertaken in antiquity
without any attempt whatsoever at making permanent conquest. Such were
the oft repeated _razzias_ into Nubia made by the Pharaohs, the countless
raids of Assyrian monarchs into the mountains to the east and north,
especially the great campaign of Darius among the Scythians in 512 B.
C.[40] Of the same sort were the frequent campaigns of the Macedonian
kings against the Paeonians and Thracians, though no serious attempt
was made to extend their dominion greatly in this direction. A typical
example of such chronic punitive campaigning was the service of Clearchus
in the Chersonese, who used that peninsula as his base of operations
while raiding the Thracians above the Hellespont.[41] The whole history
of the more powerful Greek colonies is filled with the record of such
punitive expeditions intended to keep the restless barbarians at peace.
Of this identical nature were Caesar’s demonstrations across the Rhine in
Germany, and beyond the channel in Britain. He had surely no thought of
making a permanent conquest, at least at that time, but desired merely to
make a display of Roman power to the barbarians who were, or might be,
interfering with the security of his conquests in Gaul.[42] It is true
that the Romans were not generally in the habit of keeping a foe off at
arm’s length in this fashion, but preferred to close with and destroy him
once for all, but the time was bound to come soon or late when even the
amazing vitality of the Romans would reach its limit, and when they must
content themselves with defense instead of new conquest. And this limit
was first reached along the Rhine, where an effort at further advance
would have involved endless difficulties.
But we are not without examples of quite the same thing from the very
reign of Augustus, and that too at a period considerably prior to the
disaster of Varus. Of precisely this nature was the raid into Arabia
in 25-24 B. C. There is no evidence that a permanent seizure of the
land was intended; but occasion was taken to demonstrate the power
of Rome, and then the expedition returned. That there may have been
some intention of seizing or securing fabled wealth we cannot perhaps
wholly deny, although men so well informed as the Roman merchants and
administrators of Egypt could hardly have been guilty of such folly, but
its main purpose seems to have been merely a demonstration of the vigor
of the new Egyptian administration.[43] For it is significant that in
the very next year began the Ethiopian wars, which lasted until 20 B.
C., wherein likewise no effort was made at extending the limits of the
new province, but the Ethiopians or Nubians were given a taste of Roman
steel, and made to realize how serious a thing it would be to harass the
new lords of Egypt.[44] Of quite the same nature was the invasion of
Dacia, 12-9 B. C., and the later raids during the Pannonian revolt, 6-9
A. D. Augustus had certainly no intention of adding Dacia to the Empire;
he merely wished to punish the tribes north of the Danube for interfering
in the affairs of the province and to give a sharp warning against a
repetition of the offense.[45] That the invasions of Germany were made
more frequently and probably upon a larger scale than elsewhere, there
can be no denial, but that is due to the fact that the Germans were
more warlike and martial than the other contiguous barbarians. We have
already observed that practically every campaign in Germany was preceded
by grave provocation on the part of the barbarians, while frequently
the difficulties raised were settled by diplomacy without recourse to
armed intervention. But the lesson that an invasion of the Empire was
likely to cost far more than it was worth, while it took a long time to
teach, was in the end thoroughly learned. For two hundred years after
the death of Tiberius almost unbroken peace reigned along this quarter
of the frontier, which had been for half a century the storm center of
the empire[46], and when the northern defenses finally began to crumble,
it was towards the north and northeast, not the northwest, that they
first succumbed. The policy of the first two _principes_ was therefore
abundantly justified by its lasting success.
As regards the secondary policy, i. e., that of the upbuilding and
support of friendly or buffer states immediately contiguous to the actual
frontier, there is no lack of parallels from antiquity.[47] Tiglath
Pileser IV in 732 B. C., after annexing certain parts of Palestine,
set up such a buffer between his empire and Egypt along the marches of
Philistia, in the shape of a vassal principality under a Bedouin chief
called “_kipi_, (or resident) of Musri” (i. e. Egypt).[48] Similar was
doubtless the purpose of Nebuchadrezzar in leaving Jehoiakim of Judah
upon the throne of a subject kingdom after his conquest of Palestine in
704 B. C. Only after two revolts, both instigated apparently by Egypt,
did he apparently feel compelled to give up a policy which, though it
made it unnecessary to invade Egypt directly, nevertheless allowed the
temptation to renew hostilities without a desperate risk.[49] Something
similar, though under very different conditions was the policy of Sparta
in building a ring of Perioeci about her own Helot population on every
side save that of Messenia, where by the destruction of cities and the
closing of harbors the Helots were likewise cut off from contact with the
outside world. The Perioeci thus formed a double barrier, warding off
the enemy on the outside, and helping to keep in a disaffected servile
population.[50] Again, this was clearly the policy of Alexander in the
East, who set the Indus as his actual frontier, but secured that by
establishing two powerful protected states, the kingdoms of Porus and of
Taxiles, on the eastern bank.[51] A parallel not too remote, perhaps,
can be pointed out in the case of the first contact of Rome and Carthage
in Spain. Here the Romans seem to have set up Saguntum as an allied state
to act as a buffer or check to the advances of Hannibal to the Ebro, and
towards what they chose to regard as their proper sphere of influence
(or, if one prefer, that of their ancient ally Massilia). That the policy
in this case failed to prevent war is of course no proper criticism of
its intent. There were also the numerous but ephemeral protectorates
of the eastern marches, which served for the most part the purpose of
preparing the formal advance of the empire rather than actually covering
a difficult frontier, and so lasted only a short time. But in Armenia
we have a truly classical example of a buffer state, whose fortunes
no less an authority than Lord Curzon compares directly with those of
Afghanistan, similarly situated between the two great rival powers of
Russia and Great Britain.[52] One Roman general or emperor after another
might have made Armenia a province, as Trajan actually did, although his
successor immediately restored it to its former state of uncertainty, but
for more than four centuries it was preserved as a buffer state against
Parthia.[53] Less notorious but equally clear is the case of Mauretania.
In 25 B. C. Augustus transferred King Juba from Numidia, which he
thereupon transformed into a province, to Mauretania, which, after having
been eight years a province, was once more made a kingdom. The purpose of
this singular interchange of political status, must have been to protect
the actual confines of the empire from direct contact with the barbarians
of the south and west, who were not yet accustomed to the presence of the
Romans.[54] It was not until sixty-five years afterwards, 40 A. D., when
danger from this quarter might have been expected to have diminished or
disappeared after two generations of a strong and peaceful government,
that Mauretania was once more made into a province.[55]
With this brief list of parallels and precedents to the German frontier
policy which we have ascribed to Augustus, we hope to have shown that
there was no striking innovation involved therein, nothing really beyond
the range of the expedients and experiences of an ancient statesman. In
thus attributing to Augustus in Germany a policy bearing so modern a
designation as that of the “buffer state”, we feel convinced that we are
not modernizing the ancients, but only recognizing how very ancient some
of our supposedly modern expedients of statesmanship in reality are.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The whole history of Iran has been dominated by the ever recurring
struggle with Turan, the barbarians of the northeastern steppes and
deserts, down even to the 18th century. Compare Ed. Meyer’s excellent
characterization of this relation, _Gesch. d. Alt._, III, p. 103 ff.
[2] The feeble Greek colonies on the north coast of the Black Sea, though
dependent upon the Empire, were hardly an integral part thereof, and
really existed more through the favor of the barbarians, for selfish
personal ends, than by reason of their own strength or the protecting arm
of Rome. They were little more than trading posts preserved for their
mutual serviceability, not the frontiers of empire. Compare Mommsen,
_Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 277 ff., especially 286.
[3] See V. Chapot, _La frontière de l’Euphrate de Pompée à la conquête
arabe_, Paris, 1907, pp. 377, 381.
[4] Upon the general inadequacy of rivers as frontier lines there are
some good remarks by Lord Curzon, _The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers_,
Oxford, 1908, p. 20 ff., and Miss Ellen Semple, _Influences of Geographic
Environment_, New York, 1911, p. 360 ff. It is only rarely in fact that
a large river actually forms a boundary line; exceptions like the Rio
Grande, a short stretch on the upper St. Lawrence, the La Plata, the
Amur, the lower Aras and the lower Danube, only emphasize the rareness of
the phenomenon. Besides, rivers play a relatively slight rôle in military
history; they can be crossed only too easily, if not in the direct face
of the foe, as at Wagram, Fredericksburg, or the Yalu, at least at some
point above or below. In the long course of the German wars the river
Rhine plays a most subordinate part; battles were fought freely on one
side or the other, but none, that we have noted, for its actual passage,
unless an exception be made of an action of Drusus in 12 B. C., which Dio
54, 32, 1, thus describes: “Having watched for the Kelts until they were
crossing the Rhine he cut them to pieces.” This may have been a battle
for a crossing, but it seems much more plausible that it was a mere
attack from an ambuscade, the river playing merely an incidental part. Of
course these remarks apply only to the period of mobile armies. In modern
trench warfare, with solid lines hundreds of miles long, any ditch, even
such as the trifling Yser canal, may be a formidable obstacle; but this
is a wholly new phase of military tactics.
[5] The North American Indians were incomparably less numerous and more
widely scattered than the Germans, but our Indian wars were frequent,
difficult, and costly to life and property. Probably no other nations
with which civilized peoples have had to deal have made such a cult of
valor and of rapine as did the ancient Germans and the North American
Indians.
[6] O. Seeck (_Kaiser Augustus_, p. 110 f.) only partly recognizes the
difficulties involved in the constant pushing forward of the lines of
empire. It is wrong to ascribe to Augustus the absurdities which a policy
of indefinite advance entails. Cf. p. 67.
[7] See p. 65.
[8] These are perhaps the “strategical considerations which tempted
the Romans beyond [the Rhine and the Danube], as the English have been
tempted across the Indus”, to which Lord Curzon (_The Romanes Lecture:
Frontiers_, Oxford, 1908, p. 21) refers. His interesting discussion of
the problems of imperial boundaries calls occasional attention to the
similarity between the conditions faced by the Roman Empire, and by those
of the great modern empires in Asia and Africa; e. g., pp. 8, 32, 38f.,
and 54. Upon one point, however, Lord Curzon’s generalization is not
quite satisfactory. It is that of the difference between the policy in
the East, where protectorates were freely established, and that in the
West, where, to use his own words: “protectorates, strictly so-called,
were not required because the enemy with whom contact was to be avoided
was the barbarian, formidable not from his organization, but from his
numbers; and against this danger purely military barriers, whether in
Britain, Gaul, Germany, or Africa, required to be employed” (p. 38).
Organized states long since accustomed to the rule of a monarch did not
exist in the West, and of course the Romans could not be expected to
create them, but their nearest equivalent under the circumstances, tribes
closely bound to Rome by treaties of friendship and alliance, did exist,
at all events in the earlier period of the empire. Certainly this was
the situation in Germany, where at one time all the tribes between the
Rhine, and the Weser seem to have been _socii_ of Rome, and it was the
case in Gaul before the advent of Caesar, where the Haedui had long been
allies (called actually “fratres”) of the Romans (at least since 121 B.
C., cf. Kraner-Dittenberger-Meusel on Caesar, _Bell. Gall._, I, 11, 3
and 33, 2), and even the newcomer Ariovistus, as a possible source of
danger, had been solemnly recognized as _rex_ and _amicus_ in 59 B. C.
That Ariovistus had made overtures for this recognition, having attempted
to ingratiate himself with the proconsul of Gaul as early as 62 B. C.,
is no doubt to be admitted, as M. Bang (_Die Germanen im römischen
Dienst bis zum Regierungsantritt Constantins I._, Berlin, 1906, p. 2f.)
has convincingly argued (cf. also T. Rice Holmes, _Caesar’s Conquest of
Gaul_, 2nd ed., 1911, p. 40), but the Romans were apparently even more
eager to give than was Ariovistus to receive, in order to secure his
neutrality before the impending Helvetian invasion, no doubt—nothing
else would excuse the abandonment of their old allies the Haedui in the
face of the outrageous treatment which Ariovistus had accorded them.
A certain case of the establishment of a buffer state in Africa will
be noted below. To a later period, when the Romans put all their faith
in palisade and trench, Lord Curzon’s statement is no doubt perfectly
applicable. But that was the time of marked decadence, when the vigorous
offensive-defensive of the early period had changed to a defensive pure
and simple, and when, instead of foreseeing and preventing invasion, men
merely clung despairingly to a wall, and prayed that the barbarian might
dash himself to pieces against it.
[9] A good example of the way in which such affairs might be managed,
is Caesar’s treatment of Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, rivals among the
Treveri (_Bell. Gall._, V, 3 f.).
[10] Tacitus, _Ann._, II, 26: “Se noviens a divo Augusto in Germaniam
missum plura consilio quam vi perfecisse”.
[11] _Ibid._: “internis discordiis relinqui.” Cf. above p. 34. An example
of such diplomacy on the part of the Romans is the way in which a special
territory (that of the Ubii) had been assigned to the Chatti, who, for a
time at least, were thereby prevented from joining the Sugambri and the
national cause (Dio, 54, 36, 3; Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 1085).
Similarly the Frisii were treated with marked friendliness, and cordial
relations were maintained for more than a generation (Gardthausen,
_Augustus_, I, p. 1076). A party friendly to Rome was long supported
against great obstacles among the Cherusci. Domitius experienced a
humiliating diplomatic reverse in an effort to compel their return from
exile in 2 B. C. (Dio, 55, 10ᵃ, 3), but later commanders were more
successful. Only after it became impossible to support them in their own
land were the leaders of this party transferred to a position of safety
within the empire.
[12] The Ubii had made a treaty of friendship and given hostages even
before Caesar crossed the Rhine in 55 B. C. (_Bell. Gall._, IV, 16, 5).
[13] Compare Caesar’s admirable characterization of the Gauls (_Bell.
Gall._, IV, 5), who in this respect are typical of many, if not most,
primitive peoples.
[14] Compare the remark of Tiberius noted above (Ch. IV, n. 10). In
his two expeditions into Germany Caesar fought nothing that he could
dignify with the appellation of a battle (cf. Florus, I, 45, 15: “fuga
rursus in silvas et paludes, et quod acerbissimum Caesari fuit, non
fuere qui vincerentur”). The same is true of Agrippa in 37—“he crossed
the Rhine for the purpose of making war”, says Dio (48, 49, 2), not
that he actually fought a battle; and such is the case with the other
German campaigns, always the vaguest terms, never any details of a severe
engagement; a few skirmishes undoubtedly took place, and there was plenty
of ravaging and burning, but pitched battles must have been very rare.
Even the disgraceful defeat of Lollius was not followed by any battle
(Dio, 54, 20, 6). The tumultuous assault on Drusus in 11 B. C. (Dio, 54,
33, 3) was hardly more than a skirmish, as the enemy remained in the
field, and is represented merely as growing more cautious thenceforward.
This was hardly a “decisive, brilliant victory” as Gardthausen
(_Augustus_, I, p. 1083) calls it. Indeed the defeat of Varus, and the
two engagements of Germanicus, which Tacitus describes, are the only
certain “battles” that were fought in more than 50 years of intermittent
campaigning.
[15] Roman traders were active far beyond the limits of the empire.
They constitute a familiar feature of Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul. For
example, they were present in such numbers and with such equipment at the
surrendering of the Aduatuci (_Bell. Gall._, II, 33) as to purchase and
take over at once 53,000 captives, and a small campaign in the Alps was
undertaken upon one occasion merely to open up a trade route for them
(_Ibid._, III, 1). They mingled with the Suebi under Ariovistus (_Ibid._,
I, 49, 1) and had frequently entered Germany, where they exerted a
marked influence upon the Ubii (_Ibid._, IV, 3, 3) long before Caesar’s
advent into Gaul. In later years we hear of them occasionally in Germany
(Dio, 53, 26, 4; 54, 20, 4 etc.). Varus’ army had a large _tross_ (Dio,
56, 20, 2), which must have been in part at least composed of traders.
A. C. Redderoth (_Der Angrivarierwall und die letzten Römerschlachten
des Jahres_ 16 p. C., Toronto, 1912, p. 10 f.) is doubtless correct in
emphasizing the importance of commercial considerations at this time in
Germany, although our sources (like ancient historians in general) give
only the scantiest indications of the influence of economic interests
upon history. See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16.
[16] See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16.
[17] Tacitus, _Ann._, I, 56: “positoque castello super vestigia paterni
praesidii in monte Tauno.” This is probably the same fort which Dio (54,
36, 3) describes as “among the Chatti beside the Rhine”; (cf. Koepp,
_op. cit._, p. 20). The location is generally thought to be not far
from Höchst, only a few miles up the Main. A _castellum_ here would
merely command the entrance to a road into the interior; it would be no
“Zwingburg.”
[18] Kornemann (_Klio_, IX, 1909, p. 436) regards the words of Tacitus,
_Ann._, IV, 72: “haud spernanda illic civium sociorumque manus litora
Oceani praesidebat,” as proving that “das Kastell eine starke Besatzung
hatte.” On the other hand the inability of the garrison to do more than
hold the fort against the uprising (IV, 73) would indicate that the force
was rather small. A Roman fort was an easy thing to protect against
the Germans; even the feeble garrison of Aliso held out easily against
great numbers after the disaster to Varus (cf. Delbrück, _Gesch. d.
Kriegskunst_, 2nd ed., 1909, II, p. 138). That Flevum was not established
until the time of Germanicus, Kornemann (_loc. cit._, p. 437) has argued,
in refusing to accept the plausible identification of Drusus’ naval base
with Flevum, and locating Borma (Florus, II, 30, 26, a form which he very
properly defends) between the Cannanefates and the Frisii (_loc. cit._,
pp. 430 ff., especially 437-8). Our argument is not seriously affected
thereby, for Borma must have been yet closer to the Rhine than Flevum
(Kornemann, _loc. cit._, p. 437), and neither was so situated as to be a
far flung outpost designed to hold conquests fast. At the very most they
were merely starting points for hostile or commercial activity. To be
sure, if Borma could be identified with the modern Borkum, as has been
frequently attempted (cf. Kornemann, _loc. cit._, p. 433, n. 1), its
foundation might, with a certain degree of plausibility, be regarded as
a serious move looking towards conquest, but Kornemann’s localization of
Borma seems unassailable, the philological obstacles are great, and the
military difficulty of setting a naval base at this period so far away
from the Rhine quite insuperable.
[19] Velleius, II, 105, 3. Dio indeed (56, 18, 2) speaks of the Roman
soldiers in Varus’ time as “spending the winter in Germany”. The tense
used, however, the imperfect, at the head of a series of the same tenses
which are used in the inceptive sense, shows clearly that the word means
no more than: “were beginning to spend the winter.” A single instance
would be sufficient justification for the expression.
[20] This is generally changed, following Lipsius, to _caput Lupiae_, and
is identified with Aliso. If Aliso be at Haltern it is strange indeed
that he did not move on to the Rhine; if near Paderborn there is good
reason for his having remained at a depot of supplies fully 90 miles away
from Vetera.
[21] Ritterling (_op. cit._, p. 181) suggests the possibility that these
“hiberna” are the same as those that were occupied the preceding winter,
while others speak without reserve of a second winter in Germany (e. g.,
Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 1168). But Velleius uses “reduxit”, which
distinctly implies that the legions were being led back across the Rhine.
Besides, “in hiberna reducere” was a phrase which any one acquainted with
the conduct of the German wars would at once understand as implying the
recrossing of the Rhine. For “hiberna” alone as meaning the Rhine forts,
see Velleius, II, 120, 3: “ad inferiora hiberna”; see also §2 of the same
chapter: “in hiberna revertitur”, of the campaign of Tiberius in 10 A.
D., where there is no doubt that the Rhine forts are meant (see Zonaras,
10, 37 ex.). Compare also Tacitus, _Ann._, I, 38: “reduxit in hiberna”;
_ibidem_, I, 51: “miles in hibernis locatur”; II, 23: “legionum aliae ...
in hibernacula remissae”; and II, 26, “reductus inde in hiberna miles”;
and finally, Dio, 55, 2, 1, where Tiberius with the corpse of Drusus
comes from the interior of Germany “as far as to the winter camp”, i. e.,
across the Rhine. It is clear that “hiberna” or the equivalent, when used
without a special qualifying phrase, as in Velleius II, 107, 3, means the
Rhine forts and nothing else. In order to make clear that these “hiberna”
were in the interior of Germany it would have been necessary to add some
special note calling attention to that fact. Finally, as the spending of
the preceding winter in Germany is told with such a flourish (“in cuius
mediis finibus ... princeps locaverat”), the repetition of the same deed,
as enhancing its significance, could not have failed to be emphasized.
[22] The most important was certainly the _fossa Drusiana_ which led
from the Rhine to the North Sea, through a lake, probably that of
Flevum (Tacitus, _Ann._, II, 8). This may very well be identical with
the _fossae Drusinae_ (Suetonius, _Claud._, 1). Drusus also did some
work to regulate the course of the Rhine (Tacitus, _Ann._, XIII, 53,
and _Hist._, V, 19). Whether he built corduroy roads (_pontes longi_)
over the swampy land is not so certain, though Becker, Domaszewski, and
Kornemann (the references in Kornemann, _Klio_, IX, p. 432 ff.) are
probably correct when they interpret _pontibus_ (Floras, II, 30, 26)
in this sense. If this was actually a coast road connecting two naval
bases, Borma, a short distance from the Rhine, with Gesoriacum-Bononia
(Boulogne-sur-mer), as Kornemann very plausibly argues (p. 432, 435),
then it really connected only such naval bases as were necessary to hold
the mouth of the Rhine with the general military road system of Gaul.
Of course both banks of a river at its mouth must be seized in order to
insure certain control, but neither the establishment of Borma nor the
construction of this particular bit of road can properly be regarded
as measures which necessarily had the conquest of Germany in mind, nor
would they have furthered very materially such a conquest, even if it
had been intended. Professor Frank (_Roman Imperialism_, New York, 1914,
p. 352) seems to make too much of this canal of Drusus as evidence “that
serious measures were planned from the first”. The Romans unquestionably
made preparations to march into Germany and to support armies upon
such excursions; the critical consideration, however, is what they did
after entering the country, not their preliminary preparations. If they
constantly marched out again every fall, it is impossible to speak of
permanent occupation. Nor is it satisfactory to restrict the attempts at
conquest to the campaigns of Drusus, 12-9 B. C., and of Tiberius, 4-5 A.
D., alone. Domitius penetrated deeper into Germany than either of them,
as he alone crossed the Elbe. If some invasions imply conquest then
all should, or else Augustus was guilty of an incredibly shilly-shally
policy. And if all the invasions aimed at conquest, then there is an
absurd disparity between their number, scale, and extent and the utterly
negligible results obtained. Kornemann’s view (p. 440 ff.) that Drusus
constructed a coast road as far as the mouth of the Ems can hardly be
established by the evidence which he presents. It does not appear how any
number of campaigns along the coast could have accomplished the conquest
of the remote interior. Even if the view be accepted, however, it could
only show the importance of the control of the coast, a circumstance to
which we shall revert later.
[23] For the literature on these see Gardthausen, _Augustus_, II, p.
763 f. Nothing definite is known about them. If very significant for
the “conquest” of Germany, why was their construction deferred to the
period of Domitius, years after Drusus and Tiberius had been engaged in
carrying on the most extensive campaigns? The very fact that these early
incursions into Germany had been repeatedly made without the erection
of any elaborate network of solidly constructed roads, is the clearest
evidence that no permanent occupation of the country was intended.
For the purposes of the occasional demonstration mere “war-paths”,
supplemented here and there with some light, temporary construction
were entirely adequate. It is a striking fact that of permanent road
construction not a trace has been found in Germany, not in the lower
Lippe valley, where, if anywhere, the highways of armies must have been
solidly constructed if Germany was to be held as a province, nor even
before the very gates of the camp at Haltern (cf. Koepp, _Die Römer
in Deutschland_, 2nd ed., p. 136). Yet along the _limes_ roads were
regularly constructed, and were an essential part of the system of
defense. Tiberius seems to have begun a _limes_ in the _silva Caesia_,
but not to have completed it (Tacitus, _Ann._, I, 50: “limitemque a
Tiberio coeptum”). It was obviously a slight undertaking.
[24] Tacitus, _Ann._, II, 7. These were probably roads (Delbrück, _Gesch.
d. Kriegskunst_, 2nd ed., p. 128 ff.). The use of “novis” indicates that
such structures had been erected earlier. Their flimsy nature is to be
inferred from the fact that the work had to be repeated in a few years,
and the construction of Germanicus was doubtless no more lasting (see the
preceding note).
[25] As for example Agrippa’s system of roads for Gaul. Yet Gaul needed
them far less than Germany, for it was a relatively civilized country
with means of rapid communication. Caesar seems to have been embarrassed
but little in his campaigns by poor roads, in sharp contrast with the
conditions prevailing in Germany.
[26] Dio (56, 18, 2) states that “their (i. e. Roman) soldiers were
beginning to winter there and were founding cities”, but just what
these “cities” were, he neglects to say, and they appear nowhere else
either in his narrative, or in that of any other ancient writer; yet
the destruction of such incipient “cities” after the defeat of Varus
is just the sort of event that could not possibly have been passed
over in silence by all our sources. When Dio comes to the appropriate
section in his later narrative (22, 2ᵃ = Zonaras) where these should be
mentioned, he speaks of nothing but “forts” (ἐρύματα). It is perfectly
clear that his sources knew nothing about real “cities”, and that from
his knowledge of the way in which settlements grow up about any army post
however small, he is indulging in a little exaggeration in telling of
the foundation of “cities” so as to give the desired background for his
picture of a complete reversal of conditions in Germany.
[27] These defects in method have not escaped the sharp eyes of the
latest historian of the German wars, Camille Jullian, _Histoire de la
Gaule_, IV, Paris, 1914, p. 117 ff. He notes especially the failure to
create a great system of converging roads, establish numerous strong
garrisons, found colonies, and maintain a powerful army in the land.
Yet under the influence of the theory of conquest he can explain all
these grave errors only as due to the ignorance and incapacity of the
ageing emperor and his entourage. “Il y a eu, de la part d’Auguste, de
veritables aberrations militaires” (p. 117) ... “Une puérile ignorance
des situations se montra dans la politique romaine au delà du Rhin” (p.
118) ... “L’empereur vieillissait, et il semblait que sa vieillesse pesât
sur tout son entourage” (p. 119). Such a position is logical indeed but
quite inadmissable. One must surely recognize in this the _reductio ad
absurdum_ of the whole theory of conquest.
[28] The amount of such legal business that Varus did is emphasized by
Velleius (II, 118) and Florus (II, 30, 31), but not mentioned at all
by Dio (56, 18, 1) who says merely that the Germans “were establishing
markets and making peaceful gatherings”. Dio’s account is a more military
and political document; Varus there is acting in an understandable if
not wholly sagacious fashion. But Velleius and Florus wish to point a
contrast between the man of the forum and the man of the camp, and in so
doing make Varus out to have been an utter fool. Of course advocates and
law suits belong to the conventional equipment of the forum, and must be
played up in such a picture. There is grave doubt whether Varus had any
more of such matters to adjust than any other Roman general after the
presence of the Roman soldier and merchant came to be no unusual thing in
the land.
[29] This time Dio alone (56, 18, 3) mentions this feature: “he gave them
orders like slaves and in particular collected property from them as
from subjects.” It is singular indeed that neither Velleius nor Florus
is aware of any such striking change in Roman policy, the more so as
Velleius (II, 117) expressly calls attention to the avarice of Varus
(“pecuniae vero ... non contemptor”) in a short character study and
sketch of his previous record, so that some reference to his exactions
must inevitably have been made had Velleius ever heard of them. The fact
that he mentions nothing of the kind is the very strongest _argumentum ex
silentio_ against the correctness of Dio’s statement, as far as it can be
considered a matter of general policy. Or, to look at the situation for
a moment in its broader connections: our three main sources are equally
at pains to explain the reversal of the situation in Germany, and this
they very naturally do by assuming that there was a marked change of
policy under Varus. All are at the same time noticeably under the ban
of a tradition which represented the earlier campaigns in Germany as
having produced a marked change in the character of the inhabitants:
so profound was the peace established by Drusus that even the climate
seemed to have been affected thereby (Florus, II, 30, 37); Tiberius as
early as 8 B. C. had made Germany practically a tribute-paying province
(Velleius, II, 97, 4); the barbarians established fairs and conventions,
and were rapidly growing Romanized without realizing it (Dio, 56, 18, 3).
Now inconsistently enough with this picture, both Velleius and Florus,
when they come to the time of Varus, describe the Germans as fierce and
warlike barbarians who found irksome the piping times of peace and were
ready to fall upon their masters at the slightest occasion (Velleius,
II, 117, 118; Florus, II, 30, 30 and 32). On the other hand the more
philosophical or consistent Dio recognized a discrepancy in these two
pictures of the Germans, and sought to avoid it by representing the
Germans as experiencing a re-transformation. Peaceful and pious men would
not attack their masters even if they were weak and incautious, therefore
Varus must be presented as a typical tyrant who treats the Germans
“as slaves” and levies tribute upon them “as subjects.” Florus also
(II, 30, 31) ascribes to Varus the characteristics of the conventional
tyrant (_libidinem ac superbiam ... saevitiam_), traits about which
his contemporary Velleius, who had no occasion to flatter Varus, and
certainly did not do so, knows nothing whatsoever. These rhetorical
flourishes in Florus are the less excusable, as they are perfectly
gratuitous, for the attack of the Germans is already otherwise quite
sufficiently motived in his own narrative. Of course, the mere facts are
that the Germans had never been broken, pacified and civilized, and that
therefore their attack on Varus needs no specific explanation other than
that he was careless enough to give them their chance. Dio’s artless
acceptance of the palpably exaggerated reports concerning the earlier
campaigns leads him to falsify history in the interests of an illusory
consistency.
[30] Certainly if the _causarum patroni_ excited the peculiar animosity
of the Germans the _publicani_ must have done so much more, yet not even
Florus mentions the latter.
[31] It is an axiom of historians of the ancient history of the East
not to accept at face value the numerous boastful announcements of the
receipt of tribute. In a very great many cases this was nothing more than
an exchange of gifts, as little “_tribute_” on one side as on the other.
Of course the Romans gave many valuable presents to German chieftains,
otherwise it would have been impossible to maintain their friendship,
the case of Flavus, the brother of Arminius, being especially in point
(Tacitus, _Ann._, II, 9).
[32] Tacitus, _Ann._, IV, 72 ff. The very phrase which Tacitus uses of
the outbreak of war, “pacem exuere” (IV, 72, 1), shows clearly that it
was nothing like a revolt; no civil or military commanders are mentioned,
only “qui tributo aderant milites.” On the friendly relations with the
Frisians which were long maintained after their first contact with the
Romans, see Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 1076.
[33] The parallel case of the friendly Indians, who, especially in the
early period of colonization, frequently gave the white men valuable aid
and material assistance, is very much in point.
[34] We must here consider the impassioned language which Tacitus
(_Ann._, I, 59) puts in the mouth of Arminius: “Germanos numquam satis
excusaturos, quod inter Albim et Rhenum virgas et secures et togam
viderint. aliis gentibus ignorantia imperi Romani inexperta esse
supplicia, nescia tributa: quae quoniam exuerint”, etc. That this is
a violent _ex parte_ harangue, and in no sense to be regarded as an
exact statement of facts Tacitus makes sufficiently clear by calling
Arminius “vaecordem” at the very moment of introducing him. On the other
hand these expressions may not be wholly without justification. That
criminals, outlaws, and marauders may have been beaten and beheaded
is not in itself improbable. How else should a Roman commander punish
injuries to his fellow citizens, or disloyalty to political or military
agreements? That an occasional legal adviser was to be found on the
staff of the commander in chief is altogether natural. And finally
that assistance of any kind in the form of service or the furnishing
of supplies may have been called “tribute” by an excited patriot need
occasion no surprise. But it must be a weak case indeed that can find no
better arguments than such statements as these for its support.
[35] Dio, 56, 19, 1 and 5; 22, 2ᵃ (Zonaras).
[36] The siege of Aliso is, of course, abundantly described. The sea
coast was not given up at all, as is well known, and whatever _castella_
may have been there were no doubt maintained. A small force was kept
among the Chauci, to the remote northwest (doubtless on the sea coast),
until after the death of Augustus (Tacitus, _Ann._, I, 38; Gardthausen,
_Augustus_, I, p. 1227). The Taunus fort is the only other whose location
is even approximately known. Germanicus found it a ruin some years
later (see references n. 17 above), and it might conceivably have been
destroyed at this time, but it is much more likely that the enemy did
not appear in sufficient force to do this so far from the seat of the
uprising, and so close to the unshaken legions of the upper Rhine. It
was no doubt abandoned and dismantled voluntarily by the Romans when
they felt constrained to concentrate their strength. Now these three
regions are the only ones in which we have any definite record that Roman
outposts were stationed. As usually happens when one examines these
rhetorical _flosculi_ they are found to be either in flat contradiction
to the definite facts, or else improbable in themselves.
[37] A brief summary of the provocations offered by the Germans may not
be superfluous in support of such a statement. Caesar’s first campaign in
Germany, in 56 B. C., was preceded by the invasion of the Usipetes and
Tencteri (_Bell. Gall._, IV, 1), and by the refusal of the Sugambri to
yield up the survivors (_Bell. Gall._, IV, 16). The second crossing, in
53 B. C., was due to the fact that the Treveri had received assistance
from across the Rhine (_Bell. Gall._, V, 27; VI, 9). Disturbances in Gaul
and Germany compelled Agrippa’s crossing in 37 B. C. (Dio, 48, 49, 2).
In 29 B. C. the Suebi crossed the Rhine, and were defeated by Carinas,
but no invasion of Germany followed (Dio, 51, 21, 6). The punitive
expedition of M. Vinicius in 25 B. C. was occasioned by the maltreatment
of merchants (Dio, 53, 26, 4). In 19 B. C. Gaul was disturbed by German
invaders, but Agrippa restored order without being compelled to invade
Germany (Dio, 54, 11, 1). The campaign of Lollius in 17 B. C. was to
drive out the Sugambri and others who had crossed the Rhine after having
put to death Roman citizens in their own confines (Dio, 54, 20, 4). The
first act in Drusus’ campaigns was to beat back the Sugambri who began
the war with a raid into Gaul (Strabo, VII, 1, 4; Dio, 54, 32, 1). Rome
was by this time clearly disgusted with a situation which allowed so much
opportunity for disturbance, and decided now to spread the terror of her
arms far and wide on the right bank of the Rhine. For the next few years
the Germans were too busy defending themselves to take the offensive.
The moment, however, pressure was relaxed, new troubles started, as in
7 B. C. (Dio, 55, 3, 3), although no serious reprisal was undertaken by
the Romans this time. Again, after Tiberius went into exile, “Germania
... rebellavit” (Velleius, II, 100, 1), and this disturbance must surely
be brought into connection with the extensive campaigns of Domitius in
2 B. C. (Dio, 55, 10ᵃ, 2; Tacitus, _Ann._, IV, 44). More troubles in
Germany which required to be “pacified” in 4 A. D., inaugurated the
second period of activity (Suetonius, _Tib._, 16). Tiberius remained on
the offensive until the Pannonian revolt called him away in 6 A. D. From
this time until the defeat of Varus there is a blank in our information;
nevertheless, from the consistent record of other Roman leaders who never
went into Germany except on strong provocation, and not always even
then, we feel certain that some threat of trouble in the back country
alone could have tempted Varus forth on this occasion. Rome always let
the Germans studiously alone as long as they kept the peace; it would
have been utterly unprecedented for Varus to go into the German forests
in search of trouble, were his presence not demanded there. Under the
circumstances, while the Pannonian revolt was still in progress, to have
wantonly run any serious risks with so small an army would have been
sheer madness (cf. pp. 95, 99, 100 f.).
[38] Besides, as noted just above, this was only the crowning act of a
general extensive policy of reprisal, which was intended to forestall
the possibility of trouble in this quarter for a long time to come. On
Maroboduus see Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 1152 ff.
[39] For the statements of Florus regarding the general establishment of
_castella_, see Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16 _sub finem_.
[40] Compare A. Wittneben, “Dareios’ Zug gegen die Skythen im Lichte des
russischen Krieges von 1812”, _Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen_, LXVI
(1912), pp. 577-94, especially 588 ff. Wittneben quite properly insists
that the move was not intended for conquest, but rather to clear the
right flank of the Persians in a contemplated offensive against Hellas.
As a demonstration it was eminently sagacious and successful, and he very
properly draws a close parallel between this move and Caesar’s invasions
of Britain and Germany (p. 593 f.). G. B. Grundy, _The Great Persian
War_, London, 1901, p. 58 f., shows clearly “that the expedition in the
form it was made was not ... an attempt at conquest”, and he regards it
as either “a reconnaissance in force” or “a display intended to strike
awe into the tribes beyond the newly won territory.” J. Beloch, _Griech.
Gesch._, 2nd ed., II, 1914, p. 5 f., agrees with Grundy that no conquest
was intended: “er wollte nur den Skythen seine Macht zeigen, um ihnen
die Lust zu nehmen, den Istros zu überschreiten” (p. 6). Any other
interpretation of this campaign seems to be quite untenable. On the date
we follow Ed. Meyer, _Gesch. d. Alt._, III, p. 114 f.
[41] Xenophon, _Anab._, I, 1, 9.
[42] The purpose in both cases is excellently expressed by Caesar
himself, _Bell. Gall._, IV, 20: “in Britanniam proficisci contendit
(sc. Caesar), quod omnibus fere Gallicis bellis hostibus nostris inde
subministrata auxilia intellegebat”; and IV, 16: “cum videret (sc.
Caesar), Germanos tam facile impelli, ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque
rebus eos timere voluit, cum intellegerent et posse et audere populi
Romani exercitum Rhenum transire.”
[43] On this expedition see Mommsen, _Res Gestae Divi Augusti_, p. 106
ff.; Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 789 f.
[44] See Mommsen, _Res Gestae Divi Augusti_, p. 108 f.
[45] On these see Mommsen, _Res Gestae_, p. 130 ff.; Gardthausen,
_Augustus_, I, p. 1181 ff., II, p. 779 ff.; Domaszewski, _Geschichte
der römischen Kaiser_, I, p. 222 f. The Dacians seem to have given
provocation in every instance, and even in 11 A. D. once more invaded the
empire, though we know nothing about a retaliatory campaign in Dacia on
the part of the Romans upon this occasion; cf. Mommsen, _op. cit._, p.
132.
[46] Cf. M. Bang, _The Cambridge Mediaeval History_, 1911, vol. I, p. 195.
[47] An historical study of the buffer or allied state, as a device to
strengthen a frontier, would be a profitable one to undertake. There
seems to exist no comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon.
[48] See H. R. Hall, _The Ancient History of the Near East_, London,
1913, p. 466, for a brief statement of the facts. For the idea
of a buffer state in this connection, compare E. Klamroth, _Die
wirtschaftliche Lage und das geistige Lehen der jüdischen Exulanten in
Babylonien_. Diss. Königsberg, 1912, p. 20, n. 4.
[49] For the events compare Hall, _op. cit._, p. 543 ff.; for the
interpretation in terms of a buffer state, Klamroth, _op. cit._, p. 20.
See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 49.
[50] We accept upon this point B. Niese’s convincing arguments, “Neue
Beiträge zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Lakedämons”, _Nachr. d. Götting.
Ges. d. Wiss._, 1906, p. 101 ff., esp. pp. 131-7.
[51] See J. G. Droysen, _Geschichte des Hellenismus_, I, 2, p. 163 ff.
This interpretation of events is much more plausible than that of J.
Kaerst (_Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters_, I, p. 369, and n.
2), who argues that the kingdoms of Taxiles and Porus were actually parts
of the empire. J. B. Bury (_A History of Greece_, 2nd ed., 1913, p. 807)
very properly maintains the position taken by Droysen.
[52] _The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers_, Oxford, 1898, p. 38.—J. Geffcken:
_Kaiser Julianus_, 1914, p. 117 uses the expression “Pufferstaat” in
speaking of Armenia.
[53] The most elaborate recent study of the policy of Augustus towards
Armenia is by A. Abbruzzese, “Le relazioni fra l’impero romano e
l’Armenia a tempo di Augusto”, _Riv. di storia antica_, VII (1903), pp.
505-21; 721-34; VIII (1904), pp. 32-61 (also separate, Padova, 1903).
His attitude towards the diplomatic policy which Augustus followed
is, however, hypercritical, and his thesis that a policy of economic
absorption should have been followed is illusory. (Cf. De Sanctis, _Riv.
di filol._ LIII (1905), p. 159 f.). A fairly satisfactory statement,
though somewhat superficial, is P. P. Asdourian’s dissertation, _Die
politischen Beziehungen zwischen Armenien und Rom von 190 v. Chr. bis
428 n. Chr._, Venedig, 1911. His statement, p. 79, of the policy of
Augustus as one that attempted to maintain the controlling position in
Armenia by peaceful means, or through political manoeuvers, is correct
enough, but the sneering remark that this was due not to Augustus’ own
inclination, but rather to the rivalry of Parthia is quite superfluous.
Of course Rome’s relations to Armenia would have been quite different
had there not been a powerful Parthian monarchy. In the mutual rivalries
of Rome and Parthia lay the whole difficulty. The best general statement
of the problem in its large outlines is in V. Chapot, _La frontière de
l’Euphrate_ etc., p. 377 ff. He also can make nothing out of Abbruzzese’s
“lotta commerciale” theory (p. 382, note). Mommsen’s statement (_Röm.
Gesch._, V, p. 370 ff.) of the general course of Augustus’ Armenian
policy is admirable.
[54] This has been recognized by Gardthausen, _Augustus_, I, p. 706. That
this danger was a real one is clear from the wars with the Gaetulians and
Musulami, which seem to have broken out about the time of the accession
of Juba, and, after dragging on intermittently for a generation, were
ended only by the vigorous interposition of the Roman army under Cn.
Cornelius Lentulus in 6 A. D. This is R. Cagnat’s certain interpretation
of Dio, 55, 28 (_L’armée romaine d’Afrique et l’occupation militaire
de l’Afrique sous les Empereurs_, 2nd ed., Paris, 1913, I, p. 3 ff.,
esp. 7 and 8). It seems that Augustus had let Juba struggle on as best
he could for a whole generation against these wild tribes, and finally
when he seemed unable longer to cope with the situation, he was given
the assistance of a Roman army in an effort to end the trouble once for
all. The whole situation and its treatment are perfectly typical of a
developed buffer state policy.
[55] Even then the transformation was made rudely and without sufficient
preparation, for a vigorous revolt broke out which was not completely
put down until the year 42 or 43. It may very well be that Caligula’s
act in dethroning and later executing Ptolemaeus was instigated solely
by greed, as Mommsen (_Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 629, following Dio, 59, 25),
remarks, but that the land itself was not turned over to another native
prince was surely due to the belief now prevalent at Rome, that the work
of the local dynasts was completed, and it was safe to incorporate the
kingdom into the empire. This is also the view of R. Cagnat, _op. cit._,
I, p. 28. On the whole the act of Caligula seems to have been justified;
after the first revolt was put down we hear only of slight disturbances
in the reign of Domitian (Cagnat, p. 38 ff.), and Hadrian (p. 45 f.),
and thenceforward at occasional intervals until the great revolt of
the third century. Upwards of 40 years of peace followed the inclusion
in the empire, which is a long period, considering the time and the
circumstances.
APPENDIX
CHAPTER IV, NOTE 16
Of course this assumes that Aliso was at Haltern, which is far from being
well established (see below). Even Oberaden is not so very much farther
away from the Rhine, but it seems not to have been occupied any great
number of years, as Aliso certainly was. Koepp’s remark (_Die Römer in
Deutschland_, p. 102) that the extent of the fortifications at Aliso
sets a minimum figure for the number of the troops that occupied it
permanently, seems to be the reverse of probability. The camp was more
likely laid out on a large scale so as to be able to hold the largest
army that might be expected to operate in that region on its way forward
and back, as well as great quantities of war supplies, but the actual
number of troops which held the fort year in and year out was probably
very small, since our literary sources are unanimous in representing the
left bank of the Rhine as the permanent headquarters of the army. As
for the camp at Oberaden, it has yet to be proved that it was occupied
in force throughout the winter, as Koepp (_loc. cit._) believes, and
so accuses Velleius of an outright falsehood in a plain statement of
fact, where he must have known better. Certainly its size does not prove
this, as it might not have been occupied at full capacity all the time;
nor does the ornamentation of certain wall posts upon which Koepp lays
such stress. That beams were artistically shaped shows merely that the
builders had plenty of time in which to do their work, or else loved a
bit of ornamentation, not that whole armies wintered in these quarters.
The probability is that if occupied at all during the winter, it was
held by only a small body of troops. Finally, if it could be shown that
it was occupied during the winter, is it impossible that this may have
been one of the camps of Tiberius, who wintered once in Germany? Can
the archaeologist really date a structure like a camp within a limit
of 15 years (only 13 years separated Drusus’ death from Tiberius’
winter in Germany), in the case of a simple construction, whose general
plan never varied greatly, and without the evidence of superposition
and modification of structure? That a thing is “Augustan” may well be
asserted; to claim that a fortification belongs to Drusus, and not to
Tiberius, is perhaps going too far, particularly when one must reject
utterly the literary evidence in order to do so. Koepp is at pains to
insist upon this matter of permanent occupation, because, as he rightly
observes, “ein grosses Land schwerlich erobert werden kann, wenn der
Eroberer alljährlich bis zu seinem Ausgangspunkt zurückgeht, und nicht
vielmehr einen von Jahr zu Jahr wachsenden Gebietsteil besetzt hält.”
But even if one granted that Oberaden is Drusus’ first fort and Haltern
a later or contemporary establishment (as Kropatschek, and Koepp, p.
20, believe), nothing is gained regarding an ever advancing limit of
possession, for Haltern is nearer the Rhine than Oberaden. In order to
prove that the Romans were actually moving forward in this systematic
fashion, as indeed they must have done, if conquest was their purpose,
one would have to be able to show not two neighboring camps of the
same period, but a whole series of advancing forts, the later situated
ever farther inland than the earlier. This has not been done, and one
is inclined to doubt greatly if it ever can be.——Delbrück’s arguments
against Haltern or Oberaden as Aliso (_Gesch. d. Kriegskunst_, 2nd
ed., II, pp. 131-150) seem very convincing, but there are also grave
difficulties in the way of setting Aliso near Paderborn. However, no
matter in which place Aliso be located, the upper or the lower Lippe,
our argument is not affected, for though the location near Paderborn
is far inland, and, if held in great force, must have overawed the
surrounding tribes, it is perfectly clear from Delbrück’s arguments (pp.
48-50, 130 ff.) that Aliso was never a “Zwingburg”, but only a center for
munitions and supplies, probably as small as it could possibly have been
made for easy defense. He has well emphasized the fallacy of parcelling
out an army in fortresses so long as there remains a hostile force in
the field. The point we wish to make, however, is that, if the whole
country was subdued, or even any substantial portion thereof, it must
have been necessary to move forward the legions into great permanent
fortresses either in its midst, or on its farther borders, and that
this was never done in Germany; the few _castella_ of which we hear
were certainly not far extended points held in full force by an army
of permanent occupation.——We have hitherto paid no attention to the
statement of Florus that “Drusus castella ubique disposuit per Mosam
flumen, per Albin, per Visurgin” (II, 30, 26). Of course no one accepts
this as being in any sense literally true of the Elbe and the Weser (cf.
Abraham, _Zur Gesch. d. germ, u. pannon. Kriege_, etc., p. 4) and there
is grave doubt even of the correctness of the statement regarding the
“quinquaginta amplius castella”, that Drusus is supposed to have built
along the Rhine (cf. Hübner, _Römische Herrschaft_, p. 110). So much
however is clear, that the Romans did make a serious effort to pacify and
control the coast, and _castella_ may very well have been located at or
near the mouth of the Weser and the Elbe (cf. Delbrück, _op. cit._, p.
51). The strategical value of such naval bases has already been pointed
out (above, p. 51); their commercial significance is quite as great.
Ancient commerce was, whenever possible, water-borne. With Germany, in
the absence of even tolerable roads, it must have been almost wholly so.
A close parallel is furnished by the conditions which prevailed in the
American Middle West during the period of French occupation and even
later. For the Roman trade with Germany see K. T. von Inama-Sternegg,
_Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte_, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1909, I, p. 229
ff., a good though somewhat cursory summary, with references to the
literature. The very carefully worded official statement of Augustus
regarding the results of his activities in Germany, mentions this
feature, and it alone, as a solid achievement: “Gallias et Hispanias
provincias et Germaniam qua includit oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis
fluminis pacavi” (c. 26). “Pacavi” seems to be chosen in order to
indicate that peaceful commercial enterprises had been made possible.
CHAPTER IV, NOTE 49
[For the following important note upon Palestine, and especially Judah,
as a “buffer state”, I am indebted to my friend Professor F. C. Eiselen,
who writes me the following under date of May 5, 1915. W. A. O.]: “The
two great world powers in antiquity were Babylonia-Assyria on the one
hand and Egypt on the other; only for a short time did the Hittites and
the people of Urartu play a very important rôle in the ancient history
of Western Asia. Between them lay Syria-Palestine; hence if we look for
buffer states in antiquity we might expect to find them in that region.
Now the strategical position of Syria-Palestine in relation to these
two great powers has long been recognized, but historians do not seem
to have considered it from the standpoint of buffer states, but more
from the standpoint of a bone of contention, or the mixed character
of its population and civilization, or the opportunity of exerting an
influence in all directions” (E. Meyer, _Geschichte des Altertums_,
zweite Auflage, I, 2, pp. 602 ff.). It is rather strange that the other
question has received so little attention, but such is the case: while
there are more or less indirect suggestions of such a situation, the
idea of buffer states receives very little consideration. No doubt
Klamroth is right in saying that the establishment of buffer states was
not foreign to Assyrian policy. At any rate the line in the inscription
of Tiglath-Pileser IV, to which he refers (II Rawlinson, 67) may well
be interpreted as implying such a policy on the part of this ruler. It
is translated by E. Schrader (_Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek_, II, p.
21) as follows: “Den (Stamm) Idibi-il machte ich zur Grenzwacht gegen
Egypten”; similarly by A. S. Strong (_Records of the Past, New Series_,
V, p. 125): “Idibi-ili as a watch over (against) Egypt I appointed.”
(Cf. also the establishment of a Phoenician province by Tiglath-Pileser
under the rule of his own son, to hold together the states along the
Mediterranean, Hugo Winckler, _Altorientalische Forschungen_, II, p. 4;
cf. p. 67). The interpretation by Rogers of the significance of Gaza
and other Philistine cities [i. e. as possible buffer states for Egypt
against the Assyrian] is undoubtedly quite correct. The relation of
Israel and Judah and Assyria as reflected especially in 2 Kings 15-25,
suggests that the Egyptians also considered Syria-Palestine in the
nature of a buffer state. In describing the policy of Egypt during
the eighth century J. H. Breasted uses these words—applicable also in
other centuries: “Unable to oppose the formidable armies of Assyria,
the petty kinglets of Egypt constantly fomented discontent and revolt
among the Syro-Palestinian states in order, if possible, to create a
fringe of buffer states between them and the Assyrian” (_A History of
Egypt_, p. 549). The Egyptians succeeded in stirring up Hezekiah of Judah
(Isa. 28-30), whereupon Sennacherib came, severely punishing the rebel
(2 Kings 18, 19; Isa. 26, 37). May it not be that the transfer of some
of Hezekiah’s territory to Ashdod, Ekron, and Gaza was for the purpose
of maintaining or intensifying the good will of these buffer states?
(_Taylor Cylinder_ III, lines 1-26; Lehmann-Haupt, _Israel_, p. 122).
The later history of Judah may be interpreted on the same principle. The
rapid advance of Necoh against Assyria through the territory of Judah
(2 Kings 22:28, 29) resembles the rapid advance of the Germans against
the French, through the territory of Belgium; Nebuchadnezzar cannot
afford to lose such a valuable buffer state (2 Kings 24:1); and after the
revolt and destruction of Judah, he still attempts to maintain a state
under Gedaliah (2 Kings 25:22). The restored community, after the exile,
served as a buffer state between Persia and Egypt. Six years ago I wrote
regarding the attitude of Cyrus toward the Jews: “A clash with Egypt
was inevitable; hence it was to the interest of Cyrus to have on the
Egyptian border a state that was bound to him by the strongest ties of
gratitude, and upon the fidelity of which he could rely” (_Prophecy and
the Prophets_, pp. 246, 247). Regarding the general policy of Cyrus see
E. Schrader, _Keilinschriften und das alte Testament_, dritte Auflage,
p. 115; L. W. Batten, _Ezra and Nehemiah_, p. 35. A similar situation
continued to exist in later ages.”
ADDENDUM (p. 87)
Perhaps the best ancient statement regarding the workings of Roman
diplomacy with both friendly and hostile tribes beyond the Rhine is
in Flavius Vopiscus, _Probus_, ch. 14 and 15, especially the succinct
report of Probus himself to the senate (15, 2): “Omnes iam barbari vobis
arant, vobis iam serunt et contra interiores gentes militant”. Though the
period is late this is the same policy as that inaugurated by Augustus,
perfected by Tiberius, and maintained doubtless by all the abler
emperors.
INDEX
Agrippa, 65 f., 74.
Alexander, 108 f.
Aliso, 89, Appendix, Chapter IV, n. 16.
Arabia, 106.
Ariovistus, Chapter IV, n. 8.
Armenia, 83, 109 f.
Arminius, 10, 13, 17, 47; in literature, Chapter I, n. 38;
eulogized by Tacitus, 30 ff.
Augustus: attempt of to subdue Germany, 9 f., 27; refutation
of this view—summary, 80; worship of, Chapter I, n. 11; p.
75; opposed to expansion by conquest, 12 f., 57; purpose
of operations in Germany, 18, 57; protection of Gaul and
Italy by him a military and political necessity, 18, 63
f., 66; character of, 54 f.; policy one of peace, 60 ff.;
influenced by military leaders, 65 f.; influenced by political
considerations, 67 ff.
_Auxilia_, 39, 41.
Borma, Chapter IV, notes 8 and 22.
Buffer states: general policy of, 85, 105 ff.; historic
examples of, 105 ff.
Caesar, 10, 27 f., 55; in Britain and Germany, 106.
_Causarum patroni_, 96 ff., Chapter IV, n. 34.
Commerce in Germany, 92, Chapter IV, n. 15, Appendix, Chapter
IV, n. 16.
Dacia, 107.
Dio, 21 f., 56, Chapter IV, n. 29; p. 99 ff.; his description
of battle contradicted by Tacitus, 25 f.
Drusus and Tiberius: campaigns of, 12, Chapter IV, n. 23;
influence of on Augustus, 65 f.
Elbe, the, as frontier, 9 f., 11 ff., 65, 75.
Empires, ancient world, relations of to barbarians, 82 ff.
Engineering works, 92 ff.
Ethiopia, 107.
Fleet, 41, 51, Appendix, Chapter IV, n. 16.
Flevum, 90.
Florus, 23 ff., 27 f., 75, 96, 100, Chapter IV, n. 29.
Forts, Chapter IV, n. 26; p. 110, 104, Appendix, Chapter IV, n.
16.
Frontiers: Armenia, 83; Rhine, 83; rivers, Chapter IV, n. 4;
western, Chapter IV, n. 8.
Germanicus, campaigns of, 30 f., 50, 53, 104.
Germans, attacks and provocations of against Rome, 63 f., 102 f.
Germany, attempted subjugation of, 9 ff., 27 f.; anomaly of
“conquest”, 77, 89 ff., 94 f.; not made a Roman province,
Chapter I, n. 11; p. 70 ff.; 76 ff.; physical conditions of,
41, 51; military forces of, 46, 49 f.; military operations in,
87 ff.
German campaigns, strategy of, 42, 51, 88 f.; defensive
character of, 102 ff.
Legions: number of, 36 f., 41; composition of, 38 ff., Chapter
III, n. 11; size of standing army, 41 ff.; percentage of
population in army, 41; size of Rhine army, Chapter IV, n. 54.
See also _Auxilia_.
Maroboduus, 46, 47, 50, 103 f.
Mauretania, 110.
Military roads, 92 f.
_Monumentum Ancyranum_, Chapter III, n. 67; p. 61 ff., Chapter
III, n. 108.
Mount Taunus, fort, 90, Chapter IV, notes 17 and 36.
Palestine, 108 ff., Appendix, Chapter IV, n. 49.
Population: of Roman empire, 39, 41; of Germany, 44 f.; of
Gaul, 47 f.
Posidonius: on population of Gaul, 47 f.
Rhine, as frontier, 9 ff., 83 ff.
Rome: general forces of, 49 f., 50 ff., 54; alleged desire for
war on part of soldiers and citizens, 67 ff.; alleged change
of policy toward Germany, 79 f.; general frontiers of, 83 ff.;
diplomacy of in Germany, 85 ff. _See also_ Population.
Saguntum, 109.
Sources: rhetorical character of, 17, Chapter I, n. 11; p. 22,
24, 34, 96, 101; general account of, 21 ff.; contradictions
between, 24 ff., Chapter IV, n. 29.
Sparta, 108.
Tacitus, 21, 24, Chapter III, n. 68; contradicted by Dio, 25
f.; his eulogy of Arminius, 30; criticism of eulogy, 34.
Teutoburger forest: battle of and consequences, 12 ff., 36 f.,
52, 77, 81; numbers in battle of, 35 ff. See also _Varus_.
Tiberius: at Rhodes, Chapter I, n. 11; his recall of
Germanicus, 33 f., Chapter I, n. 43; operations of in Germany,
53, 74 f., 87, 91; estrangement from Augustus, 77; Character
of, 78 f.
Tribute, 97 ff.
Varus: defeat of, 9 ff., 58; circumstances of defeat, 24 ff.,
35 f.; relation to Augustus, 75 f.; character of, 95, Chapter
IV, n. 29; conduct and policy of, 96 ff., 102. _See also_
Teutoburger forest.
Velleius, 21 f., 25, 29, 53, 74, 101, Chapter IV, n. 29.