SOURCES
The only ancient accounts that have come down to us which throw light on
the battle of the Teutoburg forest are: Cassius Dio, 56, 18-23; Velleius,
II, 117-120; Florus, II, 30, 21-39; Tacitus, _Annales_, I, 60-62. These
we must now compare with each other, with the purpose of determining
their weight and credibility in the light of what we know of the authors,
of the time and circumstances under which they wrote, and of the purpose
had in view.[1]
Cassius Dio (_ca._ 150-_ca._ 235 A. D.) is the only one of these ancient
writers who has given us anything like a connected account of the
catastrophe.[2] Although he wrote in Greek, Dio must be regarded as a
Roman, being the son of a Roman senator, and himself filling the office
of praetor and consul. His industry—he spent ten years (200-210 A. D.)
in accumulating material for his history—and his various activities, as
a practical soldier and politician, made his work much more than a mere
compilation. While not remarkable for historical insight it represents
what Dio sincerely believed to be the truth. Nevertheless, Dio was a
product of the rhetorical schools and under the spell of their influence
he wrote. His battle scenes are rhetorical exercises.[3] Noticeable also
is his inclination toward a lively narration of events of a military
character, a tendency which causes him to depart from the bare truth of
his sources, and to ornament them with sensational descriptions after
the rhetorical manner.[4] Delbrück notes that our sources for the wars
of the Romans with the Germans are almost all from second, third, or
fourth hand, and that Dio’s account was written at the very time when
the rhetorical spirit most completely dominated literature. Dio, as well
as our other sources for these years, is to be used with caution, since
these writers regarded historical composition as preeminently an _opus
oratorium_, and sought first of all to hold the reader’s attention by
brilliant characterizations and striking descriptions.
To Velleius (_ca._ 19 B. C.-_ca._ 30 A. D.), the only contemporary author
who tells of the Varus disaster, we are indebted for a brief account.[5]
A loyal officer with a military record behind him, a dilettante with
undeniable _studium_, Velleius, in the reign of Tiberius, turned to
the writing of history. As prefect of horse he accompanied Tiberius
to Germany, where he served “per annos continuos novem praefectus aut
legatus.”[6] His fervid loyalty and extravagance cause him to magnify
everything that concerns Tiberius to such a degree that he is scarcely
more than a partisan memoir writer. In his hasty sketches of military
campaigns in Germany and Pannonia, full of blunders and inconsistencies,
it is clear that he is but little concerned with the exact establishment
of facts. With no appreciation of the internal connection of things, and
no ability to sift evidence, he centers his interest almost entirely upon
individuals for purpose of praise or blame, and excels as a rhetorical
anecdotist, and as a delineator of individual actors. His inflated
style, his straining after effect by hyperbole, antithesis, epigram,
and piquancies of all kinds, mark the degenerate taste of the Silver
Age, of which he is the earliest representative.[7] His reflections
and observations generally outweigh the information given. Velleius’
training, the occasion of his composition, the attempt to satisfy the
taste of his age, all make him a source, which, because of distortions
and overemphasis, cannot be accepted at full value.
L. Annaeus Florus, usually identified with the rhetorician and poet of
Hadrian’s time, wrote (probably in 137 A. D.) an abridgement in two
short books of Rome’s wars from the foundation of the city to the era
of Augustus. As to Florus’ purpose in writing, and his rating as a
rhetorician, scholars are agreed.[8] He composed solely from rhetorical
motives[9], hence historical truth is frequently misrepresented, both
intentionally and unintentionally, in a work full of errors, confusions,
and contradictions.[10] Florus’ work is declamatory in tone, shows no
traces of independent investigation, and little of the calm, even temper
demanded of the historian. In his search for the surprising, the unusual,
and the spirited, he is frequently led into exaggerations. He is given to
the use of superlatives and enhancing epithets, as _ingens_, _immensus_,
_incredibilis_, _perpetuus_, etc., and that he was himself conscious
of exaggerations is clear from his free use of such words as _quippe_,
seventy-five times, and _quasi_, more than a hundred times. In Florus
each event is presented as a marvellous fact, and no better commentary on
the poverty and unsatisfactoriness of our sources for the Varus disaster
could be found than the fact that to Florus many writers have given the
honor of being our chief authority.[11]
It is apparent to the most superficial reader that the accounts
given by our sources—especially those by Cassius Dio and Florus—are
contradictory[12], notwithstanding the efforts that have been made to
show that there is no conflict between them.[13] According to Dio,
supported by Tacitus, the attack was made on Varus while he was on the
march, whereas Florus says that Varus was seated in his camp quietly
dispensing justice, when he was surprised by the German host.[14]
Further, a detailed examination of the several accounts, sundry
particulars of which we have no other means of testing, reveals so many
inconsistencies and improbabilities that we are scarcely justified in
accepting more than the bare defeat of Varus, the popular tradition of
which was later incorporated into the studiously dramatic sketches of
the rhetorical historians who serve as our sources. For example, Dio
tells us[15] that the Germans craftily enticed Varus away from the Rhine
and by conducting themselves in a peaceful and friendly manner lulled
him into a feeling of security. This enticement is not mentioned by the
other writers, and is in itself improbable[16], as Roman generals had
frequently down to this time marched much further into the interior
without any enticement whatsoever. It becomes doubly suspicious when
we note the excellent rhetorical effect it produces by bringing into
greater relief the setting of the disaster, and Varus’ sudden reversal of
fortune. Again, Dio makes the statement that Varus and all his highest
officers committed suicide.[17] If this remarkable event took place, it
is almost wholly inconceivable that it should have found no mention in
Velleius and Florus, the former of whom stood much nearer in time to
the event. On the other hand, both of these writers relate that Varus’
body was treated with indignity by the savage foe, and according to
Velleius, one prefect died honorably in battle, and one preferred to
surrender, while Varus’ legate, Numonius Vala, treacherously deserted.
Dio’s description of the battle, moreover, is in sharp contradiction
to that revealed by Tacitus’ account of conditions in Varus’ camp, as
discovered by Germanicus in the year 15 A. D. The first camp that he
came upon was one which, by its wide circuit and the measurement of its
headquarters, showed the work of three legions, i. e. of an undiminished
army; then came a second camp, with half-fallen rampart and shallow
trench, where the diminished remnant were understood to have sunken down,
i. e. the camp was laid out after a day’s loss with heavy fighting.
Finally, Germanicus found in the plain the whitening bones, scattered
or accumulated, just as Varus’ men had fled or made their stand in the
final catastrophe.[18] Tacitus’ description of a regular camp, the “wide
circuit and headquarters” on a scale suitable for the whole force, is
utterly inconsistent with the statement of Dio that the first camp was
pitched “after securing a suitable place so far as that was possible on
a wooded mountain.” And so is there contradiction in Tacitus’ statement
that the legions suffered loss only after moving on from the first
encampment. For according to Dio their greatest suffering and losses were
on the first day’s march before their first encampment; on the second
the loss, he tells us, was less because they had burned or abandoned the
greater number of their wagons, and hence advanced in better order.
According to Florus it was while Varus was in his summer camp holding
court that suddenly the Germans broke in upon him. Mommsen is undoubtedly
correct in saying that this ridiculous representation does not reflect
real tradition, but a picture of sheer fancy manufactured out of it.
Doubtless it is nothing but a rhetorical exaggeration of the silly
security into which Varus is represented as having been inveigled, and by
which the disaster is dramatically brought about. It is past credibility
that the Germans in such numbers could have broken into the Roman camp
without arousing suspicion, or without having come into contact with
the Roman sentries. And the more so if Varus had already been warned by
Segestes of the enemy’s plans. Further, the storming of a single camp
is out of harmony with the two camps mentioned by Tacitus, and clearly
implied in Dio’s narrative. And it is difficult to believe that Varus
would choose such a place for his summer camp—one shut in by forests,
swamps, and untrodden ways. The entire description of the place where
the battle was fought is far more in keeping with a camp pitched by an
army on the march, than with a summer camp, in which Varus exercised the
functions of a judicial office. Moreover, Florus’ account is contradicted
by Velleius[19], who says that Ceionius, one of the prefects of Varus’
camp, wished to surrender to the enemy just at the time when a large part
of the Roman army had fallen in battle. Now if this refers to the first
camp, in which the Romans must have left a detachment (for which there
is no direct evidence), then the main part of the army must have come out
in orderly wise, and no unexpected surprise at the hands of the Germans
could have occurred. Or, if it refers to the second camp, it was clearly
not the summer camp, as Florus relates.
Florus’ account is by no means a bare narration of events, nor does he
bring forward events in their sequence. His choice both of materials and
the grouping of facts is with reference to the leading thought. The very
words introducing the story of the Germanic wars show that they serve as
the theme for the part that follows: “Germaniam quoque utinam vincere
tanti non putasset! magis turpiter amissa est quam gloriose adquisita.”
The same is true of the words by which he passes on to the events under
Varus’ rule: “sed difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere.”[20]
Having assumed that Augustus conquered Germany, Florus seeks to maintain
the thesis that the government of a province is a difficult undertaking;
that Varus took the task all too lightly, and as a result Germany was
ignominiously lost. It is significant that Florus is the only author who
asserts that Augustus wished to conquer Germany. And the reason assigned
for this conquest is as follows: “set quatenus sciebat patrem suum C.
Caesarem bis transvectum ponte Rhenum quaesisse bellum, in illius honorem
concupierat facere provinciam.”[21] It is absurd to believe that Augustus
ever intended to make a province of Germany for so puerile a reason as
merely to honor Julius Caesar, for the latter “had not charged the heirs
of his dictatorial power with the extension of Roman territory on the
north slope of the Alps and on the right banks of the Rhine so directly
as with the conquest of Britain.”[22] If Augustus had desired to make
a province in honor of his father, he would doubtless have conquered
Britain instead, in accordance with Caesar’s supposed wish. Julius
Caesar’s expeditions against the Germans were, as stated by Mommsen
himself[23], merely forward movements of defense. And it seems reasonable
to assume that Augustus did not, as Florus tells us, wish to conquer
Germany, but was merely continuing in a more extensive manner the policy
of his father.
How untrustworthy Florus is as an authority may be seen from the
following: “quippe Germani victi magis quam domiti erant moresque
nostros magis quam arma sub imperatore Druso suspiciebant; postquam
ille defunctus est, Vari Quintilli libidinem ac superbiam haut secus
quam saevitiam odisse coeperunt.”[24] That is, according to Florus,
Varus follows Drusus directly as commander in Germany, in spite of
the fact that there intervene between them three commanders, and a
long series of important events.[25] The reason for this statement is
Florus’ indifference to mere facts, and his desire to harp on the theme
“_difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere_,” and hence to bring
into sharp contrast the man who won that territory and the man who was
directly responsible for its loss.[26] Florus’ method is observable
elsewhere. According to Velleius the Germans purposely introduced a
series of fictitious lawsuits and legal contests to throw Varus off his
guard. It suits Florus’ purpose, however, to represent them as having
recourse to arms at once, as soon as they saw the toga, and felt that
laws were more cruel than arms. He thus illustrates in a rhetorical
way the sudden and unexpected perils which beset one who attempts the
difficult task of maintaining authority over a province. Further evidence
of Florus’ inaccuracy is found in his statement that “to this day the
barbarians are in possession of the two eagles.” They had as a matter of
fact been recovered long before the time at which he wrote, two in the
time of Tiberius[27], and the third during the reign of Claudius.[28]
With this fact established, Florus’ story to the effect that one of the
standards was saved at the time of the disaster is seen to be without any
basis of truth. Finally, attention may be called to Florus’ concluding
statement: “hac clade factum est ut imperium, quod in litore Oceani non
steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret.” This has no value save that
of a glittering rhetorical antithesis, but like other statements in the
account, has exercised far more than due influence upon writers who
discuss the effect of Varus’ defeat upon Rome’s imperial policy.
Velleius’ undisguised flattery of Tiberius warns us that even a
contemporary source must be used with caution. His account shows that his
one great purpose is to praise Tiberius, and place him in a favorable
light. To shed the greater luster on his hero he reveals a marked animus
against Varus, whose command in Germany immediately preceded Tiberius’
second term of service there. Note the depreciatory tone in which Varus
is spoken of, a man who in his stupidity imagined that the inhabitants of
Germany were not human beings save in voice and body, and that men who
could not be subdued by the sword might be civilized by law; likewise
the persistent malice which runs through his account of the loss of
Varus’ legions, a dreadful calamity brought about by the incompetence
and indolence of the leader; an army unrivalled in bravery, the flower
of Roman troops in discipline, vigor, and experience, some of whom were
severely punished by their general for using Roman arms with Roman
spirit, chastised by a general who showed some courage in dying though
none in fighting. Immediately following this is a sketch of the mighty
deeds in Germany done by Tiberius, the constant patron of the Roman
empire, who undertook its cause as usual. And the next chapter relates
that the same courage and good fortune which had animated Tiberius at the
beginning of his command still continued with him.
Certain disagreements between Tacitus’ account of the Varus disaster
and that of our other sources have already been cited.[29] But of even
more importance for our discussion is Tacitus’ warm personal eulogy of
Arminius at the notice of his death.[30] There can be no doubt that this
tribute has done much to perpetuate the traditional view as to the effect
of Varus’ defeat. The observation has often been made that Tacitus’
sympathies were strongly inclined toward the aristocratic Republic;[31]
that notwithstanding his conviction that the Republic had become
impossible and the monarchy necessary[32], the terrors and indignities of
Domitian’s reign embittered his whole thought;[33] that although he felt
that the beneficent rule of Nerva and Trajan offered to the Roman state
the best possible combination of liberty and authority[34], “those happy
and glorious times when men were able to think what they would and say
what they thought”[35], the dark colors, the severe and uncompromising
judgment found in Tacitus’ representation of the whole imperial period
covered by the Annals owe not a little of their gloom to the sense that
the acts of the early emperors were in anticipation of, even a direct
preparation for, the wretchedness and bitter degradation which Tacitus
himself felt at the hands of Domitian.[36] Having at best little or no
sympathy with the early emperors, and living in a time of great imperial
expansion, Tacitus has only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of
Augustus.[37] He regards it as a weakness of all the emperors[38] that
down to the days of Nerva and Trajan they took no pains to extend the
empire. But for the two generals in whom he discovered some inclination
to renew the traditions of conquest he has warm admiration. Observe
the complacency with which he dwells upon the campaigns of Germanicus
and Corbulo, and upon these alone, in his history of the early empire.
These two characters he treats with sympathy and admiration bordering
on affection.[39] And just as Tacitus is hearty in his praise of those
features of German social life which reflect obliquely on the life of the
Roman aristocracy[40], so he regards as a hero the energetic and martial
Arminius, who destroyed three legions of the conservative Augustus, led
by the supine and incompetent Varus.
It is worth while to notice the basis for Tacitus’ generalization,
“liberator haud dubie Germaniae.” Does Tacitus here summarize correctly
the facts as given by him of Rome’s conflict with Germany under the
leadership of Varus and his successors?[41] Did Arminius become a
liberator by virtue of the defeat of Varus? Or by the defeat of Varus’
successors? Is it correct to infer that Arminius was oftentimes
victorious, when only one instance is cited of a clear defeat for the
Romans? An examination of Tacitus’ narrative forces a negative to each
of these inquiries. His first mention of Arminius is as a leader of one
of the German parties—Segestes was leader of the rival faction—against
whom Germanicus was operating in the campaign of 15 A. D.[42] In this
year Germanicus fell suddenly upon the Chatti, many of whom were captured
or killed, while others abandoned their villages and fled to the woods.
Their capital, Mattium, was burned, and their country ravaged before
Germanicus marched back to the Rhine.[43] Then acting on an appeal
from Segestes for relief against the violence of Arminius, Germanicus
marched back and fought off the besiegers of Segestes, who was rescued,
together with his followers and relatives, among them his daughter, the
wife of Arminius.[44] Next, after Arminius had aroused the Cherusci and
bordering tribes, Germanicus, having dispatched a part of his army under
lieutenants, who utterly defeated the Bructeri[45], himself pursued
Arminius until he retired into pathless wastes.[46] The Germans, after
engaging and harassing the Romans in the swamps, were finally overpowered
and the slaughter continued as long as daylight lasted.[47] Tacitus
adds that although the Romans were distressed by want of provisions and
wounds, yet in their great victory they found everything, vigor, health,
and abundance.
With the year 16 A. D. Germanicus, supported by the ardent enthusiasm of
his soldiers, sought further engagements with the Germans, remembering
that they were always worsted in a regular battle and on ground adapted
to fighting.[48] The Chatti, who at this time were besieging a Roman
stronghold on the river Lippe, stole away and disappeared at the report
of the Roman approach. Finally, however, the Germans dared to meet the
Romans in the plain of Idistaviso, near the river Weser, Tacitus, after
giving a detailed account of the dreadful slaughter which here befell
the Germans[49], says that it was a great victory for the Romans and
without loss on their part. Not less disastrous to the Germans was a
succeeding Roman victory on grounds chosen by the Germans.[50] But after
the losses by storm that overtook the Roman legions on their return by
fleet to winter quarters[51], the Germans were encouraged to renew their
attacks. Again Germanicus marched against the Chatti and the Marsi, who
either did not dare to engage, or wherever they did engage were instantly
defeated, exclaiming that the Romans were invincible and superior to any
misfortune.[52] Tacitus tells us that at the conclusion of the conflict
the Roman army was led back into winter quarters full of joy that this
expedition had compensated for their misfortune at sea. Significant are
his concluding words: “nor was it doubted that the enemy were tottering
to their fall and concerting means for obtaining peace, and that if
another summer were added the war could be brought to completion.”[53]
Immediately following this we read of Germanicus’ recall by Tiberius to
celebrate his triumph, and to enter on a second consulship, no further
operations being conducted against the Germans. Tacitus hints that this
step was taken by Tiberius through envy of Germanicus. But whether for
this reason or for the far more probable one, assigned by Tiberius
himself[54], it is evident to any one following the story as told by
Tacitus that Arminius was not a liberator of Germany, either by his
defeat of Varus or through the conflict that he waged against Varus’
successors. Tacitus’ account shows on the one hand that the Romans were
not concerned about securing permanent possessions in Germany, and on the
other that with but one exception the Romans were victorious throughout
the conflict. But in tracing the biography of Arminius further Tacitus
recounts that on the departure of the Romans the German tribes, the Suebi
led by Maroboduus, who had assumed the title of king, and the Cherusci,
led by Arminius, the champion of the people, turned their swords against
each other;[55] that, however, after the defeat of Maroboduus, Arminius
aiming at royalty became antagonistic to the liberty of his countrymen,
and fell by the treachery of his own kinsmen.[56] The opportunity here
for a rhetorical antithesis between Arminius the foe of his country’s
liberty and Arminius its erstwhile champion, Tacitus could not resist.
Hence, “liberator haud dubie Germaniae,” notwithstanding the fact that
this bold assertion has no basis in what has gone before. A Roman
historian under the spell of rhetoric did not as a rule hesitate to
adjust his conclusions in the interest of dramatic portrayal of character.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The great interest in the story of Arminius and his victory has led
to an examination of the sources by many investigators. The following is
a partial list of the works of which use has been made:
Knoke, _Die Kriegszüge des Germanicus in Deutschland_, Berlin, 1887,
pp. 4-17; 63-82. Knoke, _Die Kriegszüge des Germanicus in Deutschland:
Nachtrag_, Berlin, 1889, pp. 19-31; 174-189. Knoke, _Fleckeisens
Jahrbr. f. Phil._, CXXXIX (1889), pp. 361-368. Delbrück, _Gesch. der
Kriegskunst_, II, p. 65 f. Koepp, _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 25 f.
Koepp, _Westfalen_, I, p. 35. Von Ranke, _Weltgeschichte_, III, 2, p.
272 f. Höfer, _Die Varusschlacht_, Leipzig, 1888, pp. 133-166. Asbach,
_Rhein. Jahrbr._, LXXXV (1888), pp. 14-54. Deppe, _Rhein. Jahrbr._,
LXXXVII (1889), p. 53 f. Riese, _Das rhein. Germanien in der antiken
Litteratur_, Leipzig, 1892, pp. 39-84. Riese, _Forsch. zur Gesch. der
Rheinlande in der Römerzeit_, Frankfurt a. M., 1889. Mommsen, _Röm.
Gesch._, V, 41. Gardthausen _Augustus_, II, 802. _Wilisch, Neue Jahrbr.
f. d. kl. Alter._, XXIII (1909), p. 322 f. Hayes, _Sources Relating to
the Germanic Invasions_, New York, 1909, p. 36 f. Wolf, _Die That des
Arminius_, Berlin, pp. 9-13. Winkelsesser, _De Rebus Divi Augusti in
Germania Gestis_, Detmold, pp. 42 f. Edmund Meyer, _Untersuchungen über
die Schlacht im Teutoburger Walde_, Berlin, 1893, p. 56 f.
[2] For details of his life, and an estimate of Dio as a writer, see
Schwartz, Pauly-Wissowa, _R. E._, VI (1899), p. 1684 f.; Christ-Schmidt,
_Gesch. der griech. Literatur_⁵, 1913, II, 2, p. 629 f.; Wachsmuth,
_Einleitung in das Studium der alten Gesch._, 1895, pp. 596-601; Peter,
_Die gesch. Lit. über die röm. Kaiserzeit_, 1897, II, 84-101.
[3] Schwartz, _loc. cit._: “Die Schlachtbeschreibungen Dios sind
ausnahmslos rhetorische Schildereien ohne jeden Wert.... Ein drastischer
Beweis, wie unmöglich es dem im Praktischen verständigen Manne war, als
Schriftsteller den Bann der Schultheorie zu durchbrechen.”
[4] As an example of this tendency Christ (_l. c._) cites 40, 41, where
Dio writes a whole chapter of rhetorically effective scenes on the
surrender of Vercingetorix and his last meeting with Caesar, whereas his
source, Caes., _B. G._, VII, 8, has only “Vercingetorix deditur.”
[5] For Velleius as a historian, see Schanz, Röm. Literaturgesch., II, 2
(1913), p. 255 f.; Wachsmuth, p. 60 f.; Peter, I, 382 f.
[6] Velleius, II, 104, 3.
[7] Norden, _Antike Kunstprosa_, I, p. 302: “Velleius ist für uns der
erste, der, jedes historisches Sinnes bar, Geschichte nur vom Standpunkt
des Rhetors geschrieben hat.”
[8] Rossbach, Pauly-Wissowa, _R. E._, VI, pp. 2761-70; Wachsmuth, p. 610
f.; Peter, II, 278 f.; Schanz, III (1896), p. 56 f.; Eussner, _Philol._,
37 (1872), pp. 130-136.
[9] Cf. Rossbach, _loc. cit._, p. 2763: “Dabei ist er nicht Historiker,
sondern Rhetor ... und will kein Handbuch der römischen Geschichte
schreiben, sondern aus dem besonders geeigneten Stoff seine Beredsamkeit
zeigen”; Wachsmuth, p. 610: “So ist bei Florus sachliches Interesse ganz
geschwunden und nur ein rhetorisch-stilistisches übrig geblieben und
damit sein Werth als Geschichtsquelle auf Null reducirt”; Eussner, _op.
cit._, p. 133: “Ihm ist die Geschichte Roms, welche die Weltgeschichte
in sich begreift, nichts als ein _corpus vile_, an dem die stilistische
Begabung und Kunst sich erproben kann ... Freilich fehlt dem Künstler
der Sinn für das Massvolle, der Geschmack für das Einfache. Die Umrisse
der Zeichnung verrathen seine Vorliebe für das Colossale, die Farben des
Gemäldes seine Neigung zum Glänzenden und Blendenden.”
[10] Cf. Wachsmuth, p. 612: “Wie ein solcher Litterat mit den
historischen und chronologischen Thatsachen umspringt, kann man sich
denken, und das Sündenregister seiner absichtlosen Versehen und
absichtlichen Verdrehungen ist ellenlang.” See also Peter, II, 289; 292.
[11] Equally pertinent for Florus is von Ranke’s criticism (II, 2, p. 396
N. 1) of Dio: “Bei Dio muss man immer seine Bemerkungen, die aus einer
späteren Epoche herrühren, von den Thatsachen, die er authentisch kennen
lernt, scheiden; dann haben auch die ersten ihren Wert.”
[12] Von Ranke, _op. cit._, III, 2, p. 275: “Schon daraus sieht man,
dass die Nachrichten bei Dio mit den beiden andern Autoren sich nicht
vereinigen lassen. Es ist eben, als wenn von zwei ganz verschiedenen
Ereignissen die Rede wäre, die nur durch den Namen des Varus
zusammengehalten werden.”
[13] Knoke, _Fleck. Jahrbr. f. Phil._, CXXXIX (1889), p. 368; cf.
also Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 41; “Der Bericht des Florus beruht
keineswegs auf ursprünglich anderen Quellen ... sondern lediglich auf dem
dramatischen Zusammenrücken der Motive, wie es allen Historiken dieses
Schlages eigen ist.”
[14] On the assumption that a choice must be made between Dio and
Florus, a great difference of opinion has arisen among investigators as
to their respective value. Von Ranke, followed by Höfer, Asbach, and
others, argues that Dio’s report is untrustworthy, while that of Florus
is correct. This view has been rejected by Knoke, Edmund Meyer, Deppe,
Mommsen, and Gardthausen.
[15] 56, 18.
[16] Von Ranke, _op. cit._, p. 275: “Dass sich nun Varus in unwegesame
Gegenden mit seinem ganzen Lager, seinem ganzen Gepäck habe führen
lassen, um eine kleine Völkerschaft niederzuwerfen, ist ... kaum zu
glauben.”
[17] Von Ranke, _op. cit._, p. 275: “Diese letzte Nachricht ist die
unglaubwürdigste von allen.”
[18] Cf. Tac., _Ann._, I, 61: “Prima Vari castra lato ambitu et dimensis
principiis trium legionum manus ostentabant; dein semiruto vallo, humili
fossa occisae iam reliquiae consedisse intellegebantur. Medio campi
albentia ossa, ut fugerant, ut restiterant, disiecta vel aggerata.”
[19] II, 119, 4.
[20] This same observation is made in slightly different words (I, 33, 8)
with respect to affairs in Spain, recently won by Scipio Africanus: “plus
est provinciam retinere quam facere.”
[21] We must notice that in Florus’ account _provincia_ is used several
times, and in no clearly defined way. He says, e. g. (II, 30, 23):
“missus in eam provinciam Drusus primos domuit Usipites”; and again (II,
30, 26): “et praeterea in tutelam provinciae praesidia ubique disposuit.”
In the first _provincia_ = “land,” since at that time, before Drusus’
campaigns, it is clear there could have been no province even in a
rhetorical sense; in the second it can easily refer to the province of
Gaul.
[22] Mommsen, _Hist. of Rome_, V, p. 9. In point of fact what charge had
Julius Caesar given his heirs at all? At the time of his death he was
planning an expedition against the Getae and the Parthians. There is not
a shred of evidence that he himself contemplated action of any kind in
the northwest, or ever enjoined it upon his heirs.
[23] _Ibid._, p. 155.
[24] II, 30, 30.
[25] Drusus died in 9 B. C. Tiberius was in command during the years 8
and 7; Domitius Ahenobarbus, years 6-1. M. Vinicius took charge in 1 B.
C. Tiberius, on his return from Rhodes, was again in command in 4, 5, and
6 A. D., and after he started on his great campaign against Maroboduus
(year 6), Varus was placed in charge in Germany, probably at once, or at
all events early in the year 7.
[26] Note also the purpose of Florus’ insipid and misleading exaggeration
of the result of Drusus’ deeds, II, 30, 27: “ea denique in Germania pax
erat, ut mutati homines, alia terra, caelum ipsum mitius molliusque
solito videretur.” Drusus’ success is magnified by way of contrast
with Varus’ failure, and with the aim of preparing the reader for the
statement “sed difficilius est,” etc.
[27] Tac., _Ann._, I, 60; II, 25.
[28] Cassius Dio, 60, 8.
[29] See p. 25 f.
[30] _Ann._, II, 88: “liberator haud dubie Germaniae et qui non primordia
populi Romani, sicut alii reges ducesque, sed florentissimum imperium
lacessierit, proeliis ambiguus, bello victus. Septem et triginta annos
vitae, duodecim potentiae explevit, caniturque adhuc barbaras apud
gentes, Graecorum annalibus ignotus, qui sua tantum mirantur, Romanis
haud perinde celebris, dum vetera extollimus recentium incuriosi.”
[31] Boissier, _L’Opposition sous les Césars_, 1892, p. 288 f.
[32] _Hist._, I, 16.
[33] _Agr._, 45: “praecipua sub Domitiano miseriarum pars erat videre et
adspici, cum suspiria nostra subscriberentur; cum denotandis tot hominum
palloribus sufficeret saevus ille vultus et rubor, quo se contra pudorem
muniebat”; _Ibid._, 2: “dedimus profecto grande patientiae documentum; et
sicut vetus aetas vidit quid ultimum in libertate esset, ita nos quid in
servitute.”
[34] Cf. Boissier, _op. cit._, p. 30: “il possédait enfin le gouvernement
qui lui semblait préférable aux autres, et, sous les plus mauvais
empereurs il n’a jamais attendu et souhaité que l’avènement d’un bon
prince.” _Agr._, 3: “nunc demum redit animus; sed quamquam primo statim
beatissimi saeculi ortu Nerva Caesar res olim dissociabiles miscuerit,
principatum ac libertatem, augeatque quotidie felicitatem temporum Nerva
Trajanus.”
[35] _Hist._, I, 1.
[36] Spooner, _Histories of Tacitus_, 1891, Introd., p. 7.
[37] See Chapter III, n. 68.
[38] That Tacitus disliked Tiberius’ conservative attitude toward Germany
is clear from such a passage as _Ann._, IV, 74, where it is implied
also that for selfish reasons Tiberius was unwilling to entrust the war
to any commander who might thus gain military prestige: “clarum inde
inter Germanos Frisium nomen, dissimulante Tiberio damna, ne cui bellum
permitteret. Neque senatus in eo cura an imperii extrema dehonestarentur.”
[39] Ferguson, “Characterization in Tacitus,” _Class. Weekly_, VII, 4 f.
[40] Cf. Mackail, _Latin Literature_, p. 210: “What he [Tacitus] has in
view throughout [the Germania] is to bring the vices of civilized luxury
into stronger relief by a contrast with the idealized simplicity of the
German tribes ... the social life of the Western German tribes is drawn
in implicit or expressed contrast to the elaborate social conventions of
what he considers a corrupt and degenerate civilization.” Gudeman (ed. of
_Agricola and Germania_, Boston, 1900, Introd., p. xli), though rejecting
the ethical purpose of the Germania, says: “Now to a man like Tacitus
who, dissatisfied with the conditions in which his lot was cast, longed
to dwell in the ‘good old times,’ these sturdy vigorous Germans naturally
came to serve as a welcome background for his pessimistic reflections.”
[41] See T. S. Jerome, “The Tacitean Tiberius: A study in Historiographic
Method,” _Class. Phil._, VII, pp. 265-292. In this valuable study two
main conclusions are reached: (1) That the disharmonies between data and
generalizations in the _Annals_ are so constant and glaring as to give
conclusive evidence of Tacitus’ untrustworthiness in that work; (2) that
the _Annals_ are “an example of historical writing done according to the
method of the rhetorician, and that this is the true explanation of those
disharmonies which are not explicable on the theories that Tacitus told
the truth, or followed an established tradition, or that a strong bias
against Tiberius entered into the composition thereof.”
[42] _Ann._, I, 55.
[43] _Ibid._, I, 56.
[44] _Ann._, I, 57.
[45] _Ibid._, I, 60.
[46] _Ibid._, I, 63.
[47] _Ibid._, I, 68.
[48] _Ibid._, II, 5.
[49] _Ibid._, II, 17-18.
[50] _Ibid._, II, 19-22.
[51] _Ibid._, II, 23-24.
[52] _Ibid._, II, 25.
[53] _Ibid._, II, 26.
[54] _Ann._, II, 26: “se noviens a divo Augusto in Germaniam missum
plura consilio quam vi perfecisse; sic Sugambros in deditionem acceptos,
sic Suebos, regemque Maroboduum pace obstrictum; posse et Cheruscos
ceterasque rebellium gentes, quoniam Romanae ultioni consultum esset,
internis discordiis relinqui,” i. e. that the Romans were acting from
diplomatic considerations, and in accordance with this policy he himself,
sent nine times into Germany by Augustus, had by diplomacy brought the
Sugambri, the Suebi and Maroboduus into peaceful relations; that the
Cherusci also, and other hostile tribes, now that enough had been done
to satisfy Roman honor, might be left to their own internal dissensions.
See also Jäger (_l. c._): “die Politik des Tiberius, die Germanen ihrer
eigenen Zwietracht zu überlassen, bewährte sich.” Lang (_Beiträge zur
Geschichte des Kaisers Tiberius_, Diss. Jena, 1911, p. 56) says that
Germanicus was not recalled through envy; that Tiberius avoided all wars
except such as were immediately necessary: “Aus diesem Grunde (nihil
aeque Tiberium anxium habebat quam ne composita turbarentur, _Ann._, II,
65), suchte er alle Kriege zu vermeiden, die nicht unbedingt im Interesse
des Reiches lagen. Den Abbruch der Germanenfeldzüge veranlasste nicht
Angst oder Neid gegen Germanicus, wie kurzsichtige Schriftsteller jener
Zeit vermuten, sondern die Tatsache, dass wenig dabei erreicht, den
Provinzen jedoch grosse Lasten aufgebürdet wurden.”
[55] _Ibid._, II, 44.
[56] _Ibid._, II, 88.