UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES
IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES
VOL IV. NO. 2 JUNE 1915
BOARD OF EDITORS
ERNEST L. BOGART
JOHN A. FAIRLIE
LAURENCE M. LARSON
PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
URBANA, ILLINOIS
COPYRIGHT, 1915
BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
The Defeat of Varus and the German
Frontier Policy of Augustus
WILLIAM A. OLDFATHER, Ph. D.
Associate Professor of Classics, University of Illinois
AND
HOWARD VERNON CANTER, Ph. D.
Assistant Professor of Classics, University of Illinois
PREFACE
The present monograph is the outcome of a certain dissatisfaction
felt with the traditional view as expressed in some of the literature
which appeared six years ago on the occasion of the nineteen-hundredth
anniversary of the battle of the Teutoburg forest. The principal theses
as here presented were jotted down at the time, and although a variety
of circumstances prevented their immediate elaboration, they were not
forgotten, collections of literature were made from time to time, as
occasion offered, and the general course of argument outlined. In
1912 Mr. Cyrus S. Gentry, then a graduate student in this university,
working under the supervision of Mr. Oldfather, prepared and submitted,
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of
Arts in Classics, a thesis entitled: “The Effect of the Defeat of Varus
upon the Imperial Policy of Rome regarding the Northern Frontier.” We
desire to express our thanks to Mr. Gentry for kind permission to use
some of his collections of material. The present work is, however, a
wholly independent production, being much more extensive and detailed,
and differing substantially in plan and scope. Active work upon the
present study was begun by us in cooperation in the spring of 1914, and
continued, with intermissions, to the present time.
In the first part, which deals with the traditional view, we have
gone into some detail in the presentation and criticism of current
explanations, with the hope that, as a review of present and past
opinion, it may not be without value, even if our new interpretation fail
to receive general acceptance. A certain amount of repetition in the two
parts of the monograph has thus been rendered unavoidable, but though
this may at times prove tiresome, it contributes to the clearness of the
argument, which is, after all, the chief consideration.
To some it may perhaps seem unfortunate that a discussion of such a
subject as this should appear at a time when the German nation is
involved in a momentous conflict. We do not so feel. Disinterested
scholarship should not be affected by transitory or even permanent
emotions. We are confident that our work has not been so affected.
That we have been compelled in scientific candor to destroy a certain
glamor which has been attributed to an early period of German history,
has not the slightest bearing upon our attitude toward German character
and achievement, for which we entertain the most sincere respect. Our
investigation deals not with the quality of the deed of Arminius, but
only with its historical consequences, two utterly unrelated aspects. It
is surely no discredit that an act of heroism should not be also big with
destiny. Over consequences no man has control. The modern German nation
needs, perhaps less than any other, the lustre of a long buried past to
shed renown upon the present.
We take pleasure in acknowledging our indebtedness to Professor A.
S. Pease of the Department of Classics, who has kindly read all the
manuscript in proof.
W. A. O.
H. V. C.
THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
May 24, 1915
CONTENTS
PAGE
CHAPTER I
Introduction and General View of the Question 9
CHAPTER II
Sources 21
CHAPTER III
Criticism of the Accepted View 35
CHAPTER IV
A New Interpretation 82
Appendices 113
Index 117
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL VIEW OF THE QUESTION
Historians and other writers in discussing the defeat of Varus, and its
bearing upon the subsequent history of Rome and Germany, are almost
united in the belief that Augustus, until the events of the year 9 A.
D., had in view the complete subjugation of Germany as far as the river
Elbe. Gardthausen[1] unhesitatingly predicates the emperor’s intention
in the following words: “er wollte das Land östlich vom Rhein und
nördlich von der Donau mit seinem Reiche vereinigen, um ihm eine bessere
Grenze zu geben.” Mommsen everywhere expresses the traditional view. In
discussing Drusus’ command of the year 13 B. C. against the Germans he
says:[2] “Drusus ... übernahm bei Augustus Rückkehr nach Italien (741)
die Verwaltung von Gallien und den Oberbefehl gegen die Germanen, deren
Unterwerfung jetzt ernstlich in das Auge gefasst ward.” Further on[3]
Drusus’ successor, Tiberius, is represented as having succeeded in
making this subjugation: “weit und breit zwischen Rhein und Elbe zeigten
sich die römischen Truppen, und als Tiberius die Forderung stellte,
dass sämmtliche Gaue die römische Herrschaft förmlich anzuerkennen
hätten ... fügten sie sich ohne Ausnahme.” Again, Mommsen[4] calls
Arminius the leader in the conflict of despair over the lost national
independence, and speaks[5] of the campaign of the year 16 A. D. as the
last which the Romans waged in order to subdue Germany and to transfer
the boundary from the Rhine to the Elbe. Delbrück’s position on the
question is unequivocal[6]. So is that of Schiller.[7] Hübner[8] voices
the surprising belief that Augustus in his effort to subdue Germany
was merely following in the steps of Julius Caesar! Koepp[9] hazards
the same view, and says that not only was the shortening of the Rhine
boundary planned by Caesar, but that this plan was to have been carried
into execution after the overthrow of the Getae; that nothing but more
pressing duties prevented Caesar’s heir, for thirty years after Gaul’s
subjugation, from pushing the boundary beyond the Rhine; that the
settling of the Ubii on the left bank of the Rhine by Agrippa (19 B. C.)
was not a backward step from that taken in crossing the Rhine in 37 B.
C., but a mere confession that only in this way could Rome protect the
Ubii from the attack of their neighbors.
Seeck[10] and many others assert that not only was Germany subdued
by Rome, but that Roman administration was actually set up in the new
province.[11] This is stated by Knoke as follows:[12] “Das germanische
Gebiet konnte bis zur Elbe als unterworfen gelten ... Römische Verwaltung
und Gerichtsbarkeit waren eingeführt, die Deutschen zu Heeresfolge
und Tribut gezwungen ... nach menschlichem Ermessen musste für das
deutsche Volk die Zeit gekommen sein, wo es auf immer der Herrschaft
Roms verfallen war.” However, there is no general agreement as to when
Augustus conceived the plan of conquering Germany. Hertzberg[13] believes
it doubtful whether he had any such intention at the time of Lollius’
defeat (16 B. C.): “Ob er wirklich schon jetzt die Eroberung Deutschlands
bestimmt ins Auge gefasst hat, ist uns—wir wiederholen es—freilich
zweifelhaft.” Abraham’s conclusion is that as late even as 10 B. C.
Augustus had no further purpose than to secure the Rhine boundary, but
that later he had larger ambitions which were fully realized: “Später
indessen hat Augustus wirklich Deutschland bis zur Elbe ... zur Provinz
machen wollen, und vor der Niederlage des Varus sah er die Unterwerfung
Norddeutschlands für vollendet an.”[14] Many believe that an effort
was made on Augustus’ part to shorten the Rhine-Danube boundary, and
they regard this as tantamount to an attempt to subjugate Germany.[15]
The campaigns of Drusus and Tiberius in particular are usually cited
as proofs of Rome’s purpose with respect to Germany. So by Pelham[16]:
“Nor can we doubt that the object of the campaigns carried on beyond the
Rhine by Augustus’ two stepsons, Drusus and Tiberius (13 B.C.-6 A.D.),
had for their object the extension of Roman rule up to that [the Elbe]
river.” Occasionally, however, more caution is shown in discussing Rome’s
policy. So Abbott[17]: “To the north the frontier policy of Augustus
was, at the outset, less clearly determined. For a time the Romans seem
to have intended making the Elbe the line between them and the Germans.”
Ferrero, although he devotes a chapter of his well-known work[18] to
the “Conquest of Germania,” concedes, nevertheless, that Augustus was
opposed to expansion by conquest, and that the first fifteen years of
his rule unmistakably contradict such a policy[19]: “he had persistently
avoided hazardous adventures beyond the frontiers of the empire and had
found a thousand pretexts to deceive the impatience and ambition of the
people.” We may observe also that Eduard Meyer’s view[20] is not wholly
in harmony with the commonly accepted one. He objects to the assertion
frequently made that the victory of Arminius preserved the individuality
of the German nation: “Wenn wir ... die Frage aufwerfen, wie es gekommen
ist, dass den romanischen Völkern germanische zur Seite stehen, dass ich
hier deutsch zu Ihnen rede und nicht in einer romanischen Sprache, so
wird einer vorurteilslose Erwägung nicht die Schlacht im Teutoburger
Wald nennen dürfen.” And although he insists on the necessity resting
upon Augustus to war against the Germans in order to preserve Gaul, to
maintain peace, and to secure a shorter and more distant frontier at the
Elbe, he makes it clear that the war was in no sense prompted by the
desire for imperial expansion[21]: “aber auch dieser Krieg ist durchaus
nur als Grenzkrieg geführt worden, nicht als ein Reichskrieg an der Art
wie Cäsar seinen Geten- und Partherkrieg geplant hatte.”
Nevertheless, from a careful consideration of the foregoing opinions,
which have been selected merely as representative of a very large number
of similar expressions, we may discover a strikingly universal belief
that before the battle of the Teutoburg forest Augustus was attempting
the conquest of Germany; that the disaster which overtook the legions of
Varus in this battle caused him to give up his plans, and to renounce
all hope of making Germany a province[22]. Most historians claim in
addition that Arminius was the preserver of the German nationality, and
that his victory over Varus was a turning point in the world’s history.
So Seeck[23]: “Der Sieg des Armin hat es für alle Zeiten verhindert, dass
auch die Germanen Bürger des Reiches wurden und so den Keim gerettet,
aus dem künftig die Völkerwanderung und mit ihr eine neue Welt erwachsen
sollte.” Gardthausen[24] states the same belief in still stronger terms:
“Wenn wir daher jetzt, also beinahe nach 2000 Jahren, noch von einer
deutschen Nation reden, wenn es noch heute eine deutsche Sprache gibt,
so ist das ohne Frage, zum grossen Theile, das Verdienst des Arminius
... kurz, die Entwickelung der deutschen Geschichte und in beschränkterem
Masse auch der Weltgeschichte wäre eine andere geworden, wenn Arminius
nicht zur rechten Zeit den Kampf mit dem Varus aufgenommen und wenn er
nicht später—was noch schwerer war—den Siegespreis der Freiheit gegen
Germanicus vertheidigt hätte.” The debt of the German nation, and the
world at large, to Arminius, is proclaimed again and again in monographs,
remarkable as exhibitions of patriotic fervor, but at times wanting in
scientific spirit and in the objective temper that should characterize
estimates of historical significance.[25] Mommsen and Koepp may be cited
as the most distinguished representatives of the view that the battle of
the Teutoburg forest is a turning point in national destinies, an ebbing
in the tide of Rome’s sway over the world, a shifting of the bounds of
Roman rule from the Elbe to the Rhine and the Danube.[26] Koepp is the
more guarded. He says[27], “Seit dieser Niederlage scheint Roms Macht,
auf dieser Seite wenigstens, zurückzuebben, und wie ein Wendepunkt der
Weltgeschichte erscheint diese Schlacht im Teutoburger Walde.” But this
view has currency elsewhere than in the writings of German authors.
Thomas Arnold voices it[28] with all the extravagance that characterizes
rash generalizations: “The victory of Arminius deserves to be reckoned
among those signal deliverances which have affected for centuries the
happiness of mankind; and we may regard the destruction of Quintilius
Varus, and his three legions, on the bank of the Lippe, as second only in
the benefits derived from it to the victory of Charles Martel at Tours
over the invading host of the Mohammedans.” We find it, as one might
expect, in a text of such unscientific character as that of Creasy[29],
the motto for whose discussion is an epigrammatic sentence taken from
the epitomator Florus, “Hac clade factum, ut imperium quod in littore
oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret.” And we need feel no
surprise that this view is perpetuated in such a compilation as that of
P. V. N. Meyers.[30] Here and there, however, are to be found writers
who warn against such a sweeping generalization. So Eduard Meyer, who
has been quoted above.[31] Ferrero too shows a saner historical view
when he says[32]: “Historians have long been accustomed to regard the
defeat of Varus as one of the ‘decisive’ battles of the world, and as
an event which may be said to have changed the course of history. It is
said, that if Varus had not been overthrown, Rome would have preserved
her grip upon the territory from the Rhine to the Elbe and would have
romanised it as she did Gaul: the prospects of a Germanic nationality
and civilization would have been as impossible as those of a Celtic
nationality and civilization after the defeat of Vercingetorix. Thus
the defeat of Teutoburg is said to have saved Germanism even as that of
Alesia was the ruin of the old Celtic nationalism. This straightforward
line of argument, however, touches the sinuous course of reality only
at a few points, and those far distant from one another. It is always
a dangerous task, in dealing with history, to say what _might_ have
happened, in view of the considerable difficulty involved in the attempt
to explain what _did_ happen.”[33] It should be observed also that such a
generalization involves the assumption that the German nation developed
as it did because of its liberation from Roman influence, whereas it may
properly be argued that the so-called liberation was instrumental in
separating Germany for centuries from civilizing contact with Rome. For
it is a fact that the early Germans made no progress whatever, left no
literature, no monument, no memory of themselves until they again came
into relations with that great transmitter of civilization, Rome, in the
person of Rome’s new representative, Charlemagne.[34]
Now it is of course obvious that the estimate of Arminius’ achievement
will depend upon the significance which impartial criticism will assign
to the battle in which Varus was defeated—Arminius’ one great deed.
Regarding that we propose in the present monograph to show that the
ancient accounts of the battle of the Teutoburg forest are of inferior
authority; that while some of them are broadly detailed, they are on
the whole meager, inconsistent, and full of errors, exaggerations,
and absurdities; that a striving after rhetorical effect is their
peculiar characteristic;[35] that frequently what these sources say in
express words is not objectively trustworthy, and still less so are
the deductions made immediately from the descriptions found there, or
from the delineations which the authors of the sources doubtless never
intended to serve as objective pictures of reality;[36] that only the
less cautious writers assert that Augustus in a spirit of imperialism
sought to conquer Germany;[37] that historians who have the best standing
as authorities abandon this ground and give as a reason the necessity
resting on Augustus of protecting Gaul and Italy from the Germans. An
effort will be made to show that Germany was never made a Roman province;
that Augustus never had the intention, and never made the attempt, to
conquer Germany and organize it as a province; that his operations in
Germany consisted merely in making a series of demonstrations in force,
in order to impress the barbarians and to facilitate the defense of the
frontier by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome a
wide strip of the enemy’s territory.
It is but natural, when such exaggerated estimates are current regarding
the significance of the battle of the Teutoburg forest, that the leading
figure on the German side, Arminius, should be elevated to a position
of quite fictitious glory, and that he should have been exalted to the
rank of one of the world’s greatest heroes.[38] As Koepp pertinently
observes, many well-meant accounts of the Teutoburg battle have been
written under mere impulse of national feeling.[39] However, that the
glorification of heroes at the expense of truth finds no place in sober
historical investigation is the warning given by the best trained German
scholars themselves, and by none more effectively than by Koepp[40],
who said to an assembly of scholars at an Arminius Jubilee celebration
held at Detmold, October 22, 1908: “eher dürften wir heute unseren
Helden aus der bengalischen Beleuchtung romantischer Schwärmerei in
das Tageslicht geschichtlicher Betrachtung rücken, ohne uns gegen die
Jubiläumsstimmung zu versündigen. Es ist ja auch Vorrecht und Pflicht der
Wissenschaft, auch an festlichen Tagen der Wahrheit die Ehre zu geben.”
So Fustel de Coulanges complains that in Arminius’ case historians have
taken liberty with historical facts under motives of idealization[41]:
“Nous désapprouvons les historiens allemands, qui ont altéré l’histoire
pour créer, un Arminius legendaire et une Germanie idéale.” Finally, we
may note that the same authority warns also in more general terms of
historians who allow patriotic motives to exaggerate the few facts at
their disposal.[42]
FOOTNOTES
[1] _Augustus und seine Zeit_, Leipzig, 1891, I, p. 1069.
[2] _Röm. Gesch._, V. p. 24 (6th ed. 1909); cf. _Die germanische Politik
des Augustus_ (originally in _Im Neuen Reich_, 1871, pp. 537-556), p. 14:
“Die Unterwerfung Germaniens, kräftig begonnen, und sieben Jahre hindurch
beharrlich ... geführt.” Other representative expressions of opinion
among recent writers may be found: R. von Poehlmann (in Pflugk-Harttung’s
_Weltgeschichte_, 1910, I, p. 516); E. Kornemann (in Gercke-Norden’s
_Einleitung in die Altertumsw._, 1912, III, p. 208); E. Kornemann,
“Zu dem Germanenkriege unter Augustus,” _Klio, IX_ (1909), p. 449. On
the basis of Tiberius’ campaigns (4-6 A. D.) he speaks also of “die
gewaltigen Anstrengungen Roms zur Unterwerfung Germaniens”; H. F. Pelham,
_Outlines of Roman History_, 1905, p. 460; H. Stuart Jones, _The Roman
Empire_, 1913, p. 34; C. H. Hayes, _Sources Relating to the Germanic
Invasions_, 1909, p. 64.
[3] _Ibid._, p. 28. So J. Beloch, _Griech. Gesch.²_, I, 1 (1912),
Einleit., p. 14, says that not only was the attempt made but that Germany
was actually subjugated: “Denn Augustus hat diese Eroberung ja versucht
trotz der Verfassung, die er dem Reiche gegeben hatte, und er hatte die
Eroberung des Landes bis an die Elbe vollendet, als in der Teutoburger
Schlacht alles Errungene zusammenbrach.”
[4] _Ibid._, p. 40.
[5] _Ibid._, p. 50.
[6] See the chapter “Die Unterwerfung Germaniens durch die Römer” in
his _Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte_,
Berlin, 2nd edit., 1909, II, p. 47 f.
[7] _Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit_, Gotha, 1883, p. 221 f.
[8] _Röm. Herrschaft in Westeuropa_, Berlin, 1890, p. 110.
[9] _Die Römer in Deutschland_ (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XXII),
1912, p. 8. Fischer (_Armin und die Römer_, Halle a. S., 1893, p. 4)
is entirely correct in saying that Julius Caesar’s conflicts with the
Germans were intended merely “die Germanen von Einfällen in Gallien
abzuschrecken,” i. e. to frighten them and to flatter Roman pride.
However, inconsistently enough, he adds that Augustus saw a hope of
expansion in this direction, “und demgemäss sah er, als Adoptivsohn
Cäsars, die Unterwerfung Germaniens als eine ihm vermachte heilige
Pflicht an” (p. 25).
[10] See _Kaiser Augustus_ (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XVII), 1902,
p. 111: “bedrängte Drusus vom Unterrhein her die freien Germanen, und
hatte sie bis zur Elbe unterworfen ... Tiberius ... vollendete dann in
den beiden folgenden Jahren die Eroberung und ordnete die Verwaltung der
neuen Provinz.”
[11] See also Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, 31 f.; Schiller, _op. cit._, p.
222. Riese (_Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit_,
Frankfurt am Main, 1889, p. 11), while believing that subjugation was
made, shows that no province was established; cf. pp. 6, 7, 12. Mommsen’s
statement that proof of such organization is seen in the fact that, when
Drusus consecrated for Gaul the altar of Augustus at Lyons, the Ubii were
not included, but a similar altar was erected for the German cantons,
is answered by Riese, who points out that the emperor’s worship was by
no means confined to a single place in a province. For proofs of this
statement see examples given by Riese, p. 7 f.; also by Marquardt, _Röm.
Staatsverwaltung²_, I, p. 504. Ferrero (_Characters and Events of Roman
History_, New York, 1909, p. 165) reaches the conclusion that, owing
to the absence of Tiberius at Rhodes, Germany was not organized into a
province; that the Germans were not bound to pay tribute, but were left
to govern themselves solely and entirely by their own laws.
[12] _Armin der Befreier Deutschland_, Berlin, 1909, p. 6 f.
[13] _Die Feldzüge der Römer in Deutschland_, Halle, 1872, p. 49.
[14] _Zur Gesch. der germanischen u. pannonischen Kriege unter Augustus_,
Berlin, 1875, p. 7.
[15] Cf. Koepp, _op. cit._, p. 9: “der Wunsch, eine solche Grenze zu
verkürzen, den einspringenden Winkel zum Reiche zu ziehen, erscheint
fast selbstverständlich. Das bedeutete aber die Eroberung Germaniens
bis zur Elbe”; Idem, _Westfalen_, I (1909), p. 35: “Dieses Ziel hat nun
Augustus ohne Zweifel erstrebt.” See also Schiller, _op. cit._, p. 214:
“Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt, von seinem Grundsatz, das Reich nicht
durch Eroberungen zu mehren, abzugehen und für Gallien die Grenze nach
der Elbe, für Italien und Macedonien nach der Donau vorzuschieben und auf
diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen, welche leichter zu verteidigen und
kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende.”
[16] _Op. cit._, p. 460.
[17] _History of Roman Political Institutions_, Boston, 1910, p. 282.
[18] _The Greatness and Decline of Rome_, New York, 1909, V, p. 142 f.
[19] So Mommsen, _Die germanische Politik des Augustus_, p. 9: “Caesar
Augustus wollte womöglich, und insbesondere in dem ersten Drittel seiner
Herrschaft, den Frieden.”
[20] _Kleine Schriften zur Geschichtstheorie_, Halle, 1910, p. 444.
[21] _Ibid._, p. 471.
[22] Niese, _Grundriss der röm. Gesch._ (4th ed. 1910), p. 299: “Eine
Wiedereroberung des Verlorenen ward nicht versucht. Mit Ausnahme der
Küstenvölker, Bataver, Friesen, und Chauken, gingen die Eroberungen in
Germanien verloren, und an Stelle der Elbe ward der Rhein Grenze....
Das römische Germanien beschränkte sich in Zukunft auf die dem Rhein
benachbarten Gegenden”; Gibbon, _Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire_,
ed. 1910, p. 2: “And though, on the first attack they [the Germans]
seemed to yield to the weight of the Roman power, they soon, by a signal
act of despair, regained their independence, and reminded Augustus of the
vicissitudes of fortune.”
[23] _Op. cit._, p. 117. Cf. von Ranke, _Weltgeschichte_, III, 1,
Leipzig, 1883, p. 28: “Und auch die Geschichte muss bestätigen, dass dem
Ereigniss eine allgemeine und auf immer nachwirkende Bedeutung zukommt.”
[24] _Op. cit._, I, p. 1202 f.
[25] See F. Knoke, _Armin der Befreier Deutschlands_, 1909, p. 80: “Dass
uns die Eigenart erhalten blieb, dass wir unsere Sprache retteten,
dass wir ein freies Volk geblieben seien, dass wir eine Geschichte
erleben durften, dies alles haben wir Armin zu verdanken ... ja selbst
fremde Völker hätten alle Ursache mit uns zusammen ihn zu ehren. Gäbe
es doch, um vom anderen zu schweigen, ohne seine Taten weder ein Volk
der Franzosen, noch der Engländer, selbst nicht der Amerikaner in den
Vereinigten Staaten. Ihnen allen hat er die Möglichkeit ihres Volkstums
erst geschaffen. Das wird ihnen freilich schwerlich zum Bewusstsein
kommen. Um so mehr wollen wir ihn feiern, als den Befreier Deutschlands,
als den ersten Helden unseres Vaterlandes”; Felix Dahn, _Armin der
Cherusker_, München, 1909, p. 43: “ohne ihn [Arminius] und sein
Meisterstück der Kriegskunst wären wir Germanen eben romanisiert worden
wie die Kelten in Gallien.... Wir danken für Kant und Schiller und für
Erhaltung unseres deutschen Art und Sprach Armin und der Varus-Schlacht.”
[26] See Mommsen, _Röm. Gesch._, V, p. 53: “wir stehen hier an einem
Wendepunkt der Völkergeschichte. Auch die Geschichte hat ihre Fluth und
ihre Ebbe; hier tritt nach der Hochfluth des römischen Weltregiments die
Ebbe ein”; Idem, _Germanische Politik_, etc., p. 19: “Die Katastrophe
ist ... von den weitgreifendsten Folgen geworden, ja man kann sagen ein
Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte.”
[27] “Die Varusschlacht in Geschichte und Forschung,” _Westfalen_, I
(1909), p. 34.
[28] _History of the Later Roman Commonwealth_, London, 1845, II, p. 317.
[29] _The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World_, London, 1859, pp. 179,
195: “Had Arminius been supine or unsuccessful our Germanic ancestors
would have been enslaved or exterminated in their original seats along
the Eyder and the Elbe. This island would never have borne the name of
England.... Never was victory more decisive, never was liberation of an
oppressed people more instantaneous and complete ... within a few weeks
after Varus had fallen the German soil was freed from the foot of the
invader.”
[30] _Rome: Its Rise and Fall_, Boston, 1901, p. 323: “The victory of
Arminius ... was an event of the greatest significance in the history of
European civilization ... the Teutonic tribes were on the point of being
completely subjugated and put in the way of being Romanized, as the Celts
of Gaul had already been. Had this occurred, the entire history of Europe
would have been changed. Had Rome succeeded in exterminating or enslaving
them Britain, as Creasy says, might never have received the name of
England, and the great English nation might never have had an existence.”
[31] Note 20.
[32] _Op. cit._, p. 325.
[33] Oskar Jäger (_Deutsche Geschichte_, München, 1909, I, p. 28)
is correct in denying any significance to Arminius’ victory further
than that it showed the Germans that the dreaded Roman legions were
not invincible: “Aber weitere Erfolge hatte das Ereignis nicht. Es
erwuchs keine dauernde Organisation aus diesem Erfolg, und im römischen
Hauptquartier erholte man sich bald von dem Schrecken, den die Nachricht
in Rom hervorgerufen hatte. Tiberius, der nach dem bedrohten Punkt
geschickt wurde, fand keine geeinigte germanische Macht zu bekämpfen. Er
konnte sich damit begnügen, wie einst Cäsar, über den Rhein zu gehen, um
dem jenseitigen Lande zu beweisen, dass die Macht des Imperiums durch
die Niederlage dreier Legionen nicht erschüttert sei. Es geschah nichts
weiter; die Politik des Tiberius, die Germanen ihrer eigenen Zwietracht
zu überlassen, bewährte sich.” Cf. also Jullian, _Histoire de la Gaule_,
Paris, 1914, IV, p. 125: “Mais la victoire d’Arminius n’eut point
d’autres résultats que de refouler les Italiens jusqu’au Rhin. Il ne put
rien entreprendre de plus contre Rome, ni rien fonder en Germanie”; p.
127: “Les temps n’étaient donc point venus ni de la défaite pour l’Empire
romain ni de l’unité pour la Germanie.”
[34] Ch. Gailly de Taurines, _Les Légions de Varus_, Paris, 1911, p. 312:
“Grâce à Arminn, sept siècles plus tard, Charlemagne, conquérant latin,
champion de la Rome nouvelle, retrouvera, sur le même sol, les tribus
germaniques de l’interieur dans l’état même—ou peu s’en faut—ou les
avait laissées Germanicus. De leur existence, durant ces sept siècles,
elles n’avaient été capables de laisser à la postérité ni un monument,
ni un souvenir, ni une inscription, ni une pierre.” Cf. also Fustel de
Coulanges, _Histoire des Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France_,
Paris, 1891, II, p. 227: “Nous ne possédons aucun document de source
germanique ... nous n’avons pas un livre, pas une inscription, pas une
monnaie.”
[35] Delbrück, _op. cit._, p. 53: “Viel schlimmer ist der Geist der
Literatur dieser Epoche, der ganz und gar von Rhetorik beherrscht ist.
Diese Schriftsteller wollen nicht erzählen, wie es gewesen ist, oder wie
sie möchten, dass die Leser glauben sollen, dass es gewesen sei, sondern
sie wollen vor allem durch die Kunst ihrer Rede Empfindungen erwecken und
Eindruck machen. Mir scheint, dass bei zahlreichen Untersuchungen, die
den Schlachten des Arminius und Germanicus bisher gewidmet worden sind,
diese Charakter-Eigenschaft unserer Quellen, wenn auch oft hervorgehoben,
doch kritisch noch lange nicht stark genug in Rechnung gezogen worden
ist.”
[36] For a glaring example of how history should not be written, as
though all the labors of scholarship had been in vain, and Florus or
Dionysius of Halicarnassus were models of historical style, one might
cite the highly dramatic account of the battle as repeated by Leighton,
_History of Rome_, New York, 1891, p. 436: “Without troubling about
military measures he [Varus] travelled over the country, imposed taxes
and pronounced decisions as if a praetor in the forum at Rome. Among
the bold and turbulent Germans the spirit of freedom and independence
only slumbered; it was not broken. The national hero Arminius raised the
standard of revolt. Under this prince a confederacy of all the tribes
between the Rhine and the Weser was formed to throw off the yoke of Rome.
The governor collected three legions and advanced in 9 A.D. to quell the
revolt. The Germans retired; but the Romans pushed on until they had
advanced into the Teutoberger [_sic_] forest. Then Arminius turned and
defeated them with tremendous slaughter. The defiles of the woods were
covered far and wide with the corpses of the army, for nearly 40,000
soldiers perished. The eagles were lost and Varus perished with his own
hand. The news of the disaster caused the utmost alarm in Rome. The
Emperor himself was astounded. In his despair he dashed his head against
the wall and exclaimed ‘Varus, Varus! give me back my legions.’”
[37] Creasy, _op. cit._, p. 182: “It is a great fallacy, though
apparently sanctioned by great authorities, to suppose that the foreign
policy of Augustus was pacific. He certainly recommended such a policy
to his successors, either from timidity, or from jealousy of their fame
outshining his own; but he himself, until Arminius broke his spirit, had
followed a very different course.”
[38] Cf., e. g., the poem _Hermann_ (in twelve books, 2nd ed., 1753) by
Christopher Otto von Schönaich, beginning:
“Von dem Helden will ich singen, dessen Arm sein Volk beschützt,
Dessen Schwert auf Deutschlands Feinde für sein Vaterland geblitzt;
Der allein vermögend war, des Augustus Stolz zu brechen,
Und des Erdenkreises Schimpf in der Römer Schmach zu rächen.”
See also J. E. Riffert, “Die Hermannschlacht in der deutschen Literatur,”
_Herrigs Archiv_, 63 (1880), pp. 129-76; 241-332; W. Creizenach, “Armin
in Poesie und Literaturgeschichte,” _Preussische Jahrbücher_, 36, pp.
332-40.
[39] _Die Römer in Deutschland_, p. 24: “Mag dem Patrioten bei dem Namen
die Brust schwellen: dem Geschichtsschreiber muss der Mut sinken beim
Gedanken an so manche Bemühungen seiner Vorgänger um dieses Ereignis!
Mit Beschämung gedenkt er der alten Kollegen, die es so ungenau, mit
Beschämung vieler neuen, die es so genau erzählt haben, so mancher
wohlgemeinten Schriftstellerleistung, der man kein besseres Motto
geben könnte als Scheffels Vers: ‘In Westfalen trank er viel, drum aus
Nationalgefühl hat er’s angefertigt.’” A good instance of blind adulation
is that of Hertzberg, _op. cit._, p. 307: “Niemals wieder spiegelten sich
die Adler der Legionen in den gelben Wellen der Weser oder in dem breiten
Spiegel der Elbe. Und das ist das niemals welkende Verdienst des Armin
gewesen ... das Bild des ersten grossen Mannes deutscher Nation ... die
eherne Heldengestalt des Arminius.”
[40] _Westfalen_, I (1909), p. 34. How timely this warning by Koepp
is may be seen from the following extraordinary burst of spirit, at a
similar celebration, by T. Beneke, _Siegfried und die Varusschlacht
im Arnsberger Walde_ (Ein Beitrag zur neunzehnten Jahrhundertfeier),
Leipzig—Gohlis, 1909, p. 84: “Sechsundzwanzig Jahre war Siegfried
alt, als er diese Tat vollbrachte, die in ihren Folgen den grössten
weltgeschichtlichen Ereignissen gleichzustellen ist, indem er dem
Welteroberer eine Niederlage beibrachte, die fast einzig bis dahin
in der sonst so ruhmreichen Kriegsgeschichte dieses Volkes dasteht
... Die Varusschlacht rettete mit der reinen Rasse alle ihre Vorzüge
in leiblicher und geistiger Hinsicht, germanische Treue, Freiheit,
Religiosität, Innigkeit, Gediegenheit, Schaffensfreudigkeit, Tüchtigkeit
und Zähigkeit, kurz das, wodurch im Laufe der folgenden Jahrhunderte
die Germanen in Civilization und Kultur an die Spitze der Völker des
Erdkreises traten. Siegfrieds Tat ist der erste geschichtliche Beweis der
Ueberlegenheit einer jungen tatkräftigen Rasse, von der eine Neubelebung
der Welt ausgehen sollte.”
[41] Quoted by Gardthausen, _op. cit._, II, p. 793.
[42] _Histoire des Institutions politiques_, etc., II, p. 247: “Il y a
une école historique en Allemagne qui aime à parler des anciens Germains,
comme une école historique en France se plait à parler des anciens
Gaulois. On ne connait pas mieux les uns que les autres; mais on se
figure que le patriotisme éclaire ces ténèbres et qu’il decuple le peu de
renseignements que l’on posséde.”