PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY
REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN
ASIA MINOR.
We now commence a third act in the history of this memorable
body of men. After having followed them from Sardis to Kunaxa as
mercenaries to procure the throne for Cyrus,—then from Kunaxa to
Trapezus as men anxious only for escape, and purchasing their safety
by marvellous bravery, endurance, and organization, we shall now
track their proceedings among the Greek colonies on the Euxine and
at the Bosphorus of Thrace, succeeded by their struggles against
the meanness of the Thracian prince Seuthes, as well as against the
treachery and arbitrary harshness of the Lacedæmonian commanders
Anaxibius and Aristarchus.
Trapezus, now Trebizond, where the army had recently found repose,
was a colony from Sinôpê, as were also Kerasus and Kotyôra, farther
westward; each of them receiving an harmost or governor from the
mother-city, and paying to her an annual tribute. All these three
cities were planted on the narrow strip of land dividing the Euxine
from the elevated mountain range which so closely borders on its
southern coast. At Sinôpê itself, the land stretches out into a
defensible peninsula, with a secure harbor, and a large breadth of
adjacent fertile soil. So tempting a site invited the Milesians,
even before the year 600 B.C., to plant a colony there, and enabled
Sinôpê to attain much prosperity and power. Farther westward, not
more than a long day’s journey for a rowing vessel from Byzantium,
was situated the Megarian colony of Herakleia, in the territory of
the Mariandyni.
The native tenants of this line of coast, upon whom the Greek
settlers intruded themselves (reckoning from the westward), were the
Bithynian Thracians, the Mariandyni, the Paphlagonians, the Tibarêni,
Chalybes, Mosynœki, Drilæ, and Kolchians. Here, as elsewhere, these
natives found the Greek seaports useful, in giving a new value to
inland produce, and in furnishing the great men with ornaments
and luxuries to which they would otherwise have had no access. The
citizens of Herakleia had reduced into dependence a considerable
portion of the neighboring Mariandyni, and held them in a relation
resembling that of the natives of Esthonia and Livonia to the German
colonies in the Baltic. Some of the Kolchian villages were also
subject, in the same manner, to the Trapezuntines;[197] and Sinôpê
doubtless possessed a similar inland dominion of greater or less
extent. But the principal wealth of this important city arose from
her navy and maritime commerce; from the rich thunny fishery attached
to her promontory; from the olives in her immediate neighborhood,
which was a cultivation not indigenous, but only naturalized by the
Greeks on the seaboard; from the varied produce of the interior,
comprising abundant herds of cattle, mines of silver, iron, and
copper in the neighboring mountains, wood for ship-building, as well
as for house furniture, and native slaves.[198] The case was similar
with the three colonies of Sinôpê, more to the eastward,—Kotyôra,
Kerasus, and Trapezus; except that the mountains which border on the
Euxine, gradually approaching nearer and nearer to the shore, left
to each of them a more confined strip of cultivable land. For these
cities the time had not yet arrived, to be conquered and absorbed
by the inland monarchies around them, as Miletus and the cities on
the eastern coast of Asia Minor had been. The Paphlagonians were at
this time the only indigenous people in those regions who formed
a considerable aggregated force, under a prince named Korylas; a
prince tributary to Persia, yet half independent,—since he had
disobeyed the summons of Artaxerxes to come up and help in repelling
Cyrus[199]—and now on terms of established alliance with Sinôpê,
though not without secret designs, which he wanted only force to
execute, against that city.[200] The other native tribes to the
eastward were mountaineers both ruder and more divided; warlike on
their own heights, but little capable of any aggressive combinations.
[197] Strabo, xii, p. 542; Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 24.
[198] Strabo. xii, p. 545, 546.
[199] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 8.
[200] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 23.
Though we are told that Perikles had once despatched a detachment of
Athenian colonists to Sinôpê,[201] and had expelled from thence the
despot Timesilaus,—yet neither that city nor any of their neighbors
appear to have taken a part in the Peloponnesian war, either for
or against Athens; nor were they among the number of tributaries
to Persia. They doubtless were acquainted with the upward march of
Cyrus, which had disturbed all Asia; and probably were not ignorant
of the perils and critical state of his Grecian army. But it was
with a feeling of mingled surprise, admiration, and alarm, that they
saw that army descend from the mountainous region, hitherto only
recognized as the abode of Kolchians, Makrônes, and other analogous
tribes, among whom was perched the mining city of Gymnias.
[201] Plutarch, Perikles, c. 20.
Even after all the losses and extreme sufferings of the retreat, the
Greeks still numbered, when mustered at Kerasus,[202] eight thousand
six hundred hoplites, with peltasts or targeteers, bowmen, slingers,
etc., making a total of above ten thousand military persons. Such a
force had never before been seen in the Euxine. Considering both the
numbers and the now-acquired discipline and self-confidence of the
Cyreians, even Sinôpê herself could have raised no force capable of
meeting them in the field. Yet they did not belong to any city, nor
receive orders from any established government. They were like those
mercenary armies which marched about in Italy during the fourteenth
century, under the generals called Condottieri, taking service
sometimes with one city, sometimes with another. No one could predict
what schemes they might conceive, or in what manner they might deal
with the established communities on the shores of the Euxine. If we
imagine that such an army had suddenly appeared in Sicily, a little
time before the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, it would have
been probably enlisted by Leontini and Katana in their war against
Syracuse. If the inhabitants of Trapezus had wished to throw off the
dominion of Sinôpê,—or if Korylas, the Paphlagonian, were meditating
war against that city,—here were formidable auxiliaries to second
their wishes. Moreover there were various tempting sites, open to the
formation of a new colony, which, with so numerous a body of original
Greek settlers, would probably have overtopped Sinôpê herself. There
was no restraining cause to reckon upon, except the general Hellenic
sympathies and education of the Cyreian army; and what was of not
less importance, the fact that they were not mercenary soldiers by
permanent profession, such as became so formidably multiplied in
Greece during the next generation,—but established citizens who had
come out on a special service under Cyrus, with the full intention,
after a year of lucrative enterprise, to return to their homes and
families.[203] We shall find such gravitation towards home steadily
operative throughout the future proceedings of the army. But at the
moment when they first emerged from the mountains, no one could be
sure that it would be so. There was ample ground for uneasiness among
the Euxine Greeks, especially the Sinopians, whose supremacy had
never before been endangered.
[202] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3; v, 7, 9. The maximum of the Grecian
force, when mustered at Issus after the junction of those three
hundred men who deserted from Abrokomas, was thirteen thousand
nine hundred men. At the review in Babylonia, three days before
the battle of Kunaxa, there were mustered, however, only twelve
thousand nine hundred (Anab. i, 7, 10).
[203] Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 8.
Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν ὁι πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες
ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες,
οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσανηλωκότες χρήματα,
καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ
καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς χρήματα αὐτοῖς κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες
πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ
πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες ἐπόθουν εἶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι.
This statement respecting the position of most of the soldiers
is more authentic, as well as less disparaging, than that of
Isokrates (Orat. iv, Panegyr. s. 170).
In another oration, composed about fifty years after the
Cyreian expedition, Isokrates notices the large premiums which
it had been formerly necessary to give to those who brought
together mercenary soldiers, over and above the pay to the
soldiers themselves (Isokrates, Orat. v. ad Philipp. s. 112); as
contrasted with the over-multiplication of unemployed mercenaries
during his own later time (Ibid. s. 142 _seq._)
An undisturbed repose of thirty days enabled the Cyreians to recover
from their fatigues, to talk over their past dangers, and to take
pride in the anticipated effect which their unparalleled achievement
could not fail to produce in Greece. Having discharged their vows
and celebrated their festival to the gods, they held an assembly
to discuss their future proceedings; when a Thurian soldier, named
Antileon, exclaimed,—“Comrades, I am already tired of packing up,
marching, running, carrying arms, falling into line, keeping watch,
and fighting. Now that we have the sea here before us, I desire to
be relieved from all these toils, to sail the rest of the way, and
to arrive in Greece outstretched and asleep, like Odysseus.” This
pithy address being received with vehement acclamations, and warmly
responded to by all,—Cheirisophus offered, if the army chose to
empower him, to sail forthwith to Byzantium, where he thought he
could obtain from his friend the Lacedæmonian admiral, Anaxibius,
sufficient vessels for transport. His proposition was gladly
accepted; and he departed to execute the project.
Xenophon then urged upon the army various resolutions and
measures, proper for the regulation of affairs during the absence
of Cheirisophus. The army would be forced to maintain itself by
marauding expeditions among the hostile tribes in the mountains.
Such expeditions, accordingly, must be put under regulation; neither
individual soldiers, nor small companies, must be allowed to go out
at pleasure, without giving notice to the generals; moreover, the
camp must be kept under constant guard and scouts, in the event of
surprise from a retaliating enemy. It was prudent also to take the
best measures in their power for procuring vessels; since, after all,
Cheirisophus might possibly fail in bringing an adequate number.
They ought to borrow a few ships of war from the Trapezuntines, and
detain all the merchant ships which they saw; unshipping the rudders,
placing the cargoes under guard, and maintaining the crew during all
the time that the ships might be required for transport of the army.
Many such merchant vessels were often sailing by;[204] so that they
would thus acquire the means of transport, even though Cheirisophus
should bring few or none from Byzantium. Lastly, Xenophon proposed to
require the Grecian cities to repair and put in order the road along
the coast, for a land-march; since, perhaps, with all their efforts,
it would be found impossible to get together a sufficient stock of
transports.
[204] Xen. Anab. v, 1, 3-13.
Ὁρῶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ πλοῖα πολλάκις παραπλέοντα, etc. This is a forcible
proof how extensive was the Grecian commerce with the town and
region of Phasis, at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.
All the propositions of Xenophon were readily adopted by the army,
except the last. But the mere mention of a renewed land-march excited
such universal murmurs of repugnance, that he did not venture to put
that question to the vote. He took upon himself, however, to send
messages to the Grecian cities, on his own responsibility; urging
them to repair the roads, in order that the departure of the army
might be facilitated. And he found the cities ready enough to carry
his wishes into effect, as far as Kotyôra.[205]
[205] Xen. Anab v. 1, 15.
The wisdom of these precautionary suggestions of Xenophon soon
appeared; for Cheirisophus not only failed in his object, but was
compelled to stay away for a considerable time. A pentekonter (or
armed ship with fifty oars) was borrowed from the Trapezuntines, and
committed to the charge of a Lacedæmonian Periœkus, named Dexippus,
for the purpose of detaining the merchant vessels passing by. This
man having violated his trust, and employed the ship to make his own
escape out of the Euxine, a second was obtained and confided to an
Athenian, Polykrates; who brought in successively several merchant
vessels. These the Greeks did not plunder, but secured the cargoes
under adequate guard, and only reserved the vessels for transports.
It became, however, gradually more and more difficult to supply the
camp with provisions. Though the army was distributed into suitable
detachments for plundering the Kolchian villages on the hills, and
seizing cattle and prisoners for sale, yet these expeditions did
not always succeed; indeed on one occasion, two Grecian lochi or
companies got entangled in such difficult ground, that they were
destroyed, to a man. The Kolchians united on the hills in increased
and menacing numbers, insomuch that a larger guard became necessary
for the camp; while the Trapezuntines,—tired of the protracted
stay of the army, as well as desirous of exempting from pillage
the natives in their own immediate neighborhood,—conducted the
detachments only to villages alike remote and difficult of access.
It was in this manner that a large force under Xenophon himself,
attacked the lofty and rugged stronghold of the Drilæ,—the most
warlike nation of mountaineers in the neighborhood of the Euxine;
well armed, and troublesome to Trapezus by their incursions. After a
difficult march and attack which Xenophon describes in interesting
detail, and wherein the Greeks encountered no small hazard of ruinous
defeat,—they returned in the end completely successful, and with a
plentiful booty.[206]
[206] Xen. Anab. v. 2.
At length, after long awaiting in vain the reappearance of
Cheirisophus, increasing scarcity and weariness determined them to
leave Trapezus. A sufficient number of vessels had been collected to
serve for the transport of the women, of the sick and wounded, and of
the baggage. All these were accordingly placed on board, under the
command of Philesius and Sophænetus, the two oldest generals; while
the remaining army marched by land, along a road which had been just
made good under the representations of Xenophon. In three days they
reached Kerasus, another maritime colony of the Sinopeans, still in
the territory called Kolchian; there they halted ten days, mustered
and numbered the army, and divided the money acquired by the sale of
their prisoners. Eight thousand six hundred hoplites, out of a total
probably greater than eleven thousand, were found still remaining;
besides targeteers and various light troops.[207]
[207] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 3. Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, p.
327) and many other authors, have naturally presumed from the
analogy of name that the modern town Kerasoun (about long. 38°
40′) corresponds to the Kerasus of Xenophon; which Arrian in
his Periplus conceives to be identical with what was afterwards
called Pharnakia.
But it is remarked both by Dr. Cramer (Asia Minor, vol. i, p.
281) and by Mr. Hamilton (Travels in Asia Minor, ch. xv, p. 250),
that Kerasoun is too far from Trebizond to admit of Xenophon
having marched with the army from the one place to the other in
three days; or even in less than ten days, in the judgment of Mr.
Hamilton. Accordingly Mr. Hamilton places the site of the Kerasus
of Xenophon much nearer to Trebizond (about long. 39° 20′, as it
stands in Kiepert’s map of Asia Minor,) near a river now called
the Kerasoun Dere Sú.
During the halt at Kerasus, the declining discipline of the army
became manifest as they approached home. Various acts of outrage
occurred, originating now, as afterwards, in the intrigues of
treacherous officers. A captain named Klearetus persuaded his company
to attempt the plunder of a Kolchian village near Kerasus, which had
furnished a friendly market to the Greeks, and which rested secure on
the faith of peaceful relations. He intended to make off separately
with the booty in one of the vessels; but his attack was repelled,
and he himself slain. The injured villagers despatched three elders,
as heralds, to remonstrate with the Grecian authorities; but these
heralds being seen in Kerasus by some of the repulsed plunderers,
were slain. A partial tumult then ensued, in which even the
magistrates of Kerasus were in great danger, and only escaped the
pursuing soldiers by running into the sea. This enormity, though it
occurred under the eyes of the generals, immediately before their
departure from Kerasus, remained without inquiry or punishment, from
the numbers concerned in it.
Between Kerasus and Kotyôra, there was not then (nor is there now)
any regular road.[208] This march cost the Cyreian army not less
than ten days, by an inland track departing from the sea-shore, and
through the mountains inhabited by the indigenous tribes Mosynœki
and Chalybes. The latter, celebrated for their iron works, were
under dependence to the former. As the Mosynœki refused to grant a
friendly passage across their territory, the army were compelled to
fight their way through it as enemies, with the aid of one section
of these people themselves; which alliance was procured for them by
the Trapezuntine Timesitheos, who was proxenus of the Mosynœki, and
understood their language. The Greeks took the mountain fastnesses
of this people, and plundered the wooden turrets which formed their
abodes. Of their peculiar fashions Xenophon gives an interesting
description, which I have not space to copy.[209] The territory of
the Tibarêni was more easy and accessible. This people met the Greeks
with presents, and tendered a friendly passage. But the generals at
first declined the presents,—preferring to treat them as enemies
and plunder them; which in fact they would have done, had they not
been deterred by inauspicious sacrifices.[210]
[208] It was not without great difficulty that Mr. Kinneir
obtained horses to travel from Kotyôra to Kerasoun by land.
The aga of the place told him that it was madness to think of
travelling by land, and ordered a felucca for him; but was at
last prevailed on to furnish horses. There seems, indeed, to
have been no regular or trodden road at all; the hills approach
close to the sea, and Mr. Kinneir “travelled the whole of the way
along the shore alternately over a sandy beach and a high wooded
bank. The hills at intervals jutting out into the sea, form capes
and numerous little bays along the coast; but the nature of the
country was still the same, that is to say, studded with fine
timber, flowers, and groves of cherry trees” (Travels in Asia
Minor, p. 324).
Kerasus is the indigenous country of the cherry tree, and the
origin of its name.
Professor Koch thinks, that the number of days’ march given by
Xenophon (ten days) between Kerasus and Kotyôra, is more than
consists with the real distance, even if Kerasus be placed where
Mr. Hamilton supposes. If the number be correctly stated, he
supposes that the Greeks must have halted somewhere (Zug der Zehn
Tausend. p. 115. 116).
[209] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 3.
[210] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 18-25.
Near Kotyôra, which was situated on the coast of the Tibarêni, yet
on the borders of Paphlagonia, they remained forty-five days, still
awaiting the appearance of Cheirisophus with the transports to carry
them away by sea. The Sinopian harmost or governor, did not permit
them to be welcomed in so friendly a manner as at Trapezus. No market
was provided for them, nor were their sick admitted within the walls.
But the fortifications of the town were not so constructed as to
resist a Greek force, the like of which had never before been seen
in those regions. The Greek generals found a weak point, made their
way in, and took possession of a few houses for the accommodation
of their sick; keeping a guard at the gate to secure free egress,
but doing no farther violence to the citizens. They obtained their
victuals partly from the Kotyôrite villages, partly from the
neighboring territory of Paphlagonia, until at length envoys arrived
from Sinôpê to remonstrate against their proceedings.
These envoys presented themselves before the assembled soldiers in
the camp, when Hekatonymus, the chief and the most eloquent among
them, began by complimenting the army upon their gallant exploits
and retreat. He then complained of the injury which Kotyôra and
Sinôpê, as the mother city of Kotyôra, had suffered at their hands,
in violation of common Hellenic kinship. If such proceedings were
continued, he intimated that Sinôpê would be compelled in her own
defence to seek alliance with the Paphlagonian prince Korylas, or
any other barbaric auxiliary who would lend them aid against the
Greeks.[211] Xenophon replied that if the Kotyôrites had sustained
any damage, it was owing to their own ill-will and to the Sinopian
harmost in the place; that the generals were under the necessity of
procuring subsistence for the soldiers, with house-room for the sick,
and that they had taken nothing more; that the sick men were lying
within the town, but at their own cost, while the other soldiers were
all encamped without; that they had maintained cordial friendship
with the Trapezuntines, and requited all their good offices; that
they sought no enemies except through necessity, being anxious
only again to reach Greece; and that as for the threat respecting
Korylas, they knew well enough that that prince was eager to become
master of the wealthy city of Sinôpê, and would speedily attempt
some such enterprise if he could obtain the Cyreian army as his
auxiliaries.[212]
[211] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 7-12.
[212] Xen. Anab. v, 5, 13-22.
This judicious reply shamed the colleagues of Hekatonymus so much,
that they went the length of protesting against what he had said,
and of affirming that they had come with propositions of sympathy
and friendship to the army, as well as with promises to give them
an hospitable reception at Sinôpê, if they should visit that town
on their way home. Presents were at once sent to the army by the
inhabitants of Kotyôra, and a good understanding established.
Such an interchange of good will with the powerful city of Sinôpê was
an unspeakable advantage to the army,—indeed, an essential condition
to their power of reaching home. If they continued their march by
land, it was only through Sinopian guidance and mediation that they
could obtain or force a passage through Paphlagonia; while for a
voyage by sea, there was no chance of procuring a sufficient number
of vessels except from Sinôpê, since no news had been received of
Cheirisophus. On the other hand, that city had also a strong interest
in facilitating their transit homeward, and thus removing formidable
neighbors for whose ulterior purposes there could be no guarantee.
After some preliminary conversation with the Sinopian envoys, the
generals convoked the army in assembly, and entreated Hekatonymus
and his companions to advise them as to the best mode of proceeding
westward to the Bosphorus. Hekatonymus, after apologizing for the
menacing insinuations of his former speech, and protesting that
he had no other object in view except to point out the safest and
easiest plan of route for the army, began to unfold the insuperable
difficulties of a march through Paphlagonia. The very entrance
into the country must be achieved through a narrow aperture in the
mountains, which it was impossible to force if occupied by the enemy.
Even assuming this difficulty to be surmounted, there were spacious
plains to be passed over, wherein the Paphlagonian horse, the most
numerous and bravest in Asia, would be found almost irresistible.
There were also three or four great rivers, which the army would
be unable to pass,—the Thermodon and the Iris, each three hundred
feet in breadth,—the Halys, two stadia or nearly a quarter of a mile
in breadth,—the Parthenius, also very considerable. Such an array
of obstacles (he affirmed) rendered the project of marching through
Paphlagonia impracticable; whereas the voyage by sea from Kotyôra
to Sinôpê, and from Sinôpê to Herakleia, was easy; and the transit
from the latter place, either by sea to Byzantium, or by land across
Thrace, yet easier.[213]
[213] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 4-11.
Difficulties like these, apparently quite real, were more than
sufficient to determine the vote of the army, already sick of
marching and fighting, in favor of the sea-voyage; though there were
not wanting suspicions of the sincerity of Hekatonymus. But Xenophon,
in communicating to the latter the decision of the army, distinctly
apprised him that they would on no account permit themselves to be
divided; that they would either depart or remain all in a body,
and that vessels must be provided sufficient for the transport of
all. Hekatonymus desired them to send envoys of their own to Sinôpê
to make the necessary arrangements. Three envoys were accordingly
sent,—Ariston, an Athenian, Kalimachus, an Arcadian, and Samolas, an
Achæan; the Athenian, probably, as possessing the talent of speaking
in the Sinopian senate or assembly.[214]
[214] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 14.
During the absence of these envoys, the army still continued near
Kotyôra with a market provided by the town, and with traders from
Sinôpê and Herakleia in the camp. Such soldiers as had no money
wherewith to purchase, subsisted by pillaging the neighboring
frontier of Paphlagonia.[215] But they were receiving no pay; every
man was living on his own resources; and instead of carrying back a
handsome purse to Greece, as each soldier had hoped when he first
took service under Cyrus, there seemed every prospect of their
returning poorer than when they left home.[216] Moreover, the army
was now moving onward without any definite purpose, with increasing
dissatisfaction and decreasing discipline; insomuch that Xenophon
foresaw the difficulties which would beset the responsible commanders
when they should come within the stricter restraints and obligations
of the Grecian world.
[215] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19; vi, 1, 2.
[216] Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8; vi, 2, 4.
It was these considerations which helped to suggest to him the
idea of employing the army on some enterprise of conquest and
colonization in the Euxine itself; an idea highly flattering to
his personal ambition, especially as the army was of unrivalled
efficiency against an enemy, and no such second force could ever
be got together in those distant regions. His patriotism as a
Greek was inflamed with the thoughts of procuring for Hellas a new
autonomous city, occupied by a considerable Hellenic population,
possessing a spacious territory, and exercising dominion over many
indigenous neighbors. He seems to have thought first of attacking and
conquering some established non-Hellenic city; an act which his ideas
of international morality did not forbid, in a case where he had
contracted no special convention with the inhabitants,—though he (as
well as Cheirisophus) strenuously protested against doing wrong to
any innocent Hellenic community.[217] He contemplated the employment
of the entire force in capturing Phasis or some other native city;
after which, when the establishment was once safely effected, those
soldiers who preferred going home to remaining as settlers, might
do so without emperiling those who stayed, and probably with their
own purses filled by plunder and conquest in the neighborhood. To
settle as one of the richest proprietors and chiefs,—perhaps even
the recognized Œkist, like Agnon at Amphipolis,—of a new Hellenic
city such as could hardly fail to become rich, powerful, and
important,—was a tempting prospect for one who had now acquired the
habits of command. Moreover, the sequel will prove, how correctly
Xenophon appreciated the discomfort of leading the army back to
Greece without pay and without certain employment.
[217] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 15-30; vi, 2, 6; vii, 1, 25, 29.
Haken and other commentators do injustice to Xenophon when they
ascribe to him the design of seizing the Greek city of Kotyôra.
It was the practice of Xenophon, and the advice of his master
Sokrates,[218] in grave and doubtful cases, where the most careful
reflection was at fault, to recur to the inspired authority of an
oracle or a prophet, and to offer sacrifice, in full confidence
that the gods would vouchsafe to communicate a special revelation
to any person whom they favored. Accordingly Xenophon, previous to
any communication with the soldiers respecting his new project, was
anxious to ascertain the will of the gods by a special sacrifice; for
which he invoked the presence of the Ambrakiot Silanus, the chief
prophet in the army. This prophet (as I have already mentioned),
before the battle of Kunaxa, had assured Cyrus that Artaxerxes would
not fight for ten days,—and the prophecy came to pass; which made
such an impression on Cyrus that he rewarded him with the prodigious
present of three thousand darics or ten Attic talents. While others
were returning poor, Silanus, having contrived to preserve this sum
throughout all the hardships of the retreat, was extremely rich,
and anxious only to hasten home with his treasure in safety. He
heard with strong repugnance the project of remaining in the Euxine,
and determined to traverse it by intrigue. As far as concerned
the sacrifices, indeed, which he offered apart with Xenophon, he
was obliged to admit that the indications of the victims were
favorable;[219] Xenophon himself being too familiar with the process
to be imposed upon. But he at the same time tried to create alarm by
declaring that a nice inspection disclosed evidence of treacherous
snares laid for Xenophon; which latter indications he himself began
to realize, by spreading reports among the army that the Athenian
general was laying clandestine plans for keeping them away from
Greece without their own concurrence.[220]
[218] Xen. Memorab. i, 1, 8, 9. Ἔφη δὲ (Sokrates) δεῖν, ἃ μὲν
μαθόντας ποιεῖν ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνειν· ἃ δὲ μὴ δῆλα τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ, πειρᾶσθαι διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυνθάνεσθαι·
τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, οἷς ἂν ὦσιν ἰλέω, σημαίνειν.
Compare passages in his Cyropædia, i, 6, 3; De Officio Magistr.
Equit. ix, 9.
“The gods (says Euripides, in the Sokratic vein) have given us
wisdom to understand and appropriate to ourselves the ordinary
comforts of life; in obscure or unintelligible cases, we are
enabled to inform ourselves by looking at the blaze of the fire,
or by consulting prophets who understand the livers of sacrificial
victims and the flight of birds. When they have thus furnished so
excellent a provision for life, who but spoilt children can be
discontented, and ask for more? Yet still human prudence, full of
self-conceit, will struggle to be more powerful, and will presume
itself to be wiser, than the gods.”
Ἃ δ᾽ ἔστ᾽ ἄσημα, κοὐ σαφῆ, γιγνώσκομεν
Εἰς πῦρ βλέποντες, καὶ κατὰ σπλάγχνων πτύχας
Μάντεις προσημαίνουσιν οἰωνῶν τ᾽ ἄπο.
Ἆρ᾽ οὐ τρυφῶμεν, θεοῦ κατασκευὴν βίου
Δόντος τοιαύτην, οἷσιν οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τάδε;
Ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φρόνησις τοῦ θεοῦ μεῖζον σθένειν
Ζητεῖ· τὸ γαῦρον δ᾽ ἐν χεροῖν κεκτημένοι
Δοκοῦμεν εἶναι δαιμόνων σοφώτεροι (Supplices, 211).
It will be observed that this constant outpouring of special
revelations, through prophets, omens, etc., was (in the view of
these Sokratic thinkers) an essential part of the divine
government; indispensable to satisfy their ideas of the
benevolence of the gods; since rational and scientific
prediction was so habitually at fault and unable to fathom the
phenomena of the future.
[219] Xen. Anab. v. 6, 29.
[220] Though Xenophon accounted sacrifice to be an essential
preliminary to any action of dubious result, and placed great
faith in the indications which the victims offered, as signs of
the future purposes of the gods,—he nevertheless had very little
confidence in the professional prophets. He thought them quite
capable of gross deceit (See Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 2, 3; compare
Sophokles, Antigone, 1035, 1060; and Œdip. Tyrann. 387).
Thus prematurely and insidiously divulged, the scheme found some
supporters, but a far larger number of opponents; especially among
those officers who were jealous of the ascendency of Xenophon.
Timasion and Thorax employed it as a means of alarming the
Herakleotic and Sinopian traders in the camp; telling them that
unless they provided not merely transports, but also pay for the
soldiers, Xenophon would find means to detain the army in the Euxine,
and would employ the transports when they arrived, not for the
homeward voyage, but for his own projects of acquisition This news
spread so much terror both at Sinôpê and Herakleia, that large offers
of money were made from both cities to Timasion, on condition that he
would ensure the departure of the army, as soon as the vessels should
be assembled at Kotyôra. Accordingly these officers, convening an
assembly of the soldiers, protested against the duplicity of Xenophon
in thus preparing momentous schemes without any public debate or
decision. And Timasion, seconded by Thorax, not only strenuously
urged the army to return, but went so far as to promise to them, on
the faith of the assurances from Herakleia and Sinôpê, future pay
on a liberal scale, to commence from the first new moon after their
departure; together with a hospitable reception in his native city of
Dardanus on the Hellespont, from whence they could make incursions on
the rich neighboring satrapy of Pharnabazus.[221]
[221] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 19-26.
It was not, however, until these attacks were repeated from more
than one quarter,—until the Achæans Philesius and Lykon had loudly
accused Xenophon of underhand manœuvring to cheat the army into
remaining against their will,—that the latter rose to repel the
imputation; saying, that all that he had done was, to consult the
gods whether it would be better to lay his project before the army or
to keep it in his own bosom. The encouraging answer of the gods, as
conveyed through the victims and testified even by Silanus himself,
proved that the scheme was not ill-conceived; nevertheless, (he
remarked) Silanus had begun to lay snares for him, realizing by his
own proceedings a collateral indication which he had announced to be
visible in the victims. “If (added Xenophon) you had continued as
destitute and unprovided as you were just now,—I should still have
looked out for a resource in the capture of some city which would
have enabled such of you as chose, to return at once; while the rest
stay behind to enrich themselves. But now there is no longer any
necessity; since Herakleia and Sinôpê are sending transports, and
Timasion promises pay to you from the next new moon. Nothing can be
better; you will go back safely to Greece, and will receive pay for
going thither. I desist at once from my scheme, and call upon all who
were favorable to it to desist also. Only let us all keep together
until we are on safe ground; and let the man who lags behind or runs
off, be condemned as a wrong-doer.”[222]
[222] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 30-33.
Xenophon immediately put this question to the vote, and every hand
was held up in its favor. There was no man more disconcerted with
the vote than the prophet Silanus, who loudly exclaimed against the
injustice of detaining any one desirous to depart. But the soldiers
put him down with vehement disapprobation, threatening that they
would assuredly punish him if they caught him running off. His
intrigue against Xenophon thus recoiled upon himself, for the moment.
But shortly afterwards, when the army reached Herakleia, he took his
opportunity for clandestine flight, and found his way back to Greece
with the three thousand darics.[223]
[223] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 34; vi, 4, 13.
If Silanus gained little by his manœuvre, Timasion and his partners
gained still less. For so soon as it became known that the army had
taken a formal resolution to go back to Greece, and that Xenophon
himself had made the proposition, the Sinopians and the Herakleots
felt at their ease. They sent the transport vessels, but withheld the
money which they had promised to Timasion and Thorax. Hence these
officers were exposed to dishonor and peril; for, having positively
engaged to find pay for the army, they were now unable to keep their
word. So keen were their apprehensions, that they came to Xenophon
and told him that they had altered their views, and that they now
thought it best to employ the newly-arrived transports in conveying
the army, not to Greece, but against the town and territory of Phasis
at the eastern extremity of the Euxine.[224] Xenophon replied, that
they might convene the soldiers and make the proposition, if they
chose; but that he would have nothing to say to it. To make the
very proposition themselves, for which they had so much inveighed
against Xenophon, was impossible without some preparation; so that
each of them began individually to sound his captains, and get
the scheme suggested by them. During this interval, the soldiery
obtained information of the manœuvre, much to their discontent
and indignation; of which Neon (the lieutenant of the absent
Cheirisophus) took advantage, to throw the whole blame upon Xenophon;
alleging that it was he who had converted the other officers to his
original project, and that he intended as soon as the soldiers were
on shipboard, to convey them fraudulently to Phasis instead of to
Greece. There was something so plausible in this glaring falsehood,
which represented Xenophon as the author of the renewed project,
once his own,—and something so improbable in the fact that the
other officers should spontaneously have renounced their own strong
opinions to take up his,—that we can hardly be surprised at the
ready credence which Neon’s calumny found among the army. Their
exasperation against Xenophon became so intense, that they collected
in fierce groups; and there was even a fear that they would break
out into mutinous violence, as they had before done against the
magistrates of Kerasus.
[224] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 36.
I may here note that this _Phasis_ in the Euxine means the town
of that name, not the river.
Well knowing the danger of such spontaneous and informal assemblages,
and the importance of the habitual solemnities of convocation
and arrangement, to ensure either discussion or legitimate
defence,[225]—Xenophon immediately sent round the herald to summon
the army into the regular agora, with customary method and ceremony.
The summons was obeyed with unusual alacrity, and Xenophon then
addressed them,—refraining, with equal generosity and prudence, from
saying anything about the last proposition which Timasion and others
had made to him. Had he mentioned it, the question would have become
one of life and death between him and those other officers.
[225] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 1-3.
Ἐπεὶ δὲ ᾐσθάνετο ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ὡς τάχιστα συναγαγεῖν
αὐτῶν ἀγορὰν, καὶ μὴ ἐᾶσαι συλλεγῆναι αὐτομάτους· καὶ ἐκέλευε τὸν
κήρυκα συλλέξαι ἀγοράν.
The prudence of Xenophon in convoking the assembly at once is
incontestable. He could not otherwise have hindered the soldiers
from getting together, and exciting one another to action,
without any formal summons.
The reader should contrast with this the scene at Athens
(described in Thucydides, ii, 22; and in Vol. VI, Ch. xlviii, p.
133 of this History) during the first year of the Peloponnesian
war, and the first invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians;
when the invaders were at Acharnæ, within sight of the walls of
Athens, burning and destroying the country. In spite of the most
violent excitement among the Athenian people, and the strongest
impatience to go out and fight, Perikles steadily refused to call
an assembly, for fear that the people should take the resolution
of going out. And what was much more remarkable—the people
even in that state of excitement though all united within the
walls, did not meet in any informal assembly, nor come to any
resolution, or to any active proceeding; which the Cyreians would
certainly have done, had they not been convened in a regular
assembly.
The contrast with the Cyreian army here illustrates the
extraordinary empire exercised by constitutional forms over the
minds of the Athenian citizens.
“Soldiers (said he), I understand that there are some men here
calumniating me, as if I were intending to cheat you and carry you
to Phasis. Hear me, then, in the name of the gods. If I am shown to
be doing wrong, let me not go from hence unpunished; but if, on the
contrary, my calumniators are proved to be the wrong-doers, deal
with them as they deserve. You surely well know where the sun rises
and where he sets; you know that if a man wishes to reach Greece,
he must go westward,—if to the barbaric territories, he must go
eastward. Can any one hope to deceive you on this point, and persuade
you that the sun rises on _this_ side, and sets on _that_? Can any
one cheat you into going on shipboard with a wind which blows you
away from Greece? Suppose even that I put you aboard when there is
no wind at all. How am I to force you to sail with me against your
own consent,—I being only in one ship, you in a hundred and more?
Imagine, however, that I could even succeed in deluding you to
Phasis. When we land there, you will know at once that we are not
in Greece; and what fate can I then expect,—a detected impostor in
the midst of ten thousand men with arms in their hands? No,—these
stories all proceed from foolish men, who are jealous of my influence
with you; jealous, too, without reason,—for I neither hinder _them_
from outstripping me in your favor, if they can render you greater
service,—nor _you_ from electing them commanders, if you think fit.
Enough of this, now; I challenge any one to come forward and say how
it is possible either to cheat, or to be cheated, in the manner laid
to my charge.”[226]
[226] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 7-11.
Having thus grappled directly with the calumnies of his enemies, and
dissipated them in such manner as doubtless to create a reaction in
his own favor, Xenophon made use of the opportunity to denounce the
growing disorders in the army; which he depicted as such that, if no
corrective were applied, disgrace and contempt must fall upon all.
As he paused after this general remonstrance, the soldiers loudly
called upon him to go into particulars; upon which he proceeded to
recall, with lucid and impressive simplicity, the outrages which had
been committed at and near Kerasus,—the unauthorized and unprovoked
attack made by Klearetus and his company on a neighboring village
which was in friendly commerce with the army,—the murder of the
three elders of the village, who had come as heralds to complain
to the generals about such wrong,—the mutinous attack made by
disorderly soldiers even upon the magistrates of Kerasus, at the
very moment when they were remonstrating with the generals on what
had occurred; exposing these magistrates to the utmost peril, and
putting the generals themselves to ignominy.[227] “If such are to
be our proceedings, (continued Xenophon), look you well into what
condition the army will fall. You, the aggregate body,[228] will no
longer be the sovereign authority to make war or peace with whom
you please; each individual among you will conduct the army against
any point which he may choose. And even if men should come to you as
envoys, either for peace or for other purposes, they may be slain
by any single enemy; so that you will be debarred from all public
communications whatever. Next, those whom your universal suffrage
shall have chosen commanders, will have no authority; while any
self-elected general who chooses to give the word, Cast! Cast! (i.
e. darts or stones), may put to death, without trial, either officer
or soldier, as it suits him; that is, if he finds you ready to obey
him, as it happened near Kerasus. Look, now, what these self-elected
leaders have done for you. The magistrate of Kerasus, if he was
really guilty of wrong towards you, has been enabled to escape with
impunity; if he was innocent, he has been obliged to run away from
you, as the only means of avoiding death without pretence or trial.
Those who stoned the heralds to death, have brought matters to such
a pass, that you alone, among all Greeks, cannot enter the town of
Kerasus in safety, unless in commanding force; and that we cannot
even send in a herald to take up our dead (Klearetus and those who
were slain in the attack on the Kerasuntine village) for burial;
though at first those who had slain them in self-defence were anxious
to give up the bodies to us. For who will take the risk of going in
as herald, from those who have set the example of putting heralds to
death? We generals were obliged to entreat the Kerasuntines to bury
the bodies for us.”[229]
[227] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 13-26.
[228] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 26-27. Εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τοιαῦτα ἔσται,
θεάσασθε οἵα ἡ κατάστασις ἡμῖν ἔσται τῆς στρατιᾶς. Ὑμεῖς μὲν οἱ
πάντες οὐκ ἔσεσθε κύριοι, οὔτ᾽ ἀνελέσθαι πόλεμον ᾧ ἂν βούλησθε,
οὔτε καταλῦσαι· ἰδίᾳ δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος ἄξει στράτευμα ἐφ᾽ ὅ,τι ἂν
ἐθέλῃ. Κἄν τινες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἴωσι πρέσβεις, ἢ εἰρήνης δεόμενοι ἢ
ἄλλου τινός, κατακαίνοντες τούτους οἱ βουλόμενοι, ποιήσουσιν ὑμᾶς
τῶν λόγων μὴ ἀκοῦσαι τῶν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἰόντων. Ἔπειτα δὲ, οὓς μὲν ἂν
ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες ἔλησθε ἄρχοντας, ἐν οὐδεμίᾳ χώρᾳ ἔσονται· ὅστις δ᾽
ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἕληται στρατηγὸν, καὶ ἐθέλῃ λέγειν, Βάλλε, Βάλλε, οὗτος
ἔσται ἱκανὸς καὶ ἄρχοντα κατακαίνειν καὶ ἰδιώτην ὃν ἂν ὑμῶν ἐθέλῃ
ἄκριτον—ἂν ὦσιν οἱ πεισόμενοι αὐτῷ, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐγένετο.
[229] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 27-30.
Continuing in this emphatic protest against the recent disorders
and outrages, Xenophon at length succeeded in impressing his own
sentiment, heartily and unanimously, upon the soldiers. They passed
a vote that the ringleaders of the mutiny at Kerasus should be
punished; that if any one was guilty of similar outrages in future,
he should be put upon his trial by the generals, before the lochages
or captains as judges, and if condemned by them, put to death; and
that trial should be had before the same persons, for any other wrong
committed since the death of Cyrus. A suitable religious ceremony was
also directed to be performed, at the instance of Xenophon and the
prophets, to purify the army.[230]
[230] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 34, 35.
This speech affords an interesting specimen of the political
morality universal throughout the Grecian world, though deeper and
more predominant among its better sections. In the miscellaneous
aggregate, and temporary society, now mustered at Kotyôra, Xenophon
insists on the universal suffrage of the whole body, as the
legitimate sovereign authority for the guidance of every individual
will; the decision of the majority, fairly and formally collected,
as carrying a title to prevail over every dissentient minority;
the generals chosen by the majority of votes, as the only persons
entitled to obedience. This is the cardinal principle to which he
appeals, as the anchorage of political obligation in the mind of
each separate man or fraction; as the condition of all success, all
safety, and all conjoint action; as the only condition either for
punishing wrong or protecting right; as indispensable to keep up
their sympathies with the Hellenic communities, and their dignity
either as soldiers or as citizens. The complete success of his speech
proves that he knew how to touch the right chord of Grecian feeling.
No serious acts of individual insubordination occurred afterwards,
though the army collectively went wrong on more than one occasion.
And what is not less important to notice,—the influence of Xenophon
himself, after his unreserved and courageous remonstrance, seems to
have been sensibly augmented,—certainly no way diminished.
The circumstances which immediately followed were indeed well
calculated to augment it. For it was resolved, on the proposition of
Xenophon himself[231] that the generals themselves should be tried
before the newly-constituted tribunal of the lochages or captains,
in case any one had complaint to make against them for past matters;
agreeably to the Athenian habit of subjecting every magistrate to
a trial of accountability on laying down his office. In the course
of this investigation, Philesius and Xanthiklês were fined twenty
minæ, to make good an assignable deficiency of that amount, in the
cargoes of those merchantmen which had been detained at Trapezus
for the transport of the army; Sophænetus, who had the general
superintendence of this property, but had been negligent in that
duty, was fined ten minæ. Next, the name of Xenophon was put up, when
various persons stood forward to accuse him of having beaten and
ill-used them. As commander of the rear-guard, his duty was by far
the severest and most difficult, especially during the intense cold
and deep snow; since the sick and wounded, as well as the laggards
and plunderers, all fell under his inspection. One man especially
was loud in complaints against him, and Xenophon questioned him, as
to the details of his case, before the assembled army. It turned out
that he had given him blows, because the man, having been intrusted
with the task of carrying a sick soldier, was about to evade the duty
by burying the dying man alive.[232] This interesting debate (given
in the Anabasis at length) ended by full approbation, on the part of
the army, of Xenophon’s conduct, accompanied with regret that he had
not handled the man yet more severely.
[231] Xen. Anab. v, 7, 35.
Παραινοῦντος δὲ Ξενοφῶντος, καὶ τῶν μάντεων συμβουλευόντων, ἔδοξε
καὶ καθᾶραι τὸ στράτευμα· καὶ ἐγένετο καθαρμός· ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ τοὺς
στρατηγοὺς δίκην ὑποσχεῖν τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου.
In the distribution of chapters as made by the editors, chapter
the eighth is made to begin at the second ἔδοξε, which seems to
me not convenient for comprehending the full sense. I think that
the second ἔδοξε, as well as the first, is connected with the
words παραινοῦντος Ξενοφῶντος, and ought to be included not only
in the same chapter with them, but also in the same sentence,
without an intervening full stop.
[232] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 3-12.
The statements of Xenophon himself give us a vivid idea of the
internal discipline of the army, even as managed by a discreet and
well-tempered officer. “I acknowledge (said he to the soldiers) to
have struck many men for disorderly conduct; men who were content to
owe their preservation to your orderly march and constant fighting,
while they themselves ran about to plunder and enrich themselves at
your cost. Had we all acted as they did, we should have perished to
a man. Sometimes, too, I struck men who were lagging behind with
cold and fatigue, or were stopping the way so as to hinder others
from getting forward; I struck them with my fist,[233] in order to
save them from the spear of the enemy. You yourselves stood by,
and saw me; you had arms in your hands, yet none of you interfered
to prevent me. I did it for their good as well as for yours, not
from any insolence of disposition; for it was a time when we were
all alike suffering from cold, hunger, and fatigue; whereas I now
live comparatively well, drink more wine, and pass easy days,—and
yet I strike no one. You will find that the men who failed most
in those times of hardship, are now the most outrageous offenders
in the army. There is Boïskus,[234] the Thessalian pugilist, who
pretended sickness during the march, in order to evade the burthen
of carrying his shield,—and now, as I am informed, he has stripped
several citizens of Kotyôra of their clothes. If (he concluded) the
blows which I have occasionally given, in cases of necessity, are
now brought in evidence,—I call upon those among you also, to whom
I have rendered aid and protection, to stand up and testify in my
favor.”[235]
[233] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 16. ἔπαισα πὺξ, ὅπως μὴ λόγχῃ ὑπὸ τῶν
πολεμίων παίοιτο.
[234] The idea that great pugilists were not good soldiers in
battle, is as old among the Greeks as the Iliad. The unrivalled
pugilist of the Homeric Grecian army, Epeius, confesses his own
inferiority as a soldier (Iliad, xxiii 667).
Ἆσσον ἴτω, ὅστις δέπας οἴσεται ἀμφικύπελλον·
Ἡμίονον δ᾽ οὔ φημί τιν᾽ ἄξεμεν ἄλλον Ἀχαιῶν,
Πυγμῇ νικήσαντ᾽· ἐπεὶ εὔχομαι εἶναι ἄριστος.
~Ἦ οὐχ ἅλις, ὅ,ττι μάχης ἐπιδεύομαι~; οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πως ἦν
Ἐν πάντεσσ᾽ ἔργοισι δαήμονα φῶτα γενέσθαι.
[235] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 13-25.
Many individuals responded to this appeal, insomuch that Xenophon
was not merely acquitted, but stood higher than before in the
opinion of the army. We learn from his defence that for a commanding
officer to strike a soldier with his fist, if wanting in duty,
was not considered improper; at least under such circumstances as
those of the retreat. But what deserves notice still more, is, the
extraordinary influence which Xenophon’s powers of speaking gave him
over the minds of the army. He stood distinguished from the other
generals, Lacedæmonian, Arcadian, Achæan, etc., by having the power
of working on the minds of the soldiers collectively; and we see
that he had the good sense, as well as the spirit, not to shrink
from telling them unpleasant truths. In spite of such frankness—or
rather, partly by means of such frankness,—his ascendency as
commander not only remained unabated, as compared with that of the
others, but went on increasing. For whatever may be said about the
flattery of orators as a means of influence over the people,—it
will be found that though particular points may be gained in this
way, yet wherever the influence of an orator has been steady and
long-continued (like that of Perikles[236] or Demosthenes) it is
owing in part to the fact that he has an opinion of his own, and is
not willing to accommodate himself constantly to the prepossessions
of his hearers. Without the oratory of Xenophon, there would have
existed no engine for kindling or sustaining the _sensus communis_
of the ten thousand Cyreians assembled at Kotyôra, or for keeping
up the moral authority of the aggregate over the individual members
and fractions. The other officers could doubtless speak well enough
to address short encouragements, or give simple explanations, to
the soldiers; without this faculty, no man was fit for military
command over Greeks. But the oratory of Xenophon was something of
a higher order. Whoever will study the discourse pronounced by him
at Kotyôra, will perceive a dexterity in dealing with assembled
multitudes,—a discriminating use sometimes of the plainest and
most direct appeal, sometimes of indirect insinuation or circuitous
transitions to work round the minds of the hearers,—a command of
those fundamental political convictions which lay deep in the Grecian
mind, but were often so overlaid by the fresh impulses arising out of
each successive situation, as to require some positive friction to
draw them out from their latent state—lastly, a power of expansion
and varied repetition—such as would be naturally imparted both
by the education and the practice of an intelligent Athenian, but
would rarely be found in any other Grecian city. The energy and
judgment displayed by Xenophon in the retreat were doubtless not less
essential to his influence than his power of speaking; but in these
points we may be sure that other officers were more nearly his equals.
[236] See the striking remarks of Thucydides (ii, 65) upon
Perikles.
The important public proceedings above described not only restored
the influence of Xenophon, but also cleared off a great amount of
bad feeling, and sensibly abated the bad habits, which had grown up
in the army. A scene which speedily followed was not without effect
in promoting cheerful and amicable sympathies. The Paphlagonian
prince Korylas, weary of the desultory warfare carried on between
the Greeks and the border inhabitants, sent envoys to the Greek camp
with presents of horses and fine robes,[237] and with expressions of
a wish to conclude peace. The Greek generals accepted the presents,
and promised to submit the proposition to the army. But first they
entertained the envoys at a banquet, providing at the same time
games and dances, with other recreations amusing not only to them
but also to the soldiers generally. The various dances, warlike and
pantomimic, of Thracians, Mysians, Ænianes, Magnêtes, etc., are
described by Xenophon in a lively and interesting manner. They were
followed on the next day by an amicable convention concluded between
the army and the Paphlagonians.[238]
[237] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 2. Πέμπει παρὰ τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρέσβεις,
ἔχοντας ἵππους καὶ στολὰς καλάς, etc.
The horses sent were doubtless native Paphlagonian; the robes
sent were probably the produce of the looms of Sinôpê and
Kotyôra; just as the Thracian princes used to receive fine woven
and metallic fabrics from Abdêra and the other Grecian colonies
on their coast—ὑφαντὰ καὶ λεῖα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευὴ, etc.
(Thucyd. ii, 96). From the like industry probably proceeded
the splendid “regia textilia” and abundance of gold and silver
vessels, captured by the Roman general Paulus Emilius along with
Perseus the last king of Macedonia (Livy, xlv, 33-35).
[238] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 10-14.
Not long afterwards,—a number of transports, sufficient for the
whole army, having been assembled from Herakleia and Sinôpê,—all the
soldiers were conveyed by sea to the latter place, passing by the
mouth of the rivers Thermodon, Iris, and Halys, which they would have
found impracticable to cross in a land-march through Paphlagonia.
Having reached Sinôpê after a day and a night of sailing with a fair
wind, they were hospitably received, and lodged in the neighboring
seaport of Armênê, where the Sinopians sent to them a large present
of barley-meal and wine, and where they remained for five days.
It was here that they were joined by Cheirisophus, whose absence
had been so unexpectedly prolonged. But he came with only a single
trireme, bringing nothing except a message from Anaxibius, the
Lacedæmonian admiral in the Bosphorus; who complimented the army,
and promised that they should be taken into pay as soon as they
were out of the Euxine. The soldiers, severely disappointed on
seeing him arrive thus empty-handed, became the more strongly bent
on striking some blow to fill their own purses before they reached
Greece. Feeling that it was necessary to the success of any such
project that it should be prepared not only skilfully, but secretly,
they resolved to elect a single general in place of that board of
six (or perhaps more) who were still in function. Such was now the
ascendency of Xenophon, that the general sentiment of the army at
once turned towards him; and the lochages or captains, communicating
to him what was in contemplation, intimated to him their own anxious
hopes that he would not decline the offer. Tempted by so flattering
a proposition, he hesitated at first what answer he should give. But
at length the uncertainty of being able to satisfy the exigencies
of the army, and the fear of thus compromising the reputation which
he had already realized, outweighed the opposite inducements. As
in other cases of doubt, so in this,—he offered sacrifice to Zeus
Basileus; and the answer returned by the victims was such as to
determine him to refusal. Accordingly, when the army assembled, with
predetermination to choose a single chief, and proceeded to nominate
him,—he respectfully and thankfully declined, on the ground that
Cheirisophus was a Lacedæmonian, and that he himself was not; adding
that he should cheerfully serve under any one whom they might name.
His excuse, however, was repudiated by the army; and especially by
the lochages. Several of these latter were Arcadians; and one of
them, Agasias, cried out, with full sympathy of the soldiers, that if
that principle were admitted, he, as an Arcadian, ought to resign his
command. Finding that his former reason was not approved, Xenophon
acquainted the army that he had sacrificed to know whether he ought
to accept the command, and that the gods had peremptorily forbidden
him to do so.[239]
[239] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 22-31.
Cheirisophus was then elected sole commander, and undertook the
duty; saying that he would have willingly served under Xenophon,
if the latter had accepted the office, but that it was a good
thing for Xenophon himself to have declined,—since Dexippus had
already poisoned the mind of Anaxibius against him, although he
(Cheirisophus) had emphatically contradicted the calumnies.[240]
[240] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32.
On the next day, the army sailed forward, under the command of
Cheirisophus, to Herakleia; near which town they were hospitably
entertained, and gratified with a present of meal, wine, and
bullocks, even greater than they had received at Sinôpê. It now
appeared that Xenophon had acted wisely in declining the sole
command; and also that Cheirisophus, though elected commander, yet
having been very long absent, was not really of so much importance
in the eyes of the soldiers as Xenophon. In the camp near Herakleia,
the soldiers became impatient that their generals (for the habit
of looking upon Xenophon as one of them still continued) took no
measures to procure money for them. The Achæan Lykon proposed that
they should extort a contribution of no less than three thousand
staters of Kyzikus (about sixty thousand Attic drachmæ, or ten
talents, equal to two thousand three hundred pounds) from the
inhabitants of Herakleia; another man immediately outbid this
proposition, and proposed that they should require ten thousand
staters—a full month’s pay for the army. It was moved that
Cheirisophus and Xenophon should go to the Herakleots as envoys with
this demand. But both of them indignantly refused to be concerned in
so unjust an extortion from a Grecian city which had just received
the army kindly, and sent handsome presents. Accordingly, Lykon
with two Arcadian officers undertook the mission, and intimated
the demand, not without threats in case of non-compliance, to
the Herakleots. The latter replied that they would take it into
consideration. But they waited only for the departure of the envoys,
and then immediately closed their gates, manned their walls, and
brought in their outlying property.
The project being thus baffled, Lykon and the rest turned their
displeasure upon Cheirisophus and Xenophon, whom they accused of
having occasioned its miscarriage. And they now began to exclaim,
that it was disgraceful to the Arcadians and Achæans; who formed more
than one numerical half of the army and endured all the toil—to obey
as well as to enrich generals from other Hellenic cities; especially
a single Athenian who furnished no contingent to the army. Here
again it is remarkable that the personal importance of Xenophon
caused him to be still regarded as a general, though the sole command
had been vested, by formal vote, in Cheirisophus. So vehement was
the dissatisfaction, that all the Arcadian and Achæan soldiers in
the army, more than four thousand and five hundred hoplites in
number, renounced the authority of Cheirisophus, formed themselves
into a distinct division, and chose ten commanders from out of
their own numbers. The whole army thus became divided into three
portions—first, the Arcadians and Achæans; secondly, one thousand
and four hundred hoplites and seven hundred peltasts, who adhered
to Cheirisophus; lastly, one thousand seven hundred hoplites, three
hundred peltasts, and forty horsemen, (all the horsemen in the army)
attaching themselves to Xenophon; who however was taking measures to
sail away individually from Herakleia and quit the army altogether,
which he would have done had he not been restrained by unfavorable
sacrifices.[241]
[241] Xen. Anab. vi, 2, 11-16.
The Arcadian division, departing first, in vessels from Herakleia,
landed at the harbor of Kalpê; an untenanted promontory of the
Bithynian or Asiatic Thrace, midway between Herakleia and Byzantium.
From thence they marched at once into the interior of Bithynia, with
the view of surprising the villages, and acquiring plunder. But
through rashness and bad management, they first sustained several
partial losses, and ultimately became surrounded upon an eminence, by
a large muster of the indigenous Bithynians from all the territory
around. They were only rescued from destruction by the unexpected
appearance of Xenophon with his division; who had left Herakleia
somewhat later, but heard by accident, during their march, of the
danger of their comrades. The whole army thus became re-assembled at
Kalpê, where the Arcadians and Achæans, disgusted at the ill-success
of their separate expedition, again established the old union
and the old generals. They chose Neon in place of Cheirisophus,
who,—afflicted by the humiliation put upon him, in having been
first named sole commander and next deposed within a week,—had
fallen sick of a fever and died. The elder Arcadian captains farther
moved a resolution, that if any one henceforward should propose to
separate the army into fractions, he should be put to death.[242]
[242] Xenoph. Anab. vi. 3, 10-25; vi, 4, 11.
The locality of Kalpê was well suited for the foundation of a colony,
which Xenophon evidently would have been glad to bring about, though
he took no direct measures tending towards it; while the soldiers
were so bent on returning to Greece, and so jealous lest Xenophon
should entrap them into remaining, that they almost shunned the
encampment. It so happened that they were detained there for some
days without being able to march forth even in quest of provisions,
because the sacrifices were not favorable. Xenophon refused to
lead them out, against the warning of the sacrifices—although the
army suspected him of a deliberate manœuvre for the purpose of
detention. Neon, however, less scrupulous, led out a body of two
thousand men who chose to follow him, under severe distress for want
of provisions. But being surprised by the native Bithynians, with
the aid of some troops of the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, he was
defeated with the loss of no less than five hundred men; a misfortune
which Xenophon regards as the natural retribution for contempt of
the sacrificial warning. The dangerous position of Neon with the
remainder of the detachment was rapidly made known at the camp; upon
which Xenophon, unharnessing a waggon-bullock as the only animal near
at hand, immediately offered sacrifice. On this occasion, the victim
was at once favorable; so that he led out without delay the greater
part of the force, to the rescue of the exposed detachment, which was
brought back in safety to the camp. So bold had the enemy become,
that in the night the camp was attacked. The Greeks were obliged on
the next day to retreat into stronger ground, surrounding themselves
with a ditch and palisade. Fortunately a vessel arrived from
Herakleia, bringing to the camp at Kalpê a supply of barley-meal,
cattle, and wine; which restored the spirits of the army, enabling
them to go forth on the ensuing morning, and assume the aggressive
against the Bithynians and the troops of Pharnabazus. These troops
were completely defeated and dispersed, so that the Greeks returned
to their camp at Kalpê in the evening, both safe and masters of the
country.[243]
[243] Xen. Anab. vi, 5.
At Kalpê they remained some time, awaiting the arrival of Kleander
from Byzantium, who was said to be about to bring vessels for their
transport. They were now abundantly provided with supplies, not
merely from the undisturbed plunder of the neighboring villages, but
also from the visits of traders who came with cargoes. Indeed the
impression—that they were preparing, at the instance of Xenophon,
to found a new city at Kalpê—became so strong, that several of the
neighboring native villages sent envoys to ask on what terms alliance
would be granted to them. At length Kleander came, but with two
triremes only.[244]
[244] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 1-5.
Kleander was the Lacedæmonian harmost or governor of Byzantium. His
appearance opens to us a new phase in the eventful history of this
gallant army, as well as an insight into the state of the Grecian
world under the Lacedæmonian empire. He came attended by Dexippus,
who had served in the Cyreian army until their arrival at Trapezus,
and who had there been entrusted with an armed vessel for the purpose
of detaining transports to convey the troops home, but had abused the
confidence reposed in him by running away with the ship to Byzantium.
It so happened that at the moment when Kleander arrived, the whole
army was out on a marauding excursion. Orders had been already
promulgated, that whatever was captured by every one when the whole
army was out, should be brought in and dealt with as public property;
though on days when the army was collectively at rest, any soldier
might go out individually and take to himself whatever he could
pillage. On the day when Kleander arrived, and found the whole army
out, some soldiers were just coming back with a lot of sheep which
they had seized. By right, the sheep ought to have been handed into
the public store. But these soldiers, desirous to appropriate them
wrongfully, addressed themselves to Dexippus, and promised him a
portion if he would enable them to retain the rest. Accordingly
the latter interfered, drove away those who claimed the sheep as
public property, and denounced them as thieves to Kleander; who
desired him to bring them before him. Dexippus arrested one of them,
a soldier belonging to the lochus or company of one of the best
friends of Xenophon,—the Arcadian Agasias. The latter took the man
under his protection; while the soldiers around, incensed not less
at the past than at the present conduct of Dexippus, broke out into
violent manifestations, called him a traitor and pelted him with
stones. Such was their wrath that not Dexippus alone, but the crew
of the triremes also, and even Kleander himself, fled in alarm; in
spite of the intervention of Xenophon and the other generals, who
on the one hand explained to Kleander, that it was an established
army-order which these soldiers were seeking to enforce—and on the
other hand controlled the mutineers. But the Lacedæmonian harmost
was so incensed as well by his own fright as by the calumnies of
Dexippus, that he threatened to sail away at once, and proclaim the
Cyreian army enemies to Sparta, so that every Hellenic city should
be interdicted from giving them reception.[245] It was in vain that
the generals, well knowing the formidable consequences of such
an interdict, entreated him to relent. He would consent only on
condition that the soldier who had begun to throw stones, as well as
Agasias the interfering officer, should be delivered up to him. This
latter demand was especially insisted upon by Dexippus, who, hating
Xenophon, had already tried to prejudice Anaxibius against him, and
believed that Agasias had acted by his order.[246]
[245] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 5-9.
[246] Xen. Anab. vi, 1, 32; vi, 4, 11-15.