would not easily be brought to surrender their comrades,—who had
a perfectly righteous cause, though they had supported it by undue
violence,—to the vengeance of a traitor like Dexippus. When the
army was convened in assembly, several of them went so far as to
treat the menace of Kleander with contempt. But Xenophon took pains
to set them right upon this point. “Soldiers (said he), it will be
no slight misfortune if Kleander shall depart as he threatens to
do, in his present temper towards us. We are here close upon the
cities of Greece; now the Lacedæmonians are the imperial power in
Greece, and not merely their authorized officers, but even each one
of their individual citizens, can accomplish what he pleases in the
various cities. If then Kleander begins by shutting us out from
Byzantium, and next enjoins the Lacedæmonian harmosts in the other
cities to do the same, proclaiming us lawless and disobedient to
Sparta,—if, besides, the same representation should be conveyed to
the Lacedæmonian admiral of the fleet, Anaxibius,—we shall be hard
pressed either to remain or to sail away; for the Lacedæmonians are
at present masters, both on land and at sea.[247] We must not, for
the sake of any one or two men, suffer the whole army to be excluded
from Greece. We must obey whatever the Lacedæmonians command,
especially as our cities, to which we respectively belong, now obey
them. As to what concerns myself, I understand that Dexippus has told
Kleander that Agasias would never have taken such a step except by my
orders. Now, if Agasias himself states this, I am ready to exonerate
both him and all of you, and to give myself up to any extremity
of punishment. I maintain too, that any other man whom Kleander
arraigns, ought in like manner to give himself up for trial, in order
that you collectively may be discharged from the imputation. It will
be hard indeed, if just as we are reaching Greece, we should not
only be debarred from the praise and honor which we anticipated, but
should be degraded even below the level of others, and shut out from
the Grecian cities.”[248]
[247] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12, 13.
Εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἐγγὺς αἱ Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις· τῆς δ᾽ Ἑλλάδος
Λακεδαιμόνιοι προεστήκασιν· ~ἱκανοὶ δέ εἰσι καὶ εἶς ἕκαστος
Λακεδαιμονίων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅ,τι βούλονται διαπράττεσθαι~.
Εἰ οὖν οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς Βυζαντίου ἀποκλείσει, ἔπειτα δὲ
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἁρμοσταῖς παραγγελεῖ εἰς τὰς πόλεις μὴ δέχεσθαι,
ὡς ἀπιστοῦντας Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ ἀνόμους ὄντας—ἔτι δὲ πρὸς
Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον οὗτος ὁ λόγος περὶ ἡμῶν ἥξει—χαλεπὸν
ἔσται καὶ μένειν καὶ αποπλεῖν· ~καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἄρχουσι
Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ τὸν νῦν χρόνον~.
[248] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 12-16.
After this speech from the philo-Laconian Xenophon,—so significant
a testimony of the unmeasured ascendency and interference of the
Lacedæmonians throughout Greece,—Agasias rose and proclaimed, that
what he had done was neither under the orders, nor with the privity,
of Xenophon; that he had acted on a personal impulse of wrath, at
seeing his own honest and innocent soldier dragged away by the
traitor Dexippus; but that he now willingly gave himself up as a
victim, to avert from the army the displeasure of the Lacedæmonians.
This generous self-sacrifice, which at the moment promised nothing
less than a fatal result to Agasias, was accepted by the army; and
the generals conducted both him and the soldier whom he had rescued,
as prisoners to Kleander. Presenting himself as the responsible
party, Agasias at the same time explained to Kleander the infamous
behavior of Dexippus to the army, and said that towards no one else
would he have acted in the same manner; while the soldier whom he had
rescued and who was given up at the same time, also affirmed that
he had interfered merely to prevent Dexippus and some others from
overruling, for their own individual benefit, a proclaimed order
of the entire army. Kleander, having observed that if Dexippus had
done what was affirmed, he would be the last to defend him, but that
no one ought to have been stoned without trial,—desired that the
persons surrendered might be left for his consideration, and at the
same time retracted his expressions of displeasure as regarded all
the others.[249]
[249] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 22-28.
The generals then retired, leaving Kleander in possession of the
prisoners, and on the point of taking his dinner. But they retired
with mournful feelings, and Xenophon presently convened the army
to propose that a general deputation should be sent to Kleander to
implore his lenity towards their two comrades. This being cordially
adopted, Xenophon, at the head of a deputation comprising Drakontius,
the Spartan, as well as the chief officers, addressed an earnest
appeal to Kleander, representing that his honor had been satisfied
with the unconditional surrender of the two persons required; that
the army, deeply concerned for two meritorious comrades, entreated
him now to show mercy and spare their lives; that they promised him
in return the most implicit obedience, and entreated him to take the
command of them, in order that he might have personal cognizance
of their exact discipline, and compare their worth with that of
Dexippus. Kleander was not merely soothed, but completely won over
by this address; and said in reply that the conduct of the generals
belied altogether the representations made to him, (doubtless by
Dexippus) that they were seeking to alienate the army from the
Lacedæmonians. He not only restored the two men in his power, but
also accepted the command of the army, and promised to conduct them
back into Greece.[250]
[250] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 31-36.
The prospects of the army appeared thus greatly improved; the
more so, as Kleander, on entering upon his new functions as
commander, found the soldiers so cheerful and orderly, that he was
highly gratified, and exchanged personal tokens of friendship and
hospitality with Xenophon. But when sacrifices came to be offered,
for beginning the march homeward, the signs were so unpropitious,
for three successive days, that Kleander could not bring himself to
brave such auguries at the outset of his career. Accordingly, he told
the generals, that the gods plainly forbade him, and reserved it
for them, to conduct the army into Greece; that he should therefore
sail back to Byzantium, and would receive the army in the best way
he could, when they reached the Bosphorus. After an interchange
of presents with the soldiers, he then departed with his two
triremes.[251]
[251] Xen. Anab. vi, 6, 36, 37.
The favorable sentiment now established in the bosom of Kleander will
be found very serviceable hereafter to the Cyreians at Byzantium;
but they had cause for deeply regretting the unpropitious sacrifices
which had deterred him from assuming the actual command at Kalpê. In
the request preferred to him by them that he would march as their
commander to the Bosphorus, we may recognize a scheme, and a very
well-contrived scheme, of Xenophon; who had before desired to leave
the army at Herakleia, and who saw plainly that the difficulties of
a commander, unless he were a Lacedæmonian of station and influence,
would increase with every step of their approach to Greece. Had
Kleander accepted the command, the soldiers would have been better
treated, while Xenophon himself might either have remained as his
adviser, or might have gone home. He probably would have chosen the
latter course.
Under the command of their own officers, the Cyreians now marched
from Kalpê across Bithynia to Chrysopolis,[252] (in the territory of
Chalkêdon on the Asiatic edge of the Bosphorus, immediately opposite
to Byzantium, as Scutari now is to Constantinople), where they
remained seven days, turning into money the slaves and plunder which
they had collected. Unhappily for them, the Lacedæmonian admiral
Anaxibius was now at Byzantium, so that their friend Kleander was
under his superior command. And Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap
of the north-western regions of Asia Minor, becoming much alarmed
lest they should invade his satrapy, despatched a private message
to Anaxibius; whom he prevailed upon, by promise of large presents,
to transport the army forthwith across to the European side of the
Bosphorus.[253] Accordingly, Anaxibius, sending for the generals and
the lochages across to Byzantium, invited the army to cross, and gave
them his assurance that as soon as the soldiers should be in Europe,
he would provide pay for them. The other officers told him that they
would return with this message and take the sense of the army; but
Xenophon, on his own account, said that he should not return; that he
should now retire from the army, and sail away from Byzantium. It was
only on the pressing instance of Anaxibius that he was induced to go
back to Chrysopolis and conduct the army across; on the understanding
that he should depart immediately afterwards.
[252] Nearly the same cross march was made by the Athenian
general Lamachus, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war,
after he had lost his triremes by a sudden rise of the water
at the mouth of the river Kalex, in the territory of Herakleia
(Thucyd. iv, 75).
[253] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 2. Πέμψας πρὸς Ἀναξίβιον τὸν ναύαρχον,
ἐδεῖτο διαβιβάσαι τὸ στράτευμα ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, καὶ ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντα
ποιήσειν αὐτῷ ὅσα δέοι.
Compare vii, 2, 7, when Anaxibius demanded in vain the fulfilment
of this promise.
Here at Byzantium, he received his first communication from the
Thracian prince Seuthes; who sent Medosadês to offer him a reward
if he would bring the army across. Xenophon replied that the army
would cross; that no reward from Seuthes was needful to bring about
that movement; but that he himself was about to depart, leaving the
command in other hands. In point of fact, the whole army crossed
with little delay, landed in Europe, and found themselves within the
walls of Byzantium.[254] Xenophon, who had come along with them, paid
a visit shortly afterwards to his friend the harmost Kleander, and
took leave of him as about to depart immediately. But Kleander told
him that he must not think of departing until the army was out of
the city, and that he would be held responsible if they stayed. In
truth Kleander was very uneasy so long as the soldiers were within
the walls, and was well aware that it might be no easy matter to
induce them to go away. For Anaxibius had practised a gross fraud
in promising them pay, which he had neither the ability nor the
inclination to provide. Without handing to them either pay or even
means of purchasing supplies, he issued orders that they must go
forth with arms and baggage, and muster outside of the gates, there
to be numbered for an immediate march; any one who stayed behind
being held as punishable. This proclamation was alike unexpected
and offensive to the soldiers, who felt that they had been deluded,
and were very backward in obeying. Hence Kleander, while urgent
with Xenophon to defer his departure until he had conducted the
army outside of the walls, added—“Go forth as if you were about to
march along with them; when you are once outside, you may depart as
soon as you please.”[255] Xenophon replied that this matter must be
settled with Anaxibius, to whom accordingly both of them went, and
who repeated the same directions, in a manner yet more peremptory.
Though it was plain to Xenophon that he was here making himself a
sort of instrument to the fraud which Anaxibius had practised upon
the army, yet he had no choice but to obey. Accordingly, he as well
as the other generals put themselves at the head of the troops, who
followed, however reluctantly, and arrived most of them outside
of the gates. Eteonikus (a Lacedæmonian officer of consideration,
noticed more than once in my last preceding volume) commanding at
the gate, stood close to it in person; in order that when all the
Cyreians had gone forth, he might immediately shut it and fasten it
with the bar.[256]
[254] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 5-7.
[255] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 7-10. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁμῶς (ἔφη), ἐγώ σοι
συμβουλεύω ἐξελθεῖν ὡς πορευσόμενον· ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ ἔξω γένηται τὸ
στράτευμα, τότε ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.
[256] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 12.
Anaxibius knew well what he was doing. He fully anticipated that the
communication of the final orders would occasion an outbreak among
the Cyreians, and was anxious to defer it until they were outside.
But when there remained only the rearmost companies still in the
inside and on their march, all the rest having got out—he thought
the danger was over, and summoned to him the generals and captains,
all of whom were probably near the gates superintending the march
through. It seems that Xenophon, having given notice that he intended
to depart, did not answer to this summons as one of the generals, but
remained outside among the soldiers. “Take what supplies you want
(said Anaxibius) from the neighboring Thracian villages, which are
well furnished with wheat, barley, and other necessaries. After thus
providing yourselves, march forward to the Chersonesus, and there
Kyniskus will give you pay.”[257]
[257] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 13.
This was the first distinct intimation given by Anaxibius that he did
not intend to perform his promise of finding pay for the soldiers.
Who Kyniskus was, we do not know, nor was he probably known to the
Cyreians; but the march here enjoined was at least one hundred and
fifty English miles, and might be much longer. The route was not
indicated, and the generals had to inquire from Anaxibius whether
they were to go by what was called the Holy Mountain (that is, by
the shorter line, skirting the northern coast of the Propontis), or
by a more inland and circuitous road through Thrace;—also whether
they were to regard the Thracian prince, Seuthes, as a friend or an
enemy.[258]
[258] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 14.
Instead of the pay which had been formally promised to them by
Anaxibius if they would cross over from Asia to Byzantium, the
Cyreians thus found themselves sent away empty-handed, to a long
march,—through another barbarous country, with chance supplies to
be ravished only by their own efforts,—and at the end of it a lot
unknown and uncertain; while, had they remained in Asia, they would
have had at any rate the rich satrapy of Pharnabazus within their
reach. To perfidy of dealing was now added a brutal ejectment from
Byzantium, without even the commonest manifestations of hospitality;
contrasting pointedly with the treatment which the army had recently
experienced at Trapezus, Sinôpê, and Herakleia; where they had been
welcomed not only by compliments on their past achievements, but also
by an ample present of flour, meat, and wine. Such behavior could
not fail to provoke the most violent indignation in the bosoms of
the soldiery; and Anaxibius had therefore delayed giving the order
until the last soldiers were marching out, thinking that the army
would hear nothing of it until the generals came out of the gates
to inform them; so that the gates would be closed, and the walls
manned to resist any assault from without. But his calculations were
not realized. Either one of the soldiers passing by heard him give
the order, or one of the captains forming his audience stole away
from the rest, and hastened forward to acquaint his comrades on the
outside. The bulk of the army, already irritated by the inhospitable
way in which they had been thrust out, needed nothing farther to
inflame them into spontaneous mutiny and aggression. While the
generals within (who either took the communication more patiently, or
at least, looking farther forward, felt that any attempt to resent
or resist the ill usage of the Spartan admiral would only make their
position worse) were discussing with Anaxibius the details of the
march just enjoined, the soldiers without, bursting into spontaneous
movement, with a simultaneous and fiery impulse, made a rush back to
get possession of the gate. But Eteonikus, seeing their movement,
closed it without a moment’s delay, and fastened the bar. The
soldiers on reaching the gate and finding it barred, clamored loudly
to get it opened, threatened to break it down, and even began to
knock violently against it. Some ran down to the sea-coast, and made
their way into the city round the line of stones at the base of the
city wall, which protected it against the sea; while the rearmost
soldiers who had not yet marched out, seeing what was passing, and
fearful of being cut off from their comrades, assaulted the gate from
the inside, severed the fastenings with axes, and threw it wide open
to the army.[259] All the soldiers then rushed up, and were soon
again in Byzantium.
[259] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 15-17.
Nothing could exceed the terror of the Lacedæmonians as well as of
the native Byzantines, when they saw the excited Cyreians again
within the walls. The town seemed already taken and on the point of
being plundered. Neither Anaxibius nor Eteonikus took the smallest
means of resistance, nor stayed to brave the approach of the
soldiers, whose wrath they were fully conscious of having deserved.
Both fled to the citadel—the former first running to the sea-shore,
and jumping into a fishing-boat to go thither by sea. He even thought
the citadel not tenable with its existing garrison, and sent over to
Chalkêdon for a reinforcement. Still more terrified were the citizens
of the town. Every man in the market-place instantly fled; some to
their houses, others to the merchant vessels in the harbor, others to
the triremes or ships of war, which they hauled down to the water,
and thus put to sea.[260]
[260] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 18, 19.
To the deception and harshness of the Spartan admiral, there was
thus added a want of precaution in the manner of execution, which
threatened to prove the utter ruin of Byzantium. For it was but
too probable that the Cyreian soldiers, under the keen sense of
recent injury, would satiate their revenge, and reimburse themselves
for the want of hospitality towards them, without distinguishing
the Lacedæmonian garrison from the Byzantine citizens; and that
too from mere impulse, not merely without orders, but in spite of
prohibitions, from their generals. Such was the aspect of the case,
when they became again assembled in a mass within the gates; and
such would probably have been the reality, had Xenophon executed
his design of retiring earlier, so as to leave the other generals
acting without him. Being on the outside along with the soldiers,
Xenophon felt at once, as soon as he saw the gates forced open and
the army again within the town, the terrific emergency which was
impending; first, the sack of Byzantium,—next, horror and antipathy,
throughout all Greece, towards the Cyreian officers and soldiers
indiscriminately,—lastly, unsparing retribution inflicted upon all
by the power of Sparta. Overwhelmed with these anxieties, he rushed
into the town along with the multitude, using every effort to pacify
them and bring them into order. They on their parts, delighted to
see him along with them, and conscious of their own force, were
eager to excite him to the same pitch as themselves, and to prevail
on him to second and methodize their present triumph. “Now is your
time, Xenophon, (they exclaimed), to make yourself a man. You have
here a city,—you have triremes,—you have money,—you have plenty
of soldiers. Now then, if you choose, you can enrich us; and we in
return can make you powerful.”—“You speak well (replied he); I
shall do as you propose; but if you want to accomplish anything,
you must fall into military array forthwith.” He knew that this was
the first condition of returning to anything like tranquillity; and
by great good fortune, the space called the Thrakion, immediately
adjoining the gate inside, was level, open, and clear of houses;
presenting an excellent place of arms or locality for a review. The
whole army,—partly from their long military practice,—partly under
the impression that Xenophon was really about to second their wishes
and direct some aggressive operation,—threw themselves almost of
their own accord into regular array on the Thrakion; the hoplites
eight deep, the peltasts on each flank. It was in this position that
Xenophon addressed them as follows:—
“Soldiers! I am not surprised that you are incensed, and that you
think yourselves scandalously cheated and ill-used. But if we give
way to our wrath, if we punish these Lacedæmonians now before us for
their treachery, and plunder this innocent city,—reflect what will
be the consequence. We shall stand proclaimed forthwith as enemies to
the Lacedæmonians and their allies; and what sort of a war that will
be, those who have witnessed and who still recollect recent matters
of history may easily fancy. We Athenians entered into the war
against Sparta with a powerful army and fleet, an abundant revenue,
and numerous tributary cities in Asia as well as Europe,—among them
this very Byzantium in which we now stand. We have been vanquished
in the way that all of you know. And what then will be the fate of
us soldiers, when we shall have as united enemies, Sparta with all
her old allies and Athens besides,—Tissaphernes and the barbaric
forces on the coast,—and most of all, the Great King whom we marched
up to dethrone and slay, if we were able? Is any man fool enough to
think that we have a chance of making head against so many combined
enemies? Let us not plunge madly into dishonor and ruin, nor incur
the enmity of our own fathers and friends; who are in the cities
which will take arms against us,—and will take arms justly, if we,
who abstained from seizing any barbaric city, even when we were in
force sufficient, shall nevertheless now plunder the first Grecian
city into which we have been admitted. As far as I am concerned, may
I be buried ten thousand fathoms deep in the earth, rather than see
you do such things; and I exhort _you_, too, as Greeks, to obey the
leaders of Greece. Endeavor, while thus obedient, to obtain your just
rights; but if you should fail in this, rather submit to injustice
than cut yourselves off from the Grecian world. Send to inform
Anaxibius that we have entered the city, not with a view to commit
any violence, but in the hope, if possible, of obtaining from him the
advantages which he promised us. If we fail, we shall at least prove
to him that we quit the city, not under his fraudulent manœuvres, but
under our own sense of the duty of obedience.”[261]
[261] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 30-31.
This speech completely arrested the impetuous impulse of the army,
brought them to a true sense of their situation, and induced them to
adopt the proposition of Xenophon. They remained unmoved in their
position on the Thrakion, while three of the captains were sent to
communicate with Anaxibius. While they were thus waiting, a Theban
named Kœratadas approached, who had once commanded in Byzantium under
the Lacedæmonians, during the previous war. He had now become a sort
of professional Condottiero or general, looking out for an army to
command, wherever he could find one, and offering his services to any
city which would engage him. He addressed the assembled Cyreians,
and offered, if they would accept him for their general, to conduct
them against the Delta of Thrace (the space included between the
north-west corner of the Propontis and the south-west corner of the
Euxine), which he asserted to be a rich territory presenting great
opportunity to plunder; he farther promised to furnish them with
ample subsistence during the march. Presently the envoys returned,
bearing the reply of Anaxibius, who received the message favorably,
promising that not only the army should have no cause to regret their
obedience, but that he would both report their good conduct to the
authorities at home, and do everything in his own power to promote
their comfort.[262] He said nothing farther about taking them into
pay; that delusion having now answered its purpose. The soldiers, on
hearing his communication, adopted a resolution to accept Kœratadas
as their future commander, and then marched out of the town. As soon
as they were on the outside, Anaxibius, not content with closing the
gates against them, made public proclamation that if any one of them
were found in the town, he should be sold forthwith into slavery.
[262] Xen. Anab. viii, 1, 32-35.
There are few cases throughout Grecian history in which an able
discourse has been the means of averting so much evil, as was averted
by this speech of Xenophon to the army in Byzantium. Nor did he
ever, throughout the whole period of his command, render to them a
more signal service. The miserable consequences, which would have
ensued, had the army persisted in their aggressive impulse,—first,
to the citizens of the town, ultimately to themselves, while
Anaxibius, the only guilty person, had the means of escaping by
sea, even under the worst circumstances,—are stated by Xenophon
rather under than above the reality. At the same time no orator ever
undertook a more difficult case, or achieved a fuller triumph over
unpromising conditions. If we consider the feelings and position
of the army at the instant of their breaking into the town, we
shall be astonished that any commander could have arrested their
movements. Though fresh from all the glory of their retreat, they
had been first treacherously entrapped over from Asia, next roughly
ejected, by Anaxibius; and although it may be said truly that the
citizens of Byzantium had no concern either in the one or the other,
yet little heed is commonly taken, in military operations, to the
distinction between garrison and citizens in an assailed town.
Having arms in their hands, with consciousness of force arising
out of their exploits in Asia, the Cyreians were at the same time
inflamed by the opportunity both of avenging a gross recent injury,
and enriching themselves in the process of execution; to which we
may add, the excitement of that rush whereby they had obtained the
reëntry, and the farther fact, that without the gates they had
nothing to expect except poor, hard, uninviting service in Thrace.
With soldiers already possessed by an overpowering impulse of this
nature, what chance was there that a retiring general, on the point
of quitting the army, could so work upon their minds as to induce
them to renounce the prey before them? Xenophon had nothing to
invoke except distant considerations, partly of Hellenic reputation,
chiefly of prudence; considerations indeed of unquestionable reality
and prodigious magnitude, yet belonging all to a distant future,
and therefore of little comparative force, except when set forth in
magnified characters by the orator. How powerfully he worked upon
the minds of his hearers, so as to draw forth these far-removed
dangers from the cloud of present sentiment by which they were
overlaid,—how skilfully he employed in illustration the example of
his own native city,—will be seen by all who study his speech. Never
did his Athenian accomplishments,—his talent for giving words to
important thoughts,—his promptitude in seizing a present situation
and managing the sentiments of an impetuous multitude,—appear to
greater advantage than when he was thus suddenly called forth to
meet a terrible emergency. His pre-established reputation and the
habit of obeying his orders, were doubtless essential conditions of
success. But none of his colleagues in command would have been able
to accomplish the like memorable change on the minds of the soldiers,
or to procure obedience for any simple authoritative restraint;
nay, it is probable, that if Xenophon had not been at hand, the
other generals would have followed the passionate movement, even
though they had been reluctant,—from simple inability to repress
it.[263] Again,—whatever might have been the accomplishments of
Xenophon, it is certain that even _he_ would not have been able to
work upon the minds of these excited soldiers, had they not been
Greeks and citizens as well as soldiers,—bred in Hellenic sympathies
and accustomed to Hellenic order, with authority operating in part
through voice and persuasion, and not through the Persian whip and
instruments of torture. The memorable discourse on the Thrakion
at Byzantium illustrates the working of that persuasive agency
which formed one of the permanent forces and conspicuous charms of
Hellenism. It teaches us that if the orator could sometimes accuse
innocent defendants and pervert well-disposed assemblies,—a part
of the case which historians of Greece often present as if it were
the whole,—he could also, and that in the most trying emergencies,
combat the strongest force of present passion, and bring into vivid
presence the half-obscured lineaments of long-sighted reason and duty.
[263] So Tacitus says about the Roman general Spurinna (governor
of Placentia for Otho against Vitellius), and his mutinous army
who marched out to fight the Vitellian generals against his
strenuous remonstrance—“Fit _temeritatis alienæ comes_ Spurinna,
primo coactus, mox _velle simulans_, quo plus auctoritatis
inesset consiliis, si seditio mitesceret” (Tacitus, Hist. ii, 18).
After conducting the army out of the city, Xenophon sent, through
Kleander, a message to Anaxibius, requesting that he himself might
be allowed to come in again singly, in order to take his departure
by sea. His request was granted, though not without much difficulty;
upon which he took leave of the army, under the strongest expressions
of affection and gratitude on their part,[264] and went into
Byzantium along with Kleander; while on the next day Kœratadas came
to assume the command according to agreement, bringing with him a
prophet, and beasts to be offered in sacrifice. There followed in
his train twenty men carrying sacks of barley-meal, twenty more with
jars of wine, three bearing olives, and one man with a bundle of
garlic and onions. All these provisions being laid down, Kœratadas
proceeded to offer sacrifice, as a preliminary to the distribution
of them among the soldiers. On the first day, the sacrifices being
unfavorable, no distribution took place; on the second day, Kœratadas
was standing with the wreath on his head at the altar, and with the
victims beside him, about to renew his sacrifice,—when Timasion and
the other officers interfered, desired him to abstain, and dismissed
him from the command. Perhaps the first unfavorable sacrifices may
have partly impelled them to this proceeding. But the main reason
was, the scanty store, inadequate even to one day’s subsistence for
the army, brought by Kœratadas,—and the obvious insufficiency of his
means.[265]
[264] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 33.
[265] Xen. Anab. vii, 1, 34-40.
On the departure of Kœratadas, the army marched to take up its
quarters in some Thracian villages not far from Byzantium, under
its former officers; who however could not agree as to their future
order of march. Kleanor and Phryniskus, who had received presents
from Seuthes, urged the expediency of accepting the service of
that Thracian prince; Neon insisted on going to the Chersonese
under the Lacedæmonian officers in that peninsula (as Anaxibius had
projected); in the idea that he, as a Lacedæmonian, would there
obtain the command of the whole army; while Timasion, with the view
of re-establishing himself in his native city of Dardanus, proposed
returning to the Asiatic side of the strait.
Though this last plan met with decided favor among the army, it
could not be executed without vessels. These Timasion had little
or no means of procuring; so that considerable delay took place,
during which the soldiers, receiving no pay, fell into much distress.
Many of them were even compelled to sell their arms in order to get
subsistence; while others got permission to settle in some of the
neighboring towns, on condition of being disarmed. The whole army was
thus gradually melting away, much to the satisfaction of Anaxibius,
who was anxious to see the purposes of Pharnabazus accomplished.
By degrees, it would probably have been dissolved altogether, had
not a change of interest on the part of Anaxibius induced him to
promote its reorganization. He sailed from Byzantium to the Asiatic
coast, to acquaint Pharnabazus that the Cyreians could no longer
cause uneasiness, and to require his own promised reward. It seems
moreover that Xenophon himself departed from Byzantium by the same
opportunity. When they reached Kyzikus, they met the Lacedæmonian
Aristarchus; who was coming out as newly-appointed harmost of
Byzantium, to supersede Kleander, and who acquainted Anaxibius that
Polus was on the point of arriving to supersede him as admiral.
Anxious to meet Pharnabazus and make sure of his bribe, Anaxibius
impressed his parting injunction upon Aristarchus to sell for slaves
all the Cyreians whom he might find at Byzantium on his arrival, and
then pursued his voyage along the southern coast of the Propontis
to Parium. But Pharnabazus, having already received intimation of
the change of admirals, knew that the friendship of Anaxibius was no
longer of any value, and took no farther heed of him; while he at the
same time sent to Byzantium to make the like compact with Aristarchus
against the Cyreian army.[266]
[266] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 7. Φαρνάβαζος δὲ, ἐπεὶ ᾔσθετο
Ἀρίσταρχόν τε ἥκοντα εἰς Βυζάντιον ἁρμοστὴν καὶ Ἀναξίβιον
οὐκέτι ναυαρχοῦντα, Ἀναξιβίου μὲν ἠμέλησε, πρὸς Ἀρίσταρχον δὲ
διεπράττετο τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τοῦ Κυρείου στρατεύματος ἅπερ καὶ πρὸς
Ἀναξίβιον.
Anaxibius was stung to the quick at this combination of
disappointment and insult on the part of the satrap. To avenge it, he
resolved to employ those very soldiers whom he had first corrupted
and fraudulently brought across to Europe, next cast out from
Byzantium, and lastly, ordered to be sold into slavery, so far as any
might yet be found in that town; bringing them back into Asia for
the purpose of acting against Pharnabazus. Accordingly he addressed
himself to Xenophon, and ordered him without a moment’s delay to
rejoin the army, for the purpose of keeping it together, of recalling
the soldiers who had departed, and transporting the whole body across
into Asia. He provided him with an armed vessel of thirty oars to
cross over from Parium to Perinthus, sending over a peremptory
order to the Perinthians to furnish him with horses in order that
he might reach the army with the greatest speed.[267] Perhaps it
would not have been safe for Xenophon to disobey this order, under
any circumstances. But the idea of acting with the army in Asia
against Pharnabazus, under Lacedæmonian sanction, was probably very
acceptable to him. He hastened across to the army, who welcomed his
return with joy, and gladly embraced the proposal of crossing to
Asia, which was a great improvement upon their forlorn and destitute
condition. He accordingly conducted them to Perinthus, and encamped
under the walls of the town; refusing, in his way through Selymbria,
a second proposition from Seuthes to engage the services of the army.
[267] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 8-25.
Ἐκ τούτου δὴ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος, καλέσας Ξενοφῶντα, ~κελεύει πάσῃ τέχνῃ
καὶ μηχανῇ πλεῦσαι ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα ὡς τάχιστα~, καὶ συνέχειν τε
τὸ στράτευμα καὶ συναθροίζειν τῶν διεσπαρμένων ὡς ἂν πλείστους
δύνηται, καὶ παραγαγόντα εἰς τὴν Πέρινθον διαβιβάζειν εἰς τὴν
Ἀσίαν ~ὅτι τάχιστα~· καὶ δίδωσιν αὐτῷ τριακόντορον, καὶ ἐπιστολὴν
καὶ ἄνδρα συμπέμπει κελεύσοντα τοὺς Περινθίους ~ὡς τάχιστα~
Ξενοφῶντα προπέμψαι τοῖς ἵπποις ἐπὶ τὸ στράτευμα.
The vehement interest which Anaxibius took in this new project is
marked by the strength of Xenophon’s language; extreme celerity
is enjoined three several times.
While Xenophon was exerting himself to procure transports for the
passage of the army at Perinthus, Aristarchus the new harmost arrived
there with two triremes from Byzantium. It seems that not only
Byzantium, but also both Perinthus and Selymbria, were comprised in
his government as harmost. On first reaching Byzantium to supersede
Kleander, he found there no less than four hundred of the Cyreians,
chiefly sick and wounded; whom Kleander, in spite of the ill-will
of Anaxibius, had not only refused to sell into slavery, but had
billeted upon the citizens, and tended with solicitude; so much did
his good feeling towards Xenophon and towards the army now come
into play. We read with indignation that Aristarchus, immediately
on reaching Byzantium to supersede him, was not even contented
with sending these four hundred men out of the town; but seized
them,—Greeks, citizens, and soldiers as they were,—and sold them
all into slavery.[268] Apprised of the movements of Xenophon
with the army, he now came to Perinthus to prevent their transit
into Asia; laying an embargo on the transports in the harbor, and
presenting himself personally before the assembled army to prohibit
the soldiers from crossing. When Xenophon informed him that Anaxibius
had given them orders to cross, and had sent him expressly to conduct
them,—Aristarchus replied, “Anaxibius is no longer in functions
as admiral, and I am harmost in this town. If I catch any of you
at sea, I will sink you.” On the next day, he sent to invite the
generals and the captains (lochages) to a conference within the
walls. They were just about to enter the gates, when Xenophon, who
was among them, received a private warning, that if he went in,
Aristarchus would seize him, and either put him to death or send
him prisoner to Pharnabazus. Accordingly Xenophon sent forward the
others, and remained himself with the army, alleging the obligation
of sacrificing. The behavior of Aristarchus,—who, when he saw the
others without Xenophon, sent them away, and desired that they
would all come again in the afternoon,—confirmed the justice of
his suspicions, as to the imminent danger from which he had been
preserved by this accidental warning.[269] It need hardly be added
that Xenophon disregarded the second invitation no less than the
first; moreover a third invitation, which Aristarchus afterwards
sent, was disregarded by all.
[268] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 6. Καὶ ὁ Ἀναξίβιος τῷ μὲν Ἀριστάρχῳ
ἐπιστέλλει ὁπόσους ἂν εὕροι ἐν Βυζαντίῳ τῶν Κύρου στρατιωτῶν
ὑπολελειμμένους, ἀποδόσθαι· ὁ δὲ Κλέανδρος οὐδένα ἐπεπράκει,
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς κάμνοντας ἐθεράπευεν οἰκτείρων, καὶ ἀναγκάζων
οἰκίᾳ δέχεσθαι. Ἀρίσταρχος δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἦλθε τάχιστα, οὐκ ἐλάττους
τετρακοσίων ἀπέδοτο.
[269] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 14-16.
Ἥδη δὲ ὄντων πρὸς τῷ τείχει, ἐξαγγέλλει τις τῷ Ξενοφῶντι ὅτι, εἰ
εἴσεισι, συλληφθήσεται· καὶ ἢ αὐτοῦ τι πείσεται, ἢ καὶ Φαρναβάζῳ,
παραδοθήσεται. Ὁ δὲ, ἀκούσας ταῦτα, τοὺς μὲν προπέμπεται, αὐτὸς
δ᾽ εἶπεν, ὅτι θῦσαί τι βούλοιτο.... Οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ
λοχαγοὶ ἥκοντες παρὰ τοῦ Ἀριστάρχου, ἀπήγγελλον ὅτι νῦν μὲν
ἀπιέναι σφᾶς κελεύει, τῆς δείλης δὲ ἥκειν· ἔνθα καὶ δήλη μᾶλλον
ἐδόκει [εἶναι] ἡ ἐπιβουλή. Compare vii, 3, 2.
We have here a Lacedæmonian harmost, not scrupling to lay a snare of
treachery as flagrant as that which Tissaphernes had practised on
the banks of the Zab to entrap Klearchus and his colleagues,—and
that too against a Greek, and an officer of the highest station
and merit, who had just saved Byzantium from pillage, and was now
actually in execution of orders received from the Lacedæmonian
admiral Anaxibius. Had the accidental warning been withheld, Xenophon
would assuredly have fallen into this snare, nor could we reasonably
have charged him with imprudence,—so fully was he entitled to count
upon straightforward conduct under the circumstances. But the same
cannot be said of Klearchus, who undoubtedly manifested lamentable
credulity, nefarious as was the fraud to which he fell a victim.
At the second interview with the other officers, Aristarchus, while
he forbade the army to cross the water, directed them to force their
way by land through the Thracians who occupied the Holy mountain, and
thus to arrive at the Chersonese; where (he said) they should receive
pay. Neon the Lacedæmonian, with about eight hundred hoplites who
adhered to his separate command, advocated this plan as the best. To
be set against it, however, there was the proposition of Seuthes to
take the army into pay; which Xenophon was inclined to prefer, uneasy
at the thoughts of being cooped up in the narrow peninsula of the
Chersonese, under the absolute command of the Lacedæmonian harmost,
with great uncertainty both as to pay and as to provisions.[270]
Moreover it was imperiously necessary for these disappointed troops
to make some immediate movement; for they had been brought to the
gates of Perinthus in hopes of passing immediately on shipboard; it
was mid-winter,—they were encamped in the open field, under the
severe cold of Thrace,—they had neither assured supplies, nor even
money to purchase, if a market had been near.[271] Xenophon, who
had brought them to the neighborhood of Perinthus, was now again
responsible for extricating them from this untenable situation,
and began to offer sacrifices, according to his wont, to ascertain
whether the gods would encourage him to recommend a covenant with
Seuthes. The sacrifices were so favorable, that he himself, together
with a confidential officer from each of the generals, went by
night and paid a visit to Seuthes, for the purpose of understanding
distinctly his offers and purposes.
[270] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 15; vii, 3, 3; vii, 6, 13.
[271] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 24. μέσος δὲ χείμων ἦν, etc. Probably
the month of December.
Mæsadês, the father of Seuthes, had been apparently a dependent
prince under the great monarchy of the Odrysian Thracians; so
formidable in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. But intestine
commotions had robbed him of his principality over three Thracian
tribes; which it was now the ambition of Seuthes to recover, by
the aid of the Cyreian army. He offered to each soldier one stater
of Kyzikus (about twenty Attic drachmæ, or nearly the same as that
which they originally received from Cyrus) as pay per month; twice as
much to each lochage or captain,—four times as much to each of the
generals. In case they should incur the enmity of the Lacedæmonians
by joining him, he guaranteed to them all the right of settlement and
fraternal protection in his territory. To each of the generals, over
and above pay, he engaged to assign a fort on the sea-coast, with a
lot of land around it, and oxen for cultivation. And to Xenophon in
particular, he offered the possession of Bisanthê, his best point on
the coast. “I will also (he added, addressing Xenophon) give you my
daughter in marriage; and if you have any daughter, I will buy her
from you in marriage according to the custom of Thrace.”[272] Seuthes
farther engaged never on any occasion to lead them more than seven
days’ journey from the sea, at farthest.
[272] Xen. Anab. vii, 2, 17-38.
These offers were as liberal as the army could possibly expect;
and Xenophon himself, mistrusting the Lacedæmonians, as well as
mistrusted by them, seems to have looked forward to the acquisition
of a Thracian coast-fortress and territory (such as Miltiades,
Alkibiades, and other Athenian leaders had obtained before him) as
a valuable refuge in case of need.[273] But even if the promise had
been less favorable, the Cyreians had no alternative; for they had
not even present supplies,—still less any means of subsistence
throughout the winter; while departure by sea was rendered impossible
by the Lacedæmonians. On the next day, Seuthes was introduced by
Xenophon and the other generals to the army, who accepted his offers
and concluded the bargain.
[273] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 34.
They remained for two months in his service, engaged in warfare
against various Thracian tribes, whom they enabled him to conquer
and despoil; so that at the end of that period, he was in possession
of an extensive dominion, a large native force, and a considerable
tribute. Though the sufferings of the army from cold were extreme,
during these two months of full winter and amidst the snowy
mountains of Thrace, they were nevertheless enabled by their
expeditions along with Seuthes to procure plentiful subsistence;
which they could hardly have done in any other manner. But the pay
which he had offered was never liquidated; at least, in requital
of their two months of service, they received pay only for twenty
days and a little more. And Xenophon himself, far from obtaining
fulfilment of those splendid promises which Seuthes had made to
him personally, seems not even to have received his pay as one
of the generals. For him, the result was singularly unhappy;
since he forfeited the good-will of Seuthes by importunate demand
and complaint for the purpose of obtaining the pay due to the
soldiers; while they on their side, imputing to his connivance the
non-fulfilment of the promise, became thus in part alienated from
him. Much of this mischief was brought about by the treacherous
intrigues and calumny of a corrupt Greek from Maroneia, named
Herakleides; who acted as minister and treasurer to Seuthes.
Want of space compels me to omit the narrative given by Xenophon,
both of the relations of the army with Seuthes, and of the warfare
carried on against the hostile Thracian tribes,—interesting as it
is from the juxtaposition of Greek and Thracian manners. It seems
to have been composed by Xenophon under feelings of acute personal
disappointment, and probably in refutation of calumnies against
himself as if he had wronged the army. Hence we may trace in it a
tone of exaggerated querulousness, and complaint that the soldiers
were ungrateful to him. It is true that a portion of the army, under
the belief that he had been richly rewarded by Seuthes while they had
not obtained their stipulated pay, expressed virulent sentiments and
falsehoods against him.[274] Until such suspicions were refuted, it
is no wonder that the army were alienated; but they were perfectly
willing to hear both sides,—and Xenophon triumphantly disproved the
accusation. That in the end, their feelings towards him were those
of esteem and favor, stands confessed in his own words,[275] proving
that the ingratitude of which he complains was the feeling of some
indeed, but not of all.
[274] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 9, 10.
[275] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 55-57.
It is hard to say, however, what would have been the fate of this
gallant army, when Seuthes, having obtained from their arms in two
months all that he desired, had become only anxious to send them off
without pay,—had they not been extricated by a change of interest
and policy on the part of all-powerful Sparta. The Lacedæmonians had
just declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus,—sending
Thimbron into Asia to commence military operations. They then became
extremely anxious to transport the Cyreians across to Asia, which
their harmost, Aristarchus had hitherto prohibited,—and to take them
into permanent pay; for which purpose two Lacedæmonians, Charmînus
and Polynîkus were commissioned by Thimbron to offer to the army the
same pay as had been promised, though not paid, by Seuthes; and as
had been originally paid by Cyrus. Seuthes and Herakleides, eager
to hasten the departure of the soldiers, endeavored to take credit
with the Lacedæmonians for assisting their views.[276] Joyfully did
the army accept this offer, though complaining loudly of the fraud
practised upon them by Seuthes; which Charmînus, at the instance
of Xenophon, vainly pressed the Thracian prince to redress.[277]
He even sent Xenophon to demand the arrear of pay in the name of
the Lacedæmonians, which afforded to the Athenian an opportunity
of administering a severe lecture to Seuthes.[278] But the latter
was found less accessible to the workings of eloquence than the
Cyreian assembled soldiers; nor did Xenophon obtain anything beyond a
miserable dividend upon the sum due;—together with civil expressions
towards himself personally,—an invitation to remain in his service
with one thousand hoplites instead of going to Asia with the
army,—and renewed promises, not likely now to find much credit, of a
fort and grant of lands.
[276] Xen. Anab. vii, 6, 1-7.
[277] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 15.
[278] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 21-47.
The lecture is of unsuitable prolixity, when we consider the
person to whom, and the circumstances under which, it purports to
have been spoken.
When the army, now reduced by losses and dispersions to six thousand
men,[279] was prepared to cross into Asia, Xenophon was desirous of
going back to Athens, but was persuaded to remain with them until the
junction with Thimbron. He was at this time so poor, having scarcely
enough to pay for his journey home, that he was obliged to sell his
horse at Lampsakus, the Asiatic town where the army landed. Here
he found Eukleides, a Phliasian prophet with whom he had been wont
to hold intercourse and offer sacrifice at Athens. This man, having
asked Xenophon how much he had acquired in the expedition, could not
believe him when he affirmed his poverty. But when they proceeded to
offer sacrifice together, from some animals sent by the Lampsakenes
as a present to Xenophon, Eukleides had no sooner inspected the
entrails of the victims, than he told Xenophon that he fully credited
the statement. “I see (he said) that even if money shall be ever on
its way to come to you, you yourself will be a hindrance to it, even
if there be no other (here Xenophon acquiesced); Zeus Meilichios (the
Gracious)[280] is the real bar. Have you ever sacrificed to him, with
entire burnt-offerings, as we used to do together at Athens?” “Never
(replied Xenophon), throughout the whole march.” “Do so now, then
(said Eukleides), and it will be for your advantage.” The next day,
on reaching Ophrynium, Xenophon obeyed the injunction; sacrificing
little pigs entire to Zeus Meilichios, as was the custom at Athens
during the public festival called Diasia. And on the very same day he
felt the beneficial effects of the proceeding; for Biton and another
envoy came from the Lacedæmonians with an advance of pay to the army,
and with dispositions so favorable to himself, that they bought back
for him his horse, which he had just sold at Lampsakus for fifty
darics. This was equivalent to giving him more than one year’s pay
in hand (the pay which he would have received as general being four
darics per month, or four times that of the soldier), at a time when
he was known to be on the point of departure, and therefore would not
stay to earn it. The short-comings of Seuthes were now made up with
immense interest, so that Xenophon became better off than any man in
the army; though he himself slurs over the magnitude of the present,
by representing it as a delicate compliment to restore to him a
favorite horse.
[279] Xen. Anab. vii, 7, 23.
[280] It appears that the epithet _Meilichios_ (the Gracious)
is here applied to Zeus in the same euphemistic sense as the
denomination _Eumenides_ to the avenging goddesses. Zeus
is conceived as having actually inflicted, or being in a
disposition to inflict, evil; the sacrifice to him under this
surname represents a sentiment of fear, and is one of atonement,
expiation or purification, destined to avert his displeasure; but
the surname itself is to be interpreted _proleptice_, to use the
word of the critics—it designates, not the actual disposition of
Zeus (or of other gods), but that disposition which the sacrifice
is intended to bring about in him.
See Pausan. i, 37, 3; ii, 20, 3. K. F. Herrmann, Gottesdienstl.
Alterthümer der Griechen, s. 58; Van Stegeren, De Græcorum Diebus
Festis, p. 5 (Utrecht, 1849).
Thus gratefully and instantaneously did Zeus the Gracious respond
to the sacrifice which Xenophon, after a long omission, had been
admonished by Eukleides to offer. And doubtless Xenophon was more
than ever confirmed in the belief, which manifests itself throughout
all his writings, that sacrifice not only indicates, by the interior
aspect of the immolated victims, the tenor of coming events,—but
also, according as it is rendered to the right god and at the right
season, determines his will, and therefore the course of events, for
dispensations favorable or unfavorable.
But the favors of Zeus the Gracious, though begun, were not yet
ended. Xenophon conducted the army through the Troad, and across
mount Ida, to Antandrus; from thence along the coast to Lydia,
through the plain of Thêbê and the town of Adramyttium, leaving
Atarneus on the right hand, to Pergamus in Mysia, a hill-town
overhanging the river and plain of Käikus. This district was occupied
by the descendants of the Eretrian Gongylus, who, having been
banished for embracing the cause of the Persians when Xerxes invaded
Greece, had been rewarded (like the Spartan king Demaratus) with
this sort of principality under the Persian empire. His descendant,
another Gongylus, now occupied Pergamus, with his wife Hellas and
his sons Gorgion and Gongylus. Xenophon was here received with great
hospitality. Hellas acquainted him that a powerful Persian, named
Asidates, was now dwelling, with his wife, family, and property, in a
tower not far off, on the plain; and that a sudden night-march, with
three hundred men, would suffice for the capture of this valuable
booty, to which her own cousin should guide him. Accordingly, having
sacrificed and ascertained that the victims were favorable, Xenophon
communicated his plan after the evening meal to those captains who
had been most attached to him throughout the expedition, wishing to
make them partners in the profit. As soon as it became known, many
volunteers, to the number of six hundred, pressed to be allowed
to join. But the captains repelled them, declining to take more
than three hundred, in order that the booty might afford an ampler
dividend to each partner.
Beginning their march in the evening, Xenophon and his detachment of
three hundred reached about midnight the tower of Asidates; it was
large, lofty, thickly built, and contained a considerable garrison.
It served for protection to his cattle and cultivating slaves around,
like a baronial castle in the middle ages; but the assailants
neglected this outlying plunder, in order to be more sure of taking
the castle itself. Its walls however were found much stronger than
was expected; and although a breach was made by force about daybreak,
yet so vigorous was the defence of the garrison, that no entrance
could be effected. Signals and shouts of every kind were made by
Asidates to procure aid from the Persian forces in the neighborhood;
numbers of whom soon began to arrive, so that Xenophon and his
company were obliged to retreat. And their retreat was at last only
accomplished, after severe suffering and wounds to nearly half of
them, through the aid of Gongylus with his forces from Pergamus, and
of Proklês (the descendant of Demaratus) from Halisarna, a little
farther off seaward.[281]
[281] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 10-19.
Though his first enterprise thus miscarried, Xenophon soon laid plans
for a second, employing the whole army; and succeeded in bringing
Asidates prisoner to Pergamus, with his wife, children, horses, and
all his personal property. Thus (says he, anxious above all things
for the credit of sacrificial prophecy) the “previous sacrifices
(those which had promised favorably before the first unsuccessful
attempt) now came true.”[282] The persons of this family were
doubtless redeemed by their Persian friends for a large ransom;[283]
which, together with the booty brought in, made up a prodigious total
to be divided.
[282] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 22. Ἐνταῦθα οἱ περὶ Ξενοφῶντα
συμπεριτυγχάνουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ λαμβάνουσιν αὐτὸν (Ἀσιδάτην) καὶ
γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας καὶ τοὺς ἵππους καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα· ~καὶ οὕτω
τὰ πρότερα ἱερὰ ἀπέβη~.
[283] Compare Plutarch, Kimon, c. 9; and Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 21.
In making the division, a general tribute of sympathy and admiration
was paid to Xenophon, to which all the army,—generals, captains, and
soldiers,—and the Lacedæmonians besides,—unanimously concurred.
Like Agamemnon at Troy, he was allowed to select for himself the
picked lots of horses, mules, oxen, and other items of booty;
insomuch that he became possessor of a share valuable enough to
enrich him at once, in addition to the fifty darics which he had
before received. “Here then Xenophon (to use his own language[284])
had no reason to complain of the god” (Zeus Meilichios). We may
add,—what he ought to have added, considering the accusations which
he had before put forth,—that neither had he any reason to complain
of the ingratitude of the army.
[284] Xen. Anab. vii, 8, 23.
Ἐνταῦθα τὸν θεὸν οὐκ ᾐτιάσατο ὁ Ξενοφῶν· συνέπραττον γὰρ καὶ οἱ
Λάκωνες καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται,
ὥστε ἐξαίρετα λαβεῖν καὶ ἵππους καὶ ζεύγη καὶ ἄλλα, ὥστε ἱκανὸν
εἶναι καὶ ἄλλον ἤδη εὖ ποιεῖν.
As soon as Thimbron arrived with his own forces, and the Cyreians
became a part of his army, Xenophon took his leave of them. Having
deposited in the temple at Ephesus that portion which had been
confided to him as general, of the tithe set apart by the army at
Kerasus for the Ephesian Artemis,[285] he seems to have executed his
intention of returning to Athens.[286] He must have arrived there,
after an absence of about two years and a half, within a few weeks,
at farthest, after the death of his friend and preceptor Sokrates,
whose trial and condemnation have been recorded in my last volume.
That melancholy event certainly occurred during his absence from
Athens;[287] but whether it had come to his knowledge before he
reached the city, we do not know. How much grief and indignation
it excited in his mind, we may see by his collection of memoranda
respecting the life and conversations of Sokrates, known by the name
of Memorabilia, and probably put together shortly after his arrival.
[285] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 6. It seems plain that this deposit must
have been first made on the present occasion.
[286] Compare Anabasis, vii, 7, 57; vii, 8, 2.
[287] Xenoph. Memorab. iv, 8, 4—as well as the opening sentence
of the work.
That he was again in Asia, three years afterwards, on military
service under the Lacedæmonian king Agesilaus, is a fact attested by
himself; but at what precise moment he quitted Athens for his second
visit to Asia, we are left to conjecture. I incline to believe that
he did not remain many months at home, but that he went out again
in the next spring to rejoin the Cyreians in Asia,—became again
their commander,—and served for two years under the Spartan general
Derkyllidas before the arrival of Agesilaus. Such military service
would doubtless be very much to his taste; while a residence at
Athens, then subject and quiescent, would probably be distasteful to
him; both from the habits of command which he had contracted during
the previous two years, and from feelings arising out of the death of
Sokrates. After a certain interval of repose, he would be disposed to
enter again upon the war against his old enemy Tissaphernes; and his
service went on when Agesilaus arrived to take the command.[288]
[288] See Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 2, 7—a passage which Morus
refers, I think with much probability, to Xenophon himself.
The very circumstantial details, which Xenophon gives (iii, 1,
11-28) about the proceedings of Derkyllidas against Meidias in
the Troad, seem also to indicate that he was serving there in
person.
But during the two years after this latter event, Athens became a
party to the war against Sparta, and entered into conjunction with
the king of Persia as well as with the Thebans and others; while
Xenophon, continuing his service as commander of the Cyreians, and
accompanying Agesilaus from Asia back into Greece, became engaged
against the Athenian troops and their Bœotian allies at the bloody
battle of Korôneia. Under these circumstances, we cannot wonder that
the Athenians passed sentence of banishment against him; not because
he had originally taken part in aid of Cyrus against Artaxerxes,—nor
because his political sentiments were unfriendly to democracy, as has
been sometimes erroneously affirmed,—but because he was now openly
in arms, and in conspicuous command, against his own country.[289]
Having thus become an exile, Xenophon was allowed by the
Lacedæmonians to settle at Skillus, one of the villages of Triphylia,
near Olympia in Peloponnesus, which they had recently emancipated
from the Eleians. At one of the ensuing Olympic festivals, Megabyzus,
the superintendent of the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, came over as
a spectator; bringing with him the money which Xenophon had dedicated
therein to the Ephesian Artemis. This money Xenophon invested in the
purchase of lands at Skillus, to be consecrated in permanence to the
goddess; having previously consulted her by sacrifice to ascertain
her approval of the site contemplated, which site was recommended
to him by its resemblance in certain points to that of the Ephesian
temple. Thus, there was near each of them a river called by the
same name Selinus, having in it fish and a shelly bottom. Xenophon
constructed a chapel, an altar, and a statue of the goddess made of
cypress-wood: all exact copies, on a reduced scale, of the temple and
golden statue at Ephesus. A column near them was inscribed with the
following words,—“This spot is sacred to Artemis. Whoever possesses
the property and gathers its fruits, must sacrifice to her the tithe
every year, and keep the chapel in repair out of the remainder.
Should any one omit this duty the goddess herself will take the
omission in hand.”[290]
[289] That the sentence of banishment on Xenophon was not passed
by the Athenians until after the battle of Korôneia, appears
plainly from Anabasis, v. 3, 7. This battle took place in August
394 B.C.
Pausanias also will be found in harmony with this statement, as
to the time of the banishment. Ἐδιώχθη δὲ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων,
ὡς ἐπὶ βασιλέα τῶν Περσῶν, ~σφίσιν εὔνουν ὄντα~, στρατείας
μετασχὼν Κύρῳ πολεμιωτάτῳ τοῦ δήμου (iv, 6, 4). Now it was not
until 396 or 395 B.C., that the Persian king began to manifest
the least symptoms of good-will towards Athens; and not until the
battle of Knidus (a little before the battle of Korôneia in the
same year), that he testified his good-will by conspicuous and
effective service. If, therefore, the motive of the Athenians
to banish Xenophon arose out of the good feeling on the part of
the king of Persia toward them, the banishment could not have
taken place before 395 B.C., and is not likely to have taken
place until after 394 B.C.; which is the intimation of Xenophon
himself as above.
Lastly, Diogenes Laërtius (ii, 52) states, what I believe to
be the main truth, that the sentence of banishment was passed
against Xenophon by the Athenians on the ground of his attachment
to the Lacedæmonians—ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ.
Krüger and others seem to think that Xenophon was banished
because he took service under Cyrus, who had been the bitter
enemy of Athens. It is true that Sokrates, when first consulted,
was apprehensive beforehand that this might bring upon him the
displeasure of Athens (Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 5). But it is to be
remembered that _at this time_, the king of Persia was just as
much the enemy of Athens as Cyrus was; and that Cyrus in fact
had made war upon her with the forces and treasures of the king.
Artaxerxes and Cyrus being thus, at that time, both enemies of
Athens, it was of little consequence to the Athenians whether
Cyrus succeeded or failed in his enterprise. But when Artaxerxes,
six years afterwards, became their friend, their feelings towards
his enemies were altered.
The passage of Pausanias as above cited, if understood as
asserting the main cause of Xenophon’s banishment, is in my
judgment inaccurate. Xenophon was banished _for Laconism_, or
attachment to Sparta against his country; the fact of his having
served under Cyrus against Artaxerxes counted at best only as a
secondary motive.
[290] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 13. Καὶ στήλη ἔστηκε παρὰ τὸν ναὸν,
γράμματα ἔχουσα—Ἱερὸς ὁ Χῶρος τῆς Αρτέμιδος· τὸν δὲ ἔχοντα καὶ
καρπούμενον τὴν μὲν δεκάτην καταθύειν ἑκάστου ἔτους, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
περίττου τόν ναὸν ἐπισκευάζειν· ἐὰν δέ τις μὴ ποιῇ ταῦτα, τῇ θεῷ
μελήσει.
Immediately near the chapel was an orchard of every description of
fruit-trees, while the estate around comprised an extensive range
of meadow, woodland, and mountain,—with the still loftier mountain
called Pholoê adjoining. There was thus abundant pasture for horses,
oxen, sheep, etc., and excellent hunting-ground near for deer and
other game; advantages not to be found near the Artemision at
Ephesus. Residing hard by on his own property, allotted to him by
the Lacedæmonians, Xenophon superintended this estate as steward
for the goddess; looking perhaps to the sanctity of her name for
protection from disturbance by the Eleians, who viewed with a jealous
eye the Lacedæmonian[291] settlers at Skillus, and protested against
the peace and convention promoted by Athens after the battle of
Leuktra, because it recognized that place, along with the townships
of Triphylia, as autonomous. Every year he made a splendid sacrifice,
from the tithe of all the fruits of the property; to which solemnity
not only all the Skilluntines, but also all the neighboring villages,
were invited. Booths were erected for the visitors, to whom the
goddess furnished (this is the language of Xenophon) an ample dinner
of barley-meal, wheaten loaves, meat, game, and sweetmeats;[292] the
game being provided by a general hunt, which the sons of Xenophon
conducted, and in which all the neighbors took part if they chose.
The produce of the estate, saving this tithe and subject to the
obligation of keeping the holy building in repair, was enjoyed
by Xenophon himself. He had a keen relish for both hunting and
horsemanship, and was among the first authors, so far as we know, who
ever made these pursuits, with the management of horses and dogs, the
subject of rational study and description.
[291] Xen. Hellen. vi, 5, 2.
[292] Xen. Anab. v, 3, 9. Παρεῖχε δ᾽ ἡ θεὸς τοῖς σκηνοῦσιν ἄλφιτα
ἄρτους, οἶνον, τραγήματα, etc.
Such was the use to which Xenophon applied the tithe voted by
the army at Kerasus to the Ephesian Artemis; the other tithe,
voted at the same time to Apollo, he dedicated at Delphi in the
treasure-chamber of the Athenians, inscribing upon the offering his
own name and that of Proxenus. His residence being only at a distance
of twenty stadia from the great temple of Olympia, he was enabled to
enjoy society with every variety of Greeks,—and to obtain copious
information about Grecian politics, chiefly from philo-Laconian
informants, and with the Lacedæmonian point of view predominant in
his own mind; while he had also leisure for the composition of his
various works. The interesting description which he himself gives of
his residence at Skillus, implies a state of things not present and
continuing,[293] but past and gone; other testimonies too, though
confused and contradictory, seem to show that the Lacedæmonian
settlement at Skillus lasted no longer than the power of Lacedæmon
was adequate to maintain it. During the misfortunes which befel
that city after the battle of Leuktra (371 B.C.), Xenophon, with
his family and his fellow-settlers, was expelled by the Eleians,
and is then said to have found shelter at Corinth. But as Athens
soon came to be not only at peace, but in intimate alliance, with
Sparta,—the sentence of banishment against Xenophon was revoked; so
that the latter part of his life was again passed in the enjoyment
of his birthright as an Athenian citizen and Knight.[294] Two of
his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, fought among the Athenian horsemen
at the cavalry combat which preceded the battle of Mantineia, where
the former was slain, after manifesting distinguished bravery; while
his grandson Xenophon became in the next generation the subject of
a pleading before the Athenian Dikastery, composed by the orator
Deinarchus.[295]
[293] Xen. Anab. v. 3, 9.
[294] Diogen. Laërt. ii, 53, 54, 59. Pausanias (v, 6, 4) attests
the reconquest of Skillus by the Eleians, but adds (on the
authority of the Eleian ἐξηγηταὶ or show guides) that they
permitted Xenophon, after a judicial examination before the
Olympic Senate, to go on living there in peace. The latter point
I apprehend to be incorrect.
The latter works of Xenophon (De Vectigalibus, De Officio
Magistri Equitum, etc.), seem plainly to imply that he had been
restored to citizenship, and had come again to take cognizance of
politics at Athens.
[295] Diogen. Laërt. ut sup. Dionys. Halic. De Dinarcho, p. 664,
ed. Reiska. Dionysius mentions this oration under the title of
Ἀποστασίου ἀπολογία Αἰσχύλου πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα. And Diogenes also
alludes to it—ὥς φησι Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ξενοφῶντα ἀποστασίου.
Schneider in his Epimetrum (ad calcem Anabaseos, p. 573),
respecting the exile of Xenophon, argues as if the person against
whom the oration of Deinarchus was directed, was Xenophon
himself, the Cyreian commander and author. But this, I think, is
chronologically all but impossible; for Deinarchus was not born
till 361 B.C., and composed his first oration in 336 B.C.
Yet Deinarchus, in his speech against Xenophon, undoubtedly
mentioned several facts respecting the Cyreian Xenophon, which
implies that the latter was a relative of the person against
whom the oration was directed. I venture to set him down as
grandson, on that evidence, combined with the identity of name
and the suitableness in point of time. He might well be the son
of Gryllus, who was slain fighting at the battle of Mantineia in
362 B.C.
Nothing is more likely than that an orator, composing an oration
against Xenophon the grandson, should touch upon the acts and
character of Xenophon the grandfather; see for analogy, the
oration of Isokrates, de Bigis; among others.
On bringing this accomplished and eminent leader to the close of
that arduous retreat which he had conducted with so much honor, I
have thought it necessary to anticipate a little on the future,
in order to take a glance at his subsequent destiny. To his exile
(in this point of view not less useful than that of Thucydides) we
probably owe many of those compositions from which so much of our
knowledge of Grecian affairs is derived. But to the contemporary
world, the retreat, which Xenophon so successfully conducted,
afforded a far more impressive lesson than any of his literary
compositions. It taught in the most striking manner the impotence
of the Persian land-force, manifested not less in the generals than
in the soldiers. It proved that the Persian leaders were unfit
for any systematic operations, even under the greatest possible
advantages, against a small number of disciplined warriors resolutely
bent on resistance; that they were too stupid and reckless even
to obstruct the passage of rivers, or destroy roads, or cut off
supplies. It more than confirmed the contemptuous language applied
to them by Cyrus himself, before the battle of Kunaxa; when he
proclaimed that he envied the Greeks their freedom, and that he was
ashamed of the worthlessness of his own countrymen.[296] Against
such perfect weakness and disorganization, nothing prevented the
success of the Greeks along with Cyrus, except his own paroxysm
of fraternal antipathy.[297] And we shall perceive hereafter the
military and political leaders of Greece,—Agesilaus, Jason of
Pheræ,[298] and others down to Philip and Alexander[299]—firmly
persuaded that with a tolerably numerous and well-appointed Grecian
force, combined with exemption from Grecian enemies, they could
succeed in overthrowing or dismembering the Persian empire. This
conviction, so important in the subsequent history of Greece, takes
its date from the retreat of the Ten Thousand. We shall indeed find
Persia exercising an important influence, for two generations to
come,—and at the peace of Antalkidas an influence stronger than
ever,—over the destinies of Greece. But this will be seen to arise
from the treason of Sparta, the chief of the Hellenic world, who
abandons the Asiatic Greeks, and even arms herself with the name and
the force of Persia, for purposes of aggrandizement and dominion
to herself. Persia is strong by being enabled to employ Hellenic
strength against the Hellenic cause; by lending money or a fleet
to one side of the Grecian intestine parties, and thus becoming
artificially strengthened against both. But the Xenophontic Anabasis
betrays her real weakness against any vigorous attack; while it at
the same time exemplifies the discipline, the endurance, the power
of self-action and adaptation, the susceptibility of influence from
speech and discussion, the combination of the reflecting obedience of
citizens with the mechanical regularity of soldiers,—which confer
such immortal distinction on the Hellenic character. The importance
of this expedition and retreat, as an illustration of the Hellenic
qualities and excellence, will justify the large space which has been
devoted to it in this History.
[296] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 4. Compare Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 20; and
Isokrates, Panegyr. Or. iv, s. 168, 169 _seq._
The last chapter of the Cyropædia of Xenophon (viii, 20, 21-26)
expresses strenuously the like conviction, of the military
feebleness and disorganization of the Persian empire, not
defensible without Grecian aid.
[297] Isokrates, Orat. v, (Philipp.) s. 104-106. ἤδη δ᾽
ἐγκρατεῖς δοκοῦντας εἶναι (_i. e._ the Greeks under Klearchus)
διὰ τὴν Κύρου ~προπέτειαν~ ἀτυχῆσαι, etc.
[298] Isokrates. Orat. v. (Philipp.) s. 141: Xen. Hellen. vi, 1,
12.
[299] See the stress laid by Alexander the Great upon the
adventures of the Ten Thousand, in his speech to encourage his
soldiers before the battle of Issus (Arrian, E. A. ii, 7, 8).