If, even in that encouraging autumn which followed immediately

upon the great Athenian catastrophe before Syracuse, the inertia

of Sparta could not be stirred into vigorous action without the

vehemence of the Athenian Alkibiades,—much more was it necessary

under the depressing circumstances which now overclouded the

unofficered Grecian army, that an Athenian bosom should be found as

the source of new life and impulse. Nor would any one, probably,

except an Athenian, either have felt or obeyed the promptings to

stand forward as a volunteer at that moment, when there was every

motive to decline responsibility, and no special duty to impel him.

But if by chance, a Spartan or an Arcadian had been found thus

forward, he would have been destitute of such talents as would

enable him to work on the minds of others[148]—of that flexibility,

resource, familiarity with the temper and movements of an assembled

crowd, power of enforcing the essential views and touching the

opportune chords, which Athenian democratical training imparted.

Even Brasidas and Gylippus, individual Spartans of splendid merit,

and equal or superior to Xenophon in military resource, would not

have combined with it that political and rhetorical accomplishment

which the position of the latter demanded. Obvious as the wisdom

of his propositions appears, each of them is left to him not only

to imitate, but to enforce;—Cheirisophus and Kleanor, after a few

words of introduction, consign to him the duty of working up the

minds of the army to the proper pitch. How well he performed this,

may be seen by his speech to the army, which bears in its general

tenor a remarkable resemblance to that of Perikles addressed to the

Athenian public in the second year of the war, at the moment when

the miseries of the epidemic, combined with those of invasion, had

driven them almost to despair. It breathes a strain of exaggerated

confidence, and an undervaluing of real dangers, highly suitable

for the occasion, but which neither Perikles nor Xenophon would

have employed at any other moment.[149] Throughout the whole of his

speech, and especially in regard to the accidental sneeze near at

hand which interrupted the beginning of it, Xenophon displayed that

skill and practice in dealing with a numerous audience and a given

situation, which characterized more or less every educated Athenian.

Other Greeks, Lacedæmonians or Arcadians, could act, with bravery

and in concert; but the Athenian Xenophon was among the few who

could think, speak, and act, with equal efficiency.[150] It was this

tripartite accomplishment which an aspiring youth was compelled to

set before himself as an aim, in the democracy of Athens, and which

the sophists as well as the democratical institutions, both of them

so hardly depreciated, helped and encouraged him to acquire. It was

this tripartite accomplishment, the exclusive possession of which,

in spite of constant jealousy on the part of Bœotian officers and

comrades of Proxenus,[151] elevated Xenophon into the most ascendent

person of the Cyreian army, from the present moment until the time

when it broke up,—as will be seen in the subsequent history.

[148] Compare the observations of Perikles, in his last speech

to the Athenians about the inefficiency of the best thoughts, if

a man had not the power of setting them forth in an impressive

manner (Thucyd. ii, 60). Καίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε, ὃς

οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἥσσων εἶναι ~γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι

ταῦτα~, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείττων· ὅ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ

σαφῶς διδάξας, ἐν ἵσῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη, etc.

The philosopher and the statesman at Athens here hold the same

language. It was the opinion of Sokrates—μόνους ἀξίους εἶναι

τιμῆς ~τοὺς εἰδότας τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἑρμηνεῦσαι δυναμένους~

(Xenoph. Mem. i, 2, 52).

A striking passage in the funeral harangue of Lysias (Orat. ii,

Epitaph. s. 19) sets forth the prevalent idea of the Athenian

democracy—authoritative law, with persuasive and instructive

speech, as superseding mutual violence (νόμος and λόγος, as the

antithesis of βία). Compare a similar sentiment in Isokrates (Or.

iv, (Panegyr.) s. 53-56).

[149] See the speech of Perikles (Thuc. ii, 60-64). He justifies

the boastful tone of it, by the unwonted depression against which

he had to contend on the part of his hearers—Δελώσω δὲ καὶ

τόδε ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ᾽ αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν

μεγέθους περὶ ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις, ~οὐδ᾽

ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπωδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσποίησιν, εἰ μὴ

καταπεπληγμένους ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἑώρων~.

This is also the proper explanation of Xenophon’s tone.

[150] In a passage of the Cyropædia (v. 5, 46), Xenophon sets

forth in a striking manner the combination of the λεκτικὸς καὶ

πρακτικός—Ὥσπερ καὶ ὅταν μάχεσθαι δέῃ, ὁ πλείστους χειρωσάμενος

ἀλκιμώτατος δοξάζεται εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ ὅταν πεῖσαι δέῃ, ὁ

πλέιστους ὁμογνώμονας ἡμῖν ποιήσας οὗτος δικαίως ἂν ~λεκτικώτατος

καὶ πρακτικώτατος~ κρίνοιτο ἂν εἶναι. Μὴ μέντοι ὡς ~λόγον

ἡμῖν ἐπιδειξόμενοι, οἷον ἂν εἴποιτε πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, τοῦτο

μελετᾶτε—ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τοὺς πεπεισμένους ὑφ᾽ ἑκάστου δήλους ἐσομένους

οἷς ἂν πράττωσιν, ὅυτω παρασκευάζεσθε~.

In describing the duties of a Hipparch or commander of the

cavalry, Xenophon also insists upon the importance of persuasive

speech, as a means of keeping up the active obedience of the

soldiers—Εἴς γε μὴν τὸ εὐπειθεῖς εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους, μέγα μὲν

καὶ τὸ λόγῳ διδάσκειν, ὅσα ἀγαθὰ ἔνι ἐν τῷ πειθαρχεῖν, etc. (Xen.

Mag. Eq. i, 24).

[151] See Xenoph. Anab. v, 6, 25.

I think it the more necessary to notice this fact,—that the

accomplishments whereby Xenophon leaped on a sudden into such

extraordinary ascendency, and rendered such eminent service to

his army, were accomplishments belonging in an especial manner to

the Athenian democracy and education,—because Xenophon himself

has throughout his writings treated Athens not merely without the

attachment of a citizen, but with feelings more like the positive

antipathy of an exile. His sympathies are all in favor of the

perpetual drill, the mechanical obedience, the secret government

proceedings, the narrow and prescribed range of ideas, the silent

and deferential demeanor, the methodical, though tardy, action—of

Sparta. Whatever may be the justice of his preference, certain it

is, that the qualities whereby he was himself enabled to contribute

so much both to the rescue of the Cyreian army, and to his own

reputation,—were Athenian far more than Spartan.

While the Grecian army, after sanctioning the propositions of

Xenophon, were taking their morning meal before they commenced

their march, Mithridates, one of the Persians previously attached

to Cyrus, appeared with a few horsemen on a mission of pretended

friendship. But it was soon found out that his purposes were

treacherous, and that he came merely to seduce individual soldiers

to desertion,—with a few of whom he succeeded. Accordingly, the

resolution was taken to admit no more heralds or envoys.

Disembarrassed of superfluous baggage, and refreshed, the army

now crossed the Great Zab River, and pursued their march on the

other side, having their baggage and attendants in the centre, and

Cheirisophus leading the van, with a select body of three hundred

hoplites.[152] As no mention is made of a bridge, we are to presume

that they forded the river,—which furnishes a ford (according to Mr.

Ainsworth), still commonly used, at a place between thirty and forty

miles from its junction with the Tigris. When they had got a little

way forward, Mithridates again appeared with a few hundred cavalry

and bowmen. He approached them like a friend; but as soon as he was

near enough, suddenly began to harass the rear with a shower of

missiles. What surprises us most, is, that the Persians, with their

very numerous force, made no attempt to hinder them from crossing so

very considerable a river; for Xenophon estimates the Zab at four

hundred feet broad,—and this seems below the statement of modern

travellers, who inform us that it contains not much less water than

the Tigris; and though usually deeper and narrower, cannot be much

narrower at any fordable place.[153] It is to be recollected that

the Persians, habitually marching in advance of the Greeks, must

have reached the river first, and were, therefore, in possession

of the crossing, whether bridge or ford. Though on the watch for

every opportunity of perfidy, Tissaphernes did not dare to resist

the Greeks even in the most advantageous position, and ventured only

upon sending Mithridates to harass the rear; which he executed with

considerable effect. The bowmen and darters of the Greeks, few in

number, were at the same time inferior to those of the Persians;

and when Xenophon employed his rear guard, hoplites and peltasts,

to charge and repel them, he not only could never overtake any one,

but suffered much in getting back to rejoin his own main body. Even

when retiring, the Persian horseman could discharge his arrow or cast

his javelin behind him with effect; a dexterity which the Parthians

exhibited afterwards still more signally, and which the Persian

horsemen of the present day parallel with their carbines. This was

the first experience which the Greeks had of marching under the

harassing attack of cavalry. Even the small detachment of Mithridates

greatly delayed their progress; so that they accomplished little

more than two miles, reaching the villages in the evening, with many

wounded, and much discouragement.[154]

[152] Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 6; iii, 5, 43.

[153] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 1. Ainsworth. Travels and Researches in

Asia Minor, etc. vol. ii, ch. 44, p. 327; also his Travels in the

Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 119-134.

Professor Koch, who speaks with personal knowledge both of

Armenia and of the region east of the Tigris, observes truly

that the Great Zab is the only point (east of the Tigris) which

Xenophon assigns in such a manner as to be capable of distinct

local identification. He also observes, here as elsewhere, that

the number of parasangs specified by Xenophon is essentially

delusive as a measure of distance (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 64).

[154] Xen. Anab. iii, 3, 9.

“Thank Heaven,” (said Xenophon in the evening, when Cheirisophus

reproached him for imprudence in quitting the main body to charge

cavalry, whom yet he could not reach.) “Thank Heaven, that our

enemies attacked us with a small detachment only, and not with their

great numbers. They have given us a valuable lesson, without doing

us any serious harm.” Profiting by the lesson, the Greek leaders

organized during the night and during the halt of the next day, a

small body of fifty cavalry; with two hundred Rhodian slingers,

whose slings, furnished with leaden bullets, both carried farther

and struck harder than those of the Persians hurling large stones.

On the ensuing morning, they started before daybreak, since there

lay in their way a ravine difficult to pass. They found the ravine

undefended (according to the usual stupidity of Persian proceedings),

but when they had got nearly a mile beyond it, Mithridates reappeared

in pursuit with a body of four thousand horsemen and darters.

Confident from his achievement of the preceding day, he had promised,

with a body of that force, to deliver the Greeks into the hands

of the satrap. But the latter were now better prepared. As soon

as he began to attack them, the trumpet sounded,—and forthwith

the horsemen, slingers, and darters, issued forth to charge the

Persians, sustained by the hoplites in the rear. So effective was

the charge, that the Persians fled in dismay, notwithstanding their

superiority in number; while the ravine so impeded their flight

that many of them were slain, and eighteen prisoners made. The

Greek soldiers of their own accord mutilated the dead bodies, in

order to strike terror into the enemy.[155] At the end of the day’s

march they reached the Tigris, near the deserted city of Larissa,

the vast, massive, and lofty brick walls of which (twenty-five feet

in thickness, one hundred feet high, seven miles in circumference)

attested its former grandeur. Near this place was a stone pyramid,

one hundred feet in breadth, and two hundred feet high; the summit

of which was crowded with fugitives out of the neighboring villages.

Another day’s march up the course of the Tigris brought the army to

a second deserted city called Mespila, nearly opposite to the modern

city of Mosul. Although these two cities, which seem to have formed

the continuation or the substitute of the once colossal Nineveh or

Ninus, were completely deserted,—yet the country around them was so

well furnished with villages and population, that the Greeks not only

obtained provisions, but also strings for the making of new bows, and

lead for bullets to be used for the slingers.[156]

[155] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 1-5.

[156] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 17, 18. It is here, on the site of the

ancient Nineveh, that the recent investigations of Mr. Layard

have brought to light so many curious and valuable Assyrian

remains. The legend which Xenophon heard on the spot, respecting

the way in which these cities were captured and ruined, is of a

truly Oriental character.

During the next day’s march, in a course generally parallel with

the Tigris, and ascending the stream, Tissaphernes, coming up along

with some other grandees, and with a numerous army, enveloped the

Greeks both in flanks and rear. In spite of his advantage of numbers,

he did not venture upon any actual charge, but kept up a fire of

arrows, darts, and stones. He was, however, so well answered by

the newly-trained archers and slingers of the Greeks, that on the

whole they had the advantage, in spite of the superior size of the

Persian bows, many of which were taken and effectively employed on

the Grecian side. Having passed the night in a well-stocked village,

they halted there the next day in order to stock themselves with

provisions, and then pursued their march for four successive days

along a level country, until, on the fifth day, they reached hilly

ground with the prospect of still higher hills beyond. All this

march was made under unremitting annoyance from the enemy, insomuch

that though the order of the Greeks was never broken, a considerable

number of their men were wounded. Experience taught them, that it

was inconvenient for the whole army to march in one inflexible,

undivided, hollow square; and they accordingly constituted six lochi

or regiments of one hundred men each, subdivided into companies

of fifty, and enômoties or smaller companies of twenty-five, each

with a special officer (conformably to the Spartan practice) to

move separately on each flank, and either to fall back, or fall in,

as might suit the fluctuations of the central mass, arising from

impediments in the road or menaces of the enemy.[157] On reaching

the hills, in sight of an elevated citadel or palace, with several

villages around it, the Greeks anticipated some remission of the

Persian attack. But after having passed over one hill, they were

proceeding to ascend the second, when they found themselves assailed

with unwonted vigor by the Persian cavalry from the summit of it,

whose leaders were seen flogging on the men to the attack.[158]

This charge was so efficacious, that the Greek light troops were

driven in with loss, and forced to take shelter within the ranks of

the hoplites. After a march both slow and full of suffering, they

could only reach their night-quarters by sending a detachment to get

possession of some ground above the Persians, who thus became afraid

of a double attack.

[157] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 19-23.

I incline to believe that there were six lochi upon _each_

flank—that is, twelve lochi in all; though the words of Xenophon

are not quite clear.

[158] Xen. Anab. iii, 4-25. Compare Herodot. vii, 21, 56, 103.

The villages which they now reached (supposed by Mr. Ainsworth

to have been in the fertile country under the modern town called

Zakhu),[159] were unusually rich in provisions; magazines of flour,

barley, and wine, having been collected there for the Persian

satrap. They reposed here three days, chiefly in order to tend the

numerous wounded, for whose necessities, eight of the most competent

persons were singled out to act as surgeons. On the fourth day they

resumed their march, descending into the plain. But experience had

now satisfied them that it was imprudent to continue in march under

the attack of cavalry, so that when Tissaphernes appeared and began

to harass them, they halted at the first village, and when thus in

station, easily repelled him. As the afternoon advanced, the Persian

assailants began to retire; for they were always in the habit of

taking up their night-post at a distance of near seven miles from

the Grecian position; being very apprehensive of nocturnal attack in

their camp, when their horses were tied by the leg and without either

saddle or bridle.[160] As soon as they had departed, the Greeks

resumed their march, and made so much advance during the night, that

the Persians did not overtake them either on the next day or the day

after.

[159] Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 68) is of the same

opinion.

[160] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 35; see also Cyropædia, iii, 3, 37.

The Thracian prince Seuthes was so apprehensive of night attack,

that he and his troops kept their horses bridled all night (Xen.

Anab. vii, 2, 21.)

Mr. Kinneir (Travels in Asia Minor, etc., p. 481) states that the

horses of Oriental cavalry, and even of the English cavalry in

Hindostan, are still kept tied and shackled at night, in the same

way as Xenophon describes to have been practised by the Persians.

On the ensuing day, however, the Persians, having made a forced

march by night, were seen not only in advance of the Greeks, but

in occupation of a spur of high and precipitous ground overhanging

immediately the road whereby the Greeks were to descend into the

plain. When Cheirisophus approached, he at once saw that descent

was impracticable in the face of an enemy thus posted. He therefore

halted, sent for Xenophon from the rear, and desired him to bring

forward the peltasts to the van. But Xenophon, though he obeyed

the summons in person and galloped his horse to the front, did not

think it prudent to move the peltasts from the rear, because he saw

Tissaphernes, with another portion of the army, just coming up; so

that the Grecian army was at once impeded in front, and threatened by

the enemy closing upon them behind. The Persians on the high ground

in front could not be directly assailed. But Xenophon observed,

that on the right of the Grecian army, there was an accessible

mountain-summit yet higher, from whence a descent might be made for a

flank attack upon the Persian position. Pointing out this summit to

Cheirisophus, as affording the only means of dislodging the troops

in front, he urged that one of them should immediately hasten with a

detachment to take possession of it, and offered to Cheirisophus the

choice either of going, or staying with the army. “Choose yourself,”

said Cheirisophus. “Well, then, (said Xenophon), I will go; since I

am the younger of the two.” Accordingly, at the head of a select

detachment from the van and centre of the army, he immediately

commenced his flank march up the steep ascent to this highest

summit. So soon as the enemy saw their purpose, they also detached

troops on their side, hoping to get to the summit first; and the two

detachments were seen mounting at the same time, each struggling with

the utmost efforts to get before the other,—each being encouraged by

shouts and clamor from the two armies respectively.

As Xenophon was riding by the side of his soldiers, cheering them

on and reminding them that their chance of seeing their country and

their families all depended upon success in the effort before them, a

Sikyonian hoplite in the ranks, named Sotêridas, said to him,—“You

and I are not on an equal footing, Xenophon. You are on horseback; I

am painfully struggling up on foot, with my shield to carry.” Stung

with this taunt, Xenophon sprang from his horse, pushed Sotêridas out

of his place in the ranks, took his shield as well as his place, and

began to march forward afoot along with the rest. Though thus weighed

down at once by the shield belonging to an hoplite, and by the heavy

cuirass of a horseman (who carried no shield), he nevertheless put

forth all his strength to advance, under such double incumbrance,

and to continue his incitement to the rest. But the soldiers around

him were so indignant at the proceeding of Sotêridas, that they

reproached and even struck him, until they compelled him to resume

his shield as well as his place in the ranks. Xenophon then remounted

and ascended the hill on horseback as far as the ground permitted;

but was obliged again to dismount presently, in consequence of the

steepness of the uppermost portion. Such energetic efforts enabled

him and his detachment to reach the summit first. As soon as the

enemy saw this, they desisted from their ascent, and dispersed in all

directions; leaving the forward march open to the main Grecian army,

which Cheirisophus accordingly conducted safely down into the plain.

Here he was rejoined by Xenophon on descending from the summit. All

found themselves in comfortable quarters, amidst several well-stocked

villages on the banks of the Tigris. They acquired moreover an

additional booty of large droves of cattle, intercepted when on the

point of being transported across the river; where a considerable

body of horse were seen assembled on the opposite bank.[161]

[161] Xen. Anab. iii, 4, 36-49; iii, 5, 3.

Though here disturbed only by some desultory attacks on the part of

the Persians, who burnt several of the villages which lay in their

forward line of march, the Greeks became seriously embarrassed

whither to direct their steps; for on their left flank was the

Tigris, so deep that their spears found no bottom,—and on their

right, mountains of exceeding height. As the generals and the

lochages were taking counsel, a Rhodian soldier came to them with a

proposition for transporting the whole army across to the other bank

of the river by means of inflated skins, which could be furnished

in abundance by the animals in their possession. But this ingenious

scheme, in itself feasible, was put out of the question by the view

of the Persian cavalry on the opposite bank; and as the villages in

their front had been burnt, the army had no choice except to return

back one day’s march to those in which they had before halted. Here

the generals again deliberated, questioning all their prisoners as

to the different bearings of the country. The road from the south

was that in which they had already marched from Babylon and Media;

that to the westward, going to Lydia and Ionia, was barred to them

by the interposing Tigris; eastward (they were informed) was the way

to Ekbatana and Susa; northward, lay the rugged and inhospitable

mountains of the Karduchians,—fierce freemen who despised the

Great King, and defied all his efforts to conquer them; having once

destroyed a Persian invading army of one hundred and twenty thousand

men. On the other side of Karduchia, however, lay the rich Persian

satrapy of Armenia, wherein both the Euphrates and the Tigris could

be crossed near their sources, and from whence could choose their

farther course easily towards Greece. Like Mysia, Pisidia, and other

mountainous regions, Karduchia was a free territory surrounded on all

sides by the dominions of the Great King, who reigned only in the

cities and on the plains.[162]

[162] Xen. Anab. iii, 5; iv, 1, 3. Probably the place where

the Greeks quitted the Tigris to strike into the Karduchian

mountains, was the neighborhood of Jezireh ibn Omar, the ancient

Bezabde. It is here that farther march, up the eastern side of

the Tigris, is rendered impracticable by the mountains closing

in. Here the modern road crosses the Tigris by a bridge, from the

eastern bank to the western (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 72).

Determining to fight their way across these difficult mountains into

Armenia, but refraining from any public announcement, for fear that

the passes should be occupied beforehand,—the generals sacrificed

forthwith, in order that they might be ready for breaking up at a

moment’s notice. They then began their march a little after midnight,

so that soon after daybreak they reached the first of the Karduchian

mountain-passes, which they found undefended. Cheirisophus, with

his front division and all the light troops, made haste to ascend

the pass, and having got over the first mountain, descended on the

other side to some villages in the valley or nooks beneath; while

Xenophon with the heavy-armed and the baggage, followed at a slower

pace,—not reaching the villages until dark, as the road was both

steep and narrow. The Karduchians, taken completely by surprise,

abandoned the villages as the Greeks approached, and took refuge

on the mountains; leaving to the intruders plenty of provisions,

comfortable houses, and especially, abundance of copper vessels. At

first the Greeks were careful to do no damage, trying to invite the

natives to amicable colloquy. But none of the latter would come near,

and at length necessity drove the Greeks to take what was necessary

for refreshment. It was just when Xenophon and the rear guard were

coming in at night, that some few Karduchians first set upon them; by

surprise and with considerable success,—so that if their numbers had

been greater, serious mischief might have ensued.[163]

[163] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 12.

Many fires were discovered burning on the mountains,—an earnest

of resistance during the next day; which satisfied the Greek

generals that they must lighten the army, in order to ensure greater

expedition as well as a fuller complement of available hands during

the coming march. They therefore gave orders to burn all the baggage

except what was indispensable, and to dismiss all the prisoners;

planting themselves in a narrow strait, through which the army had

to pass, in order to see that their directions were executed. The

women, however, of whom there were many with the army, could not be

abandoned; and it seems farther that a considerable stock of baggage

was still retained;[164] nor could the army make more than slow

advance, from the narrowness of the road and the harassing attack

of the Karduchians, who were now assembled in considerable numbers.

Their attack was renewed with double vigor on the ensuing day, when

the Greeks were forced, from want of provisions, to hasten forward

their march, though in the midst of a terrible snow-storm. Both

Cheirisophus in the front and Xenophon in the rear, were hard pressed

by the Karduchian slingers and bowmen; the latter, men of consummate

skill, having bows three cubits in length, and arrows of more than

two cubits, so strong that the Greeks when they took them could dart

them as javelins. These archers, amidst the rugged ground and narrow

paths, approached so near and drew the bow with such surprising

force, resting one extremity of it on the ground, that several Greek

warriors were mortally wounded even through both shield and corslet

into the reins, and through the brazen helmet into their heads;

among them especially, two distinguished men, a Lacedæmonian named

Kleonymus, and an Arcadian named Basias.[165] The rear division,

more roughly handled than the rest, was obliged continually to halt

to repel the enemy, under all the difficulties of the ground, which

made it scarcely possible to act against nimble mountaineers. On one

occasion, however, a body of these latter were entrapped into an

ambush, driven back with loss, and (what was still more fortunate)

two of their number were made prisoners.

[164] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 19-30.

[165] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 18; iv, 2, 28.

Thus impeded, Xenophon sent frequent messages entreating Cheirisophus

to slacken the march of the van division; but instead of obeying,

Cheirisophus only hastened the faster, urging Xenophon to follow

him. The march of the army became little better than a rout, so that

the rear division reached the halting-place in extreme confusion;

upon which Xenophon proceeded to remonstrate with Cheirisophus for

prematurely hurrying forward and neglecting his comrades behind. But

the other,—pointing out to his attention the hill before them, and

the steep path ascending it, forming their future line of march,

which was beset with numerous Karduchians,—defended himself by

saying that he had hastened forward in hopes of being able to reach

this pass before the enemy, in which attempt however he had not

succeeded.[166]

[166] Xen. Anab. iv, 1, 21.

To advance farther on this road appeared hopeless; yet the guides

declared that no other could be taken. Xenophon then bethought

him of the two prisoners whom he had just captured, and proposed

that these two should be questioned also. They were accordingly

interrogated apart; and the first of them,—having persisted in

denying, notwithstanding all menaces, that there was any road

except that before them,—was put to death under the eyes of the

second prisoner. This latter, on being then questioned, gave more

comfortable intelligence; saying that he knew of a different road,

more circuitous, but easier and practicable even for beasts of

burden, whereby the pass before them and the occupying enemy might be

turned; but that there was one particular high position commanding

the road, which it was necessary to master beforehand by surprise,

as the Karduchians were already on guard there. Two thousand Greeks,

having the guide bound along with them, were accordingly despatched

late in the afternoon, to surprise this post by a night-march; while

Xenophon, in order to distract the attention of the Karduchians in

front, made a feint of advancing as if about to force the direct

pass. As soon as he was seen crossing the ravine which led to this

mountain, the Karduchians on the top immediately began to roll down

vast masses of rock, which bounded and dashed down the roadway, in

such manner as to render it unapproachable. They continued to do this

all night, and the Greeks heard the noise of the descending masses

long after they had returned to their camp for supper and rest.[167]

[167] Xen. Anab. iv, 2, 4.

Meanwhile the detachment of two thousand, marching by the circuitous

road, and reaching in the night the elevated position, (though there

was another above yet more commanding), held by the Karduchians,

surprised and dispersed them, passing the night by their fires. At

daybreak, and under favor of a mist, they stole silently towards

the position occupied by the other Karduchians in front of the main

Grecian army. On coming near they suddenly sounded their trumpets,

shouted aloud, and commenced the attack, which proved completely

successful. The defenders, taken unprepared, fled with little

resistance, and scarcely any loss, from their activity and knowledge

of the country; while Cheirisophus and the main Grecian force, on

hearing the trumpet which had been previously concerted as the

signal, rushed forward and stormed the height in front; some along

the regular path, others climbing up as they could and pulling each

other up by means of their spears. The two bodies of Greeks thus

joined each other on the summit, so that the road became open for

farther advance.

Xenophon, however, with the rear guard, marched on the circuitous

road taken by the two thousand, as the most practicable for the

baggage animals, whom he placed in the centre of his division,—the

whole array covering a great length of ground, since the road was

very narrow. During this interval, the dispersed Karduchians had

rallied, and reoccupied two or three high peaks, commanding the

road,—from whence it was necessary to drive them. Xenophon’s

troops stormed successively these three positions, the Karduchians

not daring to affront close combat, yet making destructive use of

their missiles. A Grecian guard was left on the hindermost of the

three peaks, until all the baggage train should have passed by. But

the Karduchians, by a sudden and well-timed movement, contrived

to surprise this guard, slew two out of the three leaders, with

several soldiers, and forced the rest to jump down the crags as they

could, in order to join their comrades in the road. Encouraged by

such success, the assailants pressed nearer to the marching army,

occupying a crag over against that lofty summit on which Xenophon was

posted. As it was within speaking distance, he endeavored to open a

negotiation with them in order to get back the dead bodies of the

slain. To this demand the Karduchians at first acceded, on condition

that their villages should not be burnt; but finding their numbers

every moment increasing, they resumed the offensive. When Xenophon

with the army had begun his descent from the last summit, they

hurried onward in crowds to occupy it; beginning again to roll down

masses of rock, and renew their fire of missiles, upon the Greeks.

Xenophon himself was here in some danger, having been deserted by

his shield-bearer; but he was rescued by an Arcadian hoplite named

Eurylochus, who ran to give him the benefit of his own shield as a

protection for both in the retreat.[168]

[168] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17-21.

After a march thus painful and perilous, the rear division at

length found themselves in safety among their comrades in villages

with well-stocked houses and abundance of corn and wine. So eager,

however, were Xenophon and Cheirisophus to obtain the bodies of

the slain for burial, that they consented to purchase them by

surrendering the guide, and to march onward without any guide;—a

heavy sacrifice in this unknown country, attesting their great

anxiety about the burial.[169]

[169] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 23.

For three more days did they struggle and fight their way through

the narrow and rugged paths of the Karduchian mountains, beset

throughout by these formidable bowmen and slingers; whom they had to

dislodge at every difficult turn, and against whom their own Kretan

bowmen were found inferior, indeed, but still highly useful. Their

seven days’ march through this country, with its free and warlike

inhabitants, were days of the utmost fatigue, suffering and peril;

far more intolerable than anything which they had experienced from

Tissaphernes and the Persians. Right glad were they once more to

see a plain, and to find themselves near the banks of the river

Kentritês, which divided these mountains from the hillocks and plains

of Armenia,—enjoying comfortable quarters in villages, with the

satisfaction of talking over past miseries.[170]

[170] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 2. His expressions have a simple emphasis

which marks how unfading was the recollection of what he had

suffered in Karduchia.

Καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐνταῦθα ἀνεπαύσαντο ἄσμενοι ἰδόντες πεδίον· ἀπεῖχε

δὲ τῶν ὀρέων ὁ ποταμὸς ἓξ ἢ ἕπτα στάδια τῶν Καρδούχων. Τότε μὲν

οὖν ηὐλίσθησαν μάλα ἡδέως, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχοντες καὶ πολλὰ

τῶν παρεληλυθότων πόνων μνημονεύοντες. Ἕπτα γὰρ ἡμέρας, ὅσασπερ

ἐπορεύθησαν διὰ τῶν Καρδούχων, πάσας μαχόμενοι διετέλεσαν, καὶ

ἔπαθον κακὰ ὅσα οὐδὲ τὰ σύμπαντα ὑπὸ βασιλέως καὶ Τισσαφέρνους.

Ὡς οὖν ἀπηλλαγμένοι τούτων ἡδέως ἐκοιμήθησαν.

Such were the apprehensions of Karduchian invasion, that the Armenian

side of the Kentritês, for a breadth of fifteen miles, was unpeopled

and destitute of villages.[171] But the approach of the Greeks having

become known to Tiribazus, satrap of Armenia, the banks of the river

were lined with his cavalry and infantry to oppose their passage; a

precaution, which if Tissaphernes had taken at the Great Zab at the

moment when he perfidiously seized Klearchus and his colleagues, the

Greeks would hardly have reached the northern bank of that river.

In the face of such obstacles, the Greeks, nevertheless, attempted

the passage of the Kentritês, seeing a regular road on the other

side. But the river was two hundred feet in breadth (only half the

breadth of the Zab), above their breasts in depth, extremely rapid,

and with a bottom full of slippery stones; insomuch that they could

not hold their shields in the proper position, from the force of the

stream, while if they lifted the shields above their heads, they

were exposed defenceless to the arrows of the satrap’s troops. After

various trials, the passage was found impracticable, and they were

obliged to resume their encampment on the left bank. To their great

alarm they saw the Karduchians assembling on the hills in their

rear, so that their situation, during this day and night, appeared

nearly desperate. In the night, Xenophon had a dream,—the first,

which he has told us, since his dream on the terrific night after

the seizure of the generals,—but on this occasion, of augury more

unequivocally good. He dreamed that he was bound in chains, but that

his chains on a sudden dropped off spontaneously; on the faith of

which, he told Cheirisophus at daybreak that he had good hopes of

preservation; and when the generals offered sacrifice, the victims

were at once favorable. As the army were taking their morning meal,

two young Greeks ran to Xenophon with the auspicious news that they

had accidentally found another ford near half a mile up the river,

where the water was not even up to their middle, and where the rocks

came so close on the right bank that the enemy’s horse could offer no

opposition. Xenophon, starting from his meal in delight, immediately

offered libations to those gods who had revealed both the dream to

himself in the night, and the unexpected ford afterwards to these

youths; two revelations which he ascribed to the same gods.[172]

[171] Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 1.

[172] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 6-13.

Presently they marched in their usual order, Cheirisophus

commanding the van and Xenophon the rear, along the river to the

newly-discovered ford; the enemy marching parallel with them on

the opposite bank. Having reached the ford, halted, and grounded

arms, Cheirisophus placed a wreath on his head, took it off again,

and then resumed his arms, ordering all the rest to follow his

example.[173] Each lochus (company of one hundred men) was then

arranged in column or single file, with Cheirisophus himself in

the centre. Meanwhile the prophets were offering sacrifice to the

river. So soon as the signs were pronounced to be favorable, all

the soldiers shouted the pæan, and all the women joined in chorus

with their feminine yell. Cheirisophus then at the head of the army,

entered the river and began to ford it; while Xenophon, with a large

portion of the rear division, made a feint of hastening back to the

original ford, as if he were about to attempt the passage there. This

distracted the attention of the enemy’s horse; who became afraid of

being attacked on both sides, galloped off to guard the passage at

the other point, and opposed no serious resistance to Cheirisophus.

As soon as the latter had reached the other side, and put his

division into order, he marched up to attack the Armenian infantry,

who were on the high banks a little way above; but this infantry,

deserted by its cavalry, dispersed without awaiting his approach. The

handful of Grecian cavalry, attached to the division of Cheirisophus,

pursued and took some valuable spoils.[174]

[173] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 17.

... ἔθεντο τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ αὐτὸς πρῶτος Χειρίσοφος, στεφανωσάμενος

καὶ ἀποδὺς, ἐλάμβανε τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι παρήγγελλε.

I apprehend that the words τὸν στέφανον are here to be understood

after ἀποδὺς—not the words τὰ ὅπλα, as Krüger in his note seems

to imagine. It is surely incredible, that in the actual situation

of the Grecian army, the soldiers should be ordered first to

disarm, and then to resume their arms. I conceive the matter

thus:—First, the order is given, to ground arms; so that the

shield is let down and drops upon the ground, sustained by the

left hand of the soldier upon its upper rim; while the spear,

also resting on the ground, is sustained by the shield and by the

same left hand. The right hand of the soldier being thus free, he

is ordered first to wreath himself (the costume usual in offering

sacrifice)—next, to take off his wreath—lastly, to resume his

arms.

Probably the operations of wreathing and unwreathing, must

here have been performed by the soldiers symbolically, or by

gesture, raising the hand to the head, as if to crown it. For it

seems impossible that they could have been provided generally

with actual wreaths, on the banks of the Kentritês, and just

after their painful march through the Karduchian mountains.

Cheirisophus himself, however, had doubtless a real wreath, which

he put on and took off; so probably had the prophets and certain

select officiating persons.

[174] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 20-25.

As soon as Xenophon saw his colleague successfully established on

the opposite bank, he brought back his detachment to the ford over

which the baggage and attendants were still passing, and proceeded to

take precautions against the Karduchians on his own side, who were

assembling in the rear. He found some difficulty in keeping his rear

division together, for many of them, in spite of orders, quitted

their ranks, and went to look after their mistresses or their baggage

in the crossing of the water.[175] The peltasts and bowmen, who had

gone over with Cheirisophus, but whom that general now no longer

needed, were directed to hold themselves prepared on both flanks of

the army crossing, and to advance a little way into the water, in

the attitude of men just about to recross. When Xenophon was left

with only the diminished rear-guard, the rest having got over,—the

Karduchians rushed upon him, and began to shoot and sling. But on

a sudden, the Grecian hoplites charged with their accustomed pæan,

upon which the Karduchians took to flight,—having no arms for close

combat on the plain. The trumpet now being heard to sound, they ran

away so much the faster; while this was the signal, according to

orders before given by Xenophon, for the Greeks to suspend their

charge, to turn back, and to cross the river as speedily as possible.

By favor of this able manœuvre, the passage was accomplished by the

whole army, with little or no loss, about mid-day.[176]

[175] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 30.

[176] Xen. Anab. iv, 3, 31-34; iv, 4, 1.

They now found themselves in Armenia; a country of even, undulating

surface, but very high above the level of the sea, and extremely cold

at the season when they entered it,—December. Though the strip of

land bordering on Karduchia furnished no supplies, one long march

brought them to a village, containing abundance of provisions,

together with a residence of the satrap Tiribazus; after which, in

two farther marches, they reached the river Teleboas, with many

villages on its banks. Here Tiribazus himself, appearing with a

division of cavalry, sent forward his interpreter to request a

conference with the leaders; which being held, it was agreed that the

Greeks should proceed unmolested through his territory, taking such

supplies as they required,—but should neither burn nor damage the

villages. They accordingly advanced onward for three days, computed

at fifteen parasangs, or three pretty full days’ march; without

any hostility from the satrap, though he was hovering within less

than two miles of them. They then found themselves amidst several

villages, wherein were regal or satrapical residences, with a

plentiful stock of bread, meat, wine, and all sorts of vegetables.

Here, during their nightly bivouac, they were overtaken by so heavy

a fall of snow, that the generals, on the next day, distributed

the troops into separate quarters among the villages. No enemy

appeared near, while the snow seemed to forbid any rapid surprise.

Yet at night, the scouts reported that many fires were discernible,

together with traces of military movements around; insomuch that the

generals thought it prudent to put themselves on their guard, and

again collected the army into one bivouac. Here, in the night, they

were overwhelmed by a second fall of snow, still heavier than the

preceding; sufficient to cover over the sleeping men and their arms,

and to benumb the cattle. The men, however, lay warm under the snow

and were unwilling to rise, until Xenophon himself set the example

of rising, and employing himself, without his arms, in cutting

wood and kindling a fire.[177] Others followed his example, and

great comfort was found in rubbing themselves with pork-fat, oil of

almonds, or of sesame, or turpentine. Having sent out a clever scout

named Demokrates, who captured a native prisoner, they learned that

Tiribazus was laying plans to intercept them in a lofty mountain-pass

lying farther on in their route; upon which they immediately set

forth, and by two days of forced march, surprising in their way the

camp of Tiribazus, got over the difficult pass in safety. Three days

of additional march brought them to the Euphrates river,[178]—that

is, to the eastern branch, now called Murad. They found a ford and

crossed it, without having the water higher than the navel; and they

were informed that its sources were not far off.

[177] Xen. Anab. iv, 4, 11.

[178] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 2.

The recent editors, Schneider and Krüger, on the authority of

various MSS., read here ἐπορεύθησαν—~ἐπὶ~ τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν.

The old reading was, as it stands in Hutchinson’s edition, ~παρὰ~

τὸν Εὐφράτην ποταμόν.

This change may be right, but the geographical data are here too

vague to admit of any certainty. See my Appendix annexed to this

chapter.

Their four days of march, next on the other side of the Euphrates,

were toilsome and distressing in the extreme; through a plain covered

with deep snow (in some places six feet deep), and at times in the

face of a north wind so intolerably chilling and piercing, that at

length one of the prophets urged the necessity of offering sacrifices

to Boreas; upon which (says Xenophon[179]) the severity of the wind

abated conspicuously, to the evident consciousness of all. Many of

the slaves and beasts of burden, and a few even of the soldiers,

perished; some had their feet frost-bitten, others became blinded by

the snow, others again were exhausted by hunger. Several of these

unhappy men were unavoidably left behind; others lay down to perish,

near a warm spring which had melted the snow around, from extremity

of fatigue and sheer wretchedness, though the enemy were close upon

the rear. It was in vain that Xenophon, who commanded the rear-guard,

employed his earnest exhortations, prayers, and threats, to induce

them to move forward. The sufferers, miserable and motionless,

answered only by entreating him to kill them at once. So greatly was

the army disorganized by wretchedness, that we hear of one case in

which a soldier, ordered to carry a disabled comrade, disobeyed the

order, and was about to bury him alive.[180] Xenophon made a sally,

with loud shouts and clatter of spear with shield, in which even the

exhausted men joined,—against the pursuing enemy. He was fortunate

enough to frighten them away, and drive them to take shelter in

a neighboring wood. He then left the sufferers lying down, with

assurance that relief should be sent to them on the next day,—and

went forward, seeing all along the line of march the exhausted

soldiers lying on the snow, without even the protection of a watch.

He and his rear-guard, as well as the rest, were obliged thus to

pass the night without either food or fire, distributing scouts in

the best way the case admitted. Meanwhile, Cheirisophus with the van

division had got into a village, which they reached so unexpectedly,

that they found the women fetching water from a fountain outside

the wall, and the headman of the village in his house within. This

division here obtained rest and refreshment, and at daybreak some of

their soldiers were sent to look after the rear. It was with delight

that Xenophon saw them approach, and sent them back to bring up in

their arms, into the neighboring village, those exhausted soldiers

who had been left behind.[181]

[179] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 4.

Ἔνθα δὴ τῶν μάντέων τις εἶπε σφαγιάσασθαι τῷ Ἀνέμῳ· καὶ πᾶσι δὴ

περιφανῶς ἔδοξε λῆξαι τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ πνεύματος.

The suffering of the army from the terrible snow and cold of

Armenia are set forth in Diodorus, xiv, 28.

[180] Xen. Anab. v, 8, 8-11.

[181] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 8-22.

Repose was now indispensable after the recent sufferings. There

were several villages near at hand, and the generals, thinking it

no longer dangerous to divide the army, quartered the different

divisions among them according to lot. Polykrates, an Athenian, one

of the captains in the division of Xenophon, requested his permission

to go at once and take possession of the village assigned to him,

before any of the inhabitants could escape. Accordingly, running

at speed with a few of the swiftest soldiers, he came upon the

village so suddenly as to seize the headman, with his newly-married

daughter, and several young horses intended as a tribute for the

king. This village, as well as the rest, was found to consist of

houses excavated in the ground (as the Armenian villages are at

the present day), spacious within, but with a narrow mouth like a

well, entered by a descending ladder. A separate entrance was dug

for conveniently admitting the cattle. All of them were found amply

stocked with live cattle of every kind, wintered upon hay; as well as

with wheat, barley, vegetables, and a sort of barley-wine or beer,

in tubs, with the grains of barley on the surface. Reeds or straws,

without any joint in them, were lying near, through which they

sucked the liquid.[182] Xenophon did his utmost to conciliate the

headman (who spoke Persian, and with whom he communicated through the

Perso-Grecian interpreter of the army), promising him that not one

of his relations should be maltreated, and that he should be fully

remunerated if he would conduct the army safely out of the country,

into that of the Chalybes which he described as being adjacent.

By such treatment the headman was won over, promised his aid, and

even revealed to the Greeks the subterranean cellars wherein the

wine was deposited; while Xenophon, though he kept him constantly

under watch, and placed his youthful son as a hostage under the care

of Episthenes, yet continued to treat him with studied attention

and kindness. For seven days did the fatigued soldiers remain in

these comfortable quarters, refreshing themselves and regaining

strength. They were waited upon by the native youths, with whom they

communicated by means of signs. The uncommon happiness which all of

them enjoyed after their recent sufferings, stands depicted in the

lively details given by Xenophon; who left here his own exhausted

horse, and took young horses in exchange, for himself and the other

officers.[183]

[182] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26. Κάλαμοι γόνατα οὐκ ἔχοντες.

This Armenian practice of sucking the beer through a reed, to

which the observation of modern travellers supplies analogies

(see Krüger’s note), illustrates the Fragment of Archilochus (No.

28, ed. Schneidewin, Poetæ Græc. Minor).

ὥσπερ αὐλῷ βρύτον ἢ Θρῆιξ ἀνὴρ

ἢ Φρὺξ ἔβρυζε, etc.

The similarity of Armenian customs to those of the Thracians and

Phrygians, is not surprising.

[183] Xen. Anab. iv, 5, 26-36.

After this week of repose, the army resumed its march through the

snow. The headman, whose house they had replenished as well as they

could, accompanied Cheirisophus in the van as guide, but was not

put in chains or under guard; his son remained as an hostage with

Episthenes, but his other relations were left unmolested at home. As

they marched for three days without reaching a village, Cheirisophus

began to suspect his fidelity, and even became so out of humor,

though the man affirmed that there were no villages in the track, as

to beat him,—yet without the precaution of putting him afterwards

in fetters. The next night, accordingly, this headman made his

escape; much to the displeasure of Xenophon, who severely reproached

Cheirisophus, first for his harshness, and next for his neglect. This

was the only point of difference between the two (says Xenophon),

during the whole march; a fact very honorable to both, considering

the numberless difficulties against which they had to contend.

Episthenes retained the headman’s youthful son, carried him home in

safety, and became much attached to him.[184]

[184] Xen. Anab. iv. 6, 1-3.

Condemned thus to march without a guide, they could do no better than

march up the course of a river; and thus, from the villages which

had proved so cheering and restorative, they proceeded seven days’

march all through snow, up the river Phasis; a river not verifiable,

but certainly not the same as is commonly known under that name by

Grecian geographers; it was one hundred feet in breadth.[185] Two

more days’ march brought them from this river to the foot of a range

of mountains; near a pass occupied by an armed body of Chalybes,

Taochi, and Phasiani.

[185] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 4.

Observing the enemy in possession of this lofty ground, Cheirisophus

halted until all the army came up; in order that the generals might

take counsel. Here Kleanor began by advising that they should storm

the pass with no greater delay than was necessary to refresh the

soldiers. But Xenophon suggested that it was far better to avoid the

loss of life which must thus be incurred, and to amuse the enemy by

feigned attack, while a detachment should be sent by stealth, at

night, to ascend the mountain at another point and turn the position.

“However (continued he, turning to Cheirisophus), stealing a march

upon the enemy is more your trade than mine. For I understand that

you, the full citizens and peers at Sparta, practise stealing from

your boyhood upward;[186] and that it is held no way base, but even

honorable, to steal such things as the law does not distinctly

forbid. And to the end that you may steal with the greatest effect,

and take pains to do it in secret, the custom is, to flog you if you

are found out. Here, then, you have an excellent opportunity for

displaying your training. Take good care that we be not found out in

stealing an occupation of the mountain now before us; for if we _are_

found out, we shall be well beaten.

[186] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 10-14.

Καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ~καλὸν~ κλέπτειν, etc. The reading

~καλὸν~ is preferred by Schneider to ~ἀναγκαῖον~, which has been

the vulgar reading, and is still retained by Krüger. Both are

sanctioned by authority of MSS., and either would be admissible;

on the whole, I incline to side with Schneider.

“Why, as for that (replied Cheirisophus), you Athenians, also, as I

learn, are capital hands at stealing the public money, and that too

in spite of prodigious peril to the thief; nay, your most powerful

men steal most of all,—at least, if it be the most powerful men

among you who are raised to official command. So that this is a time

for _you_ to exhibit _your_ training as well as for me to exhibit

mine.”[187]

[187] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 16.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη ὁ Χειρίσοφος, κἀγὼ ὑμᾶς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀκούω

δεινοὺς εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μάλα ὄντος δεινοῦ τοῦ

κινδύνου τῷ κλέπτοντι, καὶ τοὺς κρατίστους μέντοι μάλιστα,

εἴπερ ὑμῖν οἱ κράτιστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιοῦνται· ὥστε ὥρα καὶ σοὶ

ἐπιδείκνυσθαι τὴν παίδειαν.

We have here an interchange of raillery between the two Grecian

officers, which is not an uninteresting feature in the history of

the expedition. The remark of Cheirisophus, especially illustrates

that which I noted in a former chapter as true both of Sparta and

Athens[188],—the readiness to take bribes, so general in individuals

clothed with official power; and the readiness, in official

Athenians, to commit such peculation, in spite of serious risk of

punishment. Now this chance of punishment proceeded altogether from

those accusing orators commonly called demagogues, and from the

popular judicature whom they addressed. The joint working of both

greatly abated the evil, yet was incompetent to suppress it. But

according to the pictures commonly drawn of Athens, we are instructed

to believe that the crying public evil was,—too great a license of

accusation, and too much judicial trial. Assuredly, such was not

the conception of Cheirisophus; nor shall we find it borne out by

any fair appreciation of the general evidence. When the peculation

of official persons was thus notorious in spite of serious risks,

what would it have become if the door had been barred to accusing

demagogues, and if the numerous popular dikasts had been exchanged

for a few select judges of the same stamp and class as the official

men themselves?

[188] See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 401 _seq._

Enforcing his proposition, Xenophon now informed his colleagues

that he had just captured a few guides by laying an ambush for

certain native plunderers who beset the rear; and that these guides

acquainted him that the mountain was not inaccessible, but pastured

by goats and oxen. He farther offered himself to take command of

the marching detachment. But this being overruled by Cheirisophus,

some of the best among the captains, Aristonymus, Aristeas, and

Nichomachus, volunteered their services and were accepted. After

refreshing the soldiers, the generals marched with the main army near

to the foot of the pass, and there took up their night-station,

making demonstrations of a purpose to storm it the next morning. But

as soon as it was dark, Aristonymus and his detachment started, and

ascending the mountain at another point, obtained without resistance

a high position on the flank of the enemy, who soon, however, saw

them and despatched a force to keep guard on that side. At daybreak

these two detachments came to a conflict on the heights, in which the

Greeks were completely victorious, while Cheirisophus was marching

up the pass to attack the main body. His light troops, encouraged

by seeing this victory of their comrades, hastened on to the charge

faster than their hoplites could follow. But the enemy was so

dispirited by seeing themselves turned, that they fled with little or

no resistance. Though only a few were slain, many threw away their

light shields of wicker or wood-work, which became the prey of the

conquerors.[189]

[189] Xen. Anab. iv, 6, 20-27.

Thus masters of the pass, the Greeks descended to the level ground

on the other side, where they found themselves in some villages

well-stocked with provisions and comforts; the first in the country

of the Taochi. Probably they halted here some days; for they had seen

no villages, either for rest or for refreshment, during the last nine

days’ march, since leaving those Armenian villages in which they had

passed a week so eminently restorative, and which apparently had

furnished them with a stock of provisions for the onward journey.

Such halt gave time to the Taochi to carry up their families and

provisions into inaccessible strongholds, so that the Greeks found

no supplies, during five days’ march through the territory. Their

provisions were completely exhausted, when they arrived before one

of these strongholds, a rock on which were seen the families and

the cattle of the Taochi; without houses or fortification, but

nearly surrounded by a river, so as to leave only one narrow ascent,

rendered unapproachable by vast rocks which the defenders hurled

or rolled from the summit. By an ingenious combination of bravery

and stratagem, in which some of the captains much distinguished

themselves, the Greeks overcame this difficulty, and took the

height. The scene which then ensued was awful. The Taochian women

seized their children, flung them over the precipice, and then cast

themselves headlong also, followed by the men. Almost every soul thus

perished, very few surviving to become prisoners. An Arcadian captain

named Æneas, seeing one of them in a fine dress about to precipitate

himself with the rest, seized him with a view to prevent it. But the

man in return grasped him firmly, dragged him to the edge of the

rock, and leaped down to the destruction of both. Though scarcely any

prisoners were taken, however, the Greeks obtained abundance of oxen,

asses, and sheep, which fully supplied their wants.[190]

[190] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 2-15.

They now entered into the territory of the Chalybes, which they

were seven days in passing through. These were the bravest warriors

whom they had seen in Asia. Their equipment was a spear of fifteen

cubits long, with only one end pointed,—a helmet, greaves, stuffed

corselet, with a kilt or dependent flaps,—a short sword which they

employed to cut off the head of a slain enemy, displaying the head

in sight of their surviving enemies with triumphant dance and song.

They carried no shield; perhaps because the excessive length of the

spear required the constant employment of both hands,—yet they did

not shrink from meeting the Greeks occasionally in regular, stand-up

fight. As they had carried off all their provisions into hill-forts,

the Greeks could obtain no supplies, but lived all the time upon

the cattle which they had acquired from the Taochi. After seven

days of march and combat,—the Chalybes perpetually attacking their

rear,—they reached the river Harpasus (four hundred feet broad),

where they passed into the territory of the Skythini. It rather seems

that the territory of the Chalybes was mountainous; that of the

Skythini was level, and containing villages, wherein they remained

three days, refreshing themselves, and stocking themselves with

provisions.[191]

[191] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 18.

Four days of additional march brought them to a sight, the like of

which they had not seen since Opis and Sittakê on the Tigris in

Babylonia,—a large and flourishing city called Gymnias; an earnest

of the neighborhood of the sea, of commerce, and of civilization. The

chief of this city received them in a friendly manner, and furnished

them with a guide who engaged to conduct them, after five days’

march, to a hill from whence they would have a view of the sea.

This was by no means their nearest way to the sea, for the chief of

Gymnias wished to send them through the territory of some neighbors

to whom he was hostile; which territory, as soon as they reached it,

the guide desired them to burn and destroy. However, the promise was

kept, and on the fifth day, marching still apparently through the

territory of the Skythini, they reached the summit of a mountain

called Thêchê, from whence the Euxine Sea was visible.[192]

[192] Diodorus (xiv, 29) calls the mountain Χήνοιν—Chenium. He

seems to have had Xenophon before him in his brief description of

this interesting scene.

An animated shout from the soldiers who formed the van-guard

testified the impressive effect of this long-deferred spectacle,

assuring as it seemed to do, their safety and their return home. To

Xenophon and to the rear-guard,—engaged in repelling the attack

of natives who had come forward to revenge the plunder of their

territory,—the shout was unintelligible. They at first imagined that

the natives had commenced attack in front as well as in the rear,

and that the van-guard was engaged in battle. But every moment the

shout became louder, as fresh men came to the summit and gave vent

to their feelings; so that Xenophon grew anxious, and galloped up

to the van with his handful of cavalry to see what had happened.

As he approached, the voice of the overjoyed crowd was heard

distinctly crying out, _Thalatta, Thalatta_ (The sea, the sea), and

congratulating each other in ecstasy. The main body, the rear-guard,

the baggage-soldiers driving up their horses and cattle before

them, became all excited by the sound, and hurried up breathless

to the summit. The whole army, officers and soldiers, were thus

assembled, manifesting their joyous emotions by tears, embraces, and

outpourings of enthusiastic sympathy. With spontaneous impulse they

heaped up stones to decorate the spot by a monument and commemorative

trophy; putting on the stones such homely offerings as their means

afforded,—sticks, hides, and a few of the wicker shields just taken

from the natives. To the guide, who had performed his engagement of

bringing them in five days within sight of the sea, their gratitude

was unbounded. They presented him with a horse, a silver bowl, a

Persian costume, and ten darics in money; besides several of the

soldiers’ rings, which he especially asked for. Thus loaded with

presents, he left them, having first shown them a village wherein

they could find quarters,—as well as the road which they were to

take through the territory of the Makrônes.[193]

[193] Xen. Anab. iv, 7, 23-27.

When they reached the river which divided the land of the Makrônes

from that of the Skythini, they perceived the former assembled in

arms on the opposite side to resist their passage. The river not

being fordable, they cut down some neighboring trees to provide the

means of crossing. While these Makrônes were shouting and encouraging

each other aloud, a peltast in the Grecian army came to Xenophon,

saying that he knew their language, and that he believed this to

be his country. He had been a slave at Athens, exported from home

during his boyhood,—he had then made his escape (probably during

the Peloponnesian war, to the garrison of Dekeleia), and afterwards

taken military service. By this fortunate accident, the generals

were enabled to open negotiations with the Makrônes, and to assure

them that the army would do them no harm, desiring nothing more than

a free passage and a market to buy provisions. The Makrônes, on

receiving such assurance in their own language from a countryman,

exchanged pledges of friendship with the Greeks, assisted them to

pass the river, and furnished the best market in their power during

the three days’ march across their territory.[194]

[194] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 4-7.

The army now reached the borders of the Kolchians, who were found in

hostile array, occupying the summit of a considerable mountain which

formed their frontier. Here Xenophon, having marshalled the soldiers

for attack, with each lochus (company of one hundred men) in single

file, instead of marching up the hill in phalanx, or continuous front

with only a scanty depth,—addressed to them the following pithy

encouragement,—“Now, gentlemen, these enemies before us are the only

impediment that keeps us away from reaching the point at which we

have been so long aiming. We must even eat them raw, if in any way we

can do so.”

Eighty of these formidable companies of hoplites, each in single

file, now began to ascend the hill; the peltasts and bowmen being

partly distributed among them, partly placed on the flanks.

Cheirisophus and Xenophon, each commanding on one wing, spread

their peltasts in such a way as to outflank the Kolchians, who

accordingly weakened their centre in order to strengthen their

wings. Hence the Arcadian peltasts and hoplites in the Greek

centre were enabled to attack and disperse the centre with little

resistance; and all the Kolchians presently fled, leaving the Greeks

in possession of their camp, as well as of several well-stocked

villages in their rear. Amidst these villages the army remained to

refresh themselves for several days. It was here that they tasted the

grateful, but unwholesome honey, which this region still continues to

produce,—unaware of its peculiar properties. Those soldiers who ate

little of it were like men greatly intoxicated with wine; those who

ate much, were seized with the most violent vomiting and diarrhœa,

lying down like madmen in a state of delirium. From this terrible

distemper some recovered on the ensuing day, others two or three days

afterwards. It does not appear that any one actually died.[195]

[195] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 15-22. Most modern travellers attest the

existence, in these regions, of honey intoxicating and poisonous,

such as Xenophon describes. They point out the _Azalea Pontica_,

as the flower from which the bees imbibe this peculiar quality.

Professor Koch, however, calls in question the existence of any

honey thus naturally unwholesome near the Black Sea. He states

(Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 111) that after careful inquiries he

could find no trace of any such. Not contradicting Xenophon, he

thinks that the honey which the Greeks ate must have been stale

or tainted.

Two more days’ march brought them to the sea, at the Greek maritime

city of Trapezus or Trebizond, founded by the inhabitants of Sinôpê

on the coast of the Kolchian territory. Here the Trapezuntines

received them with kindness and hospitality, sending them presents

of bullocks, barley-meal, and wine. Taking up their quarters in some

Kolchian villages near the town, they now enjoyed, for the first

time since leaving Tarsus, a safe and undisturbed repose during

thirty days, and were enabled to recover in some degree from the

severe hardships which they had undergone. While the Trapezuntines

brought produce for sale into the camp, the Greeks provided the

means of purchasing it by predatory incursions against the Kolchians

on the hills. Those Kolchians who dwelt under the hills and on the

plain were in a state of semi-dependence upon Trapezus; so that the

Trapezuntines mediated on their behalf and prevailed on the Greeks

to leave them unmolested, on condition of a contribution of bullocks.

These bullocks enabled the Greeks to discharge the vow which they had

made, on the proposition of Xenophon, to Zeus the Preserver, during

that moment of dismay and despair which succeeded immediately on the

massacre of their generals by Tissaphernes. To Zeus the Preserver,

to Hêraklês the Conductor, and to various other gods, they offered

an abundant sacrifice on their mountain camp overhanging the sea;

and after the festival ensuing, the skins of the victims were given

as prizes to competitors in running, wrestling, boxing, and the

pankration. The superintendence of such festival games, so fully

accordant with Grecian usage and highly interesting to the army,

was committed to a Spartan named Drakontius; a man whose destiny

recalls that of Patroklus and other Homeric heroes,—for he had been

exiled as a boy, having unintentionally killed another boy with a

short sword. Various departures from Grecian custom, however, were

admitted. The matches took place on the steep and stony hill-side

overhanging the sea, instead of on a smooth plain; and the numerous

hard falls of the competitors afforded increased interest to the

bystanders. The captive non-Hellenic boys were admitted to run for

the prize, since otherwise a boy-race could not have been obtained.

Lastly, the animation of the scene, as well as the ardor of the

competitors, was much enhanced by the number of their mistresses

present.[196]

[196] Xen. Anab. iv, 8, 23-27.

A curious and interesting anecdote in Plutarch’s Life of

Alexander, (c. 41) attests how much these Hetæræ accompanying

the soldiers (women for the most part free), were esteemed in

the Macedonian army, and by Alexander himself among the rest. A

Macedonian of Ægæ named Eurylochus, had got himself improperly

put on a list of veterans and invalids, who were on the point of

being sent back from Asia to Europe. The imposition was detected,

and on being questioned he informed Alexander that he had

practised it in order to be able to follow a free Hetæra named

Telesippa, who was about to accompany the departing division. “I

sympathize with your attachment, Eurylochus (replied Alexander);

let us see whether we cannot prevail upon Telesippa either by

persuasion or by presents, since she is of free condition, to

stay behind” (Ἡμᾶς μὲν, ὦ Εὐρύλοχε, συνερῶντας ἔχεις· ὅρα δὲ ὅπως

πείθωμεν ἢ λόγοις ἢ δώροις τὴν Τελεσίππαν, ἐπειδήπερ ἐξ ἐλευθέρας

ἐστί).

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER LXX.

ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND AFTER THEY

QUITTED THE TIGRIS AND ENTERED THE KARDUCHIAN MOUNTAINS.

It would be injustice to this gallant and long-suffering body of

men not to present the reader with a minute description of the full

length of their stupendous march. Up to the moment when the Greeks

enter Karduchia, the line of march may be indicated upon evidence

which, though not identifying special halting-places or localities,

makes us certain that we cannot be far wrong on the whole. But after

that moment, the evidence gradually disappears, and we are left with

nothing more than a knowledge of the terminus, the general course,

and a few negative conditions.

Mr. Ainsworth has given, in his Book IV. (Travels in the Track of the

Ten Thousand, p. 155 seq.) an interesting topographical comment on

the march through Karduchia, and on the difficulties which the Greeks

would have to surmount. He has farther shown what may have been their

probable line of march through Karduchia; but the most important

point which he has established here, seems to be the identity of

the river Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, an eastern affluent of

the Tigris—distinguishing it from the river of Bitlis on the west

and the river Khabur on the south-east, with both of which it had

been previously confounded (p. 167). The Buhtan-Chai falls into the

Tigris at a village called Til, and “constitutes at the present day,

a natural barrier between Kurdistan and Armenia” (p. 166). In this

identification of the Kentritês with the Buhtan-Chai, Professor Koch

agrees (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 78).

If the Greeks crossed the Kentritês near its confluence with the

Tigris, they would march up its right bank in one day to a situation

near the modern town of Sert (Mr. Ainsworth thinks), though Xenophon

takes no notice of the river of Bitlis, which nevertheless they must

have passed. Their next two days of march, assuming a direction

nearly north, would carry them (as Xenophon states, iv. 4, 2) beyond

the sources of the Tigris; that is, “beyond the headwaters of the

eastern tributaries to the Tigris.”

Three days of additional march brought them to the river

Teleboas—“of no great size, but beautiful” (iv. 4, 4). There appear

sufficient reasons to identify this river with the Kara-Su or Black

River, which flows through the valley or plain of Mush into the Murad

or Eastern Euphrates (Ainsworth, p. 172; Ritter, Erdkunde, part

x. s. 37. p. 682). Though Kinneir (Journey through Asia Minor and

Kurdistan, 1818, p. 484), Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of

Cyrus, p. 207) and Bell (System of Geography, iv. p. 140) identify it

with the Ak-Su or river of Mush—this, according to Ainsworth, “is

only a small tributary to the Kara-Su, which is the great river of

the plain and district.”

Professor Koch, whose personal researches in and around Armenia

give to his opinion the highest authority, follows Mr. Ainsworth in

identifying the Teleboas with the Kara-Su. He supposes, however, that

the Greeks crossed the Kentritês, not near its confluence with the

Tigris, but considerably higher up, near the town of Sert or Sort.

From hence he supposes that they marched nearly north-east in the

modern road from Sert to Bitlis, thus getting round the head or near

the head of the river called Bitlis-Su, which is one of the eastern

affluents to the Tigris (falling first into the Buhtan-Chai), and

which Xenophon took for the Tigris itself. They then marched farther,

in a line not far distant from the Lake of Van, over the saddle which

separates that lake from the lofty mountain Ali-Dagh. This saddle is

the water-shed which separates the affluents to the Tigris from those

to the Eastern Euphrates, of which latter the Teleboas or Kara-Su is

one (Koch, Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 82-84).

After the river Teleboas, there seems no one point in the march which

can be identified with anything approaching to certainty. Nor have

we any means even of determining the general line of route, apart

from specific places, which they followed from the river Teleboas to

Trebizond.

Their first object was to reach and cross the Eastern Euphrates.

They would of course cross at the nearest point where they could

find a ford. But how low down its course does the river continue to

be fordable, in mid-winter, with snow on the ground? Here professor

Koch differs from Mr. Ainsworth and colonel Chesney. He affirms that

the river would be fordable a little above its confluence with the

Tscharbahur, about latitude 39° 3′. According to Mr. Ainsworth, it

would not be fordable below the confluence with the river of Khanus

(Khinnis). Koch’s authority, as the most recent and systematic

investigator of these regions, seems preferable, especially as it

puts the Greeks nearly in the road now travelled over from Mush to

Erzerum, which is said to be the only pass over the mountains open

throughout all the winter, passing by Khinnis and Koili; see Ritter,

Erdkunde, x. p. 387. Xenophon mentions a warm spring, which the army

passed by during the third or fourth day after crossing the Euphrates

(Anab. iv, 5, 15). Professor Koch believes himself to have identified

this warm spring—the only one, as he states (p. 90-93), south of

the range of mountains called the Bingöldagh—in the district called

Wardo, near the village of Bashkan.

To lay down, with any certainty, the line which the Greeks followed

from the Euphrates to Trebizond, appears altogether impossible. I

cannot admit the hypothesis of Mr. Ainsworth, who conducts the army

across the Araxes to its northern bank, carries them up northward

to the latitude of Teflis in Georgia, then brings them back again

across the Harpa Chai (a northern affluent of the Araxes, which he

identifies with the Harpasus mentioned by Xenophon) and the Araxes

itself, to Gymnias, which he places near the site of Erzerum.

Professor Koch (p. 104-108), who dissents with good reason from Mr.

Ainsworth, proposes (though with hesitation and uncertainty) a line

of his own which appears to me open greatly to the same objection

as that of Mr. Ainsworth. It carries the Greeks too much to the

northward of Erzerum, more out of their line of march from the place

where they crossed the Eastern Euphrates, than can be justified by

any probability. The Greeks knew well that, in order to get home they

must take a westerly direction (see Anab. iii. 5, 15).

Their great and constant purpose would be to make way to the

westward, as soon as they had crossed the Euphrates; and the road

from that river, passing near the site of Erzerum to Trebizond, would

thus coincide, in the main, with their spontaneous tendency. They

had no motive to go northward of Erzerum, nor ought we to suppose it

without some proof. I trace out, therefore, a line of march much less

circuitous; not meaning it to be understood as the real road which

the army can be proved to have taken, but simply because it seems a

possible line, and because it serves as a sort of approximation to

complete the reader’s idea of the entire ground travelled over by the

Ten Thousand.

Koch hardly makes sufficient account of the overwhelming hardships

with which the Greeks had to contend, when he states (p. 96) that

if they had taken a line as straight, or nearly as straight as was

practicable, they might have marched from the Euphrates to Trebizond

in sixteen or twenty days, even allowing for the bad time of year.

Considering that it was mid-winter, in that very high and cold

country, with deep snow throughout; that they had absolutely no

advantages or assistance of any kind; that their sick and disabled

men, together with their arms, were to be carried by the stronger;

that there were a great many women accompanying them; that they had

beasts to drive along, carrying baggage and plunder,—the prophet

Silanus, for example, having preserved his three thousand darics

in coin from the field of Kunaxa until his return; that there was

much resistance from the Chalybes and Taochi; that they had to take

provisions where provisions were discoverable; that even a small

stream must have impeded them, and probably driven them out of their

course to find a ford,—considering the intolerable accumulation

of these and other hardships, we need not wonder at any degree of

slowness in their progress. It rarely happens that modern travellers

go over these regions in mid-winter; but we may see what travelling

is at that season, by the dreadful description which Mr. Baillie

Fraser gives of his journey from Tauris to Erzerum in the month of

March (Travels in Koordhistan, Letter XV). Mr. Kinneir says (Travels,

p. 353)—“The winters are so severe that all communication between

Baiburt and the circumjacent villages is cut off for four months in

the year, in consequence of the depth of the snow.”

Now if we measure on Kiepert’s map the rectilinear distance,—the

air-line—from Trebizond to the place where Koch represents the

Greeks to have crossed the Eastern Euphrates,—we shall find

it one hundred and seventy English miles. The number of days’

journey-marches which Xenophon mentions are fifty-four; even if we

include the five days of march undertaken from Gymnias (Anab. iv.

7, 20), which, properly speaking, were directed against the enemies

of the governor of Gymnias, more than for the promotion of their

retreat. In each of those fifty-four days, therefore, they must

have made 3.14 miles of rectilinear progress. This surely is not an

unreasonably slow progress to suppose, under all the disadvantages of

their situation; nor does it imply any very great actual departure

from the straightest line practicable. Indeed Koch himself (in his

Introduction, p. 4) suggests various embarrassments which must have

occurred on the march, but which Xenophon has not distinctly stated.

The river which Xenophon calls the Harpasus seems to be probably the

Tchoruk-su, as colonel Chesney and Prof. Koch suppose. At least it is

difficult to assign any other river with which the Harpasus can be

identified.

I cannot but think it probable that the city which Xenophon calls

_Gymnias_ (Diodorus, xiv. 29, calls it Gymnasia) was the same as

that which is now called Gumisch-Khana (Hamilton), Gumush-Kaneh

(Ainsworth), Gemisch-Khaneh (Kinneir). “Gumisch-Khana (says Mr.

Hamilton, Travels in Asia Minor, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 168; ch. xiv. p.

234) is celebrated as the site of the most ancient and considerable

silver-mines in the Ottoman dominions.” Both Mr. Kinneir and Mr.

Hamilton passed through Gumisch-Khana on the road from Trebizond to

Erzerum.

Now here is not only great similarity of name, and likelihood of

situation,—but the existence of the silver mines furnishes a

plausible explanation of that which would otherwise be very strange;

the existence of this “great, flourishing, inhabited, city,” inland,

in the midst of such barbarians,—the Chalybes, the Skythini, the

Makrônes, etc.

Mr. Kinneir reached Gumisch-Khana at the end of the third day after

quitting Trebizond; the two last days having been very long and

fatiguing. Mr. Hamilton, who also passed through Gumisch-Khana,

reached it at the end of two long days. Both these travellers

represent the road near Gumisch-Khana as extremely difficult. Mr.

Ainsworth, who did not himself pass through Gumisch-Khana, tells

us (what is of some importance in this discussion) that it lies in

the _winter-road_ from Erzerum to Trebizond (Travels in Asia Minor,

vol. ii. p. 394). “The winter-road, which is the longest, passes by

Gumisch-Khana, and takes the longer portion of valley; all the others

cross over the mountain at various points, to the east of the road

by the mines. But whether going by the mountains or the valley, the

muleteers often go indifferently to the west as far as Ash Kaleh, and

at other times turn off by the villages of Bey Mausour and Kodjah

Bunar, where they take to the mountains.”

Mr. Hamilton makes the distance from Trebizond to Gumisch-Khana

eighteen hours, or fifty-four calculated post miles; that is, about

forty English miles (Appendix to Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. p.

389).

Now we are not to suppose that the Greeks marched in any direct road

from Gymnias to Trebizond. On the contrary, the five days’ march

which they undertook immediately from Gymnias were conducted by a

guide sent from that town, who led them over the territories of

people hostile to Gymnias, in order that they might lay waste the

lands (iv. 7, 20). What progress they made, during these marches,

towards Trebizond, is altogether doubtful. The guide promised that on

the fifth day he would bring them to a spot from whence they could

view the sea, and he performed his promise by leading them to the top

of the sacred mountain Thêchê.

Thêchê was a summit (ἄκρον, iv. 7, 25), as might be expected. But

unfortunately it seems impossible to verify the particular summit

on which the interesting scene described by Xenophon took place.

Mr. Ainsworth presumes it to be the mountain called Kop-Dagh; from

whence, however, according to Koch, the sea cannot be discerned.

D’Anville and some other geographers identify it with the ridge

called Tekieh-Dagh, to the east of Gumisch-Khana; nearer to the sea

than that place. This mountain, I think, would suit pretty well for

the narrative in respect to position; but Koch and other modern

travellers affirm that it is neither high enough, nor near enough to

the sea, to permit any such view as that which Xenophon relates. It

stands on Kiepert’s map at a distance of full thirty-five English

miles from the sea, the view of which, moreover, seems intercepted

by the still higher mountain-chain now called Kolath-Dagh, a portion

of the ancient Paryadres, which runs along parallel to the coast. It

is to be recollected that in the first half of February, the time of

Xenophon’s visit, the highest peaks would certainly be all covered

with snow, and therefore very difficult to ascend.

There is a striking view obtained of the sea from the mountain called

Karakaban. This mountain, more than four thousand feet high, lies

rather above twenty miles from the sea, to the south of Trebizond,

and immediately north of the still higher chain of Kolath-Dagh. From

the Kolath-Dagh chain, which runs east and west, there strike out

three or four parallel ridges to the northward, formed of primitive

slate, and cut down precipitously so as to leave deep and narrow

valleys between. On leaving Trebizond, the traveller ascends the hill

immediately above the town, and then descends into the valley on

the other side. His road to Karakaban lies partly along the valley,

partly along the crest of one of the four ridges just mentioned. But

throughout all this road, the sea is never seen; being hidden by the

hills immediately above Trebizond. He does not again see the sea

until he reaches Karakaban, which is sufficiently high to enable him

to see over those hills. The guides (as I am informed by Dr. Holland,

who twice went over the spot) point out with great animation this

view of the sea, as particularly deserving of notice. It is enjoyed

for a short space while the road winds round the mountain, and then

again lost.

Here is a view of the sea at once distant, sudden, impressive,

and enjoyed from an eminence not too high to be accessible to the

Cyreian army. In so far, it would be suitable to the description of

Xenophon. Yet again it appears that a person coming to this point

from the land-side (as Xenophon of course did), would find it in

his descending route, not in his ascending; and this can hardly be

reconciled with the description which we read in the Greek historian.

Moreover, the subsequent marches which Xenophon mentions after

quitting the mountain summit Thêchê, can hardly be reconciled with

the supposition that it was the same as what is now called Karakaban.

It is, indeed, quite possible, (as Mr. Hamilton suggests), that

Thêchê may have been a peak apart from any road, and that the guide

may have conducted the soldiers thither for the express purpose of

showing the sea, guiding them back again into the road afterwards.

This increases the difficulty of identifying the spot. However, the

whole region is as yet very imperfectly known, and perhaps it is

not impossible that there may be some particular locality even on

Tekiah-Dagh, whence, through an accidental gap in the intervening

mountains, the sea might become visible.