CHAPTER LXX.

RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.

The first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was

exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay

and sorrow; accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture

into which he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus

himself too repented, and with good reason, of having displayed,

in his manner of fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so

little regard either to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus.

Nevertheless he still maintained the tone of a victor in the field,

and after expressions of grief for the fate of the young prince,

desired Proklês and Glus to return to Ariæus, with the reply, that

the Greeks on their side were conquerors without any enemy remaining;

that they were about to march onward against Artaxerxes; and that if

Ariæus would join them, they would place him on the throne which had

been intended for Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariæus by

his particular friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks

procured a meal as well as they could, having no bread, by killing

some of the baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook their

meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been

thrown away on the field, and the baggage carts.[100]

[100] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 5-7.

Before any answer could be received from Ariæus, heralds appeared

coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus, a Greek from

Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was in the

service of the Persian king.[101] Phalinus, an officer of some

military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes, addressed

himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the part of the

king, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to surrender their

arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme

to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it was not the practice for

victorious men to lay down their arms. Being then called away to

examine the sacrifice which was going on, he left the interview to

the other officers, who met the summons of Phalinus by an emphatic

negative. “If the king thinks himself strong enough to ask for our

arms unconditionally, let him come and try to seize them.” “The

king (rejoined Phalinus) thinks that you are in his power, being

in the midst of his territory, hemmed in by impassable rivers, and

encompassed by his innumerable subjects.”—“Our arms and our valor

are all that remain to us (replied a young Athenian); we shall not

be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining treasure, but

shall employ them still to have a fight for your treasure.”[102] But

though several spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting

others disposed to encourage a negotiation; saying that they had been

faithful to Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to

Artaxerxes, if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else.

In the midst of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested

by Phalinus to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first

asked the advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common

feeling of Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little

judgment, that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out.

“If (replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your

favor, in the event of a contest with the king, I should advise you

to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance

of safety for you against the king’s consent, I recommend you to

look out for safety in the only quarter where it presents itself.”

Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question,

Klearchus rejoined,—“That is _your_ opinion; now report our

answer: We think we shall be better friends to the king, if we are

to be his friends,—or more effective enemies, if we are to be his

enemies,—with our arms, than without them.” Phalinus, in retiring,

said that the king proclaimed a truce so long as they remained in

their present position,—but war, if they moved, either onward or

backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without declaring which he

intended to do.[103]

[101] We know from Plutarch (Artaxer. c. 13) that Ktesias

distinctly asserted himself to have been present at this

interview, and I see no reason why we should not believe him.

Plutarch indeed rejects his testimony as false, affirming that

Xenophon would certainly have mentioned him, had he been there;

but such an objection seems to me insufficient. Nor is it

necessary to construe the words of Xenophon, ἦν δ᾽ αὐτῶν Φαλῖνος

~εἶς Ἕλλην~, (ii, 1, 7) so strictly as to negative the presence

of one or two other Greeks. Phalinus is thus specified because he

was the spokesman of the party—a military man.

[102] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 12 μὴ οὖν οἴου τὰ μόνα ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα

ὑμῖν παραδώσειν· ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν

μαχούμεθα.

[103] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 14-22. Diodorus (xiv, 25) is somewhat

copious in his account of the interview with Phalinus. But he

certainly followed other authorities besides Xenophon, if even it

be true that he had Xenophon before him. The allusion to the past

heroism of Leonidas seems rather in the style of Ephorus.

Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to

Ariæus returned; communicating his reply, that the Persian grandees

would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and

that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if

the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the

night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the

lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning

sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against

the king,—a prohibition of which he now understood the reason,

from having since learnt that the king was on the other side of

the Tigris, and therefore out of their reach,—but that it was

favorable for rejoining Ariæus. He gave directions accordingly for a

night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where they had

passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian

generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly

acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and

experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The

night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariæus

at the preceding station about midnight; not without the alarming

symptom, however, that Miltokythês the Thracian deserted to the king,

at the head of three hundred and forty of his countrymen, partly

horse, partly foot.

The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange solemn

oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariæus. According

to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a

ram, were all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow

of a shield; in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariæus,

with his chief companions, a spear.[104] The latter, besides the

promise of alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks, in good faith,

down to the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what

route he proposed to take; whether to return by that along which they

had come up, or by any other. To this Ariæus replied, that the road

along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the

utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that

he intended to choose another road, which, though longer, would be

sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was,

however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days’

marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get

out of the reach of the king’s forces, who would hardly be able to

overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.

[104] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 7-9. Koch remarks, however, with good

reason, that it is difficult to see how they could get a wolf in

Babylonia, for the sacrifice (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 51).

They had now come ninety-three days’ march[105] from Ephesus, or

ninety from Sardis.[106] The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is,

according to Colonel Chesney, about twelve hundred and sixty-five

geographical miles, or fourteen hundred and sixty-four English miles.

There had been at least ninety-six days of rest, enjoyed at various

places, so that the total of time elapsed must have at least been one

hundred and eighty-nine days, or a little more than half a year;[107]

but it was probably greater, since some intervals of rest are not

specified in number of days.

[105] Such is the sum total stated by Xenophon himself (Anab.

ii, 1, 6). It is greater, by nine days, than the sum total which

we should obtain by adding together the separate days’ march

specified by Xenophon from Sardis. But the distance from Sardis

to Ephesus, as we know from Herodotus, was three days’ journey

(Herod. v, 55); and therefore the discrepancy is really only to

the amount of six, not of nine. See Krüger ad Anabas. p. 556;

Koch, Zug der Z. p. 141.

[106] Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, c. ii, p. 208)

calculates twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles from

Sardis to Kunaxa or the Mounds of Mohammed.

[107] For example, we are not told how long they rested at Pylæ,

or opposite to Charmandê. I have given some grounds (in the

preceding chapter) for believing that it cannot have been less

than five days. The army must have been in the utmost need of

repose, as well as of provisions.

How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently

insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the field,

indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more the

undisputed march throughout so long a space, left them no serious

apprehensions.[108] In spite of this great extent, population, and

riches, they had been allowed to pass through the most difficult

and defensible country, and to ford the broad Euphrates, without a

blow; nay, the king had shrunk from defending the long trench which

he had specially caused to be dug for the protection of Babylonia.

But the difficulties which stood between them and their homes were

of a very different character. How were they to find their way back,

or obtain provisions, in defiance of a numerous hostile cavalry,

which, not without efficiency even in a pitched battle would be most

formidable in opposing their retreat? The line of their upward march

had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by Cyrus;—yet even

under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of failing,

in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called

upon to think and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either

roads or distances,—without trustworthy guides,—without any one

to furnish or even to indicate supplies,—and with a territory all

hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means of crossing.

Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of any other

river except the Euphrates; nor does he indeed, in his heart, seem

to have conceived retreat as practicable without the consent of

the king.[109] The reader who casts his eye on a map of Asia, and

imagines the situation of this Greek division on the left bank of

the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude 33° 30′—will hardly be

surprised at any measure of despair, on the part either of general or

soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had not even the advantage of

such a map, or probably of any map at all, to enable him to shape his

course.

[108] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 9.

[109] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7.

In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to consult

Ariæus who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with good

reason, that return by the same road was impracticable; and promised

to conduct them home by another road,—longer indeed, yet better

supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began their march

in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night they should

reach some villages of the Babylonian territory, as in fact they

did;[110] yet not before they had been alarmed in the afternoon by

the supposed approach of some of the enemy’s horse, and by evidences

that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to slacken

their march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence they did

not reach the first villages before dark; and these too had been

pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that only

the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation, while

the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they could

without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamor, dispute, and

even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be obtained.

Early the next morning Klearchus ordered them under arms; and

desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the

herald to proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had

let the ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded

with a talent of silver.[111]

[110] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 13. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ~ἐπορεύοντο

ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸν ἥλιον~, λογιζόμενοι ἥξειν ἅμα ἡλίῳ δύνοντι

εἰς κώμας τῆς Βαβυλωνίας χώρας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθησαν.

Schneider, in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter,

(Erdkunde, part. x, 3, p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the

Track, p. 103) and Colonel Chesney (Euph. and Tigr. p. 219),

understand the words here used by Xenophon in a sense from

which I dissent. “When it was day, the army proceeded onward on

their march, having the sun on their right hand,”—these words

they understand as meaning that the army marched _northward_;

whereas, in my judgment, the words intimate that the army marched

_eastward_. _To have the sun on the right hand_, does not so

much refer either to the precise point where, or to the precise

instant when, the sun rises,—but to his diurnal path through the

heavens, and to the general direction of the day’s march. This

may be seen by comparing the remarkable passage in Herodotus,

iv, 42, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa,

from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of

Gibraltar, by the Phœnicians under the order of Nekos. These

Phœnicians said, “that in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea)

they had the sun on their right hand”—ὡς τὴν Λιβύην περιπλώοντες

~τὸν ἠέλιον ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ~. Herodotus rejects this statement as

incredible. Not knowing the phenomena of a southern latitude

beyond the tropic of Capricorn, he could not imagine that men in

sailing from East to West could possibly have the sun on their

right hand; any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits

of Gibraltar must, in his judgment, have the sun on the _left_

hand, as he himself had always experienced in the north latitude

of the Mediterranean or the African coast. See Vol. III. of this

History, ch. xviii, p. 282.

In addition to this reason, we may remark, that Ariæus and the

Greeks, starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphrates

(the place where they had passed the last night but one before

the battle of Kunaxa) and marching _northward_, could not expect

to arrive, and could not really arrive, at villages of the

Babylonian territory. But they might naturally expect to do so,

if they marched _eastward_, towards the Tigris. Nor would they

have hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact

have been something near to a return upon their own previous

steps. They would moreover have been stopped by the undefended

Trench, which could only be passed at the narrow opening close to

the Euphrates.

[111] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 20. This seems to have been a standing

military jest, to make the soldiers laugh at their past panic.

See the references in Krüger and Schneider’s notes.

What was the project of route entertained by Ariæus, we cannot

ascertain;[112] since it was not farther pursued. For the effect of

the unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the enemy,—and

even the clamor and shouting of the camp during the night—so

intimidated the Persian commanders, that they sent heralds the next

morning to treat about a truce. The contrast between this message,

and the haughty summons of the preceding day to lay down their arms,

was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, and taught them that the

proper way of dealing with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive

demeanor. When Klearchus was apprised of the arrival of the heralds,

he desired them at first to wait at the outposts until he was at

leisure; then, having put his troops into the best possible order,

with a phalanx compact on every side to the eye, and the unarmed

persons out of sight, he desired the heralds to be admitted. He

marched out to meet them with the most showy and best-armed soldiers

immediately around him, and when they informed him that they had

come from the king with instructions to propose a truce, and to

report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, Klearchus

replied abruptly,—“Well then,—go and tell the king, that our first

business must be to fight; for we have nothing to eat, nor will any

man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce, without first providing

dinner for them.” With this reply the heralds rode off, but returned

very speedily; thus making it plain that the king, or the commanding

officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the king thought

their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a

place where they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be

concluded.

[112] Diodorus (xvi, 24) tells us that Ariæus intended to guide

them towards Paphlagonia; a very loose indication.

After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon the

Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired that the guides

would conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could

be had. He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during

the march, himself taking charge of the rear guard. The guides led

them over many ditches and channels, full of water, and cut for the

purpose of irrigation; some so broad and deep that they could not be

crossed without bridges. The army had to put together bridges for

the occasion, from palm trees either already fallen, or expressly

cut down. This was a troublesome business, which Klearchus himself

superintended with peculiar strictness. He carried his spear in the

left hand, his stick in the right; employing the latter to chastise

any soldier who seemed remiss,—and even plunging into the mud and

lending his own hands in aid wherever it was necessary.[113] As it

was not the usual season of irrigation for crops, he suspected that

the canals had been filled on this occasion expressly to intimidate

the Greeks, by impressing them with the difficulties of their

prospective march; and he was anxious to demonstrate to the Persians

that these difficulties were no more than Grecian energy could easily

surmount.

[113] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 7, 13.

At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides

for quarters and provision; and here for the first time they had a

sample of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory,

which Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision.

Large quantities of corn,—dates not only in great numbers, but of

such beauty, freshness, size and flavor, as no Greek had ever seen

or tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece,

was disregarded and left for the slaves,—wine and vinegar, both

also made from the date-palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon

is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare

and anxious apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches

which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quanity, brought upon

himself and others.[114]

[114] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 14, 17.

After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they were

visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees and

a suite of slaves. The satrap began to open a negotiation with

Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an interpreter,

he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy to Greece

impressed him with a strong interest in favor of the Cyreian Greeks,

and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate

situation; that he had solicited the king’s permission to save them,

as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to

forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only

Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King

had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the meantime

to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack

him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory

answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty

in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus,

after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied,

that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march,

without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought

them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been

ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always

treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had

no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious

to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from

all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favor or

assistance. With this answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned

on the next day but one, informing them that he had obtained the

King’s permission to save the Grecian army,—though not without

great opposition, since many Persian counsellors contended that it

was unworthy of the King’s dignity, to suffer those who had assailed

him to escape. “I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and

exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back into

Greece, with the country friendly, and with a regular market for you

to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to

pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country. If I do

not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to

take them where you can find them.” Well were the Greeks content to

enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon

it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their

side,—and by Tissaphernes with the King’s brother-in-law on the

other. Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would go back to

the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home;

going himself to his own satrapy.[115]

[115] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 18-27.

The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly and

not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing that

Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in his

contest for the throne,—that the first report conveyed to her of the

battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, filled her with

joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of

his death,—that she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all

those, who though acting in the Persian army and for the defence of

Artaxerxes, had any participation in the death of Cyrus—and that

she showed favorable dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks.[116]

It seems probable, farther, that her influence may have been exerted

to procure for them an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the

use afterwards made by Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the

present convention. And in one point of view, the Persian king had

an interest in facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance

which rendered retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous

to him in their actual position. They were in the heart of the

Persian empire, within seventy miles of Babylon; in a country

not only teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible;

especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as

Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt.[117] And Klearchus might

say to his Grecian soldiers,—what Xenophon was afterwards preparing

to say to them at Kalpê on the Euxine Sea, and what Nikias also

affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he conducted away from

Syracuse[118]—that wherever they sat down, they were sufficiently

numerous and well-organized to become at once a city. A body of such

troops might effectually assist, and would perhaps encourage, the

Babylonian population to throw off the Persian yoke, and to exonerate

themselves from the prodigious tribute which they now paid to the

satrap. For these reasons, the advisers of Artaxerxes thought it

advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out of Babylonia,

beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any rate

the primary object of the convention. And it was the more necessary

to conciliate the good-will of the Greeks, because there seems to

have been but one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge could only be

reached by inviting them to advance considerably farther into the

interior of Babylonia.

[116] Ktesiæ Persica, Fragm. c. 59, ed. Bähr; compared with the

remarkable Fragment. 18, preserved by the so-called Demetrius

Phalêreus: see also Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 17.

[117] Herodot. i, 193; ii, 108; Strabo, xvii. p. 788.

[118] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 16; Thucyd. vii.

Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time when

Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention. For

twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him

any communication; the Cyreian Persians under Ariæus being encamped

near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few

days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so as

Ariæus received during this interval several visits from his Persian

kinsmen, and friendly messages from the king, promising amnesty for

his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were

painfully felt in manifest coldness of demeanor on the part of his

Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the

Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the king

had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements,

until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more

effectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus

replied,—“I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike our

tents, it will be a breach of the convention and a declaration of

war. No one will furnish us with provisions; we shall have no guides;

Ariæus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops

as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for

us to cross, I know not; but we know that the Euphrates itself can

never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any

cavalry,—while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of our

enemies. If the king, having all these advantages, really wishes to

destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all these

oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in the

eyes both of Greeks and barbarians.”[119]

[119] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 3-8.

Such words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his

own complete despair of the situation,—certainly a very natural

despair,—except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and also his

ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling

helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernes.

That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came back, with

his army prepared to return to Ionia,—with the king’s daughter

whom he had just received in marriage,—and with another grandee

named Orontas. Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march, providing

supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariæus and his

division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, and

became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the Greeks

followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the rear, with

a separate guide for themselves; not without jealousy and mistrust,

sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting wood or

forage, between them and the Persians of Ariæus. After three days’

march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the moment

when they began their retreat with Ariæus) they came to the Wall of

Media, and passed through it,[120] prosecuting their march onward

through the country on its other or interior side. It was of bricks

cemented with bitumen, one hundred feet high, and twenty feet broad;

it was said to extend a length of twenty parasangs (or about seventy

miles, if we reckon the parasang at thirty stadia), and to be not far

distant from Babylon. Two days of farther march, computed as eight

parasangs, brought them to the Tigris. During these two days they

crossed two great ship canals, one of them over a permanent bridge,

the other over a temporary bridge laid on seven boats. Canals of

such magnitude must probably have been two among the four stated by

Xenophon to be drawn from the river Tigris, each of them a parasang

distant from the other. They were one hundred feet broad, and deep

enough even for heavy vessels; they were distributed by means of

numerous smaller channels and ditches for the irrigation of the soil;

and they were said to fall into the Euphrates; or rather, perhaps,

they terminated in one main larger canal cut directly from the

Euphrates to the Tigris, each of them joining this larger canal at

a different point of its course. Within less than two miles of the

Tigris was a large and populous city named Sittakê, near which the

Greeks pitched their camp, on the verge of a beautiful park or thick

grove full of all kinds of trees; while the Persians all crossed the

Tigris, at the neighboring bridge.

[120] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 12. Διελθόντες δὲ ~τρεῖς σταθμοὺς~,

ἀφίκοντο πρὸς τὸ Μηδίας καλούμενον τεῖχος, καὶ ~παρῆλθον αὐτοῦ

εἴσω~. It appears to me that these three days’ march or σταθμοὶ

can hardly be computed from the moment when they commenced

their march under the conduct of Tissaphernes. On the other

hand, if we begin from the moment when the Greeks started under

conduct of Ariæus, we can plainly trace three distinct _resting

places_ (σταθμοὺς) before they reached the Wall of Media.

First, at the villages where the confusion and alarm arose (ii,

13-21). Secondly, at the villages of abundant supply, where

they concluded the truce with Tissaphernes, and waited twenty

days for his return (ii, 3, 14; ii, 4, 9). Thirdly, one night’s

halt under the conduct of Tissaphernes, before they reached the

Wall of Media. This makes three distinct stations or halting

places, between the station (the first station after passing

the undefended trench) from whence they started to begin their

retreat under the conduct of Ariæus,—and the point where they

traversed the Wall of Media.

As Proxenus and Xenophon were here walking in front of the camp after

supper, a man was brought up who had asked for the former at the

advanced posts. This man said that he came with instructions from

Ariæus. He advised the Greeks to be on their guard, as there were

troops concealed in the adjoining grove, for the purpose of attacking

them during the night,—and also to send and occupy the bridge

over the Tigris, since Tissaphernes intended to break it down, in

order that the Greeks might be caught without possibility of escape

between the river and the canal. On discussing this information with

Klearchus, who was much alarmed by it, a young Greek present remarked

that the two matters stated by the informant contradicted each other;

for that if Tissaphernes intended to attack the Greeks during the

night, he would not break down the bridge, so as both to prevent his

own troops on the other side from crossing to aid, and to deprive

those on this side of all retreat if they were beaten,—while, if

the Greeks were beaten, there was no escape open to them, whether

the bridge continued or not. This remark induced Klearchus to ask

the messenger, what was the extent of ground between the Tigris and

the canal. The messenger replied, that it was a great extent of

country, comprising many large cities and villages. Reflecting on

this communication, the Greek officers came to the conclusion that

the message was a stratagem on the part of Tissaphernes to frighten

them and accelerate their passage across the Tigris; under the

apprehension that they might conceive the plan of seizing or breaking

the bridge and occupying a permanent position in the spot where they

were; which was an island, fortified on one side by the Tigris,—on

the other sides, by intersecting canals between the Euphrates and

the Tigris.[121] Such an island was a defensible position, having

a most productive territory with numerous cultivators, so as to

furnish shelter and means of hostility for all the king’s enemies.

Tissaphernes calculated that the message now delivered would induce

the Greeks to become alarmed with their actual position and to cross

the Tigris with as little delay as possible. At least this was the

interpretation which the Greek officers put upon his proceeding;

an interpretation highly plausible, since, in order to reach the

bridge over the Tigris, he had been obliged to conduct the Greek

troops into a position sufficiently tempting for them to hold,—and

since he knew that his own purposes were purely treacherous. But the

Greeks, officers as well as soldiers, were animated only by the wish

of reaching home. They trusted, though not without misgivings, in

the promise of Tissaphernes to conduct them; and never for a moment

thought of taking permanent post in this fertile island. They did

not, however, neglect the precaution of sending a guard during the

night to the bridge over the Tigris, which no enemy came to assail.

On the next morning they passed over it in a body, in cautious and

mistrustful array, and found themselves on the eastern bank of the

Tigris,—not only without attack, but even without sight of a single

Persian, except Glus, the interpreter, and a few others watching

their motions.

[121] I reserve for this place the consideration of that which

Xenophon states, in two or three passages, about the Wall

of Media and about different canals in connection with the

Tigris,—the result of which, as far as I can make it out, stands

in my text.

I have already stated, in the preceding chapter, that in the

march of the day next but one preceding the battle of Kunaxa,

the army came to a deep and broad trench dug for defence across

their line of way, with the exception of a narrow gut of twenty

feet broad close by the Euphrates; through which gut the whole

army passed. Xenophon says, “This trench had been carried upwards

across the plain as far as the Wall of Media, where indeed,

the canals are situated, flowing from the river Tigris; four

canals, one hundred feet in breadth, and extremely deep, so

that corn-bearing vessels sail along them. They strike into the

Euphrates, they are distant each from the other by one parasang,

and there are bridges over them—Παρετέτατο δ᾽ ἡ τάφρος ἄνω διὰ

τοῦ πεδίου ἐπὶ δώδεκα παράσαγγας, μέχρι τοῦ Μηδίας τείχους,

ἔνθα δὴ (the books print a full stop between τείχους and ἔνθα,

which appears to me incorrect, as the sense goes on without

interruption) εἰσιν αἱ διωρύχες, ἀπὸ τοῦ Τίγρητος ποταμοῦ

ῥέουσαι· εἰσὶ δὲ τέτταρες, τὸ μὲν εὖρος πλεθριαῖαι, βαθεῖαι

δὲ ἰσχυρῶς, καὶ πλοῖα πλεῖ ἐν αὐταῖς σιταγωγά· εἰσβάλλουσι δὲ

εἰς τὸν Εὐφράτην, διαλείπουσι δ᾽ ἑκάστη παρασάγγην, γέφυραι δ᾽

ἔπεισιν. The present tense—εἰσιν αἱ διώρυχες—seems to mark the

local reference of ἔνθα to the Wall of Media, and not to the

actual march of the army.

Major Rennell (Illustrations of the Expedition of Cyrus, pp.

79-87, etc.), Ritter, (Erdkunde, x, p. 16), Koch, (Zug der Zehn

Tausend, pp. 46, 47), and Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the Track

of the Ten Thousand, p. 88) consider Xenophon to state that

the Cyreian army on this day’s march (the day but one before

the battle) passed through the Wall of Media and over the four

distinct canals reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates. They

all, indeed, contest the accuracy of this latter statement;

Rennell remarking that the level of the Tigris, in this part

of its course, is lower than that of the Euphrates; and that

it could not supply water for so many broad canals so near to

each other. Col. Chesney also conceives the army to have passed

through the Wall of Media before the battle of Kunaxa.

It seems to me, however, that they do not correctly interpret the

words of Xenophon, who does not say that Cyrus ever passed either

the Wall of Media, or these four canals _before_ the battle of

Kunaxa, but who says (as Krüger, De Authentiâ Anabaseos, p. 12,

prefixed to his edition of the Anabasis, rightly explains him),

that these four canals flowing from the Tigris are at, or near,

the Wall of Media, which the Greeks did not pass through until

long _after_ the battle, when Tissaphernes was conducting them

towards the Tigris, two days’ march before they reached Sittakê

(Anab. ii, 4, 12).

It has been supposed, during the last few years, that the

direction of the Wall of Media could be verified by actual ruins

still subsisting on the spot. Dr. Ross and Captain Lynch (see

journal of the Geographical Society, vol. ix. pp. 447-473, with

Captain Lynch’s map annexed) discovered a line of embankment

which they considered to be the remnant of it. It begins on the

western bank of the Tigris, in latitude 34° 3′, and stretches

towards the Euphrates in a direction from N. N. E. to S. S. W.

“It is a solitary straight single mound, twenty-five long paces

thick, with a bastion on its western face at every fifty-five

paces; and on the same side it has a deep ditch, twenty-seven

paces broad. The wall is here built of the small pebbles of the

country, imbedded in cement of lime of great tenacity; it is from

thirty-five to forty feet in height, and runs in a straight line

as far as the eye can trace it. The Bedouins tell me that it goes

in the same straight line to two mounds called Ramelah on the

Euphrates, some hours above Felujah; that it is, in places far

inland, built of brick, and in some parts worn down to a level

with the desert.” (Dr. Ross, l. c. p. 446).

Upon the faith of these observations, the supposed wall (now

called Sidd Nimrud by the natives) has been laid down as the Wall

of Media reaching from the Tigris to the Euphrates, in the best

recent maps, especially that of Colonel Chesney; and accepted as

such by recent inquirers.

Nevertheless, subsequent observations, recently made known by

Colonel Rawlinson to the Geographical Society, have contradicted

the views of Dr. Ross as stated above, and shown that the Wall

of Media, in the line here assigned to it, has no evidence to

rest upon. Captain Jones, commander of the steamer at Bagdad,

undertook, at the request of Colonel Rawlinson a minute

examination of the locality, and ascertained that what had been

laid down as the Wall of Media was merely a line of mounds;

no wall at all, but a mere embankment, extending seven or

eight miles from the Tigris, and designed to arrest the winter

torrents and drain off the rain water of the desert into a large

reservoir, which served to irrigate an extensive valley between

the rivers.

From this important communication it results, that there is as

yet no evidence now remaining for determining what was the line

or position of the Wall of Media; which had been supposed to be

a datum positively established, serving as premises from whence

to deduce other positions mentioned by Xenophon. As our knowledge

now stands, there is not a single point mentioned by Xenophon

in Babylonia which can be positively verified, except Babylon

itself,—and Pylæ, which is known pretty nearly, as the spot

where Babylonia proper commences.

The description which Xenophon gives of the Wall of Media is very

plain and specific. I see no reason to doubt that he actually

saw it, passed through it, and correctly describes it in height

as well as breadth. Its entire length he of course only gives

from what he was told. His statement appears to me good evidence

that there was a Wall of Media, which reached from the Tigris to

the Euphrates, or perhaps to some canal cut from the Euphrates,

though there exists no mark to show what was the precise locality

and direction of the Wall. Ammianus Marcellinus (xxiv, 2), in

the expedition of the emperor Julian, saw near Macepracta, on

the left bank of the Euphrates, the ruins of a wall, “which in

ancient times had stretched to a great distance for the defence

of Assyria against foreign invasion.” It is fair to presume that

this was the Wall of Media; but the position of Macepracta cannot

be assigned.

It is important, however, to remember,—what I have already

stated in this note,—that Xenophon did not see, and did not

cross either the Wall of Media, or the two canals here mentioned,

until many days after the battle of Kunaxa.

We know from Herodotus that all the territory of Babylonia was

intersected by canals, and that there was one canal greater

than the rest and navigable, which flowed from the Euphrates to

the Tigris, in a direction to the south of east. This coincides

pretty well with the direction assigned in Colonel Chesney’s map

to the Nahr-Malcha or Regium Flumen, into which the four great

canals, described by Xenophon as drawn from the Tigris to the

Euphrates, might naturally discharge themselves, and still be

said to fall into the Euphrates, of which the Nahr-Malcha was as

it were a branch. How the level of the two rivers would adjust

itself, when the space between them was covered with a network of

canals great and small, and when a vast quantity of the water of

both was exhausted in fertilizing the earth, is difficult to say.

The _island_ wherein the Greeks stood, at their position near

Sittakê, before crossing the Tigris, would be a parallelogram

formed by the Tigris, the Nahr-Malcha, and the two parallel

canals joining them. It might well be called a large island,

containing many cities and villages, with a large population.

After having crossed by a bridge laid upon thirty-seven pontoons,

the Greeks continued their march to the northward upon the eastern

side of the Tigris, for four days, to the river Physkus; said to

be twenty parasangs.[122] The Physkus was one hundred feet wide,

with a bridge, and the large city of Opis near it. Here, at the

frontier of Assyria and Media, the road from the eastern regions to

Babylon joined the road northerly on which the Greeks were marching.

An illegitimate brother of Artaxerxes was seen at the head of a

numerous force, which he was conducting from Susa and Ekbatana as a

reinforcement to the royal army. This great host halted to see the

Greeks pass by; and Klearchus ordered the march in column of two

abreast, employing himself actively to maintain an excellent array,

and halting more than once. The army thus occupied so long a time in

passing by the Persian host, that their numbers appeared greater than

the reality, even to themselves; while the effect upon the Persian

spectators was very imposing.[123] Here Assyria ended and Media

began. They marched, still in a northerly direction, for six days

through a portion of Media almost unpeopled, until they came to some

flourishing villages which formed a portion of the domain of queen

Parysatis; probably these villages, forming so marked an exception to

the desert character of the remaining march, were situated on the

Lesser Zab, which flows into the Tigris, and which Xenophon must have

crossed, though he makes no mention of it. According to the order

of march stipulated between the Greeks and Tissaphernes, the latter

only provided a supply of provisions for the former to purchase; but

on the present halt, he allowed the Greeks to plunder the villages,

which were rich and full of all sorts of subsistence,—yet without

carrying off the slaves. The wish of the satrap to put an insult on

Cyrus, as his personal enemy,[124] through Parysatis, thus proved a

sentence of ruin to these unhappy villagers. Five more days’ march,

called twenty parasangs, brought them to the banks of the river

Zabatus, or the Greater Zab, which flows into the Tigris near a

town now called Senn. During the first of these five days, they saw

on the opposite side of the Tigris a large town called Kænæ, from

whence they received supplies of provisions, brought across by the

inhabitants upon rafts supported by inflated skins.[125]

[122] There seems reason to believe that in ancient times the

Tigris, above Bagdad, followed a course more to the westward, and

less winding, than it does now. The situation of Opis cannot be

verified. The ruins of a large city were seen by Captain Lynch

near the confluence of the river Adhem with the Tigris, which he

supposed to be Opis, in lat. 34°.

[123] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 26.

[124] Ktesias, Fragm. 18, ed. Bähr.

[125] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 26-28.

Mannert, Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, and most modern commentators,

identify this town of Καιναὶ or Kænæ with the modern town Senn;

which latter place Mannert (Geogr. der Röm. v. p. 333) and

Rennell (Illustrations p. 129) represent to be near the Lesser

Zab instead of the Greater Zab.

To me it appears that the locality assigned by Xenophon to

Καιναὶ, does not at all suit the modern town of Senn. Nor is

there much real similarity of name between the two; although our

erroneous way of pronouncing the Latin name _Caenae_, creates a

delusive appearance of similarity. Mr. Ainsworth shows that some

modern writers have been misled in the same manner by identifying

the modern town of Sert with Tigrano-_certa_.

It is a perplexing circumstance in the geography of Xenophon’s

work, that he makes no mention of the Lesser Zab, which yet he

must have crossed. Herodotus notices them both, and remarks on

the fact that though distinct rivers, both bore the same name (v,

52). Perhaps in drawing up his narrative after the expedition,

Xenophon may have so far forgotten, as to fancy that two

synonymous rivers mentioned as distinct in his memoranda, were

only one.

On the banks of the Great Zab they halted three days,—days of

serious and tragical moment. Having been under feelings of mistrust,

ever since the convention with Tissaphernes, they had followed

throughout the whole march, with separate guides of their own, in the

rear of his army, always maintaining their encampment apart. During

their halt on the Zab, so many various manifestations occurred to

aggravate the mistrust, that hostilities seemed on the point of

breaking out between the two camps. To obviate this danger Klearchus

demanded an interview with Tissaphernes, represented to him the

threatening attitude of affairs, and insisted on the necessity of

coming to a clear understanding. He impressed upon the satrap that,

over and above the solemn oaths which had been interchanged, the

Greeks on their side could have no conceivable motive to quarrel

with him; that they had everything to hope from his friendship, and

everything to fear, even to the loss of all chance of safe return,

from his hostility; that Tissaphernes, also, could gain nothing by

destroying them, but would find them, if he chose, the best and most

faithful instruments for his own aggrandizement and for conquering

the Mysians and the Pisidians,—as Cyrus had experienced while he was

alive. Klearchus concluded his protest by requesting to be informed,

what malicious reporter had been filling the mind of Tissaphernes

with causeless suspicions against the Greeks.[126]

[126] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 2-15.

“Klearchus (replied the satrap), I rejoice to hear such excellent

sense from your lips. You remark truly, that if you were to meditate

evil against me, it would recoil upon yourselves. I shall prove to

you, in my turn, that you have no cause to mistrust either the king

or me. If we had wished to destroy you, nothing would be easier. We

have superabundant forces for the purpose; there are wide plains

in which you would be starved,—besides mountains and rivers which

you would be unable to pass, without our help. Having thus the

means of destroying you in our hands, and having nevertheless bound

ourselves by solemn oaths to save you, we shall not be fools and

knaves enough to attempt it now, when we should draw upon ourselves

the just indignation of the gods. It is my peculiar affection for my

neighbors, the Greeks,—and my wish to attach to my own person, by

ties of gratitude, the Greek soldiers of Cyrus,—which have made me

eager to conduct you to Ionia in safety. For I know that when you are

in my service, though the king is the only man who can wear his tiara

erect _upon his head_, I shall be able to wear mine erect upon _my

heart_, in full pride and confidence.”[127]

[127] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 17-23. This last comparison is curious,

and in all probability the genuine words of the satrap—τὴν μὲν

γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ τιάραν βασιλεῖ μόνῳ ἔξεστιν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν, τὴν δ᾽

ἐπὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἴσως ἂν ὑμῶν παρόντων καὶ ἕτερος εὐπετῶς ἔχοι.

So powerful was the impression made upon Klearchus by these

assurances, that he exclaimed,—“Surely those informers deserve the

severest punishment, who try to put us at enmity, when we are such

good friends to each other, and have so much reason to be so.” “Yes

(replied Tissaphernes), they deserve nothing less; and if you, with

the other generals and lochages, will come into my tent to-morrow, I

will tell you who the calumniators are.” “To-be-sure I will (rejoined

Klearchus), and bring the other generals with me. I shall tell you at

the same time, who are the parties that seek to prejudice us against

you.” The conversation then ended, the satrap detaining Klearchus

to dinner, and treating him in the most hospitable and confidential

manner.

On the next morning, Klearchus communicated what had passed to the

Greeks, insisting on the necessity that all the generals should go

to Tissaphernes pursuant to his invitation; in order to reëstablish

that confidence which unworthy calumniators had shaken, and to punish

such of the calumniators as might be Greeks. So emphatically did

he pledge himself for the good faith and philhellenic dispositions

of the satrap, that he overruled the opposition of many among the

soldiers; who, still continuing to entertain their former suspicions,

remonstrated especially against the extreme imprudence of putting

all the generals at once into the power of Tissaphernes. The urgency

of Klearchus prevailed. Himself with four other generals,—Proxenus,

Menon, Agias, and Sokrates,—and twenty lochages or captains,—went

to visit the satrap in his tent; about two hundred of the soldiers

going along with them, to make purchases for their own account in the

Persian camp-market.[128]

[128] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 30.

On reaching the quarters of Tissaphernes,—distant nearly three

miles from the Grecian camp, according to habit,—the five generals

were admitted into the interior, while the lochages remained at

the entrance. A purple flag, hoisted from the top of the tent,

betrayed too late the purpose for which they had been invited to

come. The lochages and the Grecian soldiers who had accompanied them

were surprised and cut down, while the generals in the interior

were detained, put in chains, and carried up as prisoners to the

Persian court. Here Klearchus, Proxenus, Agias, and Sokrates were

beheaded after a short imprisonment. Queen Parysatis, indeed, from

affection to Cyrus, not only furnished many comforts to Klearchus

in the prison, by the hands of her surgeon, Ktesias, but used all

her influence with her son Artaxerxes to save his life; though

her efforts were counteracted, on this occasion, by the superior

influence of queen Stateira, his wife. The rivalry between these

two royal women, doubtless arising out of many other circumstances

besides the death of Klearchus, became soon afterwards so furious,

that Parysatis caused Stateira to be poisoned.[129]

[129] Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 1. Ktesiæ Frag. Persica, c. 60, ed. Bähr;

Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 19, 20; Diodor. xiv, 27.

Menon was not put to death along with the other generals. He appears

to have taken credit at the Persian court for the treason of

entrapping his colleagues into the hands of Tissaphernes. But his

life was only prolonged to perish a year afterwards in disgrace and

torture,—probably by the requisition of Parysatis, who thus avenged

the death of Klearchus. The queen-mother had always power enough to

perpetrate cruelties, though not always to avert them.[130] She had

already brought to a miserable end every one, even faithful defenders

of Artaxerxes, concerned in the death of her son Cyrus.

[130] Tacit. Histor. i, 45. “Othoni nondum auctoritas inerat ad

_prohibendum_ scelus; _jubere_ jam poterat. Ita, simulatione

iræ, vinciri jussum (Marium Celsum) et majores pœnas daturum,

affirmans, præsenti exitio subtraxit.”

Ktesias (Persica, c. 60; compare Plutarch and Diodorus as

referred to in the preceding note) attests the treason of Menon,

which he probably derived from the story of Menon himself.

Xenophon mentions the ignominious death of Menon, and he probably

derived his information from Ktesias (see Anabasis, ii, 6, 29).

The supposition that it was Parysatis who procured the death

of Menon, in itself highly probable, renders all the different

statements consistent and harmonious.

Though Menon thought it convenient, when brought up to Babylon, to

boast of having been the instrument through whom the generals were

entrapped into the fatal tent, this boast is not to be treated as

matter of fact. For not only does Xenophon explain the catastrophe

differently, but in the delineation which he gives of Menon, dark

and odious as it is in the extreme, he does not advance any such

imputation; indirectly, indeed, he sets it aside.[131] Unfortunately

for the reputation of Klearchus, no such reasonable excuse can be

offered for his credulity, which brought himself as well as his

colleagues to so melancholy an end, and his whole army to the brink

of ruin. It appears that the general sentiment of the Grecian army,

taking just measure of the character of Tissaphernes, was disposed

to greater circumspection in dealing with him. Upon that system

Klearchus himself had hitherto acted; and the necessity of it might

have been especially present to _his_ mind, since he had served with

the Lacedæmonian fleet at Miletus in 411 B.C., and had, therefore,

had fuller experience than other men in the army, of the satrap’s

real character.[132] On a sudden he now turns round, and on the faith

of a few verbal declarations, puts all the military chiefs into the

most defenceless posture and the most obvious peril, such as hardly

the strongest grounds for confidence could have justified. Though

the remark of Machiavel is justified by large experience,—that

from the short-sightedness of men and their obedience to present

impulse, the most notorious deceiver will always find new persons

to trust him,—still such misjudgment on the part of an officer of

age and experience is difficult to explain.[133] Polyænus intimates

that beautiful women, exhibited by the satrap at his first banquet

to Klearchus alone, served as a lure to attract him with all his

colleagues to the second; while Xenophon imputes the error to

continuance of a jealous rivalry with Menon. The latter,[134] it

appears, having always been intimate with Ariæus, had been thus

brought into previous communication with Tissaphernes, by whom he had

been well received, and by whom he was also encouraged to lay plans

for detaching the whole Grecian army from Klearchus, so as to bring

it all under his (Menon’s) command, into the service of the satrap.

Such at least was the suspicion of Klearchus; who, jealous in the

extreme of his own military authority, tried to defeat the scheme by

bidding still higher himself for the favor of Tissaphernes. Imagining

that Menon was the unknown calumniator who prejudiced the satrap

against him, he hoped to prevail on the satrap to disclose his name

and dismiss him.[135] Such jealousy seems to have robbed Klearchus

of his customary prudence. We must also allow for another impression

deeply fixed in his mind; that the salvation of the army was hopeless

without the consent of Tissaphernes, and, therefore, since the latter

had conducted them thus far in safety, when he might have destroyed

them before, that his designs at the bottom could not be hostile.[136]

[131] Xenophon seems to intimate that there were various stories

current, which he does not credit, to the disparagement of

Menon,—καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀφανῆ ἔξεστι περὶ αὐτοῦ ψεύδεσθαι, etc.

(Anab. ii, 6, 28).

Athenæus (xi, p. 505) erroneously states that Xenophon affirmed

Menon to be the person who caused the destruction of Klearchus by

Tissaphernes.

[132] Xenophon in the Cyropædia (viii, 8, 3) gives a strange

explanation of the imprudent confidence reposed by Klearchus in

the assurance of the Persian satrap. It arose (he says) from the

high reputation for good faith which the Persians had acquired

by the undeviating and scrupulous honor of the first Cyrus (or

Cyrus the Great), but which they had since ceased to deserve,

though the corruption of their character had not before publicly

manifested itself.

This is a curious perversion of history to serve the purpose of

his romance.

[133] Macciavelli, Principe, c. 18, p. 65.

[134] Polyæn. vii, 18.

[135] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 27, 28.

[136] Compare Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7; ii, 5, 9.

Notwithstanding these two great mistakes,—one on the present

occasion, one previously, at the battle of Kunaxa, in keeping the

Greeks on the right contrary to the order of Cyrus,—both committed

by Klearchus, the loss of that officer was doubtless a great

misfortune to the army; while, on the contrary, the removal of Menon

was a signal benefit,—perhaps a condition of ultimate safety. A man

so treacherous and unprincipled as Xenophon depicts Menon, would

probably have ended by really committing towards the army that

treason, for which he falsely took credit at the Persian court in

reference to the seizure of the generals.

The impression entertained by Klearchus, respecting the hopeless

position of the Greeks in the heart of the Persian territory after

the death of Cyrus, was perfectly natural in a military man who could

appreciate all the means of attack and obstruction which the enemy

had it in their power to employ. Nothing is so unaccountable in this

expedition as the manner in which such means were thrown away,—the

spectacle of Persian impotence. First, the whole line of upward

march, including the passage of the Euphrates, left undefended; next,

the long trench dug across the frontier of Babylonia, with only

a passage of twenty feet wide left near the Euphrates, abandoned

without a guard; lastly, the line of the Wall of Media and the canals

which offered such favorable positions for keeping the Greeks out

of the cultivated territory of Babylonia, neglected in like manner,

and a convention concluded, whereby the Persians engaged to escort

the invaders safe to the Ionian coast, beginning by conducting them

through the heart of Babylonia, amidst canals affording inexpugnable

defences if the Greeks had chosen to take up a position among them.

The plan of Tissaphernes, as far as we can understand it, seems to

have been, to draw the Greeks to some considerable distance from

the heart of the Persian empire, and then to open his schemes of

treasonable hostility, which the imprudence of Klearchus enabled

him to do, on the banks of the Great Zab, with chances of success

such as he could hardly have contemplated. We have here a fresh

example of the wonderful impotence of the Persians. We should have

expected that, after having committed so flagrant an act of perfidy,

Tissaphernes would at least have tried to turn it to account; that

he would have poured, with all his forces and all his vigor, on the

Grecian camp, at the moment when it was unprepared, disorganized,

and without commanders. Instead of which, when the generals (with

those who accompanied them to the Persian camp) had been seized or

slain, no attack whatever was made except by small detachments of

Persian cavalry upon individual Greek stragglers in the plain. One

of the companions of the generals, an Arcadian named Nikarchus, ran

wounded into the Grecian camp, where the soldiers were looking from

afar at the horsemen scouring the plain without knowing what they

were about,—exclaiming that the Persians were massacring all the

Greeks, officers as well as soldiers. Immediately the Greek soldiers

hastened to put themselves in defence, expecting a general attack

to be made upon their camp; but no more Persians came near than a

body of about three hundred horse, under Ariæus and Mithridates

(the confidential companions of the deceased Cyrus), accompanied by

the brother of Tissaphernes. These men, approaching the Greek lines

as friends, called for the Greek officers to come forth, as they

had a message to deliver from the king. Accordingly, Kleanor and

Sophænetus, with an adequate guard, came to the front, accompanied by

Xenophon, who was anxious to hear news about Proxenus. Ariæus then

acquainted them that Klearchus, having been detected in a breach of

the convention to which he had sworn, had been put to death; that

Proxenus and Menon, who had divulged his treason, were in high honor

at the Persian quarters. He concluded by saying,—the king calls upon

you to surrender your arms, which now (he says) belong to him, since

they formerly belonged to his slave Cyrus.[137]

[137] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 37, 38.

The step here taken seems to testify a belief on the part of these

Persians, that the generals being now in their power, the Grecian

soldiers had become defenceless, and might be required to surrender

their arms, even to men who had just been guilty of the most deadly

fraud and injury towards them. If Ariæus entertained such an

expectation, he was at once undeceived by the language of Kleanor and

Xenophon, who breathed nothing but indignant reproach; so that he

soon retired and left the Greeks to their own reflections.

While their camp thus remained unmolested, every man within it was a

prey to the most agonizing apprehensions. Ruin appeared impending and

inevitable, though no one could tell in what precise form it would

come. The Greeks were in the midst of a hostile country, ten thousand

stadia from home, surrounded by enemies, blocked up by impassable

mountains and rivers, without guides, without provisions, without

cavalry to aid their retreat, without generals to give orders. A

stupor of sorrow and conscious helplessness seized upon all. Few came

to the evening muster; few lighted fires to cook their suppers; every

man lay down to rest where he was; yet no man could sleep, for fear,

anguish, and yearning after relatives whom he was never again to

behold.[138]

[138] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 2, 3.

Amidst the many causes of despondency which weighed down this forlorn

army, there was none more serious than the fact, that not a single

man among them had now either authority to command, or obligation

to take the initiative. Nor was any ambitious candidate likely

to volunteer his pretensions, at a moment when the post promised

nothing but the maximum of difficulty as well as of hazard. A new,

self-kindled, light—and self-originated stimulus—was required, to

vivify the embers of suspended hope and action, in a mass paralyzed

for the moment, but every way capable of effort. And the inspiration

now fell, happily for the army, upon one in whom a full measure of

soldierly strength and courage was combined with the education of an

Athenian, a democrat, and a philosopher.

It is in true Homeric vein, and in something like Homeric language,

that Xenophon (to whom we owe the whole narrative of the expedition)

describes his dream, or the intervention of Oneirus, sent by Zeus,

from which this renovating impulse took its rise.[139] Lying mournful

and restless, like his comrades, he caught a short repose; when

he dreamt that he heard thunder, and saw the burning thunder-bolt

fall upon his paternal house, which became forthwith encircled by

flames. Awaking, full of terror, he instantly sprang up; upon which

the dream began to fit on and blend itself with his waking thoughts,

and with the cruel realities of his position. His pious and excited

fancy generated a series of shadowy analogies. The dream was sent by

Zeus[140] the King, since it was from him that thunder and lightning

proceeded. In one respect, the sign was auspicious,—that a great

light had appeared to him from Zeus, in the midst of peril and

suffering. But on the other hand, it was alarming, that the house had

appeared to be completely encircled by flames, preventing all egress,

because this seemed to indicate that he would remain confined where

he was in the Persian dominions, without being able to overcome the

difficulties which hedged him in. Yet doubtful as the promise was,

it was still the message of Zeus addressed to himself, serving as

a stimulus to him to break through the common stupor and take the

initiative movement.[141] “Why am I lying here? Night is advancing;

at daybreak the enemy will be on us, and we shall be put to death

with tortures. Not a man is stirring to take measures of defence.

Why do I wait for any man older than myself, or for any man of a

different city, to begin?”

[139] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-11. Ἦν δέ τις ἐν τῇ στρατιᾷ Ξενοφῶν

Ἀθηναῖος, ὃς οὔτε στρατηγὸς, etc.

Homer, Iliad, v, 9—

Ἦν δέ τις ἐν Τρώεσσι Δάρης, ἀφνεῖος, ἀμύμων,

Ἱρεὺς Ἡφαίστοιο, etc.

Compare the description of Zeus sending Oneirus to the sleeping

Agamemnon, at the beginning of the second book of the Iliad.

[140] Respecting the value of a sign from Zeus Basileus, and the

necessity of conciliating him, compare various passages in the

Cyropædia, ii, 4, 19; iii, 3, 21; vii, 5, 57.

[141] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 12, 13. Περίφοβος δ᾽ εὐθὺς ἀνηγέρθη, καὶ

τὸ ὄναρ τῆ μὲν ἔκρινεν ἀγαθόν, ὅτι ἐν πόνοις ὢν καὶ κινδύνοις

φῶς μέγα ἐκ Διὸς ἰδεῖν ἔδοξε, etc. ... Ὁποῖον τι μὲν δή ἐστι τὸ

τοιοῦτον ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, ἔξεστι σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβάντων μετὰ τὸ

ὄναρ. Γίγνεται γὰρ τάδε. Εὐθὺς ἐπειδὴ ἀνηγέρθη, πρῶτον μὲν ἔννοια

αὐτῷ ἐμπίπτει· Τί κατάκειμαι; ἡ δὲ νὺξ προβαίνει· ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ

εἰκὸς τοὺς πολεμίους ἥξειν, etc.

The reader of Homer will readily recall various passages in the

Iliad and Odyssey, wherein the like mental talk is put into

language and expanded,—such as Iliad, xi, 403—and several other

passages cited or referred to in Colonel Mure’s History of the

Language and Literature of Greece, ch. xiv, vol. ii, p. 25 _seq._

A vision of light shining brightly out of a friendly house,

counts for a favorable sign (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 587

C.).

With these reflections, interesting in themselves and given with

Homeric vivacity, he instantly went to convene the lochagi or

captains who had served under his late friend Proxenus; and impressed

upon them emphatically the necessity of standing forward to put the

army in a posture of defence. “I cannot sleep, gentlemen; neither, I

presume, can you, under our present perils. The enemy will be upon

us at daybreak,—prepared to kill us all with tortures, as his worst

enemies. For my part, I rejoice that his flagitious perjury has put

an end to a truce by which we were the great losers; a truce under

which we, mindful of our oaths, have passed through all the rich

possessions of the king, without touching anything except what we

could purchase with our own scanty means. Now, we have our hands

free; all these rich spoils stand between us and him, as prizes for

the better man. The gods, who preside over the match, will assuredly

be on the side of us, who have kept our oaths in spite of strong

temptations, against these perjurers. Moreover, our bodies are more

enduring, and our spirits more gallant, than theirs. They are easier

to wound, and easier to kill, than we are, under the same favor of

the gods as we experienced at Kunaxa.

“Probably others also are feeling just as we feel. But let us not

wait for any one else to come as monitors to us; let us take the

lead, and communicate the stimulus of honor to others. Do you show

yourselves now the best among the lochages,—more worthy of being

generals than the generals themselves. Begin at once, and I desire

only to follow you. But if you order me into the front rank, I shall

obey without pleading my youth as an excuse,—accounting myself of

complete maturity, when the purpose is to save myself from ruin.”[142]

[142] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 16, 25.

“Vel imperatore, vel milite, me utemini.” (Sallust, Bellum

Catilinar. c. 20).

All the captains who heard Xenophon cordially concurred in

his suggestion, and desired him to take the lead in executing

it. One captain alone,—Apollonides, speaking in the Bœotian

dialect,—protested against it as insane; enlarging upon their

desperate position, and insisting upon submission to the king, as the

only chance of safety. “How (replied Xenophon)? Have you forgotten

the courteous treatment which we received from the Persians in

Babylonia, when we replied to their demand for the surrender of our

arms by showing a bold front? Do not you see the miserable fate which

has befallen Klearchus, when he trusted himself unarmed in their

hands, in reliance on their oaths? And yet you scout our exhortations

to resistance, again advising us to go and plead for indulgence! My

friends, such a Greek as this man, disgraces not only his own city,

but all Greece besides. Let us banish him from our counsels, cashier

him, and make a slave of him to carry baggage.”—“Nay (observed

Agasias of Stymphalus), the man has nothing to do with Greece; I

myself have seen his ears bored, like a true Lydian.” Apollonides was

degraded accordingly.[143]

[143] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 26-30. It would appear from the words

of Xenophon, that Apollonides had been one of those who had held

faint-hearted language (ὑπομαλακιζόμενοι, ii, 1, 14) in the

conversation with Phalinus shortly after the death of Cyrus.

Hence Xenophon tells him, that this is the second time of his

offering such advice—Ἃ σὺ πάντα εἰδὼς, τοὺς μὲν ἀμύνασθαι

κελεύοντας φλυαρεῖν φῂς, ~πείθειν δὲ πάλιν κελεύεις ἰόντας~;

This helps to explain the contempt and rigor with which Xenophon

here treats him. Nothing indeed could be more deplorable, under

the actual circumstances, than for a man “to show his acuteness

by summing up the perils around.” See the remarkable speech of

Demosthenes at Pylos (Thucyd. iv, 10).

Xenophon with the rest then distributed themselves in order to bring

together the chief remaining officers in the army, who were presently

convened, to the number of about one hundred. The senior captain of

the earlier body next desired Xenophon to repeat to this larger body

the topics upon which he had just before been insisting. Xenophon

obeyed, enlarging yet more emphatically on the situation, perilous,

yet not without hope,—on the proper measures to be taken,—and

especially on the necessity that they, the chief officers remaining,

should put themselves forward prominently, first fix upon effective

commanders, then afterwards submit the names to be confirmed by the

army, accompanied with suitable exhortations and encouragement. His

speech was applauded and welcomed, especially by the Lacedæmonian

general Cheirisophus, who had joined Cyrus with a body of seven

hundred hoplites at Issus in Kilikia. Cheirisophus urged the captains

to retire forthwith, and agree upon other commanders instead of the

four who had been seized; after which the herald must be summoned,

and the entire body of soldiers convened without delay. Accordingly

Timasion of Dardanus was chosen instead of Klearchus; Xanthiklês in

place of Sokrates; Kleanor in place of Agias; Philesius in place

of Menon; and Xenophon instead of Proxenus.[144] The captains, who

had served under each of the departed generals, separately chose a

successor to the captain thus promoted. It is to be recollected that

the five now chosen were not the only generals in the camp; thus for

example, Cheirisophus had the command of his own separate division,

and there may have been one or two others similarly placed. But it

was now necessary for all the generals to form a Board and act in

concert.

[144] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 36-46.

At daybreak the newly constituted Board of generals placed proper

outposts in advance, and then convened the army in general assembly,

in order that the new appointments might be submitted and confirmed.

As soon as this had been done, probably on the proposition of

Cheirisophus (who had been in command before), that general addressed

a few words of exhortation and encouragement to the soldiers. He was

followed by Kleanor, who delivered, with the like brevity, an earnest

protest against the perfidy of Tissaphernes and Ariæus. Both of

them left to Xenophon the task, alike important and arduous at this

moment of despondency, of setting forth the case at length,—working

up the feelings of the soldiers to that pitch of resolution which

the emergency required,—and above all, extinguishing all those

inclinations to acquiesce in new treacherous proposals from the

enemy, which the perils of the situation would be likely to suggest.

Xenophon had equipped himself in his finest military costume at this

his first official appearance before the army, when the scales seemed

to tremble between life and death. Taking up the protest of Kleanor

against the treachery of the Persians, he insisted that any attempt

to enter into convention or trust with such liars, would be utter

ruin,—but that if energetic resolution were taken to deal with them

only at the point of the sword, and punish their misdeeds, there was

good hope of the favor of the gods and of ultimate preservation. As

he pronounced this last word, one of the soldiers near him happened

to sneeze. Immediately the whole army around shouted with one accord

the accustomed invocation to Zeus the Preserver; and Xenophon, taking

up the accident, continued,—“Since, gentlemen, this omen from Zeus

the Preserver has appeared at the instant when we were talking about

preservation, let us here vow to offer the preserving sacrifice to

that god, and at the same time to sacrifice to the remaining gods as

well as we can, in the first friendly country which we may reach. Let

every man who agrees with me, hold up his hand.” All held up their

hands; all then joined in the vow, and shouted the pæan.

This accident, so dexterously turned to profit by the rhetorical

skill of Xenophon, was eminently beneficial in raising the army out

of the depression which weighed them down, and in disposing them to

listen to his animating appeal. Repeating his assurances that the

gods were on their side, and hostile to their perjured enemy, he

recalled to their memory the great invasions of Greece by Darius

and Xerxes,—how the vast hosts of Persia had been disgracefully

repelled. The army had shown themselves on the field of Kunaxa worthy

of such forefathers; and they would for the future be yet bolder,

knowing by that battle of what stuff the Persians were made. As for

Ariæus and his troops, alike traitors and cowards, their desertion

was rather a gain than a loss. The enemy were superior in horsemen;

but men on horseback were, after all, only men, half-occupied in the

fear of losing their seats,—incapable of prevailing against infantry

firm on the ground,—and only better able to run away. Now that the

satrap refused to furnish them with provisions to buy, they on their

side were released from their covenant, and would take provisions

without buying. Then as to the rivers; those were indeed difficult

to be crossed in the middle of their course; but the army would

march up to their sources, and could then pass them without wetting

the knee. Or indeed, the Greeks might renounce the idea of retreat,

and establish themselves permanently in the king’s own country,

defying all his force, like the Mysians and Pisidians. “If (said

Xenophon) we plant ourselves here at our ease in a rich country, with

these tall, stately, and beautiful Median and Persian women for our

companions,[145]—we shall be only too ready, like the Lotophagi,

to forget our way home. We ought first to go back to Greece, and

tell our countrymen that if they remain poor, it is their own fault,

when there are rich settlements in this country awaiting all who

choose to come, and who have courage to seize them. Let us burn our

baggage-waggons and tents, and carry with us nothing but what is of

the strictest necessity. Above all things, let us maintain order,

discipline, and obedience to the commanders, upon which our entire

hope of safety depends. Let every man promise to lend his hand to

the commanders in punishing any disobedient individuals; and let us

thus show the enemy that we have ten thousand persons like Klearchus,

instead of that one whom they have so perfidiously seized. Now is the

time for action. If any man, however obscure, has anything better to

suggest, let him come forward and state it; for we have all but one

object,—the common safety.”

[145] Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.

Ἀλλὰ γὰρ δέδοικα μή ἂν ἅπαξ μάθωμεν ἀργοὶ ζῆν καὶ ἐν ἀφθόνοις

βιοτεύειν, καὶ Μήδων δὲ καὶ Περσῶν ~καλαῖς καὶ μεγάλαις γυναιξὶ

καὶ παρθένοις ὁμιλεῖν~, μὴ ὥσπερ οἱ λωτοφάγοι, ἐπιλαθώμεθα τῆς

οἴκαδε ὁδοῦ.

Hippokrates (De Aëre, Locis, et Aquis, c. 12) compares the

physical characteristics of Asiatics and Europeans, noticing the

ample, full-grown, rounded, voluptuous, but inactive forms of

the first,—as contrasted with the more compact, muscular, and

vigorous type of the second, trained for movement, action, and

endurance.

Dio Chrysostom has a curious passage, in reference to the Persian

preference for eunuchs as slaves, remarking that they admired

even in males an approach to the type of feminine beauty,—their

eyes and tastes being under the influence only of aphrodisiac

ideas; whereas the Greeks, accustomed to the constant training

and naked exercises of the palæstra, boys competing with boys and

youths with youths, had their associations of the male beauty

attracted towards active power and graceful motion.

Οὐ γὰρ φανερὸν, ὅτι οἱ Πέρσαι εὐνούχους ἐποίουν τοὺς καλοὺς, ὅπως

αὐτοῖς ὡς κάλλιστοι ὦσι; Τοσοῦτον διαφέρειν ᾤοντο πρὸς κάλλος τὸ

θῆλυ· σχεδὸν καὶ πάντες οἱ βάρβαροι, διὰ τὸ μόνον τὰ ἀφροδίσια

ἐννοεῖν. Κἀκεῖνοι γυναικός εἰδος περιτιθέασι τοῖς ἄῤῥεσιν, ἄλλως

δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπίστανται ἐρᾷν· ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἡ τροφὴ αἰτία τοῖς Πέρσαις,

τῷ μέχρι πολλοῦ τρέφεσθαι ὑπό τε γυναικῶν καὶ εὐνούχων τῶν

πρεσβυτέρων· παῖδας δὲ μετὰ παιδῶν, καὶ μειράκια μετὰ μειρακίων

μὴ πάνυ συνεῖναι, μηδὲ γυμνοῦσθαι ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ γυμνασίοις,

etc. (Orat. xxi, p. 270).

Compare Euripides, Bacchæ, 447 _seq._; and the Epigram of Strato

in the Anthologia, xxxiv, vol. ii, p. 367 Brunck.

It appears that no one else desired to say a word, and that

the speech of Xenophon gave unqualified satisfaction; for when

Cheirisophus put the question, that the meeting should sanction his

recommendations, and finally elect the new generals proposed,—every

man held up his hand. Xenophon then moved that the army should break

up immediately, and march to some well-stored villages, rather more

than two miles distant; that the march should be in a hollow oblong,

with the baggage in the centre; that Cheirisophus, as a Lacedæmonian,

should lead the van; while Kleanor, and the other senior officers,

would command on each flank,—and himself with Timasion, as the two

youngest of the generals, would lead the rear-guard.

This proposition was at once adopted, and the assembly broke up,

proceeding forthwith to destroy, or distribute among one another,

every man’s superfluous baggage,—and then to take their morning meal

previous to the march.

The scene just described is interesting and illustrative in more

than one point of view.[146] It exhibits that susceptibility to the

influence of persuasive discourse which formed so marked a feature

in the Grecian character,—a resurrection of the collective body out

of the depth of despair, under the exhortation of one who had no

established ascendency, nor anything to recommend him, except his

intelligence, his oratorical power, and his community of interest

with themselves. Next, it manifests, still more strikingly, the

superiority of Athenian training as compared with that of other parts

of Greece. Cheirisophus had not only been before in office as one

of the generals, but was also a native of Sparta, whose supremacy

and name was at that moment all-powerful. Kleanor had been before,

not indeed a general, but a lochage, or one in the second rank of

officers;—he was an elderly man,—and he was an Arcadian, while

more than the numerical half of the army consisted of Arcadians and

Achæans. Either of these two, therefore, and various others besides,

enjoyed a sort of prerogative, or established starting-point,

for taking the initiative in reference to the dispirited army.

But Xenophon was comparatively a young man, with little military

experience;—he was not an officer at all, either in the first or

second grade, but simply a volunteer, companion of Proxenus;—he was,

moreover, a native of Athens, a city at that time unpopular among

the great body of Greeks, and especially of Peloponnesians, with

whom her recent long war had been carried on. Not only, therefore,

he had no advantages compared with others, but he was under positive

disadvantages. He had nothing to start with except his personal

qualities and previous training; in spite of which we find him not

merely the prime mover, but also the ascendent person for whom the

others make way. In him are exemplified those peculiarities of

Athens, attested not less by the denunciation of her enemies than

by the panegyric of her own citizens,[147]—spontaneous and forward

impulse, as well in conception as in execution,—confidence under

circumstances which made others despair,—persuasive discourse and

publicity of discussion, made subservient to practical business,

so as at once to appeal to the intelligence, and stimulate the

active zeal, of the multitude. Such peculiarities stood out more

remarkably from being contrasted with the opposite qualities in

Spartans,—mistrust in conception, slackness in execution, secrecy in

counsel, silent and passive obedience. Though Spartans and Athenians

formed the two extremities of the scale, other Greeks stood nearer on

this point to the former than to the latter.

[146] A very meagre abstract is given by Diodorus, of that which

passed after the seizure of the generals (xiv, 27). He does

not mention the name of Xenophon on this occasion, nor indeed

throughout all his account of the march.

[147] Compare the hostile speech of the Corinthian envoy at

Sparta, prior to the Peloponnesian war, with the eulogistic

funeral oration of Perikles, in the second year of that war

(Thucyd. i, 70, 71; ii, 39, 40).

Οἱ μέν γε (εἰσὶ), νεωτεροποιοὶ (description of the Athenians by

the Corinthian speaker) ~καὶ ἐπινοῆσαι ὀξεῖς καὶ ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργῳ

ἃ ἂν γνῶσιν~· ὑμεῖς δὲ (Lacedæmonians), τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν

καὶ ἐπιγνῶναι μηδὲν, καὶ ἔργῳ οὐδὲ τἀναγκαῖα ἐξικέσθαι. Αὖθις δὲ,

οἱ μὲν, καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώμην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ

ἐπὶ τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον, τῆς τεδυνάμεως ἐνδεᾶ

πρᾶξαι, τῆς τε γνώμης μηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι, τῶν τε δεινῶν

μηδέποτε οἴεσθαι ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄοκνοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς

μελλήτας, καὶ ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους, etc.

Again, in the oration of Perikles—Καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομεν ἢ

ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα, οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην

ἡγούμενοι, ἀλλὰ μὴ προδιδαχθῆναι μᾶλλον λόγῳ, πρότερον ἢ ἐπὶ ἃ

δεῖ ἔργῳ ἐλθεῖν. Διαφερόντως μὲν δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν, ~ὥστε τολμᾷν

τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι~· ὃ

τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον, φέρει.