is fordable. There must have been bridges; which, in the then
flourishing state of Kilikia, is by no means improbable. He and
Mr. Ainsworth, however, differ as to the route which they suppose
Cyrus to have taken between Tarsus and Issus.
Xenophon mentions nothing about the Amanian Gates, which
afterwards appear noticed both in Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) and in
Strabo (xiv, p. 676). The various data of ancient history and
geography about this region are by no means easy to reconcile;
see a valuable note of Mützel on Quintus Curtius, iii, 17, 7.
An inspection of the best recent maps, either Colonel Chesney’s
or Kiepert’s, clears up some of these better than any verbal
description. We see by these maps that Mount Amanus bifurcates
into two branches, one of them flanking the Gulf of Issus on
its western, the other on its eastern side. There are thus two
different passes, each called Pylæ Amanides or Amanian Gates; one
having reference to the Western Amanus, the other to the Eastern.
The former was crossed by Alexander, the latter by Darius, before
the battle of Issus; and Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) is equally correct
in saying of both of them that they passed the Amanian Gates;
though both did not pass the same gates.
[55] Diodor. xiv. 21.
The arrival of this last body of four hundred men was a fact of some
importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas (the
Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be three hundred
thousand men, for the king, in Phœnicia and Syria), from whom they
now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of their
reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen
marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning
amidst the king’s army. So great, indeed, was that discouragement,
that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior;
abandoning three defensible positions in succession—1. The Gates of
Kilikia and Syria. 2. The pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus. 3. The
passage of the Euphrates.—He appears to have been alarmed by the
easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, and still more,
probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis with the invader.[56]
[56] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 3-5. Ἀβροκόμας δ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἀλλ᾽
ἐπεὶ ἤκουσε Κῦρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα, αναστρέψας ἐκ Φοινίκης, παρὰ
βασιλέα ἀπήλαυνεν, etc.
Cyrus had expected to find the gates of Kilikia and Syria stoutly
defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing up his
fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport a
division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one
day’s march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of
near half a mile, between the sea on one side and the steep cliffs
terminating mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the
side of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by
walls and gates; midway between the two the river Kersus broke out
from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this
pass against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless
enabled an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it
undefended.[57] And here we cannot but notice the superior ability
and forethought of Cyrus as compared with the other Persians opposed
to him. He had looked at this as well as at the other difficulties
of his march, beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting
them; whereas, on the king’s side, all the numerous means and
opportunities of defence are successively abandoned; the Persians
have no confidence, except in vast numbers,—or when numbers fail, in
treachery.
[57] Diodor. xiv.
Five parasangs, or one day’s march from this pass, Cyrus reached the
Phœnician maritime town of Myriandrus; a place of great commerce,
with its harbor full of merchantmen. While he rested here seven days,
his two generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him; privately engaging
a merchant vessel to carry them away with their property. They could
not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them in permitting Klearchus
to retain under his command those soldiers who had deserted them
at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played off his deceitful
manœuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted may have been
unwilling to return to their original commanders, after having taken
so offensive a step. And this may partly account for the policy of
Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could not but feel as a
great wrong, in which a large portion of the army sympathized. The
general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus would immediately
despatch some triremes to overtake and bring back the fugitives.
But instead of this, he summoned the remaining generals, and after
communicating to them the fact that Xenias and Pasion were gone,
added,—“I have plenty of triremes to overtake their merchantmen
if I chose, and to bring them back. But I will do no such thing.
No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man while he is with
me,—and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use him, when he wishes
to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children under guard as
hostages, at Tralles;[58] but even these shall be given up to them,
in consideration of their good behavior down to the present day. Let
them go if they choose, with the full knowledge that they behave
worse towards me than I towards them.” This behavior, alike judicious
and conciliating, was universally admired, and produced the best
possible effect upon the spirits of the army; imparting a confidence
in Cyrus which did much to outweigh the prevailing discouragement,
in the unknown march upon which they were entering.[59]
[58] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 6. To require the wives or children of
generals in service, as hostages for fidelity, appears to have
been not unfrequent with Persian kings. On the other hand, it
was remarked as a piece of gross obsequiousness in the Argeian
Nikostratus, who commanded the contingent of his countrymen
serving under Artaxerxes Ochus in Egypt, that he volunteered to
bring up his son to the king as a hostage, without being demanded
(Theopompus, Frag. 135 [ed. Wichers] ap. Athenæ. vi, p. 252).
[59] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 7-9.
At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back his
fleet,[60] and striking with his land-force eastward into the
interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross mount
Amanus, by the pass of Beilan; an eminently difficult road, which he
was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might easily have
defended it, if he had chosen.[61] Four days’ march brought the army
to the Chalus (perhaps the river of Aleppo), full of fish held sacred
by the neighboring inhabitants; five more days, to the sources of the
river Daradax, with the palace and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys;
three days farther, to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. This was a great
and flourishing town, a centre of commerce enriched by the important
ford or transit of the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude
about 35° 40′ N.[62] The river, when the Cyreians arrived, was four
stadia, or somewhat less than half an English mile, in breadth.
[60] Diodor. xiv, 21.
[61] See the remarks of Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of
the Ten Thousand, p. 58-61; and other citations respecting the
difficult road through the pass of Beilan, in Mützel’s valuable
notes on Quintus Curtius, iii, 20, 13, p. 101.
[62] Neither the Chalus, nor the Daradax, nor indeed the
road followed by Cyrus in crossing Syria from the sea to the
Euphrates, can be satisfactorily made out (Koch, Zug der Zehn
Tausend, p. 36, 37).
Respecting the situation of Thapsakus,—placed erroneously by
Rennell lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even
in the map annexed to Col. Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, and
by Reichard higher up the river, near Bir—see Ritter, Erdkunde,
part x, B. iii; West Asien, p. 14-17, with the elaborate
discussion, p. 972-978, in the same volume; also the work of
Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus is
correctly placed in Colonel Chesney’s last work (Euphr. and Tigr.
p. 213), and in the excellent map accompanying that work; though
I dissent from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of
Beilan and Thapsakus.
Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and
best-known passage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration
of the Seleukid kings, down to 100 B.C. It was selected as a
noted point, to which observations and calculations might be
conveniently referred, by Eratosthenes and other geographers
(see Strabo, ii, p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman empire
became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the
river near Bir or Bihrejik (about the 37th parallel of latitude)
became more used and better known, at least to the Roman writers.
The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra
to Karrhæ in Northern Mesopotamia; also from Seleukeia (on the
Tigris below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern
Syria by Seleukus Nikator and his successors, Antioch on the
Orontes, Seleukeia in Pieria, Laodikeia, Antioch ad Taurum, etc.
The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 70) “is
celebrated to this day as the ford of the Anezeh or Beduins. On
the right bank of the Euphrates there are the remains of a paved
causeway leading to the very banks of the river, and continued on
the opposite side.”
Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now compelled formally
to make known to his soldiers the real object of the march, hitherto,
in name at least, disguised. He accordingly sent for the Greek
generals, and desired them to communicate publicly the fact, that
he was on the advance to Babylon against his brother,—which to
themselves, probably, had been for some time well known. Among the
soldiers, however, the first announcement excited loud murmurs,
accompanied by accusation against the generals, of having betrayed
them, in privity with Cyrus. But this outburst was very different to
the strenuous repugnance which they had before manifested at Tarsus.
Evidently they suspected, and had almost made up their minds to, the
real truth; so that their complaint was soon converted into a demand
for a donation to each man, as soon as they should reach Babylon;
as much as that which Cyrus had given to his Grecian detachment on
going up thither before. Cyrus willingly promised them five minæ
per head (about £19 5_s._), equal to more than a year’s pay, at the
rate recently stipulated of a daric and a half per month. He engaged
to give them, besides, the full rate of pay until they should have
been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such ample offers satisfied the
Greeks, and served to counterbalance at least, if not to efface, the
terrors of that unknown region which they were about to tread.
But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced their
formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was already
in the water, crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to decide
separately for themselves, and to execute their decision, before
the others had given any answer. “By acting thus (said he) you will
confer special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding reward.
If the others follow you across, he will suppose that they do so
because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others
should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat: but he will
never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you
could for him.” Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate
gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to
act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish
and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however,
completely; for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually
crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his
warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the
obligation; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents
to Menon separately.[63] He passed with his whole army immediately
afterwards; no man being wet above the breast.
[63] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12-18.
What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did he not defend
this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested? We are
told that he had been there a little before, and that he had thought
it sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the belief
that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And Xenophon
informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to have been
never before fordable,—always passed by means of boats; insomuch
that they treated the actual low state of the water as a providential
interposition of the gods in favor of Cyrus; “the river made way
for him to come and take the sceptre.” When we find that Abrokomas
came too late afterwards for the battle of Kunaxa, we shall be led
to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in Kilikia, was playing a
double game between the two royal brothers, and that he was content
with destroying those vessels which formed the ordinary means of
communication between the banks, without taking any means to inquire
whether the passage was practicable without them. The assertion of
the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was not a mere piece of flattery to
Cyrus, could hardly have had any other foundation than the fact, that
they had never seen the river crossed on foot (whether practicable or
not), so long as there were regular ferry-boats.[64]
[64] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 18. Compare (Plutarch, Alexand. 17)
analogous expressions of flattery—from the historians of
Alexander, affirming that the sea near Pamphylia providentially
made way for him—from the inhabitants on the banks of the
Euphrates, when the river was passed by the Roman legions and
the Parthian prince Tiridates, in the reign of the Emperor
Tiberius (Tacitus, Annal. vi. 37); and by Lucullus still earlier
(Plutarch, Lucull. c. 24).
The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphrates, must probably have
been about the end of July or beginning of August. Now the period
of greatest height, in the waters of the Euphrates near this
part of its course, is from the 21st to the 28th of May; the
period when they are lowest, is about the middle of November
(see Colonel Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, p. 5). Rennell
erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September
(Expedit, of Xenophon, p. 277). The waters would thus be at a
sort of mean height, when Cyrus passed.
Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water
in the ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842; the
steamers Nimrod and Nitocris then struck upon it (p. 72), though
the steamers Euphrates and Tigris had passed over it without
difficulty in the month of May.
After crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus proceeded, for nine days’
march,[65] southward along its left bank, until he came to its
affluent, the river Araxes or Chaboras, which divided Syria from
Arabia. From the numerous and well-supplied villages there situated,
he supplied himself with a large stock of provisions, to confront
the desolate march through Arabia on which they were about to enter,
following the banks of the Euphrates still further southward. It was
now that he entered on what may be called the Desert,—an endless
breadth or succession of undulations, “like the sea,” without any
cultivation or even any tree; nothing but wormwood and various
aromatic shrubs.[66] Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the
first time, wild asses, antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which
afforded sport, and occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused
themselves by chasing them; though the wild ass was swifter than
any horse, and the ostrich altogether unapproachable. Five days’
march brought them to Korsôtê, a town which had been abandoned by
its inhabitants,—probably, however, leaving the provision dealers
behind, as had before happened at Tarsus, in Kilikia;[67] since the
army here increased their supplies for the onward march. All that
they could obtain was required, and was indeed insufficient, for the
trying journey which awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and
ninety computed parasangs, did they march along the left bank of
the Euphrates, without provisions, and even without herbage except
in some few places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers
lived for some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals
perished of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and
difficult, full of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal
efforts of every man to push the cars and waggons at particular
junctures; efforts in which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under
his express orders, took zealous part, toiling in the dirt with
their ornamented attire.[68] After these thirteen days of hardship,
they reached Pylæ; near the entrance of the cultivated territory of
Babylonia, where they seem to have halted five or six days to rest
and refresh.[69] There was on the opposite side of the river, at or
near this point, a flourishing city named Charmandê; to which many of
the soldiers crossed over (by means of skins stuffed with hay), and
procured plentiful supplies, especially of date-wine and millet.[70]
[65] Xenophon gives these nine days of march as covering fifty
parasangs (Anab. i, 4, 19). But Koch remarks that the distance
is not half so great as that from the sea to Thapsakus; which
latter Xenophon gives at sixty-five parasangs. There is here some
confusion; together with the usual difficulty in assigning any
given distance as the equivalent of the parasang (Koch, Zug der
Zehn Tausend, p. 38).
[66] See the remarkable testimony of Mr. Ainsworth, from personal
observation, to the accuracy of Xenophon’s description of the
country, even at the present day.
[67] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 24.
[68] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 4-8.
[69] I infer that the army halted here five or six days, from
the story afterwards told respecting the Ambrakiot Silanus, the
prophet of the army; who, on sacrificing, had told Cyrus that his
brother would not fight for ten days (i, 7, 16). This sacrifice
must have been offered, I imagine, during the halt—not during
the distressing march which preceded. The ten days named by
Silanus, expired on the fourth day after they left Pylæ.
It is in reference to this portion of the course of the
Euphrates, from the Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the
ancient Is, noticed by Herodotus, and still celebrated from
its unexhausted supply of bitumen), between latitude 35½° and
34°—that Colonel Chesney, in his Report on the Navigation of the
Euphrates (p. 2), has the following remarks:—
“The scenery above Hit, in itself very picturesque, is greatly
heightened, as one is carried along the current, by the frequent
recurrence, at very short intervals, of ancient irrigating
aqueducts; these beautiful specimens of art and durability are
attributed by the Arabs to the times of the ignorant, meaning (as
is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers,
and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks,
and prove that the borders of the Euphrates were once thickly
inhabited by a people far advanced indeed in the application
of hydraulics to domestic purposes, of the first and greatest
utility—the transport of water. The greater portion is now more
or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up for
use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of
stone, firmly cemented, narrowing to about two feet or twenty
inches at top, placed at right angles to the current, and carried
various distances towards the interior, from two hundred to one
thousand two hundred yards.
“But what most concerns the subject of this memoir is, the
existence of a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just
above the several aqueducts. In general, there is one of the
former attached to each of the latter. And almost invariably,
between two mills on the opposite banks, one of them crosses the
stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage left
in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these
subaqueous walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the
water sufficiently at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as
a more abundant supply to the wheels. And their effect at those
times is, to create a fall in every part of the width, save the
opening left for commerce, through which the water rushes with
a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably from
four to eight feet high originally; but they are now frequently a
bank of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always
affording a sufficient passage for large boats at low seasons.”
The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous
population and industry on the banks of the Euphrates at this
part of its course, are extremely interesting and curious, when
contrasted with the desolation depicted by Xenophon; who mentions
that there were no other inhabitants than some who lived by
cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and sending
them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the
population, of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens,
either had already long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to
construct their dams and aqueducts, until a period later than
Xenophon. They probably began during the period of the Seleukid
kings, after the year 300 B.C. For this line of road along the
Euphrates began then to acquire great importance as the means
of communication between the great city of Seleukeia (on the
Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus
Nikator and his successors in the North of Syria and Asia
Minor—Seleukeia in Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, etc.
This route coincides mainly with the present route from Bagdad
to Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates at Thapsakus. It can hardly be
doubted that the course of the Euphrates was better protected
during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (B.C. 300-100,
speaking in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when
that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the
Parthians. Even at the time of the Emperor Julian’s invasion,
however, Ammianus Marcellinus describes the left bank of the
Euphrates, north of Babylonia, as being in several parts well
cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence, (Ammian. Marc.
xxiv, 1). At the time of Xenophon’s Anabasis, there was nothing
to give much importance to the banks of the Euphrates north of
Babylonia.
Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the
Euphrates, before reaching Pylæ, as being now in the same
condition as it was when Xenophon and his comrades marched
through it,—“full of hills and narrow valleys, and presenting
many difficulties to the movement of an army. The illustrator
was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphrates steamer on
this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the
Perso-Greek army, and he had to walk a day and a night across
these inhospitable regions; so that he can speak feelingly of the
difficulties which the Greeks had to encounter.” (Travels in the
Track, etc. p. 81.)
[70] I incline to think that Charmandê must have been nearly
opposite Pylæ, lower down than Hit. But Major Rennell (p. 107)
and Mr. Ainsworth (p. 84) suppose Charmandê to be the same place
as the modern Hit (the Is of Herodotus). There is no other known
town with which we can identify it.
It was during this halt opposite Charmandê that a dispute occurred
among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I have
already mentioned that Klearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the
Greek chiefs, enjoyed a separate command over his own division,
subject only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the
soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of
Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of
Menon’s soldiers to have misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged.
The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to such
a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of the
river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only through the
encampment of Menon,—one of the soldiers who happened to be cutting
wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and began to pelt
him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from this danger to
his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to take arms and
put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at the head of
his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile attitude
against Menon’s division; who on their side ran to arms, with Menon
himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of defence. A
slight accident might have now brought on irreparable disorder and
bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment with a company
of his hoplites, planted himself in military array between the two
disputing parties, and entreated Klearchus to desist from farther
assault. The latter at first refused. Indignant that his recent
insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so lightly,
he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased, until
Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came galloping
up with his personal attendants and his two javelins in hand.
“Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you know not what
you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to blows, it will be
the hour of my destruction,—and of your own also, shortly after me.
For if _your_ force be ruined, all these natives whom you see around,
will become more hostile to us even than the men now serving with the
King.” On hearing this (says Xenophon) Klearchus came to his senses,
and the troops dispersed without any encounter.[71]
[71] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 11-17.
After passing Pylæ, the territory called Babylonia began. The hills
flanking the Euphrates, over which the army had hitherto been
passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced.[72] Traces
were now discovered, the first throughout their long march, of a
hostile force moving in their front, ravaging the country and burning
the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the treason of a Persian
nobleman named Orontes, whom he examined in his tent, in the presence
of various Persians possessing his intimate confidence, as well as
of Klearchus with a guard of three thousand hoplites. Orontes was
examined, found guilty, and privately put to death.[73]
[72] The commentators agree in thinking that we are to understand
by Pylæ a sort of gate or pass, marking the spot where the desert
country north of Babylonia—with its undulations of land, and
its steep banks along the river—was exchanged for the flat and
fertile alluvium constituting Babylonia proper. Perhaps there was
a town near the pass, and named after it.
Now it appears from Col. Chesney’s survey that this alteration
in the nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit.
He observes—(Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 54)—“Three miles
below Hit, the remains of aqueducts disappear, and the windings
become shorter and more frequent, as the river flows through
a tract of country almost level.” Thereabouts it is that I am
inclined to place Pylæ.
Colonel Chesney places it lower down, twenty-five miles from Hit.
Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 44), lower down still.
Mr. Ainsworth places it as much as seventy geographical miles
lower than Hit (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 81);
compare Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, x. p. 16; xi, pp. 755-763.
[73] The description given of this scene (known to the Greeks
through the communications of Klearchus) by Xenophon, is
extremely interesting (Anab. i, 6). I omit it from regard to
space.
After three days’ march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve parasangs,
Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by the reports
of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was close at hand,
and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the middle of the
night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well as barbarians;
but the enemy did not appear as had been expected. His numbers
were counted at this spot, and it was found that there were, of
Greeks ten thousand four hundred hoplites, and two thousand five
hundred peltasts; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus, one
hundred thousand men with twenty scythed chariots. The numbers of
the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from
sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters
described the army of Artaxerxes at one million two hundred thousand
men, besides the six thousand horse-guards commanded by Artagerses,
and two hundred scythed chariots, under the command of Abrokomas,
Tissaphernes, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however,
that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts
represented the numerical estimation as too great by one-fourth.
In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals as
well as the Lochages (or captains) of the Greeks; as well to consult
about suitable arrangements, as to stimulate their zeal in his cause.
Few points in this narrative are more striking than the language
addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on
other occasions.
“It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have
brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than
any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom
which you enjoy; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would
choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand
times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you
will have to encounter,—vast numbers and plenty of noise; but if
you despise these, I am ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff
you will find in these native men. Behave well,—like brave men,
and trust me for sending you back in such condition as to make your
friends at home envy you; though I hope to prevail on many of you to
prefer my service to your own homes.”
“Some of us are remarking, Cyrus, (said a Samian exile named
Gaulitês), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but
will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when
danger is over.... As to ability, (replied Cyrus), my father’s empire
reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to
that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in
satrapies among my brother’s friends; all, if we are victorious,
will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having
enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to
receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present
a wreath of gold.”
Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek
soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them with
confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of force
and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him,—“Do you really
think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you?... Yes, by Zeus, (was
the reply); assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and Parysatis, and
my brother, I shall not win this prize without a battle.” All the
Greeks were earnest with him at the same time not to expose his own
person, but to take post in the rear of their body.[74] We shall see
presently how this advice was followed.
[74] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 2-9.
The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions employed
before during the dispute between Klearchus and the soldiers of
Menon near Charmandê—being, as they are, genuine and authentic, and
not dramatic composition such as those of Æschylus in the Persæ,
nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed to Xerxes in
Herodotus,—are among the most valuable evidences respecting the
Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the superior courage
and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus attests, compared
with the cowardice of Asiatics,—but also their fidelity and sense
of obligation which he contrasts with the time-serving treachery
of the latter;[75] connecting these superior qualities with the
political freedom which they enjoy. To hear this young prince
expressing such strong admiration and envy for Grecian freedom, and
such ardent personal preference for it above all the splendor of his
own position,—was doubtless the most flattering of all compliments
which he could pay to the listening citizen-soldiers. That a young
Persian prince should be capable of conceiving such a sentiment, is
no slight proof of his mental elevation above the level both of his
family and of his nation. The natural Persian opinion is expressed
by the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus[76] in Herodotus.
To Xerxes, the conception of free citizenship,—and of orderly,
self-sufficing courage planted by a public discipline, patriotic as
well as equalizing,—was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible.
He understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and
stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant
Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to
enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks
around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed
themselves and that there was no man who had any rights of his
own over them,—that the law was their only master, and that in
rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else but for
themselves.[77] Cyrus knew where to touch the sentiment of Hellenic
honor, so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost their political
freedom by the hands of the Macedonians, and exchanged for that
intellectual quickness, combined with moral degeneracy, which Cicero
and his contemporaries remark as the characteristic of these once
high-toned communities.
[75] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 16.
[76] See Herodot. vii, 102, 103, 209. Compare the observations of
the Persian Achæmenês, c. 236.
[77] Herod. vii, 104. Demaratus says to Xerxes, respecting the
Lacedæmonians—Ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες, οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι·
ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ
οἱ σοὶ σέ.
Again, the historian observes about the Athenians, and their
extraordinary increase of prowess after having shaken off the
despotism of Hippias (v. 78)—Δηλοῖ δ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον ἀλλὰ
πανταχοῦ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὥς ἐστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον· εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι
τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ
πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι
ἐγένοντο. Δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκακεέον, ὡς
δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι· ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωϋτῷ
προθυμέετο ἐργάζεσθαι.
Compare Menander, Fragm. Incert. CL. ap. Meineke, Fragm. Comm.
Græc. vol. iv. p. 268—
Ἐλεύθερος πᾶς ἑνὶ δεδούλωται, νόμῳ·
Δυσὶν δὲ δοῦλος, καὶ νόμῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ.
Having concerted the order of battle with the generals, Cyrus
marched forward in cautious array during the next day, anticipating
the appearance of the king’s forces. Nothing of the kind was seen,
however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were
evident. The day’s march, (called three parasangs) having been
concluded without a battle, Cyrus called to him the Ambrakiotic
prophet Silanus, and presented him with three thousand darics or
ten Attic talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day
preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time;
upon which Cyrus had told him,—“If your prophecy comes true, I will
give you three thousand darics. My brother will not fight at all, if
he does not fight within ten days.”[78]
[78] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 14-17.
In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed in reply to
Klearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle would
be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course of this last
day’s march, he came to a broad and deep trench (thirty feet broad
and eighteen feet deep), approaching so near to the Euphrates as to
leave an interval of only twenty feet for passage. This trench had
been dug by order of Artaxerxes across the plain, for a length said
to be of twelve parasangs (about forty-two English miles, if the
parasang be reckoned at thirty stadia), so as to touch at its other
extremity what was called the walls of Media.[79] It had been dug
as a special measure of defence against the approaching invaders.
Yet we hear with surprise, and the invaders themselves found with
equal surprise, that not a man was on the spot to defend it; so
that the whole Cyreian army and baggage passed without resistance
through the narrow breadth of twenty feet. This is the first notice
of any defensive measures taken to repel the invasion,—except the
precaution of Abrokomas in burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus
had been allowed to traverse all this immense space, and to pass
through so many defensible positions, without having yet struck a
blow. And now Artaxerxes, after having cut a prodigious extent of
trench at the cost of so much labor,—provided a valuable means of
resistance, especially against Grecian heavy-armed soldiers,—and
occupied it seemingly until the very last moment,—throws it up from
some unaccountable panic, and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed
through this very narrow gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so
formidable an obstacle, Cyrus as well as the Greeks imagined that
Artaxerxes would never think of fighting in the open plain. All began
to relax in that careful array which had been observed since the
midnight review, insomuch that he himself proceeded in his chariot
instead of on horseback, while many of the Greek soldiers lodged
their arms on the waggons or beasts of burden.[80]
[79] From Pylæ to the undefended trench, there intervened three
entire days of march, and one part of a day; for it occurred in
the fourth day’s march.
Xenophon calls the three entire days, twelve parasangs in all.
This argues short marches, not full marches. And it does not
seem that the space of ground traversed during any one of them
can have been considerable. For they were all undertaken with
visible evidences of an enemy immediately in front of them; which
circumstance was the occasion of the treason of Orontes, who
asked Cyrus for a body of cavalry, under pretence of attacking
the light troops of the enemy in front, and then wrote a letter
to inform Artaxerxes that he was about to desert with his
division. The letter was delivered to Cyrus, who thus discovered
the treason.
Marching with a known enemy not far off in front, Cyrus must
have kept his army in something like battle order, and therefore
must have moved slowly. Moreover the discovery of the treason of
Orontes must itself have been an alarming fact, well calculated
to render both Cyrus and Klearchus doubly cautious for the time.
And the very trial of Orontes appears to have been conducted
under such solemnities as must have occasioned a halt of the army.
Taking these circumstances, we can hardly suppose the Greeks
to have got over so much as thirty English miles of ground in
the three entire days of march. The fourth day they must have
got over very little ground indeed; not merely because Cyrus
was in momentary expectation of the King’s main army, and of
a general battle (i, 7, 14), but because of the great delay
necessary for passing the trench. His whole army (more than one
hundred thousand men), with baggage, chariots, etc., had to pass
through the narrow gut of twenty feet wide between the trench
and the Euphrates. He can hardly have made more than five miles
in this whole day’s march, getting at night so far as to encamp
two or three miles beyond the trench. We may therefore reckon
the distance marched over between Pylæ and the trench as about
thirty-two miles in all; and two or three miles farther to the
encampment of the next night. Probably Cyrus would keep near the
river, yet not following its bends with absolute precision; so
that in estimating distance, we ought to take a mean between the
straight line and the full windings of the river.
I conceive the trench to have cut the Wall of Media at a much
wider angle than appears in Col. Chesney’s map; so that the
triangular space included between the trench, the Wall, and the
river, was much more extensive. The reason, we may presume,
why the trench was cut, was, to defend that portion of the
well-cultivated and watered country of Babylonia which lay
outside of the Wall of Media—which portion (as we shall see
hereafter in the marches of the Greeks after the battle) was very
considerable.
[80] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20. The account given by Xenophon of this
long line of trench, first dug by order of Artaxerxes, and then
left useless and undefended, differs from the narrative of
Diodorus (xiv, 22), which seems to be borrowed from Ephorus.
Diodorus says that the king caused a long trench to be dug, and
lined with carriages and waggons as a defence for his baggage;
and that he afterwards marched forth from this entrenchment, with
his soldiers free and unincumbered, to give battle to Cyrus. This
is a statement more plausible than that of Xenophon, in this
point of view, that it makes out the king to have acted upon a
rational scheme; whereas in Xenophon he appears at first to have
adopted a plan of defence, and then to have renounced it, after
immense labor and cost, without any reason, so far as we can see.
Yet I have no doubt that the account of Xenophon is the true one.
The narrow passage, and the undefended trench, were both facts of
the most obvious and impressive character to an observing soldier.
On the next day but one after passing the undefended trench, they
were surprised, at a spot called Kunaxa,[81] just when they were
about to halt for the mid-day meal and repose, by the sudden
intimation that the king’s army was approaching in order of battle
on the open plain. Instantly Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback,
to arm himself, and to put his forces in order, while the Greeks on
their side halted and formed their line with all possible speed.[82]
They were on the right wing of the army, adjoining the river
Euphrates; Ariæus with the Asiatic forces being on the left, and
Cyrus himself, surrounded by a body-guard of six hundred well-armed
Persian horsemen, in the centre. Among the Greeks, Klearchus
commanded the right division of hoplites, with Paphlagonian horsemen
and the Grecian peltasts on the extreme right, close to the river;
Proxenus with his division stood next; Menon commanded on the left.
All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus had breastplates, helmets,
short Grecian swords, and two javelins in their right hands; the
horses also were defended by facings both over the breast and head.
Cyrus himself, armed generally like the rest, stood distinguished
by having an upright tiara instead of the helmet. Though the first
news had come upon them by surprise, the Cyreians had ample time
to put themselves in complete order; for the enemy did not appear
until the afternoon was advanced. First, was seen dust, like a white
cloud,—next, an undefined dark spot, gradually nearing, until the
armor began to shine, and the component divisions of troops, arranged
in dense masses, became discernible. Tissaphernes was on the left,
opposite to the Greeks, at the head of the Persian horsemen, with
white cuirasses; on his right, stood the Persian bowmen, with their
gerrha, or wicker shields, spiked so as to be fastened in the ground
while arrows were shot from behind them; next, the Egyptian infantry
with long wooden shields covering the whole body and legs. In front
of all was a row of chariots with scythes attached to the wheels,
destined to begin the charge against the Grecian phalanx.[83]
[81] Xenophon does not mention the name Kunaxa, which comes to
us from Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8), who states that it was five
hundred stadia (about fifty-eight miles) from Babylon; while
Xenophon was informed that the field of battle was distant from
Babylon only three hundred and sixty stadia. Now, according to
Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 57), Hillah
(Babylon) is distant ninety-one miles by the river, or sixty-one
and a half miles direct, from Felujah. Following therefore the
distance given by Plutarch (probably copied from Ktesias), we
should place Kunaxa a little lower down the river than Felujah.
This seems the most probable supposition.
Rennell and Mr. Baillie Fraser so place it (Mesopotamia and
Assyria, p. 186, Edin. 1842), I think rightly; moreover the
latter remarks, what most of the commentators overlook, that the
Greeks did not pass through the Wall of Media until long after
the battle. See a note a little below, near the beginning of my
next chapter, in reference to that Wall.
[82] The distance of the undefended trench from the battle-field
of Kunaxa would be about twenty-two miles. First, three miles
beyond the trench, to the first night-station; next, a full day’s
march, say twelve miles; thirdly, a half day’s march, to the time
of the mid-day halt, say seven miles.
The distance from Pylæ to the trench having before been stated at
thirty-two miles, the whole distance from Pylæ to Kunaxa will be
about fifty-four miles.
Now Colonel Chesney has stated the distance from Hit to Felujah
Castle (two known points) at forty-eight miles of straight line,
and seventy-seven miles, if following the line of the river.
Deduct four miles for the distance from Hit to Pylæ, and we shall
then have between Pylæ and Felujah, a rectilinear distance of
forty-four miles. The marching route of the Greeks (as explained
in the previous note, the Greeks following generally, but not
exactly, the windings of the river) will give fifty miles from
Pylæ to Felujah, and fifty-three or fifty-four from Pylæ to
Kunaxa.
[83] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 8-11.
As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode to the front,
and desired Klearchus to make his attack with the Greeks upon the
centre of the enemy; since it was there that the king in person would
be posted, and if that were once beaten, the victory was gained. But
such was the superiority of Artaxerxes in numbers, that his centre
extended beyond the left of Cyrus. Accordingly Klearchus, afraid of
withdrawing his right from the river, lest he should be taken both in
flank and rear, chose to keep his position on the right,—and merely
replied to Cyrus, that he would manage everything for the best. I
have before remarked[84] how often the fear of being attacked on the
unshielded side and on the rear, led the Greek soldier into movements
inconsistent with military expediency; and it will be seen presently
that Klearchus, blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution,
was induced here to commit the capital mistake of keeping on the
right flank, contrary to the more judicious direction of Cyrus.[85]
The latter continued for a short time riding slowly in front of the
lines, looking alternately at the two armies, when Xenophon, one of
the small total of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the division of
Proxenus, rode forth from the line to accost him, asking if he had
any orders to give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to every one that
the sacrifices were favorable. Hearing a murmur going through the
Grecian ranks, he inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received
for answer, that the watchword was now being passed along for the
second time. He asked, with some surprise, who gave the watchword?
and what it was? Xenophon replied that it was “Zeus the Preserver,
and Victory.”—“I accept it,” replied Cyrus; “let that be the word;”
and immediately rode away to his own post in the centre, among the
Asiatics.
[84] Thucyd. v. 70. See Vol. VII, ch. lvi, p. 84 of this History.
[85] Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8) makes this criticism upon
Klearchus; and it seems quite just.
The vast host of Artaxerxes, advancing steadily and without noise,
were now within less than half a mile of the Cyreians, when the
Greek troops raised the pæan or usual war-cry, and began to move
forward. As they advanced, the shout became more vehement, the pace
accelerated, and at last the whole body got into a run.[86] This
might have proved unfortunate, had their opponents been other than
Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to await the charge.
They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly within
bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the scythed
chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with the
rest; while the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all
directions, some turning round to follow the fugitives, others coming
against the advancing Greeks, who made open order to let them pass.
The left division of the king’s army was thus routed without a blow,
and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one Greek only
being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way
of one of the chariots.[87] Tissaphernes alone,—who, with the body
of horse immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian left,
close to the river,—formed an exception to this universal flight.
He charged and penetrated through the Grecian peltasts, who stood
opposite to him between the hoplites and the river. These peltasts,
commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, opened their ranks to let him
pass, darting at the men as they rode by, yet without losing any
one themselves. Tissaphernes thus got into the rear of the Greeks,
who continued, on their side, to pursue the flying Persians before
them.[88]
[86] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17; Diodor. xiv, 23.
[87] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17-20.
[88] Xen. Anab i, 10, 4-8.
Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of the field.
Artaxerxes, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his
superior numbers outflanked Ariæus, who commanded the extreme left of
the Cyreians.[89] Finding no one directly opposed to him, he began to
wheel round his right wing, to encompass his enemies; not noticing
the flight of his left division. Cyrus, on the other hand, when he
saw the easy victory of the Greeks on their side, was overjoyed;
and received from every one around him salutations, as if he were
already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command enough not yet to
rush forward as if the victory was already gained,[90] but remained
unmoved, with his regiment of six hundred horse around him, watching
the movements of Artaxerxes. As soon as he saw the latter wheeling
round his right division to get upon the rear of the Cyreians, he
hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge upon the
centre, where Artaxerxes was in person, surrounded by the body-guard
of six thousand horse, under Artagerses. So vigorous was the attack
of Cyrus, that with his six hundred horse, he broke and dispersed
this body-guard, killing Artagerses with his own hand. His own six
hundred horse rushed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, leaving
Cyrus himself nearly alone, with only the select few, called his
“Table-Companions,” around him. It was under these circumstances
that he first saw his brother Artaxerxes, whose person had been
exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The sight filled
him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition,[91] that
he lost all thought of safety or prudence,—cried out, “I see the
man,”—and rushed forward with his mere handful of companions to
attack Artaxerxes, in spite of the numerous host behind him. Cyrus
made directly at his brother, darting his javelin with so true an aim
as to strike him in the breast, and wound him through the cuirass;
though the wound (afterwards cured by the Greek surgeon Ktesias)
could not have been very severe, since Artaxerxes did not quit the
field, but, on the contrary, engaged in personal combat, he and those
around him, against this handful of assailants. So unequal a combat
did not last long. Cyrus, being severely wounded under the eye by the
javelin of a Karian soldier, was cast from his horse and slain. The
small number of faithful companions around him all perished in his
defence. Artasyras, who stood first among them in his confidence and
attachment, seeing him mortally wounded and fallen, cast himself down
upon him, clasped him in his arms, and in this position either slew
himself, or was slain by order of the king.[92]
[89] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 23; i, 9, 31.
[90] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 21.
Κῦρος δὲ, ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας νικῶντας τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ
διώκοντας, ἡδόμενος καὶ προσκυνούμενος ἤδη ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν
ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν, ~οὐδ᾽ ὣς ἐξήχθη διώκειν~, etc.
The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other
stimulus except that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal
antipathy, had force enough to overthrow the self-command of
Cyrus.
[91] Compare the account of the transport of rage which seized
the Theban Pelopidas, when he saw Alexander the despot of Pheræ
in the opposite army; which led to the same fatal consequences
(Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 32; Cornel. Nepos, Pelop. c. 5). See
also the reflections of Xenophon on the conduct of Teleutas
before Olynthus.—Hellenic. v. 3, 7.
[92] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 22-29. The account of this battle and of
the death of Cyrus by Ktesias (as far as we can make it out from
the brief abstract in Photius—Ktesias, Fragm. c. 58, 59, ed.
Bähr) does not differ materially from Xenophon. Ktesias mentions
the Karian soldier (not noticed by Xenophon) who hurled the
javelin; and adds that this soldier was afterwards tortured and
put to death by Queen Parysatis, in savage revenge for the death
of Cyrus. He also informs us that Bagapatês, the person who by
order of Artaxerxes cut off the head and hand of Cyrus, was
destroyed by her in the same way.
Diodorus (xiv, 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the
conflict between Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many
points, partly direct and partly implied, from Xenophon.
Plutarch (Artaxerxes, c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the
battle, and of the death of Cyrus, which he professes to have
derived from Ktesias, but which differs still more materially
from the narrative in Xenophon. Compare also the few words of
Justin, v, 11.
Diodorus (xiv, 24) says that twelve thousand men were slain of
the king’s army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks
under Klearchus, who did not lose a single man. He estimates the
loss of Cyrus’s Asiatic army at three thousand men. But as the
Greeks did not lose a man, so they can hardly have killed many
in the pursuit; for they had scarcely any cavalry, and no great
number of peltasts,—while hoplites could not have overtaken the
flying Persians.
The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were immediately
cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubtless exhibited conspicuously
to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the entire contest
was at an end; and so it was understood by Ariæus, who, together
with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the field and fled
back to the camp. Not even there did they defend themselves, when
the king and his forces pursued them; but fled yet farther back to
the resting-place of the previous night. The troops of Artaxerxes
got into the camp and began to plunder it without resistance. Even
the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. It included two Grecian
women,—of free condition, good family, and education,—one from
Phokæa, the other from Miletus, brought to him, by force, from their
parents to Sardis. The elder of these two, the Phokæan, named Milto,
distinguished alike for beauty and accomplished intelligence,
was made prisoner and transferred to the harem of Artaxerxes;
the other, a younger person, found means to save herself, though
without her upper garments,[93] and sought shelter among some
Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the Grecian baggage.
These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with considerable
slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as the persons
of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic camp of the
Cyreians was completely pillaged, not excepting those reserved
waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that his
Grecian auxiliaries might be certain, under all circumstances, of a
supply.[94]
[93] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 3. The accomplishments and fascinations
of this Phokæan lady, and the great esteem in which she was
held first by Cyrus and afterwards by Artaxerxes, have been
exaggerated into a romantic story, in which we cannot tell
what may be the proportion of truth (see Ælian, V. H. xii, 1;
Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26, 27; Justin, x, 2). Both Plutarch
and Justin state that the subsequent enmity between Artaxerxes
and his son Darius, which led to the conspiracy of the latter
against his father, and to his destruction when the conspiracy
was discovered, arose out of the passion of Darius for her. But
as that transaction certainly happened at the close of the long
life and reign of Artaxerxes, who reigned forty-six years—and
as she must have been then sixty years old, if not more—we may
fairly presume that the cause of the family tragedy must have
been something different.
Compare the description of the fate of Berenikê of Chios, and
Monimê of Miletus, wives of Mithridates king of Pontus, during
the last misfortunes of that prince (Plutarch, Lucullus, c. 18).
[94] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 17. This provision must probably have been
made during the recent halt at Pylæ.
While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he was
joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, who had charged
through between the Grecian division and the river. At this time,
there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia or three and a
half miles between him and Klearchus with the Grecian division;
so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of the Persian
fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the king’s troops had
been victorious on the left and centre, and were masters of the
camp,—but not yet knowing of the death of Cyrus,—Klearchus
marched back his troops, and met the enemy’s forces also returning.
He was apprehensive of being surrounded by superior numbers, and
therefore took post with his rear upon the river. In this position,
Artaxerxes again marshalled his troops in front, as if to attack
him, but the Greeks, anticipating his movement, were first in making
the attack themselves, and forced the Persians to take flight even
more terror-stricken than before. Klearchus, thus relieved from all
enemies, waited awhile in hopes of hearing news of Cyrus. He then
returned to the camp, which was found stripped of all its stores;
so that the Greeks were compelled to pass the night without supper,
while most of them also had had no dinner, from the early hour at
which the battle had commenced.[95] It was only on the next morning
that they learnt, through Proklês (descendant of the Spartan king
Demaratus, formerly companion of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece),
that Cyrus had been slain; news which converted their satisfaction at
their own triumph into sorrow and dismay.[96]
[95] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 18, 19.
[96] Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 3, 4.
Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along with it the ambitious
hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His character and
proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in the conduct of
this expedition, and in the two or three years of administration
in Asia Minor which preceded it, he displayed qualities such as
are not seen in Cyrus called the Great, nor in any other member of
the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any other Persian general
throughout the history of the monarchy. We observe a large and
long-sighted combination,—a power of foreseeing difficulties, and
providing means beforehand for overcoming them,—a dexterity in
meeting variable exigencies, and dealing with different parties,
Greeks or Asiatics, officers or soldiers,—a conviction of the
necessity, not merely of purchasing men’s service by lavish presents,
but of acquiring their confidence by straightforward dealing and
systematic good faith,—a power of repressing displeasure when policy
commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion, and the first
conspiracies of Orontes; although usually the punishments which he
inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the merits
and accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt when
we contrast this portrait, by Xenophon, with the description of
the Persian satraps by Isokrates.[97] That many persons deserted
from Artaxerxes to Cyrus,—none, except Orontes, from Cyrus to
Artaxerxes,—has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely throughout
the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at Kunaxa, the
judgment of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus. The two matters
of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take care of the
person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of Artaxerxes with
the central division around him. Now it was the fault of Klearchus,
and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted; and that
the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant on
the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears
that Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress
that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him, like a madman,
against his brother. The same insatiable ambition, and jealous
fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put
to death two first cousins, because they omitted, in his presence,
an act of deference never paid except to the king in person,—this
same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother,
and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in
regal families,[98] blinded him, for the moment, to all rational
calculation.
[97] Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 175-182; a striking
passage, as describing the way in which political institutions
work themselves into the individual character and habits.
[98] Diodorus (xiv, 23) notices the legendary pair of hostile
brothers, Eteokles and Polyneikes, as a parallel. Compare
Tacitus, Annal. iv, 60. “Atrox Drusi ingenium, super cupidinem
potentiæ, et _solita fratribus odia_, accendebatur invidia, quod
mater Agrippina promptior Neroni erat,” etc.; and Justin, xlii, 4.
Compare also the interesting narrative of M. Prosper Mérimée, in
his life of Don Pedro of Castile; a prince commonly known by the
name of Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in
personal conflict, by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of
Transtamare.
At the battle of Navarrete, in 1367, says M. Mérimée, “Don Pèdre,
qui, pendant le combat, s’était jété au plus fort de la mêlée,
s’acharna long temps à la poursuite des fuyards. On le voyait
galoper dans la plaine, monté sur un cheval noir, sa bannière
armoriée de Castille devant lui, cherchant son frère partout où
l’on combattait encore, et criant, échauffé par le carnage—‘Où
est ce bâtard, qui se nomme roi de Castille?’” (Histoire de Don
Pèdre, p. 504.)
Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the
castle of Montiel, was entrapped by simulated negotiations into
the power of his enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by
the dagger of his brother Henri, after a desperate struggle,
in which he seemed likely to prevail, if Henri had not been
partially aided by a bystander.
This tragical scene (on the night of the 23d of March, 1369) is
graphically described by M. Mérimée (p. 564-566).
We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to regret
the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother and become
king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his hand such a
degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to forestall
the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make
the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. He
would have employed Grecian military organization against Grecian
independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money
would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian
officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus
as recorded by Xenophon[99]) have thought him a better friend to
them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to take
advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each Grecian
city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he strengthened
his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of the Persian
kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius Codomanus, had
ability or perseverance enough to follow out; none of them knew
either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to employ
them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this
memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent
to use the resources which victory would have put in his hands,—and
an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, in avenging the
humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of Kallias.
[99] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ξενοφῶντα
Πρόξενος) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ~ὃν αὐτός ἔφη κρείττω
ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος~.