CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
In my last volume, I brought down the History of Grecian affairs to
the close of the Peloponnesian war, including a description of the
permanent loss of imperial power, the severe temporary oppression,
the enfranchisement and renewed democracy, which marked the lot of
defeated Athens. The defeat of that once powerful city, accomplished
by the Spartan confederacy,—with large pecuniary aid from the young
Persian prince Cyrus, satrap of most of the Ionian seaboard,—left
Sparta mistress, for the time, of the Grecian world. Lysander, her
victorious admiral, employed his vast temporary power for the purpose
of setting up, in most of the cities, Dekarchies or ruling Councils
of Ten, composed of his own partisans; with a Lacedæmonian Harmost
and garrison to enforce their oligarchical rule. Before I proceed,
however, to recount, as well as it can be made out, the unexpected
calamities thus brought upon the Grecian world, with their eventual
consequences,—it will be convenient to introduce here the narrative
of the Ten Thousand Greeks, with their march into the heart of
the Persian empire and their still more celebrated Retreat. This
incident, lying apart from the main stream of Grecian affairs, would
form an item, strictly speaking, in Persian history rather than in
Grecian. But its effects on the Greek mind, and upon the future
course of Grecian affairs, were numerous and important; while as an
illustration of Hellenic character and competence measured against
that of the contemporary Asiatics, it stands preeminent and full of
instruction.
This march from Sardis up to the neighborhood of Babylon, conducted
by Cyrus the younger and undertaken for the purpose of placing him
on the Persian throne in the room of his elder brother Artaxerxes
Mnemon,—was commenced about March or April in the year 401 B.C. It
was about six months afterwards, in the month of September or October
of the same year, that the battle of Kunaxa was fought, in which,
though the Greeks were victorious, Cyrus himself lost his life. They
were then obliged to commence their retreat, which occupied about one
year, and ultimately brought them across the Bosphorus of Thrace to
Byzantium, in October or November, 400 B.C.
The death of king Darius Nothus, father both of Artaxerxes and
Cyrus, occurred about the beginning of 404 B.C., a short time after
the entire ruin of the force of Athens at Ægospotami. His reign of
nineteen years, with that of his father Artaxerxes Longimanus which
lasted nearly forty years, fill up almost all the interval from
the death of Xerxes in 465 B.C. The close of the reigns both of
Xerxes and of his son Artaxerxes had indeed been marked by those
phenomena of conspiracy, assassination, fratricide, and family
tragedy, so common in the transmission of an Oriental sceptre.
Xerxes was assassinated by the chief officer of the palace, named
Artabanus,—who had received from him at a banquet the order to
execute his eldest son Darius, but had not fulfilled it. Artabanus,
laying the blame of the assassination upon Darius, prevailed upon
Artaxerxes to avenge it by slaying the latter; he then attempted the
life of Artaxerxes himself, but failed, and was himself killed, after
carrying on the government a few months. Artaxerxes Longimanus, after
reigning about forty years, left the sceptre to his son Xerxes the
second, who was slain after a few months by his brother Sogdianus;
who again was put to death after seven months, by a third brother
Darius Nothus mentioned above.[1]
[1] See Diodor. xi, 69; xii, 64-71; Ktesias, Persica, c. 29-45;
Aristotel. Polit. v, 14, 8. This last passage of Aristotle is not
very clear. Compare Justin, x, 1.
For the chronology of these Persian kings, see a valuable
Appendix in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, App. 18, vol.
ii, p. 313-316.
The wars between the Persian empire, and Athens as the head of the
confederacy of Delos (477-449 B.C.), have been already related in
one of my earlier volumes. But the internal history of the Persian
empire during these reigns is scarcely at all known to us; except a
formidable revolt of the satrap Megabyzus, obscurely noticed in the
Fragments of Ktesias.[2] About 414 B.C. the Egyptians revolted.
Their native prince Amyrtæus maintained his independence,—though
probably in a part only, and not the whole, of that country,[3]—and
was succeeded by a native Egyptian dynasty for the space of sixty
years. A revolt of the Medes, which took place in 408 B.C.,
was put down by Darius, and subsequently a like revolt of the
Kadusians.[4] The peace concluded in 449 B.C., between Athens and
the Persian empire, continued without open violation, until the
ruinous catastrophe which befel the former near Syracuse, in 413
B.C. Yet there had been various communications and envoys from
Sparta to the Persian court, endeavoring to procure aid from the
Great King during the early years of the war; communications so
confused and contradictory, that Artaxerxes (in a letter addressed
to the Spartans, in 425 B.C., and carried by his envoy Artaphernes
who was captured by the Athenians), complained of being unable
to understand what they meant,—no two Spartans telling the same
story.[5] It appears that Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, revolted from
the Persian king, shortly after this period, and that Tissaphernes
was sent by the Great King to suppress this revolt; in which having
succeeded, by bribing the Grecian commander of the satrap’s mercenary
troops, he was rewarded by the possession of the satrapy.[6] We find
Tissaphernes satrap in the year 413 B.C., commencing operations
jointly with the Spartans, for detaching the Asiatic allies from
Athens, after her reverses in Sicily; and employing the Spartans
successfully against Amorges, the revolted son of Pissuthnes, who
occupied the strong maritime town of Iasus.[7]
[2] Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-40.
[3] See the Appendix of Mr. Fynes Clinton, mentioned in the
preceding note, p. 317.
There were some Egyptian troops in the army of Artaxerxes at
the battle of Kunaxa; on the other hand, there were other
Egyptians in a state of pronounced revolt. Compare two passages
of Xenophon’s Anabasis, i, 8, 9; ii, 5, 13; Diodor. xiii, 46; and
the Dissertation of F. Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub imperio
Persarum, p. 20-56 (Cologne, 1830).
[4] Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 19; ii, 1, 13.
[5] Thucyd. iv, 50. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρεσβέων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ
λέγειν.
This incompetence, or duplicity, on the part of the Spartan
envoys, helps to explain the facility with which Alkibiades duped
them at Athens (Thucyd. v, 45). See above, in this History, Vol.
VII. ch. lv, p. 47.
[6] Ktesias, Persic. c. 52.
[7] Thucyd. viii, 28. See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 389 of this
History.
The increased vigor of Persian operations against Athens, after
Cyrus, the younger son of Darius Nothus, came down to the Ionic coast
in 407 B.C., has been recounted in my preceding volume; together
with the complete prostration of Athenian power, accomplished during
the ensuing three years. Residing at Sardis and placed in active
coöperation with Greeks, this ambitious and energetic young prince
soon became penetrated with their superior military and political
efficiency, as compared with the native Asiatics. For the abilities
and character of Lysander, the Peloponnesian admiral, he contracted
so much admiration, that, when summoned to court during the last
illness of his father Darius in 405 B.C., he even confided to that
officer the whole of his tribute and treasure, to be administered in
furtherance of the war;[8] which during his absence was brought to a
victorious close.
[8] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 14. Compare Xen. Œconom. iv, 20.
Cyrus, born after the accession of his father to the throne, was
not more than eighteen years of age when first sent down to Sardis
(in 407 B.C.) as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and Kappadokia, and
as commander of that Persian military division which mustered at
the plain of Kastôlus; a command not including the Ionic Greeks on
the seaboard, who were under the satrapy of Tissaphernes.[9] We
cannot place much confidence in the account which Xenophon gives
of his education; that he had been brought up with his brother
and many noble Persian youths in the royal palace,—under the
strictest discipline and restraint, enforcing modest habits, with
the reciprocal duties of obedience and command, upon all of them,
and upon him with peculiar success.[10] It is contradicted by all
the realities which we read about the Persian court, and is a patch
of Grecian rather than of Oriental sentiment, better suited to the
romance of the Cyropædia that to the history of the Anabasis. But in
the Persian accomplishments of horsemanship, mastery of the bow and
of the javelin, bravery in the field, daring as well as endurance in
hunting wild beasts, and power of drinking much wine without being
intoxicated,—Cyrus stood preeminent; and especially so when compared
with his elder brother Artaxerxes, who was at least unwarlike, if not
lazy and timid.[11] And although the peculiar virtue of the Hellenic
citizen,—competence for alternate command and obedience,—formed
no part of the character of Cyrus, yet it appears that Hellenic
affairs and ideas became early impressed upon his mind; insomuch that
on first coming down to Sardis as satrap, he brought down with him
strong interest for the Peloponnesian cause, and strenuous antipathy
to that ancient enemy by whom the Persian arms had been so signally
humbled and repressed. How zealously he coöperated with Lysander and
the Peloponnesians in putting down Athens, has been shown in my last
preceding volume.[12]
[9] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 2; i, 9, 7; Xen. Hellen. i, 4, 3.
[10] Xen. Anab. i, 9, 3-5. Compare Cyropædia, i, 2, 4-6; viii, 1,
16, etc.
[11] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 2-6; Xen. Anab. _ut sup._
[12] See Vol. VIII. ch. lxiv, p. 135.
An energetic and ambitious youth like Cyrus, having once learnt
from personal experience to appreciate the Greeks, was not slow in
divining the value of such auxiliaries as instruments of power to
himself. To coöperate effectively in the war, it was necessary that
he should act to a certain extent upon Grecian ideas, and conciliate
the good will of the Ionic Greeks; so that he came to combine the
imperious and unsparing despotism of a Persian prince, with something
of the regularity and system belonging to a Grecian administrator.
Though younger than Artaxerxes, he seems to have calculated from
the first upon succeeding to the Persian crown at the death of his
father. So undetermined was the law of succession in the Persian
royal family, and so constant the dispute and fratricide on each
vacancy of the throne, that such ambitious schemes would appear
feasible to a young man of much less ardor than Cyrus. Moreover he
was the favorite son of queen Parysatis,[13] who greatly preferred
him to his elder brother Artaxerxes. He was born after the accession
of Darius to the throne, while Artaxerxes had been born prior to
that event; and, as this latter consideration had been employed
seventy years earlier by queen Atossa[14] in determining her husband
Darius son of Hystaspes to declare (even during his lifetime) her
son Xerxes as his intended successor, to the exclusion of an elder
son by a different wife, and born before his accession,—so Cyrus,
perhaps, anticipated the like effective preference to himself from
the solicitations of Parysatis. Probably his hopes were farther
inflamed by the fact that he bore the name of the great founder of
the monarchy; whose memory every Persian reverenced. How completely
he reckoned on becoming king, is shown by a cruel act performed about
the early part of 405 B.C. It was required as a part of Persian
etiquette that every man who came into the presence of the king
should immerse his hands in certain pockets or large sleeves, which
rendered them for the moment inapplicable to active use; but such
deference was shown to no one except the king. Two first cousins of
Cyrus,—sons of Hieramenês, (seemingly one of the satraps or high
Persian dignitaries in Asia Minor), by a sister of Darius,—appeared
in his presence without thus concealing their hands;[15] upon which
Cyrus ordered them both to be put to death. The father and mother
preferred bitter complaints of this atrocity to Darius; who was
induced to send for Cyrus to visit him in Media, on the ground, not
at all fictitious, that his own health was rapidly declining.
[13] Darius had had thirteen children by Parysatis; but all
except Artaxerxes and Cyrus died young. Ktesias asserts that he
heard this statement from Parysatis herself (Ktesias, Persica, c.
49).
[14] Herodot. vii, 4.
[15] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 8, 9; Thucyd. viii, 58.
Compare Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 3, 10; and Lucian, Navigium seu Vota,
c. 30. vol. iii, p. 267, ed. Hemsterhuys with Du Soul’s note.
It is remarkable that, in this passage of the Hellenica, either
Xenophon, or the copyist, makes the mistake of calling Xerxes
(instead of Artaxerxes) father of Darius. Some of the editors,
without any authority from MSS., wish to alter the text from
Ξέρξου to Ἀρταξέρξου.
If Cyrus expected to succeed to the crown, it was important that he
should be on the spot when his father died. He accordingly went up
from Sardis to Media, along with his body guard of three hundred
Greeks, under the Arcadian Xenias; who were so highly remunerated for
this distant march, that the rate of pay was long celebrated.[16]
He also took with him Tissaphernes as an ostensible friend; though
there seems to have been a real enmity between them. Not long after
his arrival, Darius died; but without complying with the request
of Parysatis that he should declare in favor of Cyrus as his
successor. Accordingly Artaxerxes, being proclaimed king, went to
Pasargadæ, the religious capital of the Persians, to perform the
customary solemnities. Thus disappointed, Cyrus was farther accused
by Tissaphernes of conspiring the death of his brother; who caused
him to be seized, and was even on the point of putting him to death,
when the all-powerful intercession of Parysatis saved his life.[17]
He was sent down to his former satrapy at Sardis, whither he returned
with insupportable feelings of anger and wounded pride, and with a
determined resolution to leave nothing untried for the purpose of
dethroning his brother. This statement, given to us by Xenophon,
represents doubtless the story of Cyrus and his friends, current
among the Cyreian army. But if we look at the probabilities of the
case, we shall be led to suspect that the charge of Tissaphernes may
well have been true, and the conspiracy of the disappointed Cyrus
against his brother, a reality instead of a fiction.[18]
[16] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12.
[17] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 4.
[18] So it is presented by Justin, v, 11.
The moment when Cyrus returned to Sardis was highly favorable to his
plans and preparations. The long war had just been concluded by the
capture of Athens and the extinction of her power. Many Greeks, after
having acquired military tastes and habits, were now thrown out of
employment; many others were driven into exile, by the establishment
of the Lysandrian Dekarchies throughout all the cities at once.
Hence competent recruits, for a well-paid service like that of
Cyrus, were now unusually abundant. Having already a certain number
of Greek mercenaries, distributed throughout the various garrisons
in his satrapy, he directed the officers in command to strengthen
their garrisons by as many additional Peloponnesian soldiers as they
could obtain. His pretext was,—first, defence against Tissaphernes,
with whom, since the denunciation by the latter, he was at open
war,—next, protection of the Ionic cities on the seaboard, who had
been hitherto comprised under the government of Tissaphernes, but
had now revolted of their own accord, since the enmity of Cyrus
against him had been declared. Miletus alone had been prevented from
executing this resolution, for Tissaphernes, reinforcing his garrison
in that place, had adopted violent measures of repression, killing
or banishing several of the leading men. Cyrus, receiving these
exiled Milesians with every demonstration of sympathy, immediately
got together both an army and a fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos,[19]
to besiege Miletus by land and sea. He at the same time transmitted
to court the regular tribute due from these maritime cities, and
attempted, through the interest of his mother Parysatis, to procure
that they should be transferred from Tissaphernes to himself. Hence
the Great King was deluded into a belief that the new levies of Cyrus
were only intended for private war between him and Tissaphernes;
an event not uncommon between two neighboring satraps. Nor was it
displeasing to the court that a suspected prince should be thus
occupied at a distance.[20]
[19] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 6; i, 4, 2.
[20] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 7, 8, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἤχθετο (the king) αὐτῶν
πολεμοῦντων.
Besides the army thus collected around Miletus, Cyrus found means
to keep other troops within his call, though at a distance and
unsuspected. A Lacedæmonian officer named Klearchus, of considerable
military ability and experience, presented himself as an exile at
Sardis. He appears to have been banished, (as far as we can judge
amidst contradictory statements,) for gross abuse of authority, and
extreme tyranny, as Lacedæmonian Harmost at Byzantium, and even for
having tried to maintain himself in that place after the Ephors had
formally dismissed him. The known efficiency, and restless warlike
appetite of Klearchus,[21] procured for him the confidence of Cyrus,
who gave him the large sum of ten thousand Darics, (about £7600),
which he employed in levying an army of mercenary Greeks for the
defence of the Grecian cities in the Chersonese against the Thracian
tribes in their neighborhood; thus maintaining the troops until they
were required by Cyrus. Again, Aristippus and Menon,—Thessalians
of the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa, who had maintained
their tie of personal hospitality with the Persian royal family
ever since the time of Xerxes, and were now in connection with
Cyrus,[22]—received from him funds to maintain a force of two
thousand mercenaries for their political purposes in Thessaly,
subject to his call whenever he should require them. Other Greeks,
too, who had probably contracted similar ties of hospitality with
Cyrus by service during the late war,—Proxenus, a Bœotian; Agias
and Sophænetus, Arcadians; Sokrates, an Achæan, etc.,—were also
empowered by him to collect mercenary soldiers. His pretended objects
were, partly the siege of Miletus; partly an ostensible expedition
against the Pisidians,—warlike and predatory mountaineers who did
much mischief from their fastnesses in the south-east of Asia Minor.
[21] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 9; ii, 6, 3. The statements here contained
do not agree with Diodor. xiv, 12; while both of them differ from
Isokrates (Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 121; Or. xii, Panath. s. 111),
and Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 6.
I follow partially the narrative of Diodorus, so far as to
suppose that the tyranny which he mentions was committed by
Klearchus as Harmost of Byzantium. We know that there was a
Lacedæmonian Harmost in that town, named as soon as the town was
taken, by Lysander, after the battle of Ægospotami (Xen. Hellen.
ii, 2, 2). This was towards the end of 405 B.C. We know farther,
from the Anabasis, that Kleander was Harmost there in 400 B.C.
Klearchus may have been Harmost there in 404 B.C.
[22] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 10; Herodot. vii, 6; ix, 1; Plato, Menon,
c. 1, p. 70; c. 11, p. 78 C.
Besides these unavowed Grecian levies, Cyrus sent envoys to the
Lacedæmonians to invoke their aid, in requital for the strenuous
manner in which he had seconded their operations against Athens,—and
received a favorable answer. He farther got together a considerable
native force, taking great pains to conciliate friends as well
as to inspire confidence. “He was straightforward and just, like
a candidate for command,”—to use the expression of Herodotus
respecting the Median Dëiokês;[23] maintaining order and security
throughout his satrapy, and punishing evil doers in great numbers,
with the utmost extremity of rigor; of which the public roads
exhibited abundant living testimony, in the persons of mutilated men,
deprived of their hands, feet, or eyesight.[24] But he was also exact
in rewarding faithful service, both civil and military. He not only
made various expeditions against the hostile Mysians and Pisidians,
but was forward in exposing his own person, and munificent, rewarding
the zeal of all soldiers who distinguished themselves. He attached
men to his person both by a winning demeanor and by seasonable gifts.
As it was the uniform custom, (and is still the custom in the East),
for every one who approached Cyrus to come with a present in his
hand,[25] so he usually gave away again these presents as marks of
distinction to others. Hence he not only acquired the attachment of
all in his own service, but also of those Persians whom Artaxerxes
sent down on various pretences for the purpose of observing his
motions. Of these emissaries from Susa, some were even sent to
obstruct and enfeeble him. It was under such orders that a Persian
named Orontes, governor of Sardis, acted, in levying open war against
Cyrus; who twice subdued him, and twice pardoned him, on solemn
assurance of fidelity for the future.[26] In all agreements, even
with avowed enemies, Cyrus kept faith exactly; so that his word was
trusted by every one.
[23] Herodot. i. 96. Ὁ δὲ (Dëiokês) οἷα μνώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε
καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.
Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 1; Diodor. xiv, 19.
[24] Xen. Anab. 1, 9, 8. Πολλάκις δ᾽ ἰδεῖν ἦν ἀνὰ τὰς στειβομένας
ὁδοὺς, καὶ ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν στερουμένους ἀνθρώπους.
For other samples of mutilation inflicted by Persians, not
merely on malefactors, but on prisoners by wholesale, see
Quintus Curtius, v. 5, 6. Alexander the Great was approaching
near to Persepolis, “quum miserabile agmen, inter pauca
fortunæ exempla memorandum, regi occurrit. Captivi erant
Græci ad quatuor millia ferè, quos Persæ vario suppliciorum
modo affecerunt. Alios pedibus, quosdam manibus auribusque,
amputatis, inustisque barbararum literarum notis, in longum sui
ludibrium reservaverant,” etc. Compare Diodorus, xvii, 69; and
the prodigious tales of cruelty recounted in Herodot. ix, 112;
Ktesias, Persic. c. 54-59; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 14, 16, 17.
It is not unworthy of remark, that while there was nothing in
which the Persian rulers displayed greater invention than in
exaggerating bodily suffering upon a malefactor or an enemy,—at
Athens, whenever any man was put to death by public sentence, the
execution took place within the prison by administering a cup
of hemlock, without even public exposure. It was the minimum of
pain, as well as the minimum of indignity; as any one may see who
reads the account of the death of Sokrates, given by Plato at the
end of the Phædon.
It is certain, that, on the whole, the public sentiment in
England is more humane now than it was in that day at Athens.
Yet an Athenian public could not have borne the sight of a
citizen publicly hanged or beheaded in the market-place. Much
less could they have borne the sight of the prolonged tortures
inflicted on Damiens at Paris in 1757 (a fair parallel to the
Persian σκάφευσις described in Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 16), in the
presence of an immense crowd of spectators, when every window
commanding a view of the Place de Grève was let at a high price,
and filled by the best company in Paris.
[25] Xen. Anab. i, 9, 13.
[26] Xen. Anab. i, 6, 6.
Of such virtues, (rare in an Oriental ruler, either ancient or
modern,)—and of such secret preparations,—Cyrus sought to reap the
fruits at the beginning of 401 B.C. Xenias, his general at home,
brought together all the garrisons, leaving a bare sufficiency for
defence of the towns. Klearchus, Menon, and the other Greek generals
were recalled, and the siege of Miletus was relinquished; so that
there was concentrated at Sardis a body of seven thousand seven
hundred Grecian hoplites, with five hundred light armed.[27] Others
afterwards joined on the march, and there was, besides, a native
army of about one hundred thousand men. With such means Cyrus set
forth, (March or April, 401 B.C.), from Sardis. His real purpose was
kept secret; his ostensible purpose, as proclaimed and understood by
every one except himself and Klearchus, was to conquer and root out
the Pisidian mountaineers. A joint Lacedæmonian and Persian fleet,
under the Lacedæmonian admiral Samius, at the same time coasted
round the south of Asia Minor, in order to lend coöperation from the
sea-side.[28] This Lacedæmonian coöperation passed for a private levy
effected by Cyrus himself; for the ephors would not formally avow
hostility against the Great King.[29]
[27] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 2-3.
[28] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 1.
[29] Diodor. xiv, 21.
The body of Greeks, immortalized under the name of the Ten
Thousand, who were thus preparing to plunge into so many unexpected
perils,—though embarking on a foreign mercenary service, were by
no means outcasts, or even men of extreme poverty. They were for
the most part persons of established position, and not a few even
opulent. Half of them were Acadians or Achæans.
Such was the reputation of Cyrus for honorable and munificent
dealing, that many young men of good family had run away from their
fathers and mothers; others of mature age had been tempted to leave
their wives and children; and there were even some who had embarked
their own money in advance of outfit for other poorer men, as well as
for themselves.[30] All calculated on a year’s campaign in Pisidia;
which might perhaps be hard, but would certainly be lucrative, and
would enable them to return with a well-furnished purse. So the Greek
commanders at Sardis all confidently assured them; extolling, with
the emphasis and eloquence suitable to recruiting officers, both
the liberality of Cyrus[31] and the abundant promise of all men of
enterprise.
[30] Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8. Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ
σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν
Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ
προσανελωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας
καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς χρήματα αὐτοῖς
κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ
Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν εἰς
τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι. Compare v. 10, 10.
[31] Compare similar praises of Ptolemy Philadelphus, in order to
attract Greek mercenaries from Sicily to Egypt (Theokrit. xiv,
50-59).
Among others, the Bœotian Proxenus wrote to his friend Xenophon, at
Athens, pressing him strongly to come to Sardis, and offering to
present him to Cyrus, whom he, (Proxenus,) “considered as a better
friend to him than his own country;[32]” a striking evidence of the
manner in which such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian
patriotism, which we shall recognize more and more as we advance
forward. This able and accomplished Athenian,—entitled to respectful
gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country, but from the Cyreian
army and the intellectual world generally,—was one of the class of
Knights or Horsemen, and is said to have served in that capacity at
the battle of Delium.[33] Of his previous life we know little or
nothing, except that he was an attached friend and diligent hearer of
Sokrates; the memorials of whose conversation we chiefly derive from
his pen, as we also derive the narrative of the Cyreian march. In
my last preceding chapter on Sokrates, I have made ample use of the
Memorabilia of Xenophon; and I am now about to draw from his Anabasis
(a model of perspicuous and interesting narrative) the account of the
adventures of the Cyreian army, which we are fortunate in knowing
from so authentic a source.
[32] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Proxenus to
Xenophon) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ὃν αὐτος ἔφη κρείττω
ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.
[33] Strabo, ix, p. 403. The story that Sokrates carried off
Xenophon, wounded and thrown from his horse, on his shoulders,
and thus saved his life,—seems too doubtful to enter into the
narrative.
Among the proofs that Xenophon was among the Horsemen or Ἱππεῖς
of Athens, we may remark, not only his own strong interest, and
great skill in horsemanship, in the cavalry service and the
duties of its commander, and in all that relates to horses, as
manifested in his published works,—but also the fact, that his
son Gryllus served afterwards among the Athenian horsemen at the
combat of cavalry which preceded the great battle of Mantineia
(Diogen. Laërt. ii, 54).
On receiving the invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon felt much
inclined to comply. To a member of that class of Knights, which
three years before had been the mainstay of the atrocities of the
Thirty, (how far he was personally concerned, we cannot say,) it is
probable that residence in Athens was in those times not peculiarly
agreeable to him. He asked the opinion of Sokrates; who, apprehensive
lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of Athens, might expose
him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an application
to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went; but in truth he had
already made up his mind beforehand. So that instead of asking,
“whether he ought to go or refuse,”—he simply put the question, “To
which of the gods must I sacrifice, in order to obtain safety and
success in a journey which I am now meditating?” The reply of the
oracle,—indicating Zeus Basileus as the god to whom sacrifice was
proper,—was brought back by Xenophon; upon which Sokrates, though
displeased that the question had not been fairly put as to the
whole project, nevertheless advised, since an answer had now been
given, that it should be literally obeyed. Accordingly Xenophon,
having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took his departure first
to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found the army about
to set forth. Proxenus presented him to Cyrus, who entreated him
earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him as soon as the
campaign against the Pisidians should be finished.[34] He was thus
induced to stay, yet only as a volunteer or friend of Proxenus,
without accepting any special post in the army, either as officer
or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his service under
Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Sokrates, of rendering
him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards banished,
this sentence was not passed against him until after the battle
of Korôneia in 394 B.C., where he was in arms as a conspicuous
officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen and their Theban
allies,—nor need we look farther back for the grounds of the
sentence.
[34] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-9; v. 9, 22-24.
Though Artaxerxes, entertaining general suspicions of his brother’s
ambitious views, had sent down various persons to watch him, yet
Cyrus had contrived to gain or neutralize these spies, and had
masked his preparations so skilfully, that no intimation was conveyed
to Susa until the march was about to commence. It was only then that
Tissaphernes, seeing the siege of Miletus relinquished, and the vast
force mustering at Sardis, divined that something more was meant than
the mere conquest of Pisidian freebooters, and went up in person
to warn the king; who began his preparations forthwith.[35] That
which Tissaphernes had divined was yet a secret to every man in the
army, to Proxenus as well as the rest,—when Cyrus, having confided
the provisional management of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen,
and to his admiral the Egyptian Tamos, commenced his march in a
south-easterly direction from Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia.[36]
Three days’ march, a distance stated at twenty-two parasangs,[37]
brought him to the Mæander; one additional march of eight parasangs,
after crossing that river, forwarded him to Kolossæ, a flourishing
city in Phrygia, where Menon overtook him with a reinforcement of
one thousand hoplites, and five hundred peltasts,—Dolopes, Ænianes,
and Olynthians. He then marched three days onward to Kelænæ, another
Phrygian city, “great and flourishing,” with a citadel very strong
both by nature and art. Here he halted no less than thirty days, in
order to await the arrival of Klearchus, with his division of one
thousand hoplites, eight hundred Thracian peltasts, and two hundred
Kretan bowmen; at the same time Sophænetus arrived with one thousand
farther hoplites, and Sosias with three hundred. This total of Greeks
was reviewed by Cyrus in one united body at Kelænæ; eleven thousand
hoplites and two thousand peltasts.[38]
[35] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 4; ii, 3, 19.
Diodorus (xiv, 11) citing from Ephorus affirms that the first
revelation to Artaxerxes was made by Pharnabazus, who had learnt
it from the acuteness of the Athenian exile Alkibiades. That the
latter should have had any concern in it, appears improbable. But
Diodorus on more than one occasion, confounds Pharnabazus and
Tissaphernes.
[36] Diodor. xiv, 19.
[37] The parasang was a Persian measurement of length, but
according to Strabo, not of uniform value in all parts of Asia;
in some parts, held equivalent to thirty stadia, in others to
forty, in others to sixty (Strabo, xi, p. 518; Forbiger, Handbuch
der Alten Geograph. vol. i, p. 555). This variability of meaning
is no way extraordinary, when we recollect the difference between
English, Irish, and German miles, etc.
Herodotus tells us distinctly what _he_ meant by a parasang, and
what the Persian government of his day recognized as such in
their measurement of the great road from Sardis to Susa, as well
as in their measurements of territory for purposes of tribute
(Herod. v, 53; vi, 43). It was thirty Greek stadia = nearly three
and a half English miles, or nearly three geographical miles.
The distance between every two successive stations, on the road
from Sardis to Susa, (which was “all inhabited and all secure,”
διὰ οἰκεομένης τε ἅπασα καὶ ἀσφολέος), would seem to have been
measured and marked in parasangs and fractions of a parasang. It
seems probable, from the account which Herodotus gives of the
march of Xerxes (vii, 26), that this road passed from Kappadokia
and across the river Halys, through Kelænæ and Kolossæ to Sardis;
and therefore that the road which Cyrus took for his march, from
Sardis at least as far as Kelænæ, must have been so measured and
marked.
Xenophon also in his summing up of the route, (ii, 2, 6; vii,
8, 26) implies the parasang as equivalent to thirty stadia,
while he gives for the most part, each day’s journey measured
in parasangs. Now even at the outset of the march, we have
no reason to believe that there was any official measurer of
road-progress accompanying the army, like Bæton, ὁ Βηματιστὴς
Ἀλεξάνδρου, in Alexander’s invasion; see Athenæus, x, p. 442, and
Geier, Alexandri Magni Histor. Scriptt. p. 357. Yet Xenophon,
throughout the whole march, even as far as Trebizond, states the
day’s march of the army in parasangs; not merely in Asia Minor,
where there were roads, but through the Arabian desert between
Thapsakus and Pylæ,—through the snows of Armenia,—and through
the territory of the barbarous Chalybes. He tells us that in the
desert of Arabia they marched ninety parasangs in thirteen days,
or very nearly seven parasangs per day,—and that too under the
extreme heat of summer. He tells us, farther, that in the deep
snows of Armenia, and in the extremity of winter, they marched
fifteen parasangs in three days; and through the territory (also
covered with snow) of the pugnacious Chalybes, fifty parasangs in
seven days, or more than seven parasangs per day. Such marches,
at thirty stadia for the parasang, are impossible. And how did
Xenophon measure the distance marched over?
The most intelligent modern investigators and travellers,—Major
Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Chesney, Professor
Koch, etc., offer no satisfactory solution of the difficulty.
Major Rennell reckons the parasangs as equal to 2.25 geogr.
miles; Mr. Ainsworth at three geogr. miles; Mr. Hamilton (travels
in Asia Minor, c. 42, p. 200), at something less than two and a
half geogr. miles; Colonel Chesney (Euphrat. and Tigris, ch. 8,
p. 207) at 2.608 geogr. miles between Sardis and Thapsakus—at
1.98 geogr. miles, between Thapsakus and Kunaxa,—at something
less than this, without specifying how much, during the retreat.
It is evident that there is no certain basis to proceed upon,
even for the earlier portion of the route; much more, for the
retreat. The distance between Ikonium and Dana (or Tyana), is one
of the quantities on which Mr. Hamilton rests his calculation;
but we are by no means certain that Cyrus took the direct route
of march; he rather seems to have turned out of his way, partly
to plunder Lykaonia, partly to conduct the Kilikian princess
homeward. The other item, insisted upon by Mr. Hamilton, is the
distance between Kelænæ and Kolossæ, two places the site of which
seems well ascertained, and which are by the best modern maps,
fifty-two geographical miles apart. Xenophon calls the distance
twenty parasangs. Assuming the road by which he marched to have
been the same with that now travelled, it would make the parasang
of Xenophon = 2.6 geographical miles. I have before remarked that
the road between Kolossæ and Kelænæ was probably measured and
numbered according to parasangs; so that Xenophon, in giving the
number of parasangs between these two places, would be speaking
upon official authority.
Even a century and a half afterwards, the geographer Eratosthenes
found it not possible to obtain accurate measurements, in much of
the country traversed by Cyrus (Strabo, ii, p. 73.)
Colonel Chesney remarks,—“From Sardis to Cunaxa, or the mounds
of Mohammed, cannot be much under or over twelve hundred and
sixty-five geographical miles; making 2.364 geographical miles
for each of the five hundred and thirty-five parasangs given by
Xenophon between those two places.”
As a measure of distance, the parasang of Xenophon is evidently
untrustworthy. Is it admissible to consider, in the description
of this march, that the parasangs and stadia of Xenophon are
measurements rather of time than of space? From Sardis to Kelænæ,
he had a measured road and numbered parasangs of distance; it is
probable that the same mensuration and numeration continued for
four days farther, as far as Keramôn-Agora, (since I imagine that
the road from Kelænæ to the Halys and Kappadokia must have gone
through these two places,)—and possibly it may have continued
even as far as Ikonium or Dana. Hence, by these early marches,
Xenophon had the opportunity of forming to himself roughly an
idea of the time (measured by the course of the sun) which it
took for the army to march one, two, or three parasangs; and when
he came to the ulterior portions of the road, he called _that
length of time_ by the name of one, two, or three parasangs. Five
parasangs seem to have meant with him a full day’s march; three
or four, a short day; six, seven, or eight, a long, or very long
day.
We must recollect that the Greeks in the time of Xenophon had no
portable means of measuring hours, and did not habitually divide
the day into hours, or into any other recognized fraction. The
Alexandrine astronomers, near two centuries afterwards, were
the first to use ὥρη in the sense of hour (Ideler, Handbuch der
Chronologie, vol. i, p. 239.)
This may perhaps help to explain Xenophon’s meaning, when he
talks about marching five or seven parasangs amidst the deep
snows of Armenia; I do not however suppose that he had this
meaning uniformly or steadily present to his mind. Sometimes, it
would seem, he must have used the word in its usual meaning of
distance.
[38] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 8, 9. About Kelænæ, Arrian, Exp. Al. i, 29,
2; Quint. Curt. iii, 1, 6.
As far as Kelænæ, his march had been directed straight towards
Pisidia, near the borders of which territory that city is situated.
So far, therefore, the fiction with which he started was kept up.
But on leaving Kelænæ, he turned his march away from Pisidia, in
a direction nearly northward; first in two days, ten parasangs,
to the town of Peltæ; next in two days farther, twelve parasangs,
to Keramôn-Agora, the last city in the district adjoining Mysia.
At Peltæ, in a halt of three days, the Arcadian general Xenias
celebrated the great festival of his country, the Lykæa, with
its usual games and matches, in the presence of Cyrus. From
Keramôn-Agora, Cyrus marched in three days the unusual distance of
thirty parasangs,[39] to a city called Käystru-Pedion, (the plain
of Käystrus), where he halted for five days. Here his repose was
disturbed by the murmurs of the Greek soldiers, who had received no
pay for three months, (Xenophon had before told us that they were
mostly men who had some means of their own), and who now flocked
around his tent to press for their arrears. So impoverished was Cyrus
by previous disbursements,—perhaps also by remissions of tribute for
the purpose of popularizing himself,—that he was utterly without
money, and was obliged to put them off again with promises. And
his march might well have ended here, had he not been rescued from
embarrassment by the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of the Kilikian prince
Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum of money, and enabled him
to give to the Greek soldiers four months’ pay at once. As to the
Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received little beyond
their maintenance.
[39] These three marches, each of ten parasangs, from
Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion,—are the longest recorded in
the Anabasis. It is rather surprising to find them so; for
there seems no motive for Cyrus to have hurried forward. When
he reached Käystru-Pedion, he halted five days. Koch (Zug der
Zehn Tausend, Leipsic, 1850, p. 19) remarks that the three days’
march, which seem to have dropped out of Xenophon’s calculation,
comparing the items with the total, might conveniently be let
in here; so that these thirty parasangs should have occupied
six days’ march instead of three; five parasangs per day. The
whole march which Cyrus had hitherto made from Sardis, including
the road from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion, lay in the great
road from Sardis to the river Halys, Kappadokia, and Susa. That
road (as we see by the March of Xerxes, Herodot. vii, 26; v,
52) passed through both Kelænæ and Kolossæ; though this is a
prodigious departure from the straight line. At Käystru-Pedion,
Cyrus seems to have left this great road; taking a different
route, in a direction nearly south-east towards Ikonium. About
the point, somewhere near Synnada, where these different roads
crossed, see Mr. Ainsworth, Trav. in the Track, p. 28.
I do not share the doubts which have been raised about Xenophon’s
accuracy, in his description of the route from Sardis to Ikonium;
though the names of several of the places which he mentions are
not known to us, and their sites cannot be exactly identified.
There is a great departure from the straight line of bearing. But
we at the present day assign more weight to that circumstance
than is suited to the days of Xenophon. Straight roads,
stretching systematically over a large region of country, are
not of that age; the communications were probably all originally
made, between one neighboring town and another, without much
reference to saving of distance, and with no reference to any
promotion of traffic between distant places.
It was just about this time that King Archelaus began to “cut
straight roads” in Macedonia,—which Thucydides seems to note as
a remarkable thing (ii, 100).
Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia, brought the army
to Thymbrium; two more to Tyriæum. Each day’s march is called five
parasangs[40]. It was here that Cyrus, halting three days, passed
the army in review, to gratify the Kilikian princess Epyaxa, who
was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic troops were first
made to march in order before him, cavalry and infantry in their
separate divisions; after which he himself in a chariot, and Epyaxa
in a Harmamaxa, (a sort of carriage or litter covered with an awning
which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along the front of
the Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were marshalled
four deep, all in their best trim; brazen helmets, purple tunics,
greaves or leggings, and the shields rubbed bright, just taken out
of the wrappers in which they were carried during a mere march.[41]
Klearchus commanded on the left, and Menon on the right; the other
generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his review
along the whole line, and taken a station with the Kilikian princess
at a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to
the generals, and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly,
the orders were given, the spears were protended, the trumpets
sounded, and the whole Greek force moved forward in battle array with
the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace became accelerated, and
they made straight against the victualling portion of the Asiatic
encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all the
Asiatics fled forthwith, abandoning their property,—Epyaxa herself
among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had among her
personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus, she had never before seen
a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as terrified; much to the
satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of his coming
success.[42]
[40] Neither Thymbrium, nor Tyriæum, can be identified. But it
seems that both must have been situated on the line of road now
followed by the caravans from Smyrna to Konieh (Ikonium,) which
line of road follows a direction between the mountains called
Emir Dagh on the north-east, and those called Sultan Dagh on the
south-west (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 21, 22).
[41] Εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ, καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς, καὶ
κνημῖδας, καὶ ~τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαθαρμένας~.
When the hoplite was on march, without expectation of an enemy,
the shield seems to have been carried behind him, with his
blanket attached to it (see Aristoph. Acharn. 1085, 1089-1149);
it was slung by the strap round his neck and shoulder. Sometimes
indeed he had an opportunity of relieving himself from the
burden, by putting the shield in a baggage-wagon (Xen. Anab. i,
7, 20). The officers generally, and doubtless some soldiers,
could command attendants to carry their shields for them (iv, 2,
20; Aristoph. 1, c.).
On occasion of this review, the shields were unpacked, rubbed,
and brightened, as before a battle (Xen. Hell. vii, 5, 20); then
fastened round the neck or shoulders, and held out upon the left
arm, which was passed through the rings or straps attached to its
concave or interior side.
Respecting the cases or wrappers of the shields, see a curious
stratagem of the Syracusan Agathokles (Diodor. xx, 11). The Roman
soldiers also carried their shields in leathern wrappers, when on
march (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 27).
It is to be remarked that Xenophon, in enumerating the arms of
the Cyreians, does not mention _breastplates_; which (though
sometimes worn, see Plutarch, Dion. c. 30) were not usually worn
by hoplites, who carried heavy shields. It is quite possible
that _some_ of the Cyreian infantry may have had breastplates as
well as shields, since every soldier provided his own arms; but
Xenophon states only what was common to all.
Grecian cavalry commonly wore a heavy breastplate, but had no
shield.
[42] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 16-19.
Three days of farther march, (called twenty parasangs in all) brought
the army to Ikonium, (now Konieh), the extreme city of Phrygia;
where Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for five days (thirty
parasangs) through Lykaonia; which country, as being out of his
own satrapy, and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks to plunder.
Lykaonia being immediately on the borders of Pisidia, its inhabitants
were probably reckoned as Pisidians, since they were of the like
predatory character:[43] so that Cyrus would be partially realizing
the pretended purpose of his expedition. He thus, too, approached
near to Mount Taurus, which separated him from Kilikia; and he here
sent the Kilikian princess, together with Menon and his division,
over the mountain, by a pass shorter and more direct, but seemingly
little frequented, and too difficult for the whole army; in order
that they might thus get straight into Kilikia,[44] in the rear of
Syennesis, who was occupying the regular pass more to the northward.
Intending to enter with his main body through this latter pass, Cyrus
first proceeded through Kappadokia (four days’ march, twenty-five
parasangs) to Dana or Tyana, a flourishing city of Kappadokia; where
he halted three days, and where he put to death two Persian officers,
on a charge of conspiring against him.[45]
[43] Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.
[44] This shorter and more direct pass crosses the Taurus by
Kizil-Chesmeh, Alan Buzuk, and Mizetli; it led directly to the
Kilikian seaport-town Soli, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. It
is laid down in the Peutinger Tables as the road from Iconium to
Pompeiopolis (Ainsworth, p. 40 _seq._; Chesney, Euph. and Tigr.
ii, p. 209).
[45] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 20.
This regular pass over Taurus, the celebrated Tauri-Pylæ or Kilikian
Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a road fit for vehicles, it
was yet three thousand six hundred feet above the level of the sea,
narrow, steep, bordered by high ground on each side, and crossed by a
wall with gates, so that it could not be forced if ever so moderately
defended.[46] But the Kilikian prince, alarmed at the news that
Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less frequented pass
to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing along the coast,
evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell back to Tarsus; from
whence he again retired, accompanied by most of the inhabitants,
to an inaccessible fastness on the mountains. Accordingly Cyrus,
ascending without opposition the great pass thus abandoned, reached
Tarsus after a march of four days, there rejoining Menon and Epyaxa.
Two lochi or companies of the division of Menon, having dispersed on
their march for pillage, had been cut off by the natives; for which
the main body of Greeks now took their revenge, plundering both the
city and the palace of Syennesis. That prince, though invited by
Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused, but was at length
prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife, to return under a
safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance, to exchange
presents with Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money towards
his expedition, together with a contingent of troops; in return for
which it was stipulated that Kilikia should be no farther plundered,
and that the slaves taken away might be recovered wherever they were
found.[47]
[46] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 20. See Mr. Kinneir,
Travels in Asia Minor, p. 116; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and
Tigris, vol. i, p. 293-354; and Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the
Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 40 _seq._; also his other work,
Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. ch. 30, p. 70-77; and Koch,
Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 26-172, for a description of this
memorable pass.
Alexander the Great, as well as Cyrus, was fortunate enough to
find this impregnable pass abandoned; as it appears, through
sheer stupidity or recklessness of the satrap who ought to have
defended it, and who had not even the same excuse for abandoning
it as Syennesis had on the approach of Cyrus (Arrian. E. A. ii.
4; Curtius, iii, 9, 10, 11).
[47] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 23-27.
It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly tell us so, that
the resistance of Syennesis, (this was a standing name or title of
the hereditary princes of Kilikia under the Persian crown), was a
mere feint; that the visit of Epyaxa with a supply of money to Cyrus,
and the admission of Menon and his division over Mount Taurus, were
manœuvres in collusion with him; and that, thinking Cyrus would be
successful, he was disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the
same time to give himself the air of having been overpowered, in case
Artaxerxes should prove victorious.[48]
[48] Diodorus (xiv, 20) represents Syennesis as playing a double
game, though reluctantly. He takes no notice of the proceeding of
Epyaxa.
So Livy says, about the conduct of the Macedonian courtiers in
regard to the enmity between Perseus and Demetrius, the two
sons of Philip II. of Macedon: “Crescente in dies Philippi
odio in Romanos, cui Perseus indulgeret, Demetrius summâ ope
adversaretur, prospicientes animo exitum incauti a fraude
fraternâ juvenis—_adjuvandum, quod futurum erat, rati,
fovendamque spem potentioris, Perseo se adjungunt_,” _etc._
(Livy, xl, 5).
At first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined
to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty days. The
army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of the
expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not one of
them, either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the contrary,
except Klearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw that they
had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to be conducted
against the Persian king. Besides the resentment at such delusion,
they shrunk from the risk altogether; not from any fear of Persian
armies, but from the terrors of a march of three months inward from
the coast, and the impossibility of return, which had so powerfully
affected the Spartan King Kleomenes,[49] a century before; most of
them being (as I have before remarked) men of decent position and
family in their respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their
determination to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to
fight against the Great King.[50]
[49] See Herodot. v. 49.
[50] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 1.
Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Xenias,
etc.) commanded his own separate division, without any generalissimo
except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathized more or less
in the resentment as well as in the repugnance of the soldiers. But
Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was doubtless
prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it might be
overcome. That such a man as Klearchus could be tolerated as a
commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof of the
great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military discipline.
For though he had great military merits, being brave, resolute, and
full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for the subsistence
of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and hardship,—yet
his look and manner were harsh, his punishments were perpetual as
well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to conciliate his
soldiers; who accordingly stayed with him, and were remarkable
for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders required
them,—but preferred service under other commanders, when they
could obtain it.[51] Finding his orders to march forward disobeyed,
Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce and
punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself with the cattle
who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move forward,
and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his attempt
at coercion, he was compelled to convene the soldiers in a regular
assembly, and to essay persuasion.
[51] Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 5-15.
On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and
imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even weeping;
a remarkable point in Grecian manners,—and exceedingly impressive
to the soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At
length he addressed them: “Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me
deeply mortified. Cyrus has been my friend and benefactor. It was
he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me ten thousand Darics,
which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you, and
in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against Thracian
depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along with you, in
order to make him the best return in my power for his past kindness.
But now, since you will no longer march along with me, I am under the
necessity either of renouncing you or of breaking faith with him.
Whether I am doing right or not, I cannot say; but I shall stand
by you, and share your fate. No one shall say of me that, having
conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I betrayed the Greeks and
chose the foreigner. You are to me country, friends, allies; while
you are with me, I can help a friend, and repel an enemy. Understand
me well; I shall go wherever you go, and partake your fortune.”[52]
[52] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 2-7. Here, as on other occasions, I
translate the sense rather than the words.
This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he
would not march forward against the King, was heard by the soldiers
with much delight; in which those of the other Greek divisions
sympathized, especially as none of the other Greek commanders had yet
announced a similar resolution. So strong was this feeling among the
soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that two thousand of them left their
commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the
encampment of Klearchus.
Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encountered,
sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But the latter, knowing
well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He,
however, at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage
Cyrus with the assurance that everything would come right at
last,—and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be sent,
in order that he (Klearchus) might answer by fresh refusals. He then
again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those who had
recently deserted Xenias to join him. “Soldiers (said he), we must
recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer his
soldiers, nor he our paymaster; moreover, I know that he thinks we
have wronged him,—so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go near
him. He is a good friend,—but a formidable enemy; and has a powerful
force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This is no time
for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether to stay or
go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as to obtain
provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to suggest.”
Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops
found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from
his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the
assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency; but
their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately
instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either
of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the
commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be
impatient for immediate departure. “If Klearchus does not choose to
conduct us back (said this speaker) let us immediately elect other
generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to
ask Cyrus for merchant-vessels,—or at any rate for guides in our
return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must
put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back; sending
forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes.” Klearchus
here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for
him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other
commander who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker,
who demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus, either for
a guide, or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating
his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting
away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides? On the other
hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible.
The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting
of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really
wanted; which no one yet knew. His answer to the question should
be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their
resolution accordingly.
To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was but too plain
that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the
question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack
his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, twelve days’
march onward. If he found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he
deserved. If, on the other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again
consult what step was fit to be taken.
The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception, but
nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They required
only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about the Great King, or
the expedition against him. Cyrus granted increased pay of fifty per
cent. upon the previous rate. Instead of one daric per month to each
soldier, he agreed to give a daric and a half.[53]
[53] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 16-21.
This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the
Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal
made to their reason and judgment,—the habit, established more
or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and
attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding
afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the
fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves to
this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look at the
actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best to be
done for the future. To return back from the place where they stood,
against the wish of Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty
and danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by
the best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous
course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward.
As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example
of Klearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from
Tarsus, and reached Issus, the extreme city of Kilikia, in five
days’ march,—crossing the rivers Sarus[54] and Pyramus. At Issus, a
flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called,
Cyrus was joined by his fleet of fifty triremes,—thirty-five
Lacedæmonian and twenty-five Persian triremes; bringing a
reinforcement of seven hundred hoplites, under the command of the
Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the
Spartan Ephors.[55] He also received a farther reinforcement of four
hundred Grecian soldiers; making the total of Greeks in his army
fourteen thousand, from which are to be deducted the one hundred
soldiers of Menon’s division, slain in Kilikia.
[54] The breadth of the river Sarus (Scihun) is given by Xenophon
at three hundred feet; which agrees nearly with the statements of
modern travellers (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 34).
Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir’s Journey
through Asia Minor, p. 135; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris,
ii, p. 211; Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten
Thousand, p. 54.