I had finished this morning presenting the general rules which prevailed
during the five years of occupation in the matter of the execution of
numerous hostages in the occupied countries of the West. I brought you
the evidence, by reading a series of official German documents, that the
highest authorities of the Army, of the Party, and of the Nazi
Government had deliberately chosen to practice a terroristic policy
through the seizure of hostages.
Before passing to the examination of a few particular cases, it seems to
me to be necessary to say exactly wherein this policy consisted, in the
light of the texts which I have quoted.
According to the circumstances, people belonging by choice or ethnically
to the vanquished nations were apprehended and held as a guarantee for
the maintenance of order in a given sector; or after a given incident of
which the enemy army had been the victim. They were apprehended and held
with a view to obtaining the execution by the vanquished population of
acts determined by the occupying authority, such as denunciation,
payment of collective fines, the handing over of perpetrators of
assaults committed against the German Army, and the handing over of
political adversaries; and these persons thus arrested were often
massacred subsequently by way of reprisal.
An idea emerges from methods of this kind, namely, that the hostage, who
is a human being, becomes a special security subjected to seizure as
determined by the enemy. How contrary this is to the rule of individual
liberty and human dignity. All the members of the German Government are
jointly responsible for this iniquitous concept and for its application
in our vanquished countries. No member of the German Government can
throw this responsibility on to subordinates by claiming that they
merely executed clearly stated orders with an excess of zeal.
I have shown you that upon many occasions, on the contrary, the persons
who carried out the orders reported to the chiefs the moral consequences
resulting from the application of the terroristic policy of hostages.
And we know that in no case were contrary orders given. We know that the
original orders were always maintained.
I shall not endeavor to enumerate in their totality all the cases of
executions of hostages. For our country, France, alone, there were
29,660 executed. This is proved in Document Number F-420, dated Paris,
21 December 1945, the original of which will be submitted under Exhibit
Number RF-266 to your Tribunal. It is at the beginning of the document
book, the second document. There in detail, region by region, the number
is given of the hostages who were executed.
“Region of: Lille, 1,143; Laon, 222; Rouen, 658; Angers, 863;
Orléans, 501; Reims, 353; Dijon, 1,691; Poitiers, 82;
Strasbourg, 211; Rennes, 974; Limoges, 2,863; Clermont-Ferrand,
441; Lyons, 3,674; Marseilles, 1,513; Montpellier, 785;
Toulouse, 765; Bordeaux, 806; Nancy, 571; Metz, 220; Paris,
11,000; Nice, 324; total, 29,660.”
I shall limit my presentation to a few typical cases of executions which
unveil the political plan of the General Staff which prescribed these
executions—plans of terror, plans that were intended to create and
accentuate the division between Frenchmen, or, more generally, between
citizens of the occupied countries. You will find in your document book
a file quoted as F-133, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-288. This is
called “Posters Concerning Paris.” At the head of the page you will
read, _Pariser Zeitung_ supplement. This document reproduces a few of
the very numerous posters and bills, some of the numerous notices
inserted in the press from 1940 to 1945 announcing the arrest of
hostages in Paris, in the Paris district, and in France. I shall read
only one of these documents, which you will find on the second page,
entitled Number 6, 19 September 1941. You will see in it an appeal to
informers, an appeal to traitors; you will see in it a means of
corruption, which systematically applied to all the countries of the
West for years; all tended to demoralize them to an equal extent:
“Appeal to the population of occupied territories.
“On 21 August a German soldier was fired on and killed by
cowardly murderers. In consequence I ordered on 23 August that
hostages be taken, and threatened to have a certain number of
them shot in case such an assault should be repeated.
“New crimes have obliged me to put this threat into execution.
In spite of this, new assaults have taken place.
“I recognize that the great majority of the population is
conscious of its duty, which is to help the authorities in their
unremitting effort to maintain calm and order in the country in
the interest of this population.”
And here is the appeal to informers:
“But among you there are agents paid by powers hostile to
Germany, Communist criminal elements who have only one aim,
which is to sow discord between the occupying power and the
French population. These elements are completely indifferent to
the consequences, affecting the entire population, which result
from their activity.
“I will no longer allow the lives of German soldiers to be
threatened by these murderers. I shall stop at no measure,
however rigorous, in order to fulfill my duty.
“But it is likewise my duty to make the whole population
responsible for the fact that, up to the present, it has not yet
been possible to lay hands on the cowardly murderers and to
impose upon them the penalty which they deserve.
“That is why I have found it necessary, first of all for Paris,
to take measures which, unfortunately, will hinder the everyday
life of the entire population. Frenchmen, it depends on you
whether I am obliged to render these measures more severe or
whether they can be suspended again.
“I appeal to you all, to your administration and to your police,
to co-operate by your extreme vigilance and your active personal
intervention in the arrest of the guilty. It is necessary, by
anticipating and denouncing these criminal activities, to avoid
the creation of a critical situation which would plunge the
country into misfortune.
“He who fires in ambush on German soldiers, who are doing only
their duty here and who are safeguarding the maintenance of a
normal life, is not a patriot but a cowardly assassin and the
enemy of all decent people.
“Frenchmen! I count on you to understand these measures which I
am taking in your own interests also.”—Signed—“Von
Stülpnagel.”
Numerous notices follow which all have to do with executions.
Under Number 8 on the following page you will find a list of twelve
names among which are three of the best known lawyers of the Paris Bar,
who are characterized as militant Communists, Messrs. Pitard, Hajje and
Rolnikas.
In file 21 submitted by my colleague, M. Gerthoffer, in the course of
his economic presentation, you will find a few notices which are
similar, published in the German official journal VOBIF.
You will observe, in connection with this notice of 16 September
announcing the execution or rather, the murder, of M. Pitard and his
companions, that the murderers had neither the courage nor the honesty
to say that they were all Parisian lawyers. Was it by mistake? I think
that it was a calculated lie, for at this time it was necessary to
handle the elite gently. The occupying power still hoped to separate
them from the people of France.
I shall describe to you in detail two cases which spread grief in the
hearts of the French in the course of the month of October 1941 and
which have remained present in the memory of all my compatriots. They
are known as the “executions of Châteaubriant and of Bordeaux.” They are
related in Document Number F-415 in your document book, which I submit
to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number RF-285.
After the attack on two German officers at Nantes on 20 October 1941 and
in Bordeaux a few days later, the German Army decided to make an
example. You will find, on Page 22 of Document Number F-415, a copy of
the notice in the newspaper _Le Phare_ of 21 October 1941.
“Notice. Cowardly criminals in the pay of England and of Moscow
killed, with shots in the back, the Feldkommandant of Nantes on
the morning of 20 October 1941. Up to now the assassins have not
been arrested.
“As expiation for this crime I have ordered that 50 hostages be
shot to begin with. Because of the gravity of the crime, 50 more
hostages will be shot in case the guilty should not be arrested
between now and 23 October 1941 by midnight.”
The conditions under which these reprisals were exercised are worth
describing in detail. Stülpnagel, who was commanding the German troops
in France, ordered the Minister of the Interior to designate prisoners.
These prisoners were to be selected among the Communists who were
considered the most dangerous (these are the terms of Stülpnagel’s
order). A list of 60 Frenchmen was furnished by the Minister of the
Interior. This was Pucheu. He has since been tried by my compatriots,
sentenced to death, and executed.
The Subprefect of Châteaubriant sent a letter to the Kommandantur of
Châteaubriant, in reply to the order which he received from the Minister
of the Interior:
“Following our conversation of today, I have the honor of
confirming to you that the Minister of the Interior has
communicated today with General Von Stülpnagel in order to
designate to him the most dangerous Communist prisoners among
those who are now held at Châteaubriant. You will find enclosed
herewith the list of 60 individuals who have been handed over
this day.”
On the following page is the German order:
“Because of the assassination of the Feldkommandant of Nantes,
Lieutenant Colonel Hotz, on 20 October 1941, the following
Frenchmen, who were already imprisoned as hostages in accordance
with my publication of 22 August 1941 and of my ordinance to the
Plenipotentiary General of the French Government of 19 September
1941, are to be shot.”
In the following pages you will find a list of all the men who were shot
on that day. I leave out the reading of the list in order not to
lengthen the proceedings unduly.
On Page 16 you will find a list of 48 names. On Page 13 you will find
the list of those who were shot in Nantes. On Page 12 you will find the
list of those who were shot in Châteaubriant. Their bodies were
distributed for burial to all the surrounding communes.
I shall read to you the testimony of eyewitnesses as to how they were
buried after having been shot. On Page 3 of this document you will find
the note of M. Dumenil concerning the executions of 21 October 1941,
which was written the day after these executions. The second paragraph
reads:
“The priest was called at 11:30 to the prison of La Fayette. An
officer, probably of the GFP, told him that he was to announce
to certain prisoners that they were going to be shot. The priest
was then locked up in a room with the 13 hostages who were at
the prison. The other three, who were at les Rochettes, were
ministered to by Abbé Théon, professor at the College Stanislas.
“The Abbé Fontaine said to the condemned, ‘Gentlemen, you must
understand, alas, what my presence means.’ He then spoke with
the prisoners collectively and individually for the two hours
which the officers had said would be granted to arrange the
personal affairs of the condemned and to write their last
messages to their families.
“The execution had been fixed for 2 o’clock in the afternoon,
half an hour having been allowed for the journey. But the two
hours went by, another hour passed, and still another hour
before the condemned were sent for. Certain of them, optimists
by nature, like M. Fourny, already hoped that a countermanding
order would be given, in which the priest himself did not at all
believe.
“The condemned were all very brave. It was two of the youngest,
Gloux and Grolleau, who were students, who constantly encouraged
the others, saying that it was better to die in this way than to
perish uselessly in an accident.
“At the moment of leaving, the priest, for reasons which were
not explained to him, was not authorized to accompany the
hostages to the place of execution. He went down the stairs of
the prison with them as far as the car. They were chained
together in twos. The thirteenth had on handcuffs. Once they
were in the truck, Gloux and Grolleau made another gesture of
farewell to him, smiling and waving their hands that were
chained together.
“Signed: Dumenil, Counsellor attached to the Cabinet.”
Sixteen were shot in Nantes. Twenty-seven were shot in Châteaubriant.
Five were shot outside the department. For those who were shot in
Châteaubriant, we know what their last moments were like. The Abbé
Moyon, who was present, wrote on 22 October 1941 the account of this
execution. This is the third paragraph, Page 17 of your document:
“It was on a beautiful autumn day. The temperature was
particularly mild. There had been lovely sunshine since morning.
Everyone in town was going about his usual business. There was
great animation in the town for it was Wednesday, which was
market day. The population knew from the newspapers and from the
information it had received from Nantes that a superior officer
had been killed in a street in Nantes but refused to believe
that such savage and extensive reprisals would be applied. At
Choisel Camp the German authorities had, for some days, put into
special quarters a certain number of men who were to serve as
hostages in case of special difficulties. It was from among
these men that those who were to be shot on this evening of 22
October 1941 were chosen.
“The Curé of Béré was finishing his lunch when M. Moreau Chief
of Choisel Camp presented himself. In a few words the latter
explained to him the object of his visit. Having been delegated
by M. Lecornu, the subprefect of Châteaubriant, he had come to
inform him that 27 men selected among the political prisoners of
Choisel were going to be executed that afternoon; and he asked
Monsieur Le Curé to go immediately to attend them. The priest
said he was ready to accomplish this mission, and he went to the
prisoners without delay.
“When the priest appeared to carry out his mission, the
subprefect was already among the condemned. He came to announce
the horrible fate which was awaiting them, asking them to write
letters of farewell to their families without delay. It was
under these circumstances that the priest presented himself at
the entrance to the quarters.”
You will find on Page 19 the “departure for the execution,” Paragraph 4:
“Suddenly there was the sound of automobile engines. The door,
which I had shut at the beginning so that we might be more
private, was abruptly opened and French constables carrying
handcuffs appeared. A German officer arrived. He was actually a
chaplain. He said to me, ‘Monsieur le Curé, your mission has
been accomplished and you must withdraw immediately.’”
At the bottom of the page, the last paragraph:
“Access to the quarry where the execution took place was
absolutely forbidden to all Frenchmen. I only know that the
condemned were executed in three groups of nine men, that all
the men who were shot refused to have their eyes bound, that
young Mocquet fainted and fell, and that the last cry which
sprang from the lips of these heroes was an ardent ‘Vive la
France.’”
On Page 21 of the same document you will find the declaration of Police
Officer Roussel. It is also worth reading:
“The 22 October 1941 at about 3:30 in the afternoon, I happened
to be in the Rue du 11 Novembre at Châteaubriant, and I saw
coming from Choisel Camp four or five German trucks, I cannot
say exactly how many, preceded by an automobile in which was a
German officer. Several civilians with handcuffs were in the
trucks and were singing patriotic songs, the ‘Marseillaise,’ the
‘Chant du Depart,’ and so forth. One of the trucks was filled
with armed German soldiers.
“I learned subsequently that these were hostages who had just
been fetched from Choisel Camp to be taken to the quarry of
Sablière on the Soudan Road to be shot in reprisal for the
murder at Nantes of the German Colonel Hotz.
“About two hours later these same trucks came back from the
quarry and drove into the court of the Châteaubriant, where the
bodies of the men who had been shot were deposited in a cellar
until coffins could be made.
“Coming back from the quarry the trucks were covered and no
noise was heard, but a trickle of blood escaped from them and
left a trail on the road from the quarry to the castle.
“The following day, on the 23rd of October, the bodies of the
men who had been shot were put into coffins without any French
persons being present, the entrances to the château having been
guarded by German sentinels. The dead were then taken to nine
different cemeteries in the surrounding communes, that is, three
coffins to each commune. The Germans were careful to choose
communes where there was no regular transport service,
presumably to avoid the population going _en masse_ to the
graves of these martyrs.
“I was not present at the departure of the hostages from the
camp nor at the shooting in the quarry of Sablière, as the
approaches to it were guarded by German soldiers armed with
machine guns.”
Almost at the same time, in addition to these 48 hostages who were shot,
there were others—those of Bordeaux. You will find in your document
book, under Document Number F-400, documents which have been sent to us
by the Prefecture of the Gironde, which we submit to the Tribunal as
Exhibit Number RF-286.
One of them comes from the Bordeaux Section of Political Affairs, and is
dated 22 October 1941, Document F-400(b).
“In the course of the conference, which took place last night at
the Feldkommandantur of Bordeaux, the German authorities asked
me to proceed immediately to arrest 100 individuals known for
their sympathy with the Communist Party or the Gaullist
movement, who will be considered as hostages, and to make a
great number of house searches.
“These operations have been in process since this morning. So
far no interesting result has been called to my attention. In
addition, this morning at 11 o’clock the German authorities
informed me of the reprisal measures which they had decided to
take against the population.”
These reprisal measures you will find set forth on Page “A” of the same
document in a letter addressed by General Von Faber Du Faur, Chief of
the Regional Administration of Bordeaux, to the Prefect of the Gironde.
I quote:
“Bordeaux, 23 October 1941.
“To the Prefect of the Gironde, Bordeaux.
“As expiation for the cowardly murder of the Councillor of War,
Reimers, the Military Commander in France has ordered 50
hostages to be executed. The execution will take place tomorrow.
“In case the murderers should not be arrested in the very near
future, additional measures will be taken, as in the case of
Nantes.
“I have the honor of making this decision known to you.
“Chief of the Military Regional Administration,”—signed—“Von
Faber Du Faur.”
And in execution of this order, 50 men were shot. There is a famous
place in the surburbs of Paris which has become a place of pilgrimage
for the French since our liberation. It is the Fort of Romainville.
During the occupation the Germans converted this fort into a hostage
depot from which they selected victims when they wanted to take revenge
after some patriotic demonstration. It is from Romainville that
Professors Jacques Solomon, Decourtemanche, Georges Politzer, Dr. Boer
and six other Frenchmen departed. They had been arrested in March 1942,
tortured by the Gestapo, then executed without trial in the month of May
1942, because they refused to renounce their faith.
On 19 August 1942, 96 hostages left this fort, among them M. Le Gall, a
municipal councillor of Paris. They left the fort of Romainville, were
transferred to Mont-Valérien and executed.
In September 1942 an assault had been made against some German soldiers
at the Rex cinema in Paris. General Von Stülpnagel issued a proclamation
announcing that, because of this assault, he had caused 116 hostages to
be shot and that extensive measures of deportation were to be taken. You
will find an extract from this newspaper in Document Number F-402(b)
(Exhibit Number RF-287).
The notice was worded as follows:
“As a result of assaults committed by Communist agents and
terrorists in the pay of England, German soldiers and French
civilians have been killed or wounded.
“As reprisal for these assaults I have had 116 Communist
terrorists shot, whose participation or implication in
terroristic acts has been proved by confessions.
“In addition, severe measures of repression have been taken. In
order to prevent incidents on the occasion of demonstrations
planned by the Communists for 20 September 1942, I ordered the
following:
“1) From Saturday, 19 September 1942, from 3 o’clock in the
afternoon, until Sunday, 20 September 1942, at midnight, all
theaters, cinemas, cabarets, and other places of amusement
reserved for the French population shall be closed in the
Departments of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and Seine-et-Marne. All
public demonstrations, including sports, are forbidden.
“2) On Sunday, 20 September 1942, from 3 o’clock in the
afternoon until midnight, non-German civilians are forbidden to
walk about in the streets and public places in the Departments
of the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and Seine-et-Marne. The only
exceptions are persons representing official services. . . .”
In actual fact, it was only on the day of 20 September that 46 of these
hostages were chosen from the list of 116. The Germans handed newspapers
of 20 September to the prisoners of Romainville, announcing the decision
of the Military High Command. It was, therefore, through the newspapers
that the prisoners of Romainville learned that a certain number of them
would be chosen at the end of the afternoon to be led before the firing
squad.
All lived through that day awaiting the call that would be made that
evening. Those who were called knew their fate beforehand. All died
innocent of the crimes for which they were being executed, for those who
were responsible for the assault in the Rex cinema were arrested a few
days later.
It was in Bordeaux that the 70 other hostages of the total of 116
announced by General Von Stülpnagel were executed. In reprisal for the
murder of Ritter, the German official of the Labor Front, 50 other
hostages were shot at the end of September 1943 in Paris. Here is a
reprint of the newspaper article which announced these executions to the
French people—Document Number F-402(c).
“Reprisals against terroristic acts. Assaults and acts of
sabotage have increased in France recently. For this reason 50
terrorists, convicted of having participated in acts of sabotage
and of terrorism, were shot on 2 October 1943 by order of the
German authorities.”
All these facts concerning the hostages of Romainville have been related
to us by one of the rare survivors, M. Rabaté, a mechanic living at 69
Rue de la Tombe-Issiore, Paris, whose testimony was taken by one of our
collaborators.
In this testimony—Document Number F-402(a), which has already been
submitted as Exhibit Number RF-287—we read the following:
“There were 70 of us, including Professor Jacques Solomon,
Decourtemanche and Georges Politzer, Dr. Boer, and Messrs.
Engros, Dudach, Cadras, Dalidet, Golue, Pican who were shot in
the month of May 1942, and an approximately equal number of
women.
“Some of us were transferred to the German quarter of the Santé
(a prison in Paris), but the majority of us were taken to the
military prison of Cherche-Midi (in Paris). We were questioned
in turn by a Gestapo officer in the offices of the Rue des
Saussaies. Some of us, especially Politzer and Solomon, were
tortured to such an extent that their limbs were broken,
according to the testimony of their wives.
“Moreover, while questioning me, the Gestapo officer confirmed
this to me: I repeat his words:
“‘Rabaté, here you will have to speak. Professor Langevin’s
son-in-law, Jacques Solomon, came in here arrogant. He went out
crawling.’
“After a short stay of 5 months in the prison of Cherche-Midi,
in the course of which we learned of the execution as hostages
of the 10 prisoners already mentioned, we were transferred on 24
August 1942 to the Fort of Romainville.
“It is to be noted that from the day of our arrest we were
forbidden to write, or to receive mail, or inform our families
where we were. On the doors of our cells was written, ‘Alles
verboten’ (‘Everything is forbidden’). We received only the
strict food ration of the prison, namely, three-fourths of a
liter of vegetable soup and 200 grams of black bread per day.
The biscuits sent to the prison for political prisoners by the
Red Cross or by the Quakers’ Association were not given to us
because of this prohibition.
“In the Fort of Romainville we were interned as ‘isolated
prisoners,’ an expression corresponding to the ‘NN’ (Nacht und
Nebel), which we knew about in Germany.”
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, the Tribunal thinks that, unless there is
anything very special that you wish to read in any of these documents,
they have already heard the number of the hostages who were put to death
and they think that it really does not add to it—the actual details of
these documents.
M. DUBOST: I thought, Mr. President, that I had not spoken to you of the
regime to which men were subjected when they were prisoners of the
German Army. I thought that it was my duty to enlighten the Tribunal on
the condition of these men in the German prisons.
I thought that it was also my duty to enlighten the Tribunal on the
ill-treatment inflicted by the Gestapo, who left the son-in-law of
Professor Langevin with his limbs broken. Moreover that is found in a
testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly, if there are matters of that sort which you
think it right to go into, you must do so; but the actual details of
individual shooting of hostages we think you might, at any rate,
summarize. But if there are particular atrocities which you wish to draw
our attention to, by all means do so.
M. DUBOST: Mr. President, I have only given two examples of executions
out of the multiple executions which caused 29,660 deaths in my country.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Dubost.
M. DUBOST: In the region of the North of France, which was
administratively attached to Belgium and subjected to the authority of
General Von Falkenhausen, the same policy of execution was practiced.
You will find in Document Number F-133, submitted as Exhibit Number
RF-289, copies of a great number of posters announcing either arrests,
executions, or deportations. Certain of these posters include, moreover,
an appeal to informers, and they are analogous to those which I read to
you in connection with France. Perhaps it would be well, nevertheless,
to point out the one that you will find on Page 3, which concerns the
execution of 20 Frenchmen, ordered as the result of a theft; that on
Page 4, which concerns the execution of 15 Frenchmen, ordered as a
result of an attack against a railroad installation; and finally,
especially the last, the one that you will find on Pages 8 and 9, which
announces that executions will be carried out, and invites the civilian
population to hand over the guilty ones, if they know them, to the
German Army.
As concerns especially the countries of the West other than France, we
have a very great number of identical cases. You will find in your
document book, under Document Number F-680, Exhibit Number RF-290, a
copy of a poster by the Military Commander-in-Chief for Belgium and the
North of France, which announces the arrest in Tournai, on 18 September
1941, of 25 inhabitants as hostages, and specifies the condition under
which certain of them will be shot if the guilty are not discovered. But
you will find especially, under the Number F-680(a) a remarkable
document; it comes from the German authorities themselves. It is the
secret report of the German Chief of Police in Belgium dated 13 December
1944, that is to say, when Belgium was totally liberated and this German
official wished to give an account to his chiefs of his services during
the occupation of Belgium.
From the first page of this document we take the following passage:
“The increasing incitement of the population, by enemy radio and
enemy press, to acts of terrorism and sabotage”—this is applied
to Belgium—“the passive attitude of the population,
particularly that of the Belgian administration, the complete
failure of the public prosecutors, the examining judges, and of
the police to disclose and prevent terrorist acts, have finally
led to preventive and repressive measures of the most rigorous
kind, that is to say, to the execution of persons closely
related to the culprits.
“Already on 19 October 1941, on the occasion of the murder of
two police officials in Tournai, the Military Commander-in-Chief
declared through an announcement appearing in the press that all
the political prisoners in Belgium would be considered as
hostages with immediate effect. In the provinces of the north of
France, subject to the jurisdiction of the same Military
Commander-in-Chief, this ordinance was already in force as from
26 August 1941. Through repeated notices appearing in the press
the civilian population has been informed that political
prisoners taken as hostages will be executed if the murders
continue to be committed.
“As a result of the assassination of Teughels, Rexist major of
Charleroi, and other attempts at assassination of public
officials, the Military Commander-in-Chief has been obliged to
order, for the first time in Belgium, the execution of eight
terrorists. The date of the execution is 27 November 1942.”
On the following page of this same document—Number F-680(b)—you will
find another order dated 22 April 1944, secret, and issued by the
Military Commander in Belgium and the North of France, concerning
measures of reprisal for the murder of two Walloon SS, who had fought at
Tcherkassy; five hostages were shot on that day.
On the following page nine hostages are added to these five, and still a
tenth on the next page. Then five others on the following page.
You will find, finally, on the next to the last page of the document, a
proposed list of persons to be shot in reprisal for the murder of SS
men. Compare the dates, and judge the ferocity with which the
assassination of these two Walloon traitors, SS volunteers, was
revenged.
Finally, you will see the names of the 20 Belgian patriots who were thus
murdered.
“Nouveau Journal, 25 April 1944.
“Measures of reprisal for the murder of men who fought at
Tcherkassy.
“Announcement by the German authorities:
“The perpetrators of the assassination on 6 April of the members
of the SS Sturmbrigade Wallonie, Hubert Stassen and François
Musch, who fought at Tcherkassy, have so far not been
apprehended. Therefore, in accordance with the communication
dated 10 April 1944, the 20 terrorists whose names follow have
been executed:
“Renatus Dierickx of Louvain; François Boets of Louvain; Antoine
Smets of Louvain; Jacques Van Tilt of Holsbeek; Emiliens Van
Tilt of Holsbeek; Franciskus Aerts of Herent; Jan Van der Elst
of Herent; Gustave Morren of Louvain; Eugene Hupin of
Chapelle-lez-Herlaimont; Pierre Leroy of Boussois; Léon Hermann
of Montignies-sur-Sambre; Felix Trousson of Chaudfontaine;
Joseph Grab of Tirlemont; Octave Wintgens of Baelen-Hontem;
Stanislaw Mrozowski of Grâce-Berleur; Marcel Boeur of Athus;
Marcel Dehon of Ghlin; André Croquelois of Pont des Briques,
near Boulogne; Gustave Hos of Mons; and the stateless Jew,
Walter Kriss of Herent.”
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
M. DUBOST: As far as the other western countries, Holland and Norway,
are concerned, we have received documents which we submit as Document
Number F-224(b), Exhibits RF-291, 292, and 293.
In the French text you will find a long list of civilians who were
executed. Also you will find a report of the Chief of the Criminal
Police, Munt, in connection with these executions, and you will observe
that Munt tries to prove his own innocence, in my opinion without
success. This is in Document Number RF-277, already submitted.
On Page 6 you will find the report of an investigation concerning mass
executions carried out by the Germans in Holland. I do not think it is
necessary to read this report. It brings no new factual element and
simply illustrates the thesis that I have been presenting since this
morning: That in all the western countries the German military
authorities systematically carried out executions of hostages as
reprisals for acts of resistance. You will see that on 7 March 1945 an
order was given to shoot 80 prisoners, and the authority who gave this
order said, “I don’t care where you get your prisoners”—execution
without any designation of age or profession or origin.
The Tribunal will see that a total of 2,080 executions was reached. It
will be noted that as a reprisal for the murder of an SS soldier, a
house was destroyed and 10 Dutchmen were executed; and in addition, two
other houses were destroyed. In another case 10 Dutchmen were executed.
Altogether, 3,000 Dutchmen were executed under these conditions,
according to the testimony of this document, which was drawn up by the
War Crimes Commission, signed by the Chief of the Dutch Delegation to
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Colonel Baron Van
Tuyll van Serooskerken.
This document gives to the Tribunal the approximate number of victims,
region by region.
I do not wish to conclude the statement as to hostages concerning
Holland without drawing the attention of the Tribunal to Section (b) of
Document Number F-224, which gives a long list of hostages, prisoners or
dead, arrested by the Germans in Holland; for the Tribunal will observe
that most of the hostages were intellectuals or very highly placed
personages in Holland. We note, therein, the names of members of
parliament, lawyers, senators, Protestant clergymen, judges, and amongst
them we find a former Minister of Justice. The arrests were made
systematically among the intellectual elite of the country.
As far as Norway is concerned, the Tribunal will find in Document Number
F-240, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-292, a short report of the
executions which the Germans carried out in that country:
“On 26 April 1942 two German policemen who tried to arrest two
Norwegian patriots were killed on an island on the west coast of
Norway. In order to avenge them, 4 days later 18 young men were
shot without trial. All these 18 Norwegians had been in prison
since the 22 February of the same year and therefore had nothing
to do with this affair.”
In the first paragraph of the French translation in the French document
book, which is Page 22 of the Norwegian original, it states that:
“On 6 October 1942, 10 Norwegian citizens were executed in
reprisal for attempts at sabotage.
“On 20 July 1944 an indeterminate number of Norwegians were shot
without trial. They had all been taken from a concentration
camp. The reason for this arrest and execution is unknown.
“Finally, after the German capitulation, the bodies of 44
Norwegian citizens were found in graves. All had been shot and
we do not know the reason for their execution. It has never been
published, and we do not believe they were tried. The executions
were effected by a shot through the back of the neck or a
revolver bullet through the ear, the hands of the victims being
tied behind their backs.”
This information is given by the Norwegian Government for this Tribunal.
I draw the attention of the Tribunal to a final document, Number R-134
(Exhibit Number RF-293), signed by Terboven, which concerns the
execution of 18 Norwegians who were taken prisoners for having made an
illegal attempt to reach England.
It is by thousands and tens of thousands that in all the western
countries citizens were executed without trial in reprisal for acts in
which they never participated. It does not seem necessary to me to
multiply these examples. Each of these examples involves individual
responsibility which is not within the competency of this Tribunal. The
examples are only of interest in so far as they show that the orders of
the defendants were carried out and notably the orders of Keitel.
I believe that I have amply proved this. It is incontestable that in
every case the German Army was concerned with these executions, which
were not solely carried out by the police or the SS.
Moreover, they did not achieve the results expected. Far from reducing
the number of attacks, it increased them. Each attempt was followed by
an execution of hostages, and every shooting of hostages occasioned more
attacks in revenge. Generally the announcement of new executions of
hostages plunged the countries into a stupor and forced every citizen to
become conscious of the fate of his land, despite the efforts of German
propaganda. Faced with the failure of this terroristic policy, one might
have thought that the defendants would modify their methods. Far from
modifying them, they intensified them. I shall endeavor to show the
activity of the police and the law from the time when, the policy of
hostages having failed, it was necessary to appeal to the German police
in order to keep the occupied countries in a state of servitude. The
German authorities made arbitrary arrests at all times and from the very
beginning of the occupation; but with the failure of the policy of
executing hostages, which was—as you remember—commented upon by
General Von Falkenhausen in the case of Belgium, arbitrary arrests
increased to the point of becoming a constant practice substituted for
that of killing hostages.
We submit to the Tribunal Document Number 715-PS, Exhibit Number RF-294.
This document concerns the arrest of high-ranking officers who were to
be transferred to Germany in honorable custody:
“Subject: Measures to be taken against French Officers.
“In agreement with the German Embassy in Paris and with the
Chief of the Security Police and the SD, the Supreme Commander
in the West has made the following proposals:
“1. The senior officers enumerated below will be arrested and
transferred to Germany in honorable custody: “Generals of the
Army: Frère”—who died subsequently in Germany after his
deportation—“Gérodias, Cartier, Revers, De Lattre de Tassigny,
Fornel de la Laurencie, Robert de Saint-Vincent, Laure, Doyen,
Pisquendar, Mittelhauser, Paquin;
“Generals of the Air Force: Bouscat, Carayon, De Geffrier,
D’Harcourt, Mouchard, Mendigal, Rozoy;
“Colonels: Loriot and Fonck.
“It is a question of generals whose names have a propaganda
value in France and abroad or whose attitude and abilities
represent a danger.
“2. Moreover, we have chosen from the index of officers kept by
the ‘Arbeitsstab’ in France about 120 officers who have
distinguished themselves by their anti-German attitude during
the last two years. The SD has also given a list of about 130
officers previously accused. After the compilation of these two
lists, the arrest of these officers is to be arranged at a later
date, depending on the situation . . . .
“6. In the case of all officers of the French Army of the
Armistice, the Chief of the Security Police, in collaboration
with the Supreme Command West, will appoint a special day for
the whole territory for a check to be made by the police of
domiciles and occupations.”
And here are the most important passages:
“As a measure of reprisal, families of suspected persons who
have already shown themselves to be resistants or who might
become so in the future, will be transferred as internees to
Germany or to the territory of eastern France. For these the
question of billeting and surveillance must first of all be
solved. Afterwards we contemplate as a later measure the
deprivation of their French nationality and the confiscation of
property, already carried out in other cases by Laval.”
The police and the army were involved in all of these arrests. A
telegram in cipher shows that the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself
was concerned in the matter. Document Number 723-PS, which becomes
Exhibit Number RF-295, will be read in this connection. It is the third
document of the document book. It is addressed to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and is dated Paris, 5 June 1943:
“In the course of the conference which took place yesterday with
the representatives of the High Command West and the SD, the
following was agreed on concerning measures to be taken:
“The aim of these measures must be to prevent, by precautionary
measures, the escape from France of any more well-known soldiers
and at the same time to prevent these personages from organizing
a resistance movement in the event of an attempted landing in
France by the Anglo-Saxon powers.
“The circle of officers here concerned comprises all who, by
their rank and experience or by their name, would considerably
strengthen the military command or the political credit of the
resistants, if they should decide to join them. In the event of
military operations in France we must consider them as being of
the same importance.
“The list has been drawn up in agreement with the High Command
West, the Chief of the Security Police, and the General of the
Air Force in Paris.”
I shall not read these new names of high-ranking French officers who
were to be arrested but will go on further where the Tribunal will see
that the German authorities contemplated causing officers already
arrested by the French Government and under the surveillance of the
French authorities to undergo the same fate as General De Lattre de
Tassigny, General Laure, and General Fornel de la Laurencie. These
generals were to be literally torn away from the French authorities to
be deported.
“In view of the present general situation and the contemplated
security measures, all the authorities here consider it
undesirable for these generals to remain in French custody, as
the possibility must be considered that either through
negligence or by intentional acts of the guard personnel, they
might escape and regain their liberty.”
Finally, Page 7, under Roman numeral IX, concerning reprisals against
families:
“General Warlimont had asked the Commander-in-Chief of the
Western Front to raise the question of reprisal measures against
the relatives of persons who had joined the resistance and to
submit any proposals.
“President Laval declared himself ready, not long ago, to take
measures of this kind on behalf of the French Government; but to
limit himself to the families of some particularly distinguished
persons.”
I refer to the paragraph before the last of the telegraphic report
Number 3,486 of 29 May 1943:
“We must wait and see whether Laval is really willing to apply
reprisal measures in a practical way.
“All those present at the meetings were in agreement that such
measures should be taken in any event, as rapidly as possible,
against families of well-known personages who had become
resistants. (For example, members of the families of Generals
Giraud, Juin, Georges, the former Minister of the Interior,
Pucheu, the Inspector of Finance Couve De Murville,
Leroy-Beaulieu, and others.)
“The measures may also be carried out by the German authorities,
since the persons who have become resistants are to be
considered as foreigners belonging to an enemy power and the
members of their families are also to be considered as such.
“In the opinion of those present, the members of these families
should be interned; the practical carrying-out of this measure
and its technical possibilities must be carefully examined
. . . .
“We might also study the question of whether these families
should be interned in regions particularly exposed to air
attacks, for instance, in the vicinity of dams, or in industrial
regions which are often bombed.
“A list of families who are considered liable for internment
will be compiled in collaboration with the Embassy.”
In this premeditation of criminal arrests we find the Defendant
Ribbentrop, the Defendant Göring, and the Defendant Keitel involved; for
it is their departments who made these proposals, and we know that these
proposals were agreed to—Document Number 720-PS, submitted as Exhibit
Number RF-296, the second in your document book.
It is a fact that these arrests were carried out. Members of the family
of General Giraud were deported. General Frère was deported and died in
a concentration camp. The orders were therefore carried out. They were
approved before being carried out, and the approval inculpates the
defendants whose names I have mentioned. The arrests did not only affect
high-ranking officers but were much more extensive, and a great number
of Frenchmen were arrested. We have no exact statistics.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, did you produce any evidence for your last
statement?
M. DUBOST: I shall bring you the proof of the arrest of General Frère
and his death in the concentration camp when I deal with the
concentration camps. With regard to the arrest and death of several
French generals in the concentration camps in Dachau, the Tribunal still
remembers the testimony of Blaha. So far as the family of General Giraud
is concerned, I shall endeavor to bring proofs, but I did not believe it
was necessary; it is a well-known fact that the daughter of General
Giraud was deported.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we can take judicial notice of all
facts which may be public knowledge in France.
M. DUBOST: I shall submit to the Tribunal the supplementary proof
concerning the generals who died while deported when I deal with the
question of the camps.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
M. DUBOST: General Frère died in Struthof Camp and we shall explain the
circumstances under which he was assassinated. In addition, there exists
in your document book a document numbered F-417, Exhibit Number RF-297,
which was captured among the archives of the German Armistice
Commission, which establishes that the German authorities refused to
free French generals who were prisoners of war and whose state of health
and advanced age made it imperative that they should be released. I
quote:
“As far as this question is concerned the Führer has always
adopted an attitude of refusal, not only from the point of view
of their release but also with regard to their hospitalization
in neutral countries.
“Release or hospitalization today is more out of question than
ever, since the Führer has only recently ordered the transfer to
Germany of all French generals living in France.”
It is signed by Warlimont, and in handwriting it is noted: “No reply to
be given to the French.”
Please retain as evidence only this last sentence: “—since the Führer
has only recently ordered the transfer to Germany of all French generals
living in France.” As I explained, however, these arrests infinitely
exceeded the relatively limited number of generals or families of
well-known persons envisaged by the document which I have just read to
the Tribunal: “Very many Frenchmen will be arrested . . . .” We have no
statistics; but we have an idea of the number, which is considerable
according to the figures given for Frenchmen who died in French prisons
alone, prisons which had been placed under German command and were
supervised by German personnel during the occupation.
We know that 40,000 Frenchmen died in the French prisons, alone, in
France, according to the official figures given by the Ministry of
Prisoners and Deportees. In the prison registry “Schutzhaft” (protective
custody) is written. My American colleagues explained to the Tribunal
what this protective custody meant when they read Document Number
1723-PS, submitted under Number USA-206. It is useless to return to this
document. It is sufficient to remind the Tribunal that imprisonment and
protective custody were considered by the German authorities as the
strongest measure of forceful education for any foreigners who would
deliberately neglect their duty towards the German community or
compromise the security of the German State; they had to act in
accordance with the general interests and adapt themselves to the
discipline of the State.
This protective custody was, as the Tribunal will remember, a purely
arbitrary detention. Those who were interned in protective custody
enjoyed no rights and could not vindicate themselves. There were no
tribunals at their disposal before which they could plead their cause.
We know now through official documents which were submitted to us,
particularly by Luxembourg, that protective custody was carried out on a
very large scale.
The Tribunal will read in Document Number F-229, already submitted as
Exhibit Number USA-243, Document L-215, a list of 25 persons arrested
and placed in different concentration camps under protective custody.
The Tribunal will recall that our colleagues drew its attention to the
reason for the arrest of Ludwig, who was merely strongly suspected of
having aided deserters.
Evidence of the application of protective custody in France is given in
our Document Number F-278, submitted as Exhibit Number RF-300:
“Copy attached to VAAP-7236 (g)—Secret. Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, Berlin, 18 September 1941.
“Subject: Report of August 30, of this year.
“The explanations of the Military Commander in France, of 1
August of this year, are considered in general to be
satisfactory as a reply to the French note.
“Here, also, we consider there is every reason to avoid any
further discussion with the French concerning preventive arrest,
as this would only lead to fixing definite limits to the
exercise of these powers by the occupying power, which would not
be desirable in the interests of the liberty of action of the
military authorities. By order, signed (illegible).”
“To the Representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at
the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden.
“The Representative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs—VAAP
7236(g), Secret, dated Wiesbaden, 23 September 1941. Copy.
“. . . the Representative of the Ministry requests that he be
informed at an opportune time of the reply made to the French
note.”
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs was still involved in this question of
protective custody.
The grounds for this custody were, as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
admits and according to the testimony of this document, very weak;
nevertheless, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs does not forbid it. The
arrests were carried out under multiple pretexts, but all these pretexts
may be summarized under two general ideas: Arrests were made either for
motives of a political nature or for racial reasons. The arrests were
individual or collective in both cases.
Pretexts of a political nature:
From 1941 the French observed that there was a synchronism between the
evolution of political events and the rhythm of arrests. The French
Document Number F-274(i) (Exhibit Number RF-301), which is at the end of
your document book, will show this. A description is given by the
Ministry of Prisoners and Deportees of the conditions under which these
arrests took place, beginning in 1941—a critical period in the German
history of the war, since it was from 1941 that Germany was at war with
the Soviet Union:
“The synchronism between the evolution of political events and
the rhythm of arrests is evident. The suppression of the line of
demarcation, the establishment of resistance groups, the
formation of the Maquis resulting from forced labor, the
landings in North Africa and in Normandy, all had immediate
repercussions on the figures for arrests, of which the maximum
curve is reached for the period of May to August 1944,
especially in the southern zone and particularly in the region
of Lyons.
“We repeat that these arrests were carried out by the members of
all categories of the German repressive system: the Gestapo in
uniform or in plain clothes, the SD, the Gendarmerie,
particularly at the demarcation line, the Wehrmacht and the
SS. . . .
“The arrests took on the characteristics of collective
operations. In Paris, as a result of an attempted assassination,
the 18th Arrondissement was surrounded by the Feldgendarmerie.
Its inhabitants, men, women, and children, could not return to
their homes and spent the night where they could find shelter. A
round-up was carried out in the arrondissement.”
I do not think that it is necessary to read the following paragraph,
which deals with the arrests at the University of Clermont-Ferrand,
which the Tribunal will certainly remember, and also the arrests in
Brittany in 1944, at the time of the landing.
The last paragraph, at the bottom of Page 11:
“. . . on the pretext of conspiracy or attempted assassinations,
whole families were made to suffer. The Germans resorted to
round-ups when compulsory labor no longer furnished them
sufficient workers.
“Round-up in Grenoble, 24 December 1943, Christmas Eve.
“Round-up in Cluny, Saône-et-Loire, in March 1944.
“Round-up in Figeac in May 1944.”
The last paragraph, at the bottom of Page 11:
“Most Frenchmen who were rounded up in this way were in reality
not used for work in Germany but were deported, to be interned
in concentration camps.”
We might multiply the examples of these arbitrary arrests by delving
into official documents which have been submitted by Luxembourg,
Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium. These round-ups were never
legally justified, they were never even represented as an action taken
in accordance with the pseudo-law of hostages to which we have already
referred. They were always arbitrary and carried out without any
apparent reason, or at any rate, without its being possible for any act
of a Frenchman having motivated them even as a reprisal. Other
collective arrests were made for racial reasons. They were of the same
odious nature as the arrests made for political reasons.
On Page 5 of the official document of the Ministry of Prisoners and
Deportees, the Tribunal may read a few odious details connected with
these racial arrests.
“Certain German policemen were especially entrusted to pick out
Jewish persons, according to their physiognomy. They called this
group ‘The Brigade of Physiognomists.’ This verification
sometimes took place in public as far as men were concerned. (At
the railway station at Nice, some were unclothed at the point of
a revolver.)
“The Parisians remember these round-ups, quarter by quarter.
Large police buses transported old men, women, and children
pell-mell and crowded them into the Velodrome d’Hiver under
dreadful sanitary conditions before taking them to Drancy, where
deportation awaited them. The round-up of the month of August
1941 has gained sad renown. All the exits of the subway of the
11th Arrondissement were closed and all the Jews in that
district were arrested and imprisoned. The round-up of December
1941 was particularly aimed at intellectual circles. Then there
were the round-ups of July 1942.
“All the cities in the southern zone, particularly Lyons,
Grenoble, Cannes, and Nice, where many Jews had taken refuge,
experienced these round-ups after the total occupation of
France.
“The Germans sought out all Jewish children who had found refuge
with private citizens or with institutions. In May 1944 they
proceeded to take into custody the children of the Colony of
Eyzieux, and to arrest children who had sought refuge in the
colonies of the U.G.I.F. in June and July 1944.”
I do not believe that these children were enemies of the German people,
nor that they represented a danger of any kind to the German Army in
France.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, M. Dubost, we had better break off now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 25 January 1946 at 1000 hours._]
FORTY-THIRD DAY
Friday, 25 January 1946
_Morning Session_
MARSHAL: Your Honors, Defendants Kaltenbrunner and Streicher will be
absent from this morning’s session.
M. DUBOST: Your Honors, yesterday I was reading from an official French
document, which appears in your document book under the title “Report of
the Ministry for Prisoners of War and Deportees.” It concerned the
seizure by the Germans of Jewish children in France, who were taken from
private houses or public institutions where they had been placed.
With your permission I will come back to a statement which I had
previously made concerning the execution of orders, given by the German
General Staff with the approval of the German Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to arrest all French generals and, in reprisal, to arrest, as
well, all the families of these generals who might be resistants, in
other words, who were on the side of our Allies.
In accordance with Article 21 of the Charter the Tribunal will not
require facts of public knowledge to be proved. In the enormous amount
of facts which we submit to you there are many which are known but are
not of public knowledge. There are a few, but nevertheless certain,
facts which are both known and are also of public knowledge in all
countries. There is the famous case of the deportation of the family of
General Giraud, and I shall allow myself to recall to the Tribunal the
six principal points concerning this affair. First: We all remember
having learned through the Allied radio that Madame Giraud, wife of
General Giraud . . .
THE PRESIDENT: What is it that you are going to ask us to take judicial
knowledge of with reference to the deportation of General Giraud’s
family?
M. DUBOST: I have to ask the Tribunal, Mr. President, to apply, as far
as these facts are concerned, Article 21 of the Charter, namely, the
provision specifying that the Tribunal will not require facts to be
proved which are of public knowledge.
Secondly, I request the Tribunal to hear my statement of these facts
which we consider to be of public knowledge for they are known not only
in France but in America, since the American Army participated in these
events.
THE PRESIDENT: The words of Article 21 are not “of public knowledge” but
“of common knowledge.” It is not quite the same thing.
M. DUBOST: Before me now I have the French translation of the Charter. I
am interpreting according to the French translation: “The Tribunal will
not require that facts of public knowledge (“notoriété publique”) be
proved.” We interpret these words thus: it is not necessary to bring
documentary or testifying proof of facts universally known.
THE PRESIDENT: You say “facts universally known”; but supposing, for
instance, the members of the Tribunal did not know the facts? How could
it then be taken that they were of common knowledge? The members of the
Tribunal may be ignorant of the facts. At the same time it is difficult
for them to take cognizance of the facts if they do not know them.
M. DUBOST: It is a question of fact which will be decided by the
Tribunal. The Tribunal will say whether it does or does not know that
these six points which I shall recall to it are correct.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will retire.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of opinion that the facts with reference
to General Giraud’s deportation and the deportation of his family,
although they are matters of common knowledge or of public knowledge
within France, cannot be said to be of common knowledge or of public
knowledge within the meaning of Article 21, which applies generally to
the world.
Of course, if the French Prosecutors have governmental documents or
reports from France which state the facts with reference to the
deportation of General Giraud, the question assumes a different aspect
and if there are such documents the Tribunal will, of course, consider
them.
M. DUBOST: I must bring proof that the crimes committed individually by
the leaders of the German police in each city and in each region of the
occupied countries of the West, were committed in execution of the will
of a central authority, the will of the German Government, which permits
us to charge all the defendants one by one. I shall not be able to prove
this by submitting German documents. That you may consider it a fact, it
is necessary that you accept as valid the evidence which I am about to
read. This evidence was collected by the American and French armies and
the French Office for Inquiry into War Crimes. The Tribunal will excuse
me if I am obliged to read numerous documents.
This systematic will can only be proved by showing that everywhere and
in every case the German policy used the same methods concerning
patriots whom they interned or detained. Internment or imprisonment in
France was in civilian prisons which the Germans had seized, or in
certain sections of French prisons which the Germans had requisitioned,
which they occupied, and which all French officials were forbidden to
enter. The prisoners in all these prisons were subject to the same
regime. We shall prove this by reading to you depositions of prisoners
from each of these German penal institutions in France or the western
occupied countries. This regime was absolutely inhuman. It just allowed
the prisoners to survive under the most precarious conditions.
In Lyons, at Fort Montluc, the women received as their only food a cup
of herb tea at 7 o’clock in the morning and a ladle of soup with a small
piece of bread at 5 o’clock in the evening. This is confirmed by
Document Number F-555, which you will find the eleventh in your document
book, which we submit as Exhibit Number RF-302. The first page of this
document, second paragraph, is an analysis of the depositions which were
received. It is sufficient to refer to this analysis. I shall take a few
lines from the following deposition. The witness declares:
“. . . on their arrival at Fort Montluc, the prisoners who were
taken in the round-up by the Gestapo on 20 September 1943 were
stripped of all their belongings. The prisoners were treated in
a brutal fashion. The food rations were quite inadequate. The
women’s sense of decency was not respected.”
This testimony was received at Saint Gingolph, 9 October 1944. It refers
to the arrests made at Saint Gingolph, which were carried out in the
month of September 1943. The witness relates:
“The young men returned from the interrogation with their toes
burned by means of cotton-wool pads which had been dipped in
gasoline; others had had their calves burned by the flames of a
blow torch; others were bitten by police dogs . . . .”
DR. RUDOLF MERKEL (Counsel for the Gestapo): The French Prosecution
submits here documents which do not represent sworn affidavits. They are
statements which do not show who took them. As a matter of principle I
formally protest against these mere testimonies of persons who were not
on oath. They cannot be admitted as proof at this Trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you have to say?
DR. MERKEL: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: We will hear M. Dubost answer.
M. DUBOST: Mr. President, the Charter, which goes so far as to admit
evidence of public knowledge, has not fixed any rules as to the manner
in which this evidence, being submitted to you as proof, shall be
presented. The Charter leaves the Tribunal to decide on this or that
document. The Charter leaves the Tribunal free to decide whether such or
such method of investigation is acceptable. The way in which these
investigations have been carried out is regular according to the customs
and usages of my country. As a matter of fact, it is usual for all
official records of the police and gendarmerie to be accepted without
the witnesses being under oath. Moreover, according to the stipulations
of the Charter, all investigations made to disclose war crimes should be
held as authentic proof. Article 21 says:
“The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. It shall also
take judicial notice of official governmental documents and
reports of the United Nations, including the acts and documents
of the committees set up in the various Allied countries for the
investigation of war crimes, and the records and findings of
military or other Tribunal of any of the United Nations.”
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, is the document that you are reading to us
either an official government document or a report, or is it an act or
document of a committee set up in France?
M. DUBOST: This report, Mr. President, comes from the Sûreté Nationale.
You can verify that by examining the second sheet of the copy which you
have in your hand, at the top to the left: Direction Générale de la
Sûreté Nationale. Commissariat Special de Saint Gingolph. Testimony of
witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: May we see the original document?
M. DUBOST: This document was submitted to the Secretary of the Tribunal.
The Secretary has only to bring that document to you.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Is this a certified copy?
M. DUBOST: It is a copy certified by the Director of the Cabinet of the
Ministry of Justice.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, I am told that the French Prosecutors have all
the original documents and are not depositing them in the way it is done
by the other prosecutors. Is that so?
M. DUBOST: The French Prosecutors submitted the originals of yesterday’s
session, and they were handed over this morning to Mr. Martin.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we wish to see the original document. We understand
it is in the hands of the French Secretary. We should like to see it.
M. DUBOST: I have sent for it, Mr. President. This document is a
certified copy of the original, which is preserved in the archives of
the French Office for Inquiry into War Crimes. This certification was
made, on the one hand, by the French Delegate of the Prosecution—you
will see the signature of M. de Menthon on the document you have—on the
other, by the Director of the Cabinet of the Minister of Justice, M.
Zambeaux, with the official seal of the French Ministry of Justice.
THE PRESIDENT: It does appear to be a governmental document. It is the
document of a committee set up by France for the investigation of war
crimes, is it not?
M. DUBOST: Mr. President, it is a document which comes from the Office
of National Security (Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale), which
was set up in connection with an investigation of War Crimes as
prescribed by our French Office for Inquiry into War Crimes. The
original remains in Paris at the War Crimes office, but the certified
copy which you have was signed by the Director of the Cabinet of the
Ministry of Justice in Paris.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, M. Dubost, I was not upon the question of whether it
was a true document or not; the question I was upon was whether or not
it was, within Article 21, either a governmental document or a report of
the United Nations, or a document of a committee set up in France for
the investigation of War Crimes; and I was asking whether it is, and it
appears to be so. It is, is it not?