THE PRESIDENT: Then I do not think you need to read that.
M. DUBOST: As you wish. Then it will not be necessary either to read in
entirety the warning of Seyss-Inquart concerning Holland.
I think that by referring to these exhibits in your document book, you
will be able to obtain items of evidence which will only confirm what I
read to you of Stülpnagel’s order.
For Norway and Denmark there is a teletyped letter from Keitel to the
Supreme Command of the Navy, dated 30 November 1944, which you will find
in the document book, as Document C-48 (Exhibit Number RF-280). I read
the end of Paragraph 1:
“Every ship-yard worker must know that any act of sabotage
occurring within his sphere of activity entails for him
personally or for his relatives, if he disappears, the most
serious consequences.”
Page 2 of Document Number 870-PS (Exhibit Number RF-281):
“4. I have just received a teletype from Field Marshal Keitel
requesting the publication of an order according to which the
personnel or, if need be, their near relatives (liability of
next of kin) will be held collectively responsible for the acts
of sabotage occurring in their factories.”
And Terboven, who wrote this sentence, added (and it is he who condemns
Marshal Keitel):
“This request only makes sense and will only be successful if I
am actually allowed to have executions carried out by shooting.”
All these documents will be submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, do I understand that in Belgium, Holland, in
Norway, and in Denmark, there were similar orders or decrees with
reference to hostages?
M. DUBOST: Yes, Your Honor, I mean to read those concerning Belgium,
Holland, and Norway. For Belgium, for instance, you will find at Page 6,
Document Number F-683, which is the official document of the Belgian
Ministry of Justice:
“Brussels, 29 November 1945, 1, rue de Turin. Decree of
Falkenhausen of 19 September 1941.
“In the future, the population must expect that if attacks are
made on members of the German Army or the German Police and the
culprits cannot be arrested, a number of hostages proportionate
to the gravity of the offense, five at a minimum, will be shot
if the attack causes death. All political prisoners in Belgium
are, with immediate effect, to be considered as hostages.”
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, I did not want you to read these documents if
they are substantially in the same form as the document you have already
read.
M. DUBOST: They are more or less in the same form, Your Honor. I shall
submit them because they constitute the proof of the systematic
repetition of the same methods to obtain the same results, that is, to
cause terror to reign in all the occupied countries of the West. But, if
the Tribunal considers it constant and established that these methods
were systematically used in all the western regions, naturally I shall
spare you the reading of documents which are monotonous and which repeat
in substance what was said in the document relating to France.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you had better give us references to the
documents which concern Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark.
M. DUBOST: Yes, Your Honor, for Belgium, Document F-683, Page 6, decree
of Falkenhausen of 19 September 1941, submitted as Exhibit Number
RF-275, as constituting the official report of the Kingdom of Belgium
against the principal war criminals.
The second document is C-46, corresponding to UK-42 (24 November 1942),
submitted as Exhibit Number RF-276.
For Holland, a warning by Seyss-Inquart, Document Number F-224, which
you may feel it necessary for me to read, since Seyss-Inquart is one of
the defendants. I submit this document under Exhibit Number RF-279, and
I quote:
“For the destruction or the damaging of railway installations,
telephone cables, and post offices I shall make responsible all
the inhabitants of the community on whose territory the act is
committed.
“The population of these communities must expect that reprisals
will be taken against private property and that houses or whole
blocks will be destroyed.”
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid I don’t know where you are reading. Which
paragraph are you reading?
M. DUBOST: I am told, Mr. President, that this document has not been
bound with the Dutch report; I shall file it at the end of the hearing,
if I may.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
M. DUBOST: I quote now another document, the warning of Seyss-Inquart to
Holland.
THE PRESIDENT: And that is what number?
M. DUBOST: Number 152 in your document book, concerning German justice,
which will be submitted at the hearing tomorrow.
For Norway and Denmark we have several documents which establish that
the same policy of execution of hostages was followed. We have, in
particular, Document C-48 (Exhibit Number RF-280) from which I read a
short time ago.
All those special orders for each of the occupied regions of the West
are the result of the general order of Keitel, which my American
colleagues have already read and on which I merely gave a comment this
morning. The responsibility of Keitel in the development of the policy
of execution of hostages is total. He was given warning; German generals
even told him that this policy went beyond the aim pursued and might
become dangerous.
On 16 September 1942, General Falkenhausen addressed a letter to him,
from which I extract the following passage—it is Document Number
1594-PS, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-283:
“Enclosed is a list of the shootings of hostages which have
taken place until now in my area and the incidents on account of
which these shootings took place.
“In a great number of cases, particularly in the most serious,
the perpetrators were later apprehended and sentenced.
“This result is undoubtedly very unsatisfactory. The effect is
not so much deterrent as destructive of the feeling of the
population for right and security; the cleft between the people
influenced by communism and the remainder of the population is
being bridged; all circles are becoming filled with a feeling of
hatred toward the occupying forces and effective inciting
material is given to enemy propaganda. Thereby military danger
and general political reaction of an entirely unwanted
nature. . . .”—Signed—“Von Falkenhausen.”
I shall now present Document Number 1587-PS from the same German general
and he seems to be lucid:
“In addition I wish once more to point out the following:
“In several cases the authors of aggression or acts of sabotage
were discovered when the hostages had already been shot, shortly
after the criminal acts had been committed, according to the
instructions received. Moreover, the real culprits often did not
belong to the same circles as the executed hostages. Undoubtedly
in such cases the execution of hostages does not inspire terror
in the population but indifference to repressive measures and
even resentment on the part of some sections of the population
who until then had displayed a passive attitude. The result for
the occupying power is therefore negative as planned and
intended by the English agents, who were often the instigators
of these acts. It will therefore be necessary to prolong the
delay in cases where the arrest of the culprits may yet be
expected. I therefore request that you leave to me the
responsibility for fixing such delays, in order that the
greatest possible success in the fight against terrorist acts
may be obtained.”
THE PRESIDENT: Is it known what the date of that document was?
M. DUBOST: It is after the 16th of September 1941. We do not have the
exact date. The document is appended to another document, the date of
which is illegible; but it is after Keitel’s order since it gives an
account of the executions of hostages, carried out in compliance with
that order. It points out that after the execution of the hostages the
culprits were found; that the effect was deplorable and aroused the
resentment of some of the population.
You will find also in this Document Number 1587-PS—but this time an
extract from the monthly report of the Commander of the Wehrmacht in the
Netherlands—the report for the month of August 1942, a new warning to
Keitel:
“B. Special events and the political situation:
“On the occasion of an attempt against a train of soldiers on
furlough due to arrive in Rotterdam, a Dutch railway guard was
seriously wounded by touching a wire connected with an explosive
charge, thus causing an explosion. The following repressive
measures were announced in the Dutch press:
“The deadline for the arrest of the perpetrators, with
collaboration of the population, is fixed at 14 August,
midnight. A reward of 100,000 florins will be made for a
denunciation, which will be treated confidentially. If the
culprits are not arrested within the time appointed, arrests of
hostages are threatened; railway lines will be guarded by
Dutchmen.
“Since, despite this summons, the perpetrator did not report and
was not otherwise discovered, the following hostages, among whom
some had already been in custody for several weeks as hostages,
were shot on the order of the Higher SS and Police Führer.”
I will pass over the enumeration of the names. I omit the next
paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you read the names and the titles?
M. DUBOST: “Ruys, Willem, Director General, Rotterdam; Count E.O.G. Van
Limburg-Stirum, Arnhem; M. Baelde, Robert, Doctor of Law, Rotterdam;
Bennenkers, Christoffel, former Inspector General of the Police at
Rotterdam; Baron Alexander Schimmelpennink Van der Oye, Noordgouwe
(Seeland).” One paragraph further on:
“Public opinion was particularly affected by the execution of
these hostages. Reports at hand express the opinion that, from
the beginning of the occupation, no stroke inflicted by the
Germans was more deeply felt. Many anonymous letters, and even
some signed ones, sent to the Commander of the Wehrmacht, who
was considered as responsible for this ‘unheard of event,’ show
the varied reactions of the mass of the Dutch people. From the
bitterest insults to apparently pious petitions and prayers not
to resort to extremes, no nuance was lacking which did not in
one way or another indicate, to say the least, complete
disapproval and misunderstanding, first of the threat, and
secondly of the actual execution of the hostages. Reproaches for
this most severe infraction of law (which were based on serious
argument and often gave rise to thought), and also cries of
despair from idealists who, in spite of all that had occurred in
the political sphere, had still believed in German-Dutch
understanding but now saw all was at an end—all this was found
in the correspondence. In addition, the objection was raised
that such methods were only doing the work of the Communists,
who as the real instigators of active sabotage must be very glad
to couple with their achievements the pleasure of the
elimination of ‘such hostages.’
“In short, such disapproval even in the ranks of the very few
really pro-German Dutch had never before been noticed, so much
hatred at one time had never been felt.”—signed—“Schneider,
Captain.”
Despite these warnings proffered by conscientious subordinates, neither
the General Staff nor Keitel ever gave any order to the contrary. The
order of 16 September 1941 always remained in force. When I have shown
you examples of executions of hostages in France, you will see that a
number of facts which I shall utilize are dated 1942, 1943 and even
1944.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
MARSHAL: If Your Honor please, the Defendants Kaltenbrunner and
Streicher will continue to be absent during this afternoon’s session.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dubost, the Tribunal had some difficulty this morning
in following the documents that you were citing; and also, the Tribunal
understands the interpreters had some difficulty because the document
books, except the one that is before me, have no indications of the “PS”
or other numbers; and the documents themselves are not numbered in
order. Therefore it is extremely difficult for members of the Tribunal
to find documents, and it is also extremely difficult for the
interpreters to find any document which may be before them.
So, this afternoon, it will be appreciated if you will be so kind as to
indicate what the document is, and then give both the interpreters and
the Tribunal enough time in which they may find the document, and then
indicate exactly which part of the document you are going to read, that
is to say, whether it is the beginning of the document, or the first
paragraph, or the second, and so on. But you must bear with us if we
find some difficulty in following you in the documents.