I submit as Document Number RF-245, the report of the Ministry of
Agriculture and a statistical table drawn up by the Institut de
Conjoncture, summarizing the official German levies which included
neither individual purchases nor black market purchases which were both
considerable. It is not possible for me to read to the Tribunal a table
as long as this; I shall confine myself to giving a brief résumé of this
statistical table.
Here are some of the chief agricultural products which were seized and
their estimate in thousands of francs (I am indicating the totals in
round figures): Cereals, 8,900,000 tons, estimate 22 million francs;
meat, 900,000 tons, estimate 30 million; fish, 51,000 tons, estimate 1
million; wines, liquors, 13,413,000 hectoliters, estimate 18,500,000;
colonial products, 47,000 tons, estimate 805,900; horses and mules,
690,000 head; wood, 36 million cubic meters; sugar, 11,600,000 tons.
I shall pass over the details. The Germans settled through clearing and
by means of occupation costs 113,620,376,000 francs; the balance, that
is 13,000 million, was not settled in any way.
Naturally, these estimates do not include considerable damage caused to
forests as a result of abnormal cutting and the reduction of areas under
cultivation. There is no mention, either, of the reduction in livestock
and damage caused by soil exhaustion. This is a brief summary of the
percentage of official German levies on agriculture in relation to the
total French production: Wheat, 13 percent; oats, 75 percent; hay and
straw, 80 percent; meat, 21 percent; poultry, 35 percent; eggs, 60
percent; butter, 20 percent; preserved fish, 30 percent; champagne, 56
percent; wood for industrial uses, 50 percent; forest fuels, 50 percent;
alcohol, 25 percent. These percentages, I repeat, do not include
quantities of produce which the Germans bought up either by individual
purchases or on the black market.
I have had the privilege of presenting to you the fact that these
operations were of a considerable scope and amounted for France
approximately to several hundred thousand millions of francs. The
quantities of agricultural produce thus taken from French consumers are
incalculable. I shall simply indicate that wines, champagne, liquors,
meat, poultry, eggs, butter were the object of a very considerable
clandestine traffic to the benefit of the Germans and that the French
population, except for certain privileged persons, was almost entirely
deprived of these products.
In Section 2 of this chapter I shall discuss the important question
concerning levies of raw materials.
THE PRESIDENT: That would be a good time for us to adjourn for ten
minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
M. GERTHOFFER: The summary of the levies in raw materials from the
statistical point of view is contained in charts which I shall not take
the time to read to the Tribunal. I shall submit them as Document Number
RF-246 and point out that the total amount of these supplies reaches the
sum of 83,804,145,000 francs.
On Pages 77 to 80 of my written statement I had thought it necessary to
make a summary of these charts, but I consider it is not possible to
read even the summary because the figures are too numerous.
According to information provided by the French administration, of that
sum the Germans settled, by way of occupation costs and clearing, only
59,254,639,000 francs, leaving the difference of 19,506,109,000 francs
charged to the French Treasury.
The percentage of the German levies in relation to the whole French
production can be summarized in a chart which I have given in my brief
and I ask the Tribunal for permission to read it:
“The percentage of levies of raw materials in relation to French
production: Coal, 29 percent; electric power, 22 percent;
petroleum and motor fuel, 80 percent; iron ore, 74 percent;
steel products, crude and half finished, 51 percent; copper, 75
percent; lead, 43 percent; zinc, 38 percent; tin, 67 percent;
nickel, 64 percent; mercury, 50 percent; platinum, 76 percent;
bauxite, 40 percent; aluminum, 75 percent; magnesium, 100
percent; sulphur carbonate, 80 percent; industrial soap, 67
percent; vegetable oil, 40 percent; carbosol, 100 percent;
rubber, 38 percent; paper and cardboard, 16 percent; wool, 59
percent; cotton, 53 percent; flax, 65 percent; leather, 67
percent; cement, 55 percent; lime, 20 percent; acetone, 21
percent.”
This enumeration permits us to consider that officially about
three-quarters of the raw materials were seized by the occupying power,
but these statistics must be qualified in two ways: A large part of the
quota of raw materials theoretically left to the French economy was in
fact reserved for priority industries, that is to say, those industries
whose production was reserved for the occupying power. Secondly, these
requisitions and percentages include only the figures of official
deliveries; but we have seen that the Germans acquired considerable
quantities of raw materials from the black market, especially precious
metals: gold, platinum, silver, radium, or rare metals, such as mercury,
nickel, tin and copper.
In fact, one can say in general that the raw materials which were left
for the needs of the population were insignificant.
Now, I come to Section 3: Levies of manufactured goods and products of
the mining industry.
As I had the honor to point out to you in my general remarks, the
Germans, using divers means of pressure, succeeded in utilizing directly
or indirectly the greater part of the French industrial production. I
shall not go over these facts again and I shall immediately pass to a
summary of the products which were delivered. I submit as Document
Number RF-248 a chart which contains statistical data, according to
industries, of levies by the occupying power of manufactured goods
during the course of the occupation.
I do not want to tax the patience of the Tribunal by reading this; I
shall simply cite the summary of this chart, which is as follows: Orders
for products finished and invoiced from 25 June 1940 until the
liberation—Mechanical and electrical industries, 59,455 million;
chemical industry, 11,744 million; textiles and leather, 15,802 million;
building and construction material, 56,256 million; mines (coal,
aluminum, and phosphates), 4,160 million; iron industry, 4,474 million;
motor fuel, 568 million; naval construction, 6,104 million; aeronautical
construction, 23,620 million; miscellaneous industries, 2,457 million;
making a total of 184,640 million.
These statistics should be commented upon as follows:
1) The information which is contained here does not include the
production of the very industrialized departments of Nord and of Pas de
Calais, attached to the German administration of Brussels, nor does it
include the manufactures of the Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, and Moselle
departments, actually incorporated into the Reich.
2) Out of the total sum of 184,640 million francs worth of supplies, the
information which we have to date does not as yet permit us to fix the
amount regulated by the Germans by way of either occupation costs or
clearing, or the balance which was not made the subject of any
settlement.
3) If, on the basis of contracts, one made an estimate of the industrial
production levied by Germany in the departments of Nord and Pas de
Calais, one would obtain a figure for those two departments of 18,500
million, which would bring the approximate total up to more than 200,000
million francs.
The extent of the German levies on manufactured products is summarized
in the following chart which I submit to the Tribunal, and which I have
summarized on Page 87 of my written statement. I shall take the liberty
of reading it once more to the Tribunal. It will show the proportion of
the manufactured goods which the French population was deprived of:
Automobile construction, 70 percent; electrical and radio construction,
45 percent; industrial precision parts, 100 percent; heavy castings, 100
percent; foundries, 46 percent; chemical industries, 34 percent; rubber
industry, 60 percent; paint and varnish, 60 percent; perfume, 33
percent; wool industry, 28 percent; cotton weaving, 15 percent; flax and
cotton weaving, 12 percent; industrial hides, 20 percent; buildings and
public works, 75 percent; woodwork and furniture, 50 percent; lime and
cement, 68 percent; naval construction, 79 percent; aeronautic
construction, 90 percent.
The scrutiny of this chart leads to the following remarks:
The proportion of entirely finished products is very large, for
instance: automobiles, 70 percent; precision instruments, 100 percent;
heavy castings, 100 percent; whereas, the proportion of the products in
the process of manufacture is not as great, for example: foundry, 46
percent; chemical industry, 34 percent; _et cetera_.
This state of affairs results from the fact that the Germans directed
the products in the process of manufacture—in theory reserved for the
French population—into finishing industries which had priority, that is
to say, whose production was reserved for them.
Finally, through their purchases on the black market, the Germans
procured an enormous quantity of textiles, machine tools, leather,
perfumes, and so forth. The French population was almost completely
deprived of textiles, in particular, during the occupation. That is also
the case as regards leather.
Now, I reach Section 4: the removal of industrial tools.
I shall not impose on your time. This question has already been treated
as far as the other occupied countries are concerned. I would merely
point out that in France it was the subject of statistical estimates
which I submit to you as Document Number RF-251. These statistical
estimates show that the value of the material which was removed from the
various French factories, either private or public enterprise, exceeds
the sum of 9,000 million francs.
It was observed that for many of the machines which were removed, the
Germans merely indicated the inventory values after reduction for
depreciation and not the replacement value of the machines.
I now come to Section 5: Securities and Foreign Investments. In Document
EC-57, which I submitted as Exhibit Number RF-105 at the beginning of my
presentation, I had indicated that the Defendant Göring himself had
informed you of the aims of the German economic policy and he ventured
to say that the extension of German influence over foreign enterprises
was one of the purposes of German economic policy.
These directives were to be expressed much more precisely in the
document of the 12th of August 1940, which I submit as Exhibit Number
RF-252 (Document Number EC-40), from which I shall read a short extract:
“Since”—as the document says—“the principal economic
enterprises are in the form of stock companies, it is first of
all indispensable to secure the ownership of securities in
France.”
Further on it says:
“The exerting of influence by way of ordinances. . . .”
Then the document indicates all the means to be employed to achieve
this, in particular this passage concerning international law:
“According to Article 46 of the Hague Convention concerning Land
Warfare, private property cannot be confiscated. Therefore the
confiscation of securities is to be avoided in so far as it does
not concern state owned property. According to Article 42 and
following of the Hague Convention concerning Land Warfare, the
authority exercising power in the occupied enemy territory must
restrict itself in principle to utilizing measures which are
necessary to re-establish or maintain public order and public
life. According to international law it is forbidden in
principle to eliminate the still existing boards of companies
and to replace them by ‘commissioners.’ Such a measure would,
from the point of view of international law, probably not be
considered as efficacious. Consequently, we must strive to force
the various functionaries of such companies to work for German
economy, but not to dismiss those persons . . .”
Further on:
“If these functionaries refuse to be guided by us, we must
remove them from their posts and replace them by persons we can
use.”
We will briefly consider the three categories of seizure of financial
investments, which were the purpose of German spoliation during the
occupation, and first of all the seizure of financial investments in
companies whose interests were abroad.
On the 14th of August 1940 an ordinance was published in VOBIF, Page 67
(Document Number RF-253), forbidding any negotiations regarding credits
or foreign securities. But mere freezing of securities did not satisfy
the occupying power; it was necessary for them to become outwardly the
owners of the securities in order to be able, if necessary, to negotiate
them in neutral countries.
They had agents who purchased foreign securities from private citizens
who needed money, but above all, they put pressure on the Vichy
Government in order to obtain the handing over of the principal French
investments in foreign countries. That is why, in particular, after long
discussions in the course of which the German pressure was very great,
considerable surrenders of securities were made to the Germans.
It is not possible for me to submit to the Tribunal the numerous
documents concerning the surrender of these securities: minutes,
correspondence, valuations. There would be without exaggeration, several
cubic meters of them. I shall merely quote several passages as examples.
Concerning the Bor Mines Company, the copper mines in Yugoslavia of
which the greater part of the capital was in French hands, the Germans
appointed, on 26 July 1940, an administrative commissioner for the
branches of the company situated in Yugoslavia. This is found in
Document Number RF-254 which I submit to the Tribunal. The
administrative commissioner was Herr Neuhausen, the German Consul
General for Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
In the course of the discussions of the Armistice Commission Hemmen
declared (extract from the minutes of 27 September 1940 at 10:30, which
I submit to the Tribunal as Document Number RF-255):
“Germany wishes to acquire the shares of the company without
consideration for the juridical objections made by the French.
Germany obeys, in fact, the imperative consideration of the
economic order. She suspects that the Bor Mines are still
delivering copper to England and she has definitely decided to
take possession of these mines.”
Faced with the refusal of the French delegates, Hemmen declared at the
meeting of 4 October 1940 (I submit to the Tribunal an extract from the
minutes of this meeting as Document Number RF-256):
“I should regret to have to transmit such a reply to my
government. See if the French Government cannot reconsider its
attitude. If not, our relations will become very difficult. My
government is anxious to bring this matter to a close. If you
refuse, the consequences will be extremely grave.”