THE PRESIDENT: And then, as these are not documents of which we can take
judicial notice, only the parts which you read will be regarded as part
of the Record, and be treated as in evidence.
M. GERTHOFFER: This enormous sum imposed was much greater than Germany
was entitled to demand. In spite of the enormous sums which the Germans
may have spent in France during the first two years, they were not able
to use a sum less than half of that for which they were credited.
This is shown in the Hemmen report, where on Page 27 (Page 59 of the
French translation) he gives a summary of the French payments made as
occupational indemnity, and the German expenses in millions of marks
corresponding to these expenses. This summary is very short. I shall
read it to the Tribunal. It will constitute a German proof in support of
my presentation.
_French payment_ _German expenditure_
_in millions of marks_ _in millions of marks_
1940 4,000 1,569
1941 6,075 5,205
1942 5,475 8,271
1943 9,698.3 9,524
1944 6,345 6,748
This makes from 1940 to 1944 a total amount of 31,593,300,000 marks paid
by the French and 31,317 million marks of German expenditure.
The figures contained in this table unquestionably constitute the German
admission of the exorbitance of the indemnity for the maintenance of
occupation troops, for Germany was not able to utilize the credit at its
disposal. Most of it served to finance expenses relative to armament,
operation troops, and feeding of Germany. This is shown by Document
Number EC-232, which I submit as Exhibit Number RF-230.
According to the calculation of the “Institut de Conjoncture,” the
maximum sum of the indemnity which could be exacted was 74,531,800,000
francs, taking as a basis the average daily costs of upkeep per troop
unit during the Allied occupation of the Rhineland in 1919, namely the
sum of seventeen francs or twenty-one francs with billeting, which was
at that time provided by the German Government. According to the report
on the average cost of living (coefficient -3.14) the sum of 21 francs
should correspond to 66 francs at the 1939 value when applying the
coefficient of depreciation of the franc during the occupation, that is
2.10 percent, or a daily average cost of 139 francs per day.
Granting that the real costs of the occupation army were half of those
calculated by Hemmen, that is to say, 27,032,279,120 marks, this sum is
still lower than the 74,531,800,000 calculated by the Institut de
Conjoncture.
Even accepting the calculation most favorable to the accused, one can
estimate that the indemnity imposed without justification amounted to
631,866 million less 74,531,800,000, that is, 557,334,200,000 francs.
In his final report, Page 10, and Page 22 of the French translation,
Hemmen writes:
“. . . during the 4 years which have elapsed since conclusion of
the Armistice, there has been paid for occupation costs and
billeting 34,000 million Reichsmark, or 680,000 million francs.
France thus contributed approximately 40 percent of the total
cost of occupation and war contributions raised in all the
occupied and Allied countries. This represents a charge of 830
Reichsmark, or 16,600 francs, per head of the population.”
In the second part of this chapter we shall examine briefly the question
of clearing. The Tribunal is acquainted with the functioning of
clearing, and I shall not revert to this. I shall indicate under what
conditions the French Government at the time was made to sign agreements
which were imposed upon it.
Parallel to the discussions relative to the indemnity for the
maintenance of occupation troops, discussions were entered into
concerning a Clearing Agreement.
On the 24 July 1940 the German Delegation announced that it would
shortly submit a project. On 8 August 1940 Hemmen submitted to the
French Delegation a project of a Franco-German arrangement for payment
by compensation. This project, which I submit as Document Number
RF-231(bis) of the French documentation, shows arbitrary provisions,
which could not be voluntarily accepted.
It provided for financial transfers from France to Germany without any
equivalent in financial transfers from Germany to France. It fixed the
rate of exchange at 20 francs for 1 Reichsmark by a unilateral and
purely arbitrary decision, whereas the rate on the Berlin Exchange was
approximately 17.65 and the real parity of the two currencies, taking
into account their respective purchasing power on both markets, was
approximately ten francs for one Reichsmark.
I pass to Page 34. The French Delegation of the Armistice Commission
submitted unsuccessfully a counter project, on 20 August 1940, and
attempted to obtain a modification of the most unfavorable clauses. I
submit this project as Document Number RF-232.
On 29 August 1940, the French delegation at the Armistice Commission
brought up in detail the question of the parity of the franc and the
Reichsmark. It called attention to the fact that the prohibition of the
financial transfers from Germany to France would create gross
inequality, whereas the transfers in the other direction were organized,
and this meant the French Government giving its agreement to a veritable
expropriation of French creditors. An extract from this report is
submitted as Document Number RF-233.
In a letter of 31 August, General Huntziger again took up in vain the
argument concerning the Franc-Reichsmark rate of exchange. I submit this
letter as Document Number RF-234.
On 6 September 1940 the French delegation made a new attempt to obtain a
modification of the most unfavorable clauses in the draft of the
Clearing Agreement, but it encountered an absolute refusal. The German
delegation meant to impose under the cloak of a bilateral agreement a
project elaborated by it alone.
I quote a passage from the minutes of the Armistice Delegation (Document
Number RF-235). Herr Schone, the German delegate, stated: “I cannot
reopen the discussion on this question. I can make no concession.”
Concerning the Franc-Reichsmark rate of exchange, on 4 October 1940
Hemmen notified the French delegation that the rate of 20 francs must be
considered as definite and according to his own words “this is no longer
to be discussed.” He added that if the French for their part refused to
conclude the payment agreement, that is to say, the arbitrary contract
imposed by Germany, he would advise the Führer of this and that all
facilities with regard to the demarcation line would be stopped. I
submit as Document Number RF-236 this passage of the minutes.
Finally, in the course of the negotiations which followed on 10 October
1940, the French delegation attempted for the last time to obtain an
alleviation of the drastic conditions which were imposed upon it, but
the Germans remained intransigent and Hemmen declared in particular
. . .
THE PRESIDENT: M. Gerthoffer, do these negotiations lead up to a
conclusion, because if they do, would it not be sufficient for your
purpose to give us the conclusion without giving all the negotiations
which lead up to it?
M. GERTHOFFER: Mr. President, I am just finishing the statement with the
last quotation, in which the Tribunal will see what pressure, what
threats, were made upon the French, who were then in contact with the
Germans. I shall have concluded the discussion on clearing with this
quotation, if the Tribunal will allow it, it will be a short one and it
will then be finished:
“You are attempting to make the rate of the mark fictitious. I
beg you to warn your government that we shall break off
negotiations. I have in fact foreseen that you would be unable
to prevent prices from rising, but export prices are rising
systematically. We shall find other means of achieving our aims.
We shall get the bauxite ourselves.” (Document Number RF-237.)
This is the end of the quotation.
Perhaps the Tribunal will allow me a very brief comment. At the
Armistice Commission all kinds of economic questions were discussed; and
the French delegates resisted, for Germany wanted to seize immediately
the bauxite beds which were in the unoccupied zone. This last sentence
is the threat: if you do not accept our Clearing Agreement, we shall
seize the bauxite. That is to say, we shall occupy by force of arms the
free zone.
The so-called compensation agreement worked only to Germany’s advantage.
The results of the agreement are the following:
At the moment of liberation the total transfer from France to Germany
amounted to 221,114 million francs, while the total transfer from
Germany to France amounted to 50,474 million francs. The
difference—that is, 170,640 million francs credit balance on the French
account—represents the means of payment which Germany improperly
obtained through the functioning of the clearing which she had imposed.
I now come to the third part of this chapter, which will be very brief.
This is the seizure of goods and collective fines.
Besides the transactions which were outwardly legal, the Germans
proceeded to make seizures and impose collective fines in violation of
the principles of international law.
First, a contribution of 1,000 million francs was imposed upon the
French Jews on 17 December 1941 without any pretext. This is shown in
the documents submitted as Document Number RF-239 and cannot be
contested.
Secondly, a certain number of collective fines were imposed. The amount
actually known to the Finance Ministry amounts to 412,636,550 francs.
Thirdly, the Germans proceeded to make immediate seizure of gold. Even
Hemmen admits in his last secret report, on Pages 33 and 34, Page 72 of
the French translation, that on 24 September 1940 the Germans seized 257
kilograms of gold from the port of Bayonne, which represents at the 1939
rate 12,336,000 francs; and in July 1940 they seized a certain number of
silver coins amounting to 55 millions.
Still following the secret report of Hemmen, for the period between 1
January to 30 June 1942 Germany had seized in France 221,730 kilograms
of gold belonging to the Belgian National Bank, which represents at the
1939 rate the sum of 9,500 million francs.
It is not possible for me to present in detail the conditions under
which the Belgian gold was delivered to the Germans. This question in
itself would involve me in an explanation which would take up several
sessions. The fact is undeniable since it is admitted by Hemmen. I shall
simply indicate that as early as the month of September 1940, in
violation of international law, Hemmen had insisted on the delivery of
this gold, which had, in May 1940, been entrusted by the National Bank
of Belgium to the Bank of France. Moreover, these facts are part of the
accusations made against the ex-ministers of the Vichy Government before
the High Court of Justice in Paris.
The results of this procedure were long, and frequent discussions took
place at the Armistice Commission, and an agreement was concluded on 29
October 1940, but was in fact not carried out because of difficulties
raised by the French and Belgians.
According to the former Assistant Director of the Bank of France, the
German pressure became stronger and stronger. Laval, who was then
determined to pay any price for the authorization to go to Berlin, where
he boasted that he would be able to achieve a large scale liberation of
prisoners, the reduction of the occupation costs, as well as the
elimination of the demarcation line, yielded to the German demands.
Thus, this gold was delivered to the Reichsbank and was requisitioned by
order of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan. The documents
relative to this question are submitted as Document Number RF-240.
I shall simply add that after the liberation the Provisional Government
of the French Republic transferred to the National Bank of Belgium a
quantity of gold equal to that which the Belgian Bank had entrusted to
the Bank of France in the month of May 1940.
To conclude the gold question I shall indicate to the Tribunal that
Germany was unable to obtain the gold reserve of the Bank of France, for
it had been put in safekeeping in good time. Finally, still according to
the last secret report of Hemmen, Pages 29 and 49 of the French
translation, at the moment of their retreat the Germans seized without
any right the sum of 6,899 million francs from branches of the Bank of
France in Nancy, Belfort, and Epinal. Document 1741-PS (24). (Exhibit
Number RF-241.)
I note for the Record that during the occupation the Germans seized
great quantities of gold which they arranged to be bought from private
citizens by intermediaries. I cannot give figures for this. I simply
touch on the question for the Record.
If we summarize the question of the means of payment which Germany
unduly requisitioned in France, we shall reach—still taking the
calculation most favorable to the defendants and taking the maximum
amount for the cost of maintaining occupation troops—a minimum total of
745,833,392,550 francs, in round figures 750,000 million francs.
I now come to Page 50, that is to say the use which the Germans made of
these considerable sums; and first of all, the black market organized by
the occupying power. Here again I don’t want to take advantage of your
kind attention. I have had the honor of presenting to you the mechanism
of the black market in all the occupied countries. I have indicated how
it arose, how the Germans utilized it, how, under the orders of the
Defendant Göring, it was organized and exploited. I do not wish to
revert to this, and I shall pass over the whole section of my written
exposé which was devoted to the black market in France.
I come to Page 69 of my written exposé. Chapter 3: Ostensibly legal
acquisitions.
Under the pressure of the Germans, the Vichy Government had to consent
to reserve for them a very high quota of products of all kinds. In
exchange the Germans undertook to furnish raw materials, the quantities
of which were determined by them alone. But these raw materials, when
they were delivered, which was not always the case, were for the most
part absorbed by the industry which was forced to supply them with
finished products. In fact, there was no compensation, since the
occupiers got back in the form of finished products the raw materials
delivered and did not in reality give anything in return.
In the report of the Economic Control which has already been quoted,
submitted as Document Number RF-107, the following example may be noted
which I shall read to the Tribunal:
“An agreement permitted the purchase in the free zone of 5,000
trucks destined for the German G.B.K., whereby the Reich
furnished five tons of steel per vehicle or a total of 25,000
tons of steel destined for French industry. In view of the usual
destination of the products of our metal industry at that time,
this was obviously a one-sided bargain, indeed if our
information is exact, the deliveries of steel to be made in
return were not even fulfilled, and they were partly used for
the defense of the Mediterranean coast, rails, antitank
defenses, _et cetera_.”
It is appropriate to call attention to the fact that a considerable part
of the levies in kind were the object of no regulation whatever, either
because the Germans remained debtors in these transactions, or that they
considered without justification that these levies constituted war
booty.
In regard to this there are no documents available; however, the United
States Army has discovered a secret report of one called Kraney, the
representative of Roges, an organization which was charged with
collecting both war booty and purchases on the black market. It appears
from this report that in September 1944, the Roges had resold to Germany
for 10,858,499 marks, or 217,169,980 francs, objects seized in the
southern zone as war booty. I submit this document as Exhibit Number
RF-244.
As a result of the means of payment exacted by Germany and of
requisitions regulated by her, or not, France was literally despoiled.
Enormous quantities of articles of all kinds were removed by the
occupiers. According to information given by the French statistical
services, preliminary estimates of the minimum of these levies have been
made. These estimates do not include damages resulting from military
operations, but solely the German spoliations, computed in cases of
doubt at a minimum figure. They will be summarized in the eight
following sections.