“Whenever, in requisitioning, reference was made to the
ordinance of the military commander of 6 August 1942, this was
done in order to give the Belgian population the necessary
interpretation of the meaning of the principle of the
requisition regulations of the Hague Convention.”
Such an interpretation may leave jurists wondering, who have not been
trained in the school of National Socialism. It cannot in any case
justify the pillage of industry and the subjugation of Belgian
production.
These few considerations show how subtle and varied were the methods
employed by the Germans to attain their aims in the economic sphere. In
the same way as the preceding statements on clearing operations and the
utilization of occupation costs, they make it possible to specify the
methods employed for exacting heavy levies from the Belgian economy.
Whereas in certain spheres, as in agriculture and transport, it has been
possible to assess the extent of economic pillage with a certain
exactitude, there are, however, numerous industrial sectors where
assessments cannot yet be made. It is true that a considerable part of
the industrial losses correspond to the clearing operations,
particularly through requisition of stocks. It will therefore be
necessary to confine ourselves to the directives of the policy practiced
by the Germans.
We may examine briefly the way in which economic spoliation took place
in three sectors: industry, agriculture, and transport.
First the industrial sector: The clearing statistics, in the first
place, give particulars of the total burdens imposed upon the various
industrial branches.
The report of the military administration in Belgium, to which I shall
refer constantly, gives the following details, briefly summarized:
From the very beginning of the occupation the Germans demanded an
inventory of supplies on which they were to impose considerable levies,
notably textiles and non-ferrous metals.
I shall confine myself to some brief remarks on textiles and non-ferrous
metals. The example of the textiles industry is particularly revealing:
On the eve of the invasion, the Belgian textile industry, with its
165,000 workers, was the second largest industry in Belgium after the
metal industry. Under the pretext of avoiding the exhaustion of the very
important supplies then still available, an ordinance of 27 July 1940
prohibited the textile industry to work at more than 30 percent of its
1938 capacity. For the period from May to December 1940 alone
requisitions were not less than 1,000 million Belgian francs. They
particularly affected nearly half of the wool stock available in the
country on May 10, 1940, and nearly one-third of the stock of raw
cotton.
On the other hand, the forced closing down of factories constituted for
the Germans an excellent excuse for taking away, on the pretext of
hiring, unused equipment, unless it was requisitioned at a cheap price.
The ordinance of 7 September 1942, which is to be found in the document
book under Document Number RF-174, laid down the manner in which
factories were to be closed in execution of the right accorded to the
occupation authorities; and it also gave the right to dissolve certain
business and industrial groups and to order their liquidation.
Consolidation of enterprises was the pretext given. In the month of
January 1944, 65 percent of the textile factories had been stopped.
I shall not go into the details of these operations and I shall pass on
to Page 58. The report of the German military administration quoted
above gives particularly significant figures as to production. Of a
total output of the wool industry of 72,000 tons for the entire period
May 1940 to the end of June 1944, representing a value of about 397
million Reichsmark, the distribution of the deliveries between the
German and Belgian markets is the following: The German market, 64,700
tons, 314 million Reichsmark; the Belgian market, 7,700 tons, 83 million
Reichsmark. The whole spoliation of the textile industry is contained in
these figures.
Belgian consumption obviously had to suffer a great deal from the German
policy of direction of the textile market. The same report of the
military administration furnishes details, stating that in 1938 the
needs in textile products amounted in Belgium to a monthly average of
twelve kilos. The respective figures for the occupation years are the
following: 1940 to 1941—2.1 kilos per head, 1941 to 1942—1.4, 1942 to
1943—1.4, 1943 to 1944—0.7. The diminution of Belgian consumption
under the Germans is contained in these two figures; twelve kilos per
head in 1938; 0.7 kilo at the end of the occupation.
On the other side, the Belgian Government gives the following details on
the pillage of this produce. Compulsory deliveries to Germany during the
occupation amounted to:
Cotton yarn, about 40 percent of the production; linen, 75 percent;
rayon, 15 percent.
Finally, out of the textile stocks remaining in Belgium a great
percentage was still taken away by the Germans through purchases on the
Belgian markets, purchases of finished or manufactured products. The
equivalent of these forced deliveries can generally be found in the
clearing statistics, unless it is placed under misrepresented occupation
costs.
I have finished with textiles. As to the non-ferrous metal industry,
Belgium was in 1939 the largest producer in Europe of non-ferrous
metals, of copper, lead, zinc, and tin. The statistics included in the
report of the military command, which are to be found in Exhibit Number
RF-173 (Document Number ECH-11), will furnish the evidence for the
Tribunal.
On the 18th of February 1941, in connection with the Four Year Plan, the
Reich Office for Metals and the Supreme Command of the Army worked out a
“metal” plan which provided for Belgian consumption; the carrying out of
German orders; exports to the Reich.
These various measures did not satisfy the occupying authorities so they
ran a certain number of salvage campaigns which were called “special
actions” (Sonderaktionen) in accordance with the method they applied in
all the countries of Western Europe. I shall not go into the details of
these actions which are described on Page 63 and following of the
report; the salvage campaigns for bells, for printing lead, for lead and
copper—from information given by the Belgian Government, Document
Number RF-146, Page 65 of the report.
In other fields, but without admitting it, the Germans pursued a policy
intended to eliminate or to restrict Belgian competition, so that in
case of a German victory the economic branches concerned would have had
to restrict themselves to the Belgian market, which would then have
remained wide open to German business.
These attempts at immediate or future suppression of competition were
clearly evident in the case of foundries, glass works, textile
industries, construction works, car assembling, construction of material
for narrow-gauge railroads, the leather industry, and especially
shoe-manufacturing, for which reconstruction of destroyed factories was
systematically prohibited.
But in addition, in the textile industry as well as in numerous sectors,
especially in the iron-smelting industry, the weakening of the economy
cannot be measured only by the scale of the compulsory deliveries but in
relation to the policy practiced by the occupying power. Belgian
industry, especially coal and iron, suffered considerable losses as a
result of directives imposed to finance the war needs at a cheaper rate.
I shall pass over the question of prices of coal. The control of the
coal industry was assured by the appointment of a plenipotentiary for
coal and by centralization of all sales in the hands of a single
organism, the “single seller,” under Belgian direction but with a German
commissioner. I am referring to the Belgian coal office, one seller to a
single purchaser, “Rheinisch Westfälisches Kohlensyndikat,” which
ordered deliveries to be made to the Reich, to Alsace-Lorraine and
Luxembourg.
According to the same German report, Page 67, in spite of the rise in
the price of coal agreed to on 20 August 1940, 1 January 1941, and 1
January 1943, the coal industry showed considerable losses in the course
of the occupation years. In February 1943, the coal office having agreed
to an increase of the sales price, the price per ton for the Belgian
coal was higher than on the German home market. The German commissioner
for the mining industry forced the Belgian industry to pay the
difference in rate when exporting to the Reich by means of premiums.
From the figures indicated in Exhibits Numbers RF-176 (Document Number
ECH-35) and 178 (Document Numbers ECH-26 and 27), the Tribunal may
gather information as to the financial losses caused by exploitation.
The report of the military administration gives in its eleventh section
details regarding the iron-smelting industry: It suffered as greatly as
had the coal industry during the occupation. In the Thomas smelting
works in particular, the losses resulted from the increase in the cost
price and from price fluctuations in respect to certain elements
pertaining to the manufacture.
In this one sector, according to the memorandum of the Belgian
Government, the respective losses may be assessed at 3,000 million
Belgian francs. Still, according to the same report, out of a total
production of 1,400,000 tons, 1,300,000 tons of various products were
exported to Germany not including the metal delivered to Belgian
factories working exclusively for Germany.
According to information furnished by the Belgian Government, the
Germans removed in bulk and transported to Germany material of very
great value. The total industrial spoliation is estimated by the Belgian
Government at a sum of 2,000 million Belgian francs, at the 1940 rate,
of course.
These removals constitute a real material loss; and from the fragmentary
indications given to the Tribunal, this sum of 2,000 million Belgian
francs is the figure which I ask the Tribunal to note.
In view of the information available at present it is not easy to
estimate the extent of the levies made on industry; it is even more
difficult to evaluate it in the agricultural sphere, which I shall
briefly present.
Apart from the admissible needs of the occupation troops, the German
authorities made an effort to obtain a supplement to the food levies in
Belgium for the purpose of increasing the food of the Reich and other
territories occupied by its troops. After having employed direct methods
of levying, the Germans used the services of unscrupulous agents whose
job it was to purchase at any price on the illicit markets; and the
black market in this field assumed such proportions that the occupying
authorities were frequently alarmed and in 1943 had to suppress it.
Apart from the damage to livestock and to the woods and forests, which
play an important part in Belgium, the damage resulting from abnormal
cutting in the forests brought about an excess in deforestation reaching
a figure of 2 million tons; the damage to capital caused by this
premature cutting can be estimated at about 200 million Belgian francs.
The military operations proper caused damage to an extent of 100 million
Belgian francs; and according to the memorandum of the Belgian
Government, the total damage caused to forestry reaches a figure of 460
million Belgian francs. Taking into account the damage caused by
abnormal cutting in the forests and by the establishment of airfields,
the Belgian Government estimates at approximately 1,000 million Belgian
francs the losses suffered by its agriculture during the occupation.
It must be noted, without going further into this subject, that these
are net losses in capital, constituting a veritable exhaustion of
substance and a consequent reduction and real consumption of the
nation’s resources. With this I have concluded my presentation
concerning agriculture, and I pass on to transport.
The conduct of war led the Germans to utilize to the utmost the railroad
network and the canal and river system of Belgium. The result was that
the railroads and river fleet are included in those branches of Belgian
economy which suffered most from the occupation and the hostilities
which took place on Belgian soil. German traffic was simultaneously a
traffic of personnel as demanded by military operations and a traffic of
merchandise, coal, minerals, pit-props, foodstuffs, not to speak of the
considerable quantities of construction material required for the
fortification of the coast of the North Sea.
Railroads: The report of the Belgian Government shows that the damages
suffered by the railroads consisted of losses in capital as well as of
losses in revenue. Losses in capital resulted first and principally from
requisitions and removals, to which the Germans proceeded in a wholesale
fashion from the moment of their entry into Belgium. Thus in particular
they immediately drained the stock of locomotives under the pretext of
recovering German locomotives surrendered to Belgium after the war of
1914-1918 as a means of reparation.
In addition to seizures of locomotives, the Belgian National Railroad
Company was subjected to numerous requisitions of material, sometimes
under the form of rental; these requisitions are estimated at 4,500
million francs at the 1940 value.
Against the losses in capital, losses in revenue (Page 77) resulted
principally from the free transportation service required by the
Wehrmacht, also from the price policy pursued by the occupying power.
These levies and these exceptional costs could be borne by the
organizations concerned only by making large drains on the treasury.
Regarding automobiles, I shall say hardly anything (Page 79). The losses
amount to about 3,000 million Belgian francs, out of which individuals
received as compensation for requisition approximately 1,000 million (at
the 1938 value).
We come now to river transport: The carrying out of the plan for the
economic spoliation of Belgium presented the occupying power with
serious transportation problems, to which I have already called
attention.
In this sphere the German military administration imposed upon Belgian
river shipping very heavy burdens. According to the report of the
Belgian Government, the losses suffered by the Belgian river fleet took
three forms: Requisitions and removals by the Germans; partial or total
damage through military operations; excessive deterioration of material.
These three forms of damage amount to 500 million francs, of which only
100 million are represented in clearing. Damage to waterways (Page 81),
rivers, streams, and canals, can be evaluated at between 1,500 million
to 2,000 million francs, at the 1940 value, especially with respect to
requisitions and removals of public or private harbor installations.
Fishing boats were requisitioned for marking the river Scheldt and then
disappeared without leaving any trace. Others suffered damage through
requisitions or hire for military maneuvers.
Before closing this chapter concerned with levies in kind, the question
of removal of industrial material may be briefly mentioned (Page 82).
It has already been pointed out that the policy of production and
reorganization as pursued by the military administration had as a result
the closing of numerous enterprises, thus enabling the Germans to seize
a great number of machines under the pretext that they were out of use.
There are no branches of industry which were not despoiled in this way.
The metal industry seems now to be one of those that suffered most.
Though we do not wish to try the patience of the Tribunal, it seems
particularly pertinent to draw its attention briefly to the actual
technique used in the organization of the levies, details which were
decided upon even before the entry of German troops into the territories
of Western Europe, organization putting into play military formations,
organization emanating from the economy bureau of the General Staff of
the Army and hence from the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW.
The existence of these military detachments, veritable pillaging
detachments, is proved by various German documents. Under the name of
economic detachments, “Wirtschaftstrupps,” or special commandos, these
pillaging crews carried out nefarious and illegal activities in all the
countries of Western Europe.
The secret instructions for the “economic detachment J,” stationed at
Antwerp, are found in the file under Document Number RF-183. They
constitute a very important, irrefutable document on the German
intention to pillage and an additional proof of the contempt of the
National Socialist leaders for the rules of international law.
These instructions date from the last days of May 1940. I should like to
read a few excerpts of these instructions to the Tribunal (Document
Number RF-183, Page 1).
“The economic detachments are formed by the office for economic
armament of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. They are placed
at the disposal of the High Command of the Army for employment
in the countries to be occupied.”